This essay advances a libertarian theory of moral rights, which responds effectively to some serious objections that have been raised against libertarianism. I show how libertarianism can explain children’s rights to certain physical integrity and aid. I defend strong moral rights of human, pre-natal organisms, infants and children against all agents to certain non-interference with their physical integrity. I also argue that parents’ moral obligation to aid their offspring follows from a moral principle that prohibits agents to actively harm rights-bearers. Since this is the core principle of all versions of libertarianism, we gain simplicity and coherence. In chapter two, I explain my theory’s similarities and differences to a libertarian theory of moral rights advanced by Robert Nozick in his 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. I explain the structure and coherence of negative moral rights as advanced by Nozick. Then, I discuss what these negative rights are rights to, and the criteria for being a rights-bearer. In chapter three, I formulate a clear distinction between active and passive behaviour, and discuss the moral importance of foreseeing consequences of one’s active interventions. In chapter four, I claim that some pre-natal human organisms, human infants, and children, are rights-bearers. I formulate a morally relevant characterization of potentiality, and argue that possession of such potentiality is sufficient to have negative rights against all agents. In chapter five, I discuss whether potential moral subjects, in addition, have positive moral rights against all agents to means sufficient to develop into actual moral subjects. I argue that this suggestion brings some difficulties when applied to rights-conflicts. In chapter six, I argue that potential moral subjects’ rights to means necessary to develop into actual moral subjects can be defended in terms of merely negative rights. By adopting the view advanced in this chapter, we get a simple, coherent theory. It avoids the difficulties in the view advanced in chapter five, while keeping its intuitively plausible features. In chapter seven, I discuss whether the entitlement theory is contradictory and morally repugnant. I argue that my version of the entitlement theory is not.

Do global financial institutions and the governments of developed nations owe anything to the global poor? I argue that they do. In my view, the global poor are owed a form of assistance because of the unjust harms imposed upon them. The negative rights of the global poor, which are the rights involving freedom from unjust interference, are consistently violated by the global economic order (GEO). I demonstrate that the causal chain that connects global poverty directly with the policies of institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization reveals that the negative rights of the global poor are being violated. These violations occur through the effects of trade policies, unjustified sovereignty, and loan conditions, which serve to trap the poor in inescapable cycles of poverty. I argue that rather than relying on controversial accounts of the positive rights of the poor, and the appeals to charity that follow from them, we can ground the obligation to alleviate global poverty in negative rights, which are more minimal and widely accepted. My argument establishes that poverty poses a problem even if one does not see inequality as a problem in itself. I argue in support of Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach to poverty, which discusses the effects of poverty as a deprivation of a person’s abilities to do and be what she has reason to value. This approach identifies what is really at the heart of the problem with poverty: a deprivation of the ability to act in ways that allow the expression of basic freedoms, rather than merely a lack of resources or income. The negative rights approach to grounding an obligation to alleviate global poverty has traditionally been based on a conception of wrongdoing as a deprivation of basic needs. However, I contend that wrongdoing should be seen as a deprivation of fundamental capabilities instead. Using capability deprivations as a baseline for wrongdoing presents us with the theoretical resources required to create a foundation for an ecumenical theory of global justice, and the framework within which to demonstrate that the GEO has an obligation to help alleviate global poverty. / 2020-11-27T00:00:00Z

In an attempt to illustrate that the developed world has obligations to alleviate severe poverty, Thomas Pogge created a theory driven by human rights to focus on negative rights and duties of the avoidance of harm. His theory of global justice is developed on a minimalist account of what it means to harm. For him, the violation of the negative duty not to harm constitutes an injustice. This injustice is enacted against the citizens of developing nations by the global institutional order. Citizens of the developed world are perpetuating injustice by harming individuals through the imposition of a global order that avoidably causes human rights deficits without due compensation or reform to policies. Many critics take issue with his definition of harm as focused on negative rights, as well as find his theory of causation troublesome. His critics largely object to his assertion that the developed world causally contributes to severe poverty. Critiques of Pogge attempt to demonstrate that it is not the case that the developed world is causally responsible for severe poverty. In doing so, some make reference to domestic factors within developing nations, which they claim Pogge largely neglects. Others argue that the current global institutional order benefits developing nations. Furthermore, some of his critics engage with the normative demands that follow from his argument. They claim he has a minimal definition of harm and injustice that leads to unmanageable maximal obligations. Conversely, there are claims his argument leads to normative demands that are insufficient in redressing injustices. I argue that Pogge’s theory of global justice has developed the foundation necessary to motivate affluent nations to establish a minimally just global institutional order that avoids the perpetuation of avoidable human rights violations. This foundation elucidates and establishes, through the global institutional order, an overarching causal relationship between the world’s affluent nations and the severely poor. This relationship, despite critiques, is essential in order to illustrate that developed world citizens do indeed contribute to severe poverty and so must take action to establish a minimally just institutional order. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2009-02-02 16:07:34.355

This essay focus on the normative debate between cosmopolitanism and statism in the context of global distributive justice. The notion of basic structure and negative rights examines separately in two questions to understand distributive justice as a global subject rather than only national. Statists as Rawls holds the position that global distributive justice prerequisite a basic structure with coercive instrument. Pogge as cosmopolitan arguments for the existence of global basic structure, by addressing inequalities in real-world politics, in the form of negative rights violation. The aim of this study is to justify global distributive justice on cosmopolitan duties, based on normative political theory, reflective equilibrium, and conceptual analysis. The main issue is formulated into two questions in the following: • Does reciprocity constitute a global basic structure that presupposes resource distribution? • Can self-respect as foundation of rights justify global distributive justice? I do this first by analyzing the concept of basic structure, based on the notion reciprocity. This is to identify the basic structure of the global system that prerequisite global distributive justice. Second, I analyze Pogge’s formulation of negative rights as cosmopolitan rights, to modify them to a positive concept of rights. This is in purpose to avoid the libertarian counterargument presented by Narveson, that negative rights fail as a ground of cosmopolitan duties. I show first that coercion is not a necessary condition, but only sufficient for the basic structure. Thus, the global basic structure exists and prerequisite distributive justice, based on reciprocity. Unlike the national basic structure of coercive instrument, the global basic structure grounds on several global threats and challenges that tie all nations as alternative concept of coercion. Second, I show that cosmopolitan duties can be grounded on positive rights. I do this through the notion of self-respect and deontological ethics, which success to avoid the libertarian critique of cosmopolitan duties.

In this thesis I offer a brief overview of the current legislative, regulatory and treaty frameworks impacting emergency management in British Columbia, with a particular emphasis on Crown-identified First Nation roles. I show that the regime overwhelmingly positions non-First Nation governments, contractors and other organizations to manage emergencies on behalf of First Nations. I explore emergency management as a manifold process that includes protracted planning, mitigation and recovery phases, which, unlike emergency response, are carried out with lower levels of urgency. I consider Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 (s. 35) Aboriginal rights in light of the lack of statutorily prescribed inclusion of First Nations in off-reserve emergency management, particularly at the planning, mitigation and recovery phases concluding that the jurisprudence to date (including the duty to consult and Aboriginal title) does not appear to have revolutionized the regime. While the constitutional status of Aboriginal rights should operate to insure adequate First Nation direction in each stage of emergency management, the regime continues to restrictively prioritize other constitutional priorities, such as division of powers and civil liberties. To better understand the omission, I theorize the lack of Crown implementation of s. 35 Aboriginal rights generally as an ‘obligation gap’, highlighting how an analysis of s. 35 Aboriginal rights as ‘negative rights’ fails to compel implementation of the full scope of Crown obligations implicit within the jurisprudence to date. I then offer a new framework for s. 35 as justiciable ‘recognition rights’ and juxtapose ‘recognition rights’ with the idea of justiciability of government inaction through a brief comparative analysis of socioeconomic rights in South Africa’s constitution and Canada’s constitutional Aboriginal rights. With a decided emphasis on the obligations of the Crown, this thesis attempts to offer fodder to First Nations and legal practitioners seeking to challenge the emergency management landscape where First Nations seek an enhanced role in protecting and restoring their respective territories in anticipation of, and in the wake of, disaster. For convenience and clarity, contemporary geographical and jurisdictional references to the areas now known as Canada and British Columbia are used throughout the thesis without intention to detract from the integrity of First Nation claims to their traditional and ancestral territories.