近年來，網際網路(Internet)快速發展，已成為一個無疆無界無時差的市場，如何不被這股潮流所淘汰，我們所提出的解決方案—軟體代理人(software agent)，一位具有人工智慧(artificial intelligence)演化調適(adaptive)能力的代理人，現在已經有許多企業與資訊、管理、電腦科學等各方面專家結合，開始使用軟體代理人來代勞，試想一位永不停止、具有創新、學習適應的員工，企業家可以隨意複製或刪除，隨時配合市場規模，不必擔心任何裁員的負擔，這樣的代理人的問世，勢必對我們的經濟環境帶來莫大的衝擊。 電子商務(electronic commerce)已經行之有年，人類的消費型態似乎不易於因這個轉變而有所改變，消費者如果沒有經過視覺、觸覺、嗅覺等感官的刺激，很難有購買的動機，再加上授信制度的不健全使得電子商務的施行充滿了風險。雖然有這麼多問題，我們仍無法阻擋這股趨勢，在電子科技的進步，3D數位影像、各種感官刺激的傳送、或如同期貨市場上明確公認的規格、法律的修訂、完善的認證制度，接下來我們就是要看軟體代理人的表現。 我們將軟體代理人運用在人工雙方喊價(artificial double auction)的市場，就像真實市場已經有人開始使用自動下單或自動議價代理人的機制一樣。然而市場上是否有必然不敗的策略呢？本文就是要解開這個答案。再進一步來看，待真實市場每個成員受不了生存競爭的壓力，也採取使用代理人的演化性策略，屆時我們的人工市場就是真實市場的縮影，我們在本文也會針對這樣一個具有未來前瞻性市場的表現如何？透過經濟學的角度來揭露市場的本質是否仍然維持？ 在本文軟體代理人即為議價代理人(bargaining agent)，她可以在穩定的(stable)市場環境(其他參與者使用固定策略)中辨別出一些有利的市場特徵，藉由這些特徵發展出有利的策略，而其結果甚至不是很容易想到的策略；接著若每個人都使用議價代理人在市場上交易，這裡我們使用一種納許式過程(Nash-like process)來詮釋，之後再分別依市場的分配效率、價格效率、及所得分配來討論市場績效。

A computational grid is a hardware and software infrastructure that provides dependable, consistent, pervasive, and inexpensive access to high-end computational capabilities. In the presence of grid users who are autonomous, rational, and intelligent, there is an overall degradation of the total efficiency of the computational grid in comparison to what can be achieved when the participating users are centrally coordinated . This loss in efficiency might arise due to an unwillingness on the part of some of the grid resource providers to either not perform completely or not perform to the fullest capability, the computational jobs of other users in the grid. In this thesis, our attention is focused on designing grid resource procurement mechanisms which a grid user can use for procuring resources in a computational grid based on bids submitted by autonomous, rational, and intelligent resource providers. Specifically, we follow a game theoretic and mechanism design approach to design three elegant, different incentive compatible procurement mechanisms for this purpose: G-DSIC (Grid-Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible) mechanism which guarantees that truthful bidding is a best response for each resource provider, irrespective of what the other resource providers bid G-BIC (Grid-Bayesian Nash Incentive Compatible) mechanism which only guarantees that truthful bidding is a best response for each resource provider whenever all other resource providers also bid truthfully G-OPT (Grid-Optimal) mechanism which minimizes the cost to the grid user, satisfying at the same time, (1) Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (which guarantees that truthful bidding is a best response for each resource provider whenever all other resource providers also bid truthfully) and (2) Individual Rationality (which guarantees that the resource providers have non-negative payoffs if they participate in the bidding process). We evaluate the relative merits and demerits of the above three mechanisms using game theoretical analysis and numerical experiments. The mechanisms developed in this thesis are in the context of parameter sweep type of jobs, which consist of multiple homogeneous and independent tasks. We believe the use of the mechanisms proposed transcends beyond parameter sweep type of jobs and in general, the proposed mechanisms could be extended to provide a robust way of procuring resources in a computational grid where the resource providers exhibit rational and strategic behavior.

Abstract The aim of this thesis is to devise new paradigms on radio resource sharing including cache-enabled virtualized large cellular networks for mobile network operators (MNOs). Also, self-organizing resource allocation for small cell networks is considered. In such networks, the MNOs rent radio resources from the infrastructure provider (InP) to support their subscribers. In order to reduce the operational costs, while at the same time to significantly increase the usage of the existing network resources, it leads to a paradigm where the MNOs share their infrastructure, i.e., base stations (BSs), antennas, spectrum and edge cache among themselves. In this regard, we integrate the theoretical insights provided by stochastic geometrical approaches to model the spectrum and infrastructure sharing for large cellular networks. In the first part of the thesis, we study the non-orthogonal multi-MNO spectrum allocation problem for small cell networks with the goal of maximizing the overall network throughput, defined as the expected weighted sum rate of the MNOs. Each MNO is assumed to serve multiple small cell BSs (SBSs). We adopt the many-to-one stable matching game framework to tackle this problem. We also investigate the role of power allocation schemes for SBSs using Q-learning. In the second part, we model and analyze the infrastructure sharing system considering a single buyer MNO and multiple seller MNOs. The MNOs are assumed to operate over their own licensed spectrum bands while sharing BSs. We assume that multiple seller MNOs compete with each other to sell their infrastructure to a potential buyer MNO. The optimal strategy for the seller MNOs in terms of the fraction of infrastructure to be shared and the price of the infrastructure, is obtained by computing the equilibrium of a Cournot-Nash oligopoly game. Finally, we develop a game-theoretic framework to model and analyze a cache-enabled virtualized cellular networks where the network infrastructure, e.g., BSs and cache storage, owned by an InP, is rented and shared among multiple MNOs. We formulate a Stackelberg game model with the InP as the leader and the MNOs as the followers. The InP tries to maximize its profit by optimizing its infrastructure rental fee. The MNO aims to minimize the cost of infrastructure by minimizing the cache intensity under probabilistic delay constraint of the user (UE). Since the MNOs share their rented infrastructure, we apply a cooperative game concept, namely, the Shapley value, to divide the cost among the MNOs. / Tiivistelmä Tämän väitöskirjan tavoitteena on tuottaa uusia paradigmoja radioresurssien jakoon, mukaan lukien virtualisoidut välimuisti-kykenevät suuret matkapuhelinverkot matkapuhelinoperaattoreille. Näiden kaltaisissa verkoissa operaattorit vuokraavat radioresursseja infrastruktuuritoimittajalta (InP, infrastructure provider) asiakkaiden tarpeisiin. Toimintakulujen karsiminen ja samanaikainen olemassa olevien verkkoresurssien hyötykäytön huomattava kasvattaminen johtaa paradigmaan, jossa operaattorit jakavat infrastruktuurinsa keskenään. Tämän vuoksi työssä tutkitaan teoreettisia stokastiseen geometriaan perustuvia malleja spektrin ja infrastruktuurin jakamiseksi suurissa soluverkoissa. Työn ensimmäisessä osassa tutkitaan ei-ortogonaalista monioperaattori-allokaatioongelmaa pienissä soluverkoissa tavoitteena maksimoida verkon yleistä läpisyöttöä, joka määritellään operaattoreiden painotettuna summaläpisyötön odotusarvona. Jokaisen operaattorin oletetaan palvelevan useampaa piensolutukiasemaa (SBS, small cell base station). Työssä käytetään monelta yhdelle -vakaata sovituspeli-viitekehystä SBS:lle käyttäen Q-oppimista. Työn toisessa osassa mallinnetaan ja analysoidaan infrastruktuurin jakamista yhden ostaja-operaattorin ja monen myyjä-operaattorin tapauksessa. Operaattorien oletetaan toimivan omilla lisensoiduilla taajuuksillaan jakaen tukiasemat keskenään. Myyjän optimaalinen strategia infrastruktuurin myytävän osan suuruuden ja hinnan suhteen saavutetaan laskemalla Cournot-Nash -olipologipelin tasapainotila. Lopuksi, työssä kehitetään peli-teoreettinen viitekehys virtualisoitujen välimuistikykenevien soluverkkojen mallintamiseen ja analysointiin, missä InP:n omistama verkkoinfrastruktuuri vuokrataan ja jaetaan monen operaattorin kesken. Työssä muodostetaan Stackelberg-pelimalli, jossa InP toimii johtajana ja operaattorit seuraajina. InP pyrkii maksimoimaan voittonsa optimoimalla infrastruktuurin vuokrahintaa. Operaattori pyrkii minimoimaan infrastruktuurin hinnan minimoimalla välimuistin tiheyttä satunnaisen käyttäjän viive-ehtojen mukaisesti. Koska operaattorit jakavat vuokratun infrastruktuurin, työssä käytetään yhteistyöpeli-ajatusta, nimellisesti, Shapleyn arvoa, jakamaan kustannuksia operaatoreiden kesken.

Advances in wireless communication and microelectronics have led to the development of low-power compact sensor nodes (popularly called motes) that are capable of sensing, computing, and communication. A large number of these nodes can be deployed over some area of interest to form a multi-hop network, commonly referred to as a wireless sensor network (WSN). Typical applications of WSNs include, environment and process monitoring in industrial installations, forest fire detection, structural health monitoring, etc. In such applications where the variables to be measured are slowly varying, or the events to be monitored are rare, continuous sensing is unnecessary. Instead, the nodes, in order to conserve their battery power, can sleep-wake cycle whereby each node is allowed to independently alternate between an ON state and a low power OFF state. Sleep-wake cycling, while increasing the network lifetime, renders the network disconnected a large fraction of the time; however, connectivity can be established over time by transporting packets in a store-and-forward manner, whereby packets are held by a forwarding node until a suitable node wakes up in its neighborhood that can serve to forward the packet towards the destination. We are concerned with sleep-wake cycling multi-hop wireless networks whose main task is to carry sporadic alarms packets from sensing nodes to a sink node. Our objective is to design simple local-information based routing solutions for such networks. With this in mind, we propose a relay selection problem that arises at a forwarding node (which is currently holding the alarm packet) while choosing a next-hop relay node. The forwarder, as and when the relays wake-up, evaluating the goodness of a relay based on a “reward” metric (e.g., a function of the relay’s progress towards sink, and the power required to get the packet across), has to decide whether to forward to this relay or to wait for future ones (i.e., to stop or continue). The forwarder’s objective is to choose a relay so as to minimize a combination of the average delay incurred and the average reward achieved. A basic version of our relay selection problem is equivalent to the basic asset selling problem studied in the operations research literature. After reviewing the solution to the basic problem we will proceed to study a model with full information, referred to as the completely observable (CO) model, where the number of relays is exactly known to the forwarder. Formulating the problem as a Markov decision process (MDP) we will characterize the solution to the CO model in terms of recursively-computable threshold functions. Next, we consider the partially observable (PO) model where only a belief (probability mass function) on the number of relays is known. Hence, the PO model falls within the realm of partially observable MDPs. After incorporating our model into this framework we will characterize the solution in terms of stopping sets, which is the set of all belief states where it is optimal to stop. Our main contribution here is to obtain inner and outer bounds for the stopping sets. We next propose a variant where the relays, upon waking up, do not reveal their rewards immediately, but instead the forwarder can choose to probe the relay to know its reward, incurring a probing cost. Thus, to the existing set of stop and continue actions, we have added a new probe action. This model is motivated by the efforts required to learn the channel gains (by probing) in a wireless system. A key result we prove here is that the solution is characterized in terms of stage independent thresholds. Finally, we study a model comprising two forwarders which are competing against each other to choose a next-hop relay (one for each). Here, a relay is allowed to offer possibly different reward to each forwarder. We will first consider a complete information case where the reward pair of a relay is known to both the forwarders. Using stochastic game theory we will characterize the solution to this model in terms of Nash equilibrium policy pairs (NEPPs). We obtain results illustrating the structure of NEPPs. Next, we study a partial information model where each forwarder gets to observe only its reward value. Towards obtaining the solution for this model, we will first formulate a Bayesian game which is effectively played by both the forwarders at each stage. Next, for this Bayesian game we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies within the class of threshold strategies. This result will enable us to construct NEPPs for the partial information model. Although our primary contribution from the thesis is the theoretical study of the above mentioned variants of the basic relay selection model, we have also conducted extensive simulations to study the end-to-end performance obtained by applying the solution to these models at each hop en-route to the sink in a sleep-wake cycling WSN.

El mundo de las telecomunicaciones está cambiando de un escenario donde únicamente las personas estaban conectadas a un modelo donde prácticamente todos los dispositivos y sensores se encuentran conectados, también conocido como Internet de las cosas (IoT), donde miles de millones de dispositivos se conectarán a Internet a través de conexiones móviles y redes fijas. En este contexto, hay muchos retos que superar, desde el desarrollo de nuevos estándares de comunicación al estudio de la viabilidad económica de los posibles escenarios futuros. En esta tesis nos hemos centrado en el estudio de la viabilidad económica de diferentes escenarios mediante el uso de conceptos de microeconomía, teoría de juegos, optimización no lineal, economía de redes y redes inalámbricas. La tesis analiza la transición desde redes centradas en el servicio de tráfico HTC a redes centradas en tráfico MTC desde un punto de vista económico. El primer escenario ha sido diseñado para centrarse en las primeras etapas de la transición, en la que ambos tipos de tráfico son servidos bajo la misma infraestructura de red. En el segundo escenario analizamos la siguiente etapa, en la que el servicio a los usuarios MTC se realiza mediante una infraestructura dedicada. Finalmente, el tercer escenario analiza la provisión de servicios basados en MTC a usuarios finales, mediante la infraestructura analizada en el escenario anterior. Gracias al análisis de todos los escenarios, hemos observado que la transición de redes centradas en usuarios HTC a redes MTC es posible y que la provisión de servicios en tales escenarios es viable. Además, hemos observado que el comportamiento de los usuarios es esencial para determinar la viabilidad de los diferentes modelos de negocio, y por tanto, es necesario estudiar el comportamiento y las preferencias de los usuarios en profundidad en estudios futuros. Específicamente, los factores más relevantes son la sensibilidad de los usuarios al retardo en los datos recopilados por los sensores y la cantidad de los mismos. También hemos observado que la diferenciación del tráfico en categorías mejora el uso de las redes y permite crear nuevos servicios empleando datos que, de otro modo, no se aprovecharían, lo cual nos permite mejorar la monetización de la infraestructura. También hemos demostrado que la provisión de capacidad es un mecanismo válido, alternativo a la fijación de precios, para la optimización de los beneficios de los proveedores de servicio. Finalmente, se ha demostrado que es posible crear roles específicos para ofrecer servicios IoT en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones, específicamente, los IoT-SPs, que proporcionan servicios basados en sensores inalámbricos utilizando infraestructuras de acceso de terceros y sus propias redes de sensores. En resumen, en esta tesis hemos intentado demostrar la viabilidad económica de modelos de negocio basados en redes futuras IoT, así como la aparición de nuevas oportunidades y roles de negocio, lo cual nos permite justificar económicamente el desarrollo y la implementación de las tecnologías necesarias para ofrecer servicios de acceso inalámbrico masivo a dispositivos MTC. / The communications world is moving from a standalone devices scenario to a all-connected scenario known as Internet of Things (IoT), where billions of devices will be connected to the Internet through mobile and fixed networks. In this context, there are several challenges to face, from the development of new standards to the study of the economical viability of the different future scenarios. In this dissertation we have focused on the study of the economic viability of different scenarios using concepts of microeconomics, game theory, non-linear optimization, network economics and wireless networks. The dissertation analyzes the transition from a Human Type Communications (HTC) to a Machine Type Communications (MTC) centered network from an economic point of view. The first scenario is designed to focus on the first stages of the transition, where HTC and MTC traffic are served on a common network infrastructure. The second scenario analyzes the provision of connectivity service to MTC users using a dedicated network infrastructure, while the third stage is centered in the analysis of the provision of services based on the MTC data over the infrastructure studied in the previous scenario. Thanks to the analysis of all the scenarios we have observed that the transition from HTC users-centered networks to MTC networks is possible and that the provision of services in such scenarios is viable. In addition, we have observed that the behavior of the users is essential in order to determine the viability of a business model, and therefore, it is needed to study their behavior and preferences in depth in future studios. Specifically, the most relevant factors are the sensitivity of the users to the delay and to the amount of data gathered by the sensors. We also have observed that the differentiation of the traffic in categories improves the usage of the networks and allows to create new services thanks to the data that otherwise would not be used, improving the monetization of the infrastructure and the data. In addition, we have shown that the capacity provision is a valid mechanism for providers' profit optimization, as an alternative to the pricing mechanisms. Finally, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to create dedicated roles to offer IoT services in the telecommunications market, specifically, the IoT-SPs, which provide wireless-sensor-based services to the final users using a third party infrastructure. Summarizing, this dissertation tries to demonstrate the economic viability of the future IoT networks business models as well as the emergence of new business opportunities and roles in order to justify economically the development and implementation of the new technologies required to offer massive wireless access to machine devices. / El món de les telecomunicacions està canviant d'un escenari on únicament les persones estaven connectades a un model on pràcticament tots els dispositius i sensors es troben connectats, també conegut com a Internet de les Coses (IoT) , on milers de milions de dispositius es connectaran a Internet a través de connexions mòbils i xarxes fixes. En aquest context, hi ha molts reptes que superar, des del desenrotllament de nous estàndards de comunicació a l'estudi de la viabilitat econòmica dels possibles escenaris futurs. En aquesta tesi ens hem centrat en l'estudi de la viabilitat econòmica de diferents escenaris per mitjà de l'ús de conceptes de microeconomia, teoria de jocs, optimització no lineal, economia de xarxes i xarxes inalàmbriques. La tesi analitza la transició des de xarxes centrades en el servici de tràfic HTC a xarxes centrades en tràfic MTC des d'un punt de vista econòmic. El primer escenari ha sigut dissenyat per a centrar-se en les primeres etapes de la transició, en la que ambdós tipus de tràfic són servits davall la mateixa infraestructura de xarxa. En el segon escenari analitzem la següent etapa, en la que el servici als usuaris MTC es realitza per mitjà d'una infraestructura dedicada. Finalment, el tercer escenari analitza la provisió de servicis basats en MTC a usuaris finals, per mitjà de la infraestructura analitzada en l'escenari anterior. Als paràgrafs següents es descriu amb més detall cada escenari. Gràcies a l'anàlisi de tots els escenaris, hem observat que la transició de xarxes centrades en usuaris HTC a xarxes MTC és possible i que la provisió de servicis en tals escenaris és viable. A més a més, hem observat que el comportament dels usuaris és essencial per a determinar la viabilitat dels diferents models de negoci, i per tant, és necessari estudiar el comportament i les preferències dels usuaris en profunditat en estudis futurs. Específicament, els factors més rellevants són la sensibilitat dels usuaris al retard en les dades recopilats pels sensors i la quantitat dels mateixos. També hem observat que la diferenciació del tràfic en categories millora l'ús de les xarxes i permet crear nous servicis emprant dades que, d'una altra manera, no s'aprofitarien, la qual cosa ens permet millorar la monetització de la infraestructura. També hem demostrat que la provisió de capacitat és un mecanisme vàlid, alternatiu a la fixació de preus, per a l'optimització dels beneficis dels proveïdors de servici. Finalment, s'ha demostrat que és possible crear rols específics per a oferir servicis IoT en el mercat de les telecomunicacions, específicament, els IoT-SPs, que proporcionen servicis basats en sensors inalàmbrics utilitzant infraestructures d'accés de tercers i les seues pròpies xarxes de sensors. En resum, en aquesta tesi hem intentat demostrar la viabilitat econòmica de models de negoci basats en xarxes futures IoT, així com l'aparició de noves oportunitats i rols de negoci, la qual cosa ens permet justificar econòmicament el desenrotllament i la implementació de les tecnologies necessàries per a oferir servicis d'accés inalàmbric massiu a dispositius MTC. / Sanchis Cano, Á. (2018). Economic analysis of wireless sensor-based services in the framework of the Internet of Things. A game-theoretical approach [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/102642 / TESIS

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We have examinined the problem of constructing efficient strategies for continuous-time dynamic asset allocation. In order to obtain efficient investment strategies; a stochastic optimal control approach was applied to find optimal transaction control. Two mathematical problems are formulized and studied: Model I; a dynamic programming approach that maximizes an isoelastic functional with respect to given underlying portfolio dynamics and Model II; a more sophisticated approach where a time-inconsistent state dependent mean-variance functional is considered. In contrast to the optimal controls for Model I, which are obtained by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) partial differential equation; the efficient strategies for Model II are constructed by attaining subgame perfect Nash equilibrium controls that satisfy the extended HJB equation, introduced by Björk et al. in [1]. Furthermore; comprehensive execution algorithms where designed with help from the generated results and several simulations are performed. The results reveal that optimality is obtained for Model I by holding a fix portfolio balance throughout the whole investment period and Model II suggests a continuous liquidation of the risky holdings as time evolves. A clear advantage of using Model II is concluded as it is far more efficient and actually takes time-inconsistency into consideration. / Vi har undersökt problemet som uppstår vid konstruktion av effektiva strategier för tidskontinuerlig dynamisk tillgångsallokering. Tillvägagångsättet för konstruktionen av strategierna har baserats på stokastisk optimal styrteori där optimal transaktionsstyrning beräknas. Två matematiska problem formulerades och betraktades: Modell I, en metod där dynamisk programmering används för att maximera en isoelastisk funktional med avseende på given underliggande portföljdynamik. Modell II, en mer sofistikerad metod som tar i beaktning en tidsinkonsistent och tillståndsberoende avvägning mellan förväntad avkastning och varians. Till skillnad från de optimala styrvariablerna för Modell I som satisfierar Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellmans (HJB) partiella differentialekvation, konstrueras de effektiva strategierna för Modell II genom att erhålla subgame perfekt Nashjämvikt. Dessa satisfierar den utökade HJB ekvationen som introduceras av Björk et al. i [1]. Vidare har övergripande exekveringsalgoritmer skapats med hjälp av resultaten och ett flertal simuleringar har producerats. Resultaten avslöjar att optimalitet för Modell I erhålls genom att hålla en fix portföljbalans mellan de riskfria och riskfyllda tillgångarna, genom hela investeringsperioden. Medan för Modell II föreslås en kontinuerlig likvidering av de riskfyllda tillgångarna i takt med, men inte proportionerligt mot, tidens gång. Slutsatsen är att det finns en tydlig fördel med användandet av Modell II eftersom att resultaten påvisar en påtagligt högre grad av effektivitet samt att modellen faktiskt tar hänsyn till tidsinkonsistens.

This thesis focuses on a transformational but disregarded period in New Zealand’s twentieth century history, the era from the arrival of the Marines in 1942 to the arrival of Rock Around the Clock in 1956. It examines one of the chief agents in this metamorphosis: the impact of American culture. During this era the crucial conduits of that culture were movies, music and comics. The aims of my thesis are threefold: to explore how New Zealanders responded to this cultural trinity, determine the key features of their reactions and assess their significance. The perceived modernity and alterity of Hollywood movies, musical genres such as swing, and the content and presentation of American comics and ‘pulps’, became the sources of heated debate during the midcentury. Many New Zealanders admired what they perceived as the exuberance, variety and style of such American media. They also applauded the willingness of the cultural triptych to appropriate visual, textual and musical forms and styles without respect for the traditional classifications of cultural merit. Such perceived standards were based on the privileged judgements of cultural arbiters drawn from members of New Zealand’s educational and civic elites. Key figures within these elites insisted that American culture was ‘low’, inferior and commodified, threatening the dominance of a sacrosanct, traditional ‘high’culture. Many of them also maintained that these American cultural imports endangered both the traditionally British nature of our cultural heritage, and New Zealand’s distinctively ‘British’ identity. Many of these complaints enfolded deeper objections to American movies, music and literary forms exemplified by comics and pulps. Significant intellectual and civic figures portrayed these cultural modes as pernicious and malignant, because they were allegedly the product of malignant African-American, Jewish and capitalist sources, which threatened to poison the cultural and social values of New Zealanders, especially the young. In order to justify such attitudes, these influential cultural guardians portrayed the general public as an essentially immature, susceptible, unthinking and puritanical mass. Accordingly, this public, supposedly ignorant of the dangers posed by American culture, required the intervention and protection of members of this elite. Responses to these potent expressions of American culture provide focal points which both illuminate and reflect wider social, political and ideological controversies within midcentury New Zealand. Not only were these reactions part of a process of comprehension and negotiation of new aesthetic styles and media modes. They also represent an arena of public and intellectual contention whose significance has been neglected or under-valued. New Zealanders’ attitudes towards the new cinematic, literary and musical elements of American culture occurred within a rich and revealing socio-political and ideological context. When we comment on that culture we reveal significant features of our own national and cultural selves.