During the Cold War, NATO had proved itself successful in protecting the West. Therefore, NATO was seen as an organization that had the potential of maintaining security, democracy and peace. It has been repeatedly suggested that the US promised Russia no more NATO expansion. A promise which was broken in the 90s. During the 90s the Clinton Doctrine introduced a new way of expanding democracy. The US, NATO and EU began to argue that NATO was an extension of democracy, peace and economic prosperity, which was especially prominent during the expansion to the Baltic states. The expansion to the Baltics made Russia sensitive towards expansion to other post-Soviet regions. Interestingly, during this expansion US-Russian relations were stable and featured extensive cooperations between NATO and Global War on Terror missions. Moreover, the US made several treaties to keep relations stable in the Baltic Sea region, and they also promoted economic trade with both the Baltic states and Russia.

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NATO has provided security for the Western Hemisphere for more than half a century now and there is little doubt that it is one of the most successful security alliances the world has ever known. However, after the end of the Cold War, its future become increasingly uncertain, thus leaving space for other another security actor: the EU. During the last two decades, the EU became more active in security matters and even launched its own, first ever anti-piracy and peacekeeping operations, despite a strong NATO presence in the same areas, at the same time. We will take a step back from these specific cases and approach the question of: To what extent, if any, has the EU developed into a security actor which is similar NATO? This question has been approached by constructing a deductive mixed methods study of a longitudinal design, in which we have compared the security regimes of the EU and NATO, and the military expenditures of the two organisations. The results of this study were that: the EU has, in fact, developed into a security actor, but it aligns more closely with the neoliberal institutionalist notion of a security institution.

As of the 7th of March 2024, Sweden has become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO. Interoperability between the two organizations will be essential to ensure a high level of cooperation in future multinational land operations. The study will be conducted on NATO doctrine: Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, and the Swedish Armed Forces army doctrine: Reglemente Armé - Taktik 2023. The aim of this study is to show the level of organizational and technical interoperability between the two doctrines through the theory of Levels of Coalition Interoperability (LCI). By comparing the two doctrines to each other we find that the Swedish army and NATO are similar in many descriptions of methods and principles, mostly since the Swedish army has chosen to adept many parts of their doctrine towards NATO. However, NATO do show a lot of flexibility and adaptability towards partner nations, giving the two doctrines a high level of interoperability. The doctrines differ in description of methods for data exchange at a physical level and gives room for commanders to interpret certain aspects of the doctrines, which shows that there can be developments made to increase the interoperability, mainly in the area of adaptation of standardized methods.

This research aims to analyze and explore the contemporary strategic narratives within NATO, focusing on objectives, success, and context in relation to nuclear deterrence. Employing a narrative methodology, the thesis has identified and examined the strategic narratives in NATO's official documents. The study contributes to a deeper understanding of NATO's nuclear deterrence strategy, addressing a subject of significant political relevance and timeliness. The findings of the study indicate that NATO's strategic narratives regarding nuclear deterrence are strong when viewed from the perspectives of objectives, success, and context. However, a possible lack of credibility emerges through an indication of a "say-do gap," where there may be a discrepancy between stated intentions and actual actions. Additionally, the research highlights a lack of clarity regarding the target audience for the narrative, contributing to their perception as scattered.

The special issue revisits the NATO intervention in the 1998–1999 Kosovo War by bringing together comparative perspectives from the war-affected states of the former Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and countries that supported or opposed NATO, on the other. The authors in this special issue look at the mediatization of the NATO intervention and its ambivalent legacies in and beyond the Yugoslav region. They provide insights into contested processes of mobilization for or against a military intervention in the Kosovo War, focusing on the case studies of Greece, Germany, and China. Moreover, they analyze the political legacies and mnemonic practices in the aftermath of this military intervention by highlighting the opposing narratives of memory politics in Kosovo and Serbia.

Recent damage to the Nord Stream pipelines 1 and 2 has highlighted the vulnerabilities of the critical undersea infrastructure which our modern societies so heavily depend on. As our societies turn more dependent on these undersea systems- the question of the security, protection and resilience of critical undersea infrastructure is put to the forefront. In an European context both the policy of EU and NATO is analyzed to examine how two of the European institutions with the highest decision-making capacity is responding to the situation. Through qualitative content analysis, the research paper aims to delve into the development of European critical underwater infrastructure. With a theory testing perspective both critical junctures theory and securitization theory is applied to the specific event of the Nord Stream-sabotage and its following aftermath. The results of the study implied, through operationalized criteria, that a) the Nord Stream-sabotage could be seen as a critical juncture in relation to the development of the critical undersea infrastructure and b) confirmed the securitization of European critical undersea infrastructure.

The intervention in Libya is the best example to date to judge the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. In 2011, public demonstrations started in Libya seeking political and economic reforms in the country. In return, the Libyan President Maummar Al-Qaddafi threatened mass atrocities in Libya. This allowed the UNSC to sanction the use of force against Qaddafi’s regime in order to protect civilians. First, under resolution 1970 (2011), the UNSC referred the case to the International Criminal Court and applied sanctions. Second, via resolution 1973 (2011), the application of force was approved for the express purpose of “protecting civilians.” This thesis assess whether the military intervention in Libya in 2011 was R2P case. This question is answered by an analysis based upon the UNSC’s Resolutions, Council’s proceedings, and other official documents. / May 2016

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