Jus cogens is a mysterious body of international law. It comprises legal standards which are thought to be superior to those in ordinary international law, namely, international treaties, customary international law, and general principles of law. The title of this study 'Conflicts with Jus Cogens in International Lawa' condenses its main aims. The study examines conflict-situations between jus cogens rules and rules of ordinary international law. The study is divided into four Parts. Part I clarifies what jus cogens status means and how jus cogens rules are made. Part II analyses some of the different ways in which legal rules come into conflict with each other. I seek to push the boundaries of our understanding of legal conflict, and I also construct a typology of legal conflict. In Part III, I apply the analysis of conflict in Part II to the jus cogens context by identifying and classifying situations where rules of ordinary international conflict with jus cogens rules. Finally, Part IV explores the consequences of the conflicts with jus cogens which were identified in Part III. What we see is that the consequences of these conflicts are varied. Most strikingly, however, we find that in some cases jus cogens rules are being defeated by rules of ordinary international law. This challenges the orthodox thinking that jus cogens rules are straightforwardly superior to ordinary international law, in the sense that they always prevail in conflict-situations. But while the conclusion of the study may seem radical, it is informed by theoretical writing about law and about how rules conflict. Ultimately, the study seeks to improve our understanding of jus cogens rules in international law, as well as the more general problem of how legal rules conflict with each other.

En la práctica jurídica contemporánea es usual que muchas discusiones giren en torno a elementos tales como "derechos fundamentales", "bienes constitucionalmente protegidos", "valores superiores" y otros aspectos sustantivos, normalmente de rango constitucional. Asimismo, la distinción entre "principios" y "reglas", o conceptos como el de "ponderación", han pasado en las últimas décadas a formar parte del bagaje teórico básico de los juristas. En esta obra se intenta ofrecer un análisis riguroso de los conflictos entre principios constitucionales, de la ponderación y de la posibilidad de obtener una única respuesta correcta en todo caso, y se intenta mostrar cómo desde el positivismo jurídico y la filosofía analítica puede darse perfecta cuenta de estas cuestiones, señalando además cómo algunas afirmaciones ampliamente compartidas sobre los principios y la ponderación deberían ser abandonadas o cuanto menos matizadas, y que en esencia las situaciones de conflicto entre principios son muy similares, tanto en su estructura como en su modo de resolución, a las antinomias entre reglas. / In the contemporary legal practice, there are very often discussions related with legal elements labelled as “fundamental rights”, “constitutionally protected goods”, “superior values” and other substantive aspects, usually of a constitutional level. Also, the distinction between “legal principles” and “legal rules”, or concepts such as “weighing and balancing” have become in recent years some of the most basic theoretical tools of legal scholars and jurists. This work tries to offer a rigorous analysis about the conflicts between constitutional principles, weighing and balancing and the possibility of a single correct answer, and tries to give account of these matters from the scope of legal positivism and analytic philosophy. Some of the conclusions are that some deeply shared claims about legal principles and weighing and balancing should be abandoned or at least qualified, and that, in sum, conflicts between rules and conflicts between principles are very similar, both in their structure and in the procedures or mechanisms for solving them.

Esta pesquisa analisa a tributação das operações com valores mobiliários, sob a perspectiva de uma teoria da norma de competência tributária e do processo de positivação do direito. O estudo limita-se à investigação das hipóteses de ausência de competência tributária na tributação de uma suposta renda gerada nas operações com valores mobiliários, ocorridas no mercado financeiro e de capitais, bem como nos conflitos interpretativos relativos à tributação dos impostos incidentes sobre as diversas operações financeiras existentes no sistema financeiro nacional. Com base nas premissas adotadas à luz de uma teoria da competência tributária e do processo de positivação do direito, o trabalho conclui que significativa parte das normas gerais e abstratas relativas à tributação do imposto sobre a renda, no mercado financeiro e de capitais, são inválidas, em função de uma sanção, causada pela ausência de diálogo entre a norma geral e abstrata e a respectiva norma de competência. Sobre os conflitos interpretativos de incidências normativas, o trabalho conclui que algumas normas individuais e concretas relativas à tributação das distintas operações do sistema financeiro nacional deverão ser sancionadas com a pena de nulidade, em razão da ocorrência de erro de fato no processo de positivação. O mecanismo para identificar a invalidade da norma, no caso da tributação do imposto sobre a renda, e do erro de fato, na tributação das diversas operações do sistema financeiro, é a busca pela natureza jurídica da operação, mediante a utilização dos critérios trazidos pela lei. / The securities transactions taxation, under the perspective of the taxing power rule as well as under the rules incidence process is the main aim of this research. The study is limited to the investigation of the hypotheses of absence of taxing power in the income taxation, triggered by such transactions, occurred in the financial and capital markets. In addition, it investigates potential interpretive conflicts related to the levy of the existing different taxes concerning operations occurred in national financial system. Based on the assumptions with respect to the theory of the taxing power rule and the rules incidence process, the paper concludes that most general and abstract rules related to the taxation of the income tax in the financial and capital markets are invalid due to a legal system penalty, caused by the absence of dialogue between the general and abstract rule and its taxing power rule. On interpretive-normative conflicts issues, the paper concludes that some individual and specific rules concerning the taxation of the different transactions of the financial system should be punished with the penalty of nullity, due to the occurrence of a mistake in the facts interpretation. The suggested mechanism to identify the invalidity of the rule in the income taxation as well as to identify the mistake in the facts review in the diverse hypotheses of the financial system taxation is the search for the legal nature of the transaction, using exclusively the criteria posed by law.

[pt] Normas são aplicadas em sistemas multiagentes como mecanismos capazes de restringir o comportamento dos agentes de software com o objetivo de alcançar uma ordem social desejável. Entretanto, essas normas podem entrar em conflito, como por exemplo, uma norma que proíbe um agente de realizar uma determinada ação e outra norma que obriga o mesmo agente a realizar a mesma ação no mesmo intervalo de tempo. A decisão do agente sobre quais normas serão cumpridas pode ser definida com base nas recompensas e punições normativas e nos objetivos do agente. No entanto, em determinadas situações a avaliação desses atributos pode não ser o suficiente para permitir que o agente efetue uma tomada de decisão satisfatória. Nesse contexto, foi elaborada uma abordagem que considera traços de personalidade em agentes de software para aprimorar o processo de resolução de conflitos normativos e a escolha dos planos para tomada decisões, além de realizar a comparação da abordagem proposta com diferentes abordagens encontradas na literatura. / [en] Norms are applied in multiagent systems as mechanisms capable of restricting the behavior of software agents in order to achieve a desirable social order. However, norms eventually can be conflicting - for example, when there is a norm that prohibits an agent to perform a particular action and another norm that obligates the same agent to perform the same action in the same period of time. The agent s decision about which norms to fulfill can be defined based on rewards, punishments and agent goals. Sometimes, this balance will not be enough to allow the agent to make the best decision. In this context, this proposal introduces an approach that considers the agent s personality traits in order to improve the plan decision-making process and resolving normative conflicts. Our approach s applicability and validation is demonstrated by an experiment that reinforces the importance of considering the norms both in the agent and society s points of view.

Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2016-04-13T19:15:09Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DissertaçãoCONCLUÍDA VicenteQuintas.pdf: 980276 bytes, checksum: 11e595e21dad9c354e6b0f26ce62c032 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-13T19:15:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) DissertaçãoCONCLUÍDA VicenteQuintas.pdf: 980276 bytes, checksum: 11e595e21dad9c354e6b0f26ce62c032 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-02-10 / A dissertação apresenta um estudo descritivo-analítico do discurso jurídico-doutrinário da técnica da ponderação produzido no Brasil, com base nas ideias sustentadas por Ronald Dworkin e Robert Alexy no campo do estudo das espécies normativas. A partir da caracterização do Modelo de Regras proposto por Dworkin e das Teorias da Argumentação e dos Direitos Fundamentais, com enfoque nas ideias formuladas por Alexy, cada qual originada em contextos distintos, buscar-se-á a identificação dos seus principais conceitos e fundamentos, para então se proceder à abordagem descritivo-analítica dos discursos operacionais emanados da doutrina brasileira, naquilo que se convencionou chamar de Teoria dos Princípios, que toma os referidos autores estrangeiros como marco teórico-dogmático. A dissertação, ao trabalhar de forma comparativa os discursos oriundos das doutrinas estrangeira e brasileira, irá examinar tanto as críticas que desmerecem o sopesamento enquanto método hermenêutico capaz de oferecer uma resposta controlável e racional para os embates entre normas constitucionais quanto os termos das propostas de reformulação dos autores brasileiros que, embora aceitem a técnica ponderativa, propõem diferentes critérios de distinção entre regras e princípios, com a consequente expansão da técnica ponderativa na busca da solução dos conflitos constitucionais. Essa postura reformista mostra-se recorrente e constante na doutrina brasileira que pretende aprimorar o modelo original, habilitando o pesquisador a falar em uma aplicação da técnica da ponderação que destoa de sua elaboração original e é comumente propugnada entre os juristas que partilham das intenções de Dworkin e, especialmente, de Alexy. / The dissertation presents a descriptive-analytical study of the legal and doctrinal discourse of the weighting technique produced in Brazil, based on the ideals held by Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy in the field of study of normative species. From the characterization of the Model of Rules proposed by Dworkin and theories of Argumentation and Fundamental Rights, focusing on Alexy‟s theory, each of which originated in different contexts, will be sought to identify their key concepts and fundamentals, and then proceeding to the descriptive and analytical approach to operational discourses emanating from the Brazilian doctrine, what is conventionally called the Theory of Principles, which takes such foreign authors as a theoretical and dogmatic framework. The dissertation, the work of comparatively speeches coming from the foreign and Brazilian doctrines, will examine both the criticism that detract the balancing technique while the hermeneutical method able to offer a controllable and rational response to the conflicts between constitutional rules on the terms of the recast proposals of Brazilian authors who, while accepting the weighting technique, propose different criteria for distinguishing between rules and principles, with the consequent expansion of balancing technique in search of the solution of the constitutional conflicts. This reformist posture shows a recurring and constant in the Brazilian doctrine that intends to improve the original model, enabling the researcher to speak at an application of the weighting technique that diverges from its original design and is commonly advocated among lawyers who share Dworkin intentions and especially Alexy.

La thèse étudie sous leurs aspects, historiques, juridiques, la convergence des jurisprudences du Conseil d’Etat et de la Cour de cassation en droit du travail. D’autres juridictions,nationales (Tribunal des conflits et Conseil constitutionnel), européennes (Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme et Cour de justice de l’Union européenne) concourent à ce rapprochement. La thèse aborde la convergence des objectifs sous deux angles ; l’un né d’une attraction réciproque, l’autre, d’une attraction amplifiée. La convergence jurisprudentielle est successivement qualifiée de « recherchée » et de « nuancée ». Le « juge répartiteur » exerce une influence indirecte, à laquelle s’ajoute celle, directe, des « juges prescripteurs ». A la convergence des objectifs s’ajoute une convergence de la méthode, perceptible à travers les modes d’articulation des sources et les techniques de construction jurisprudentielle. La thèse démontre que le droit du travail, qui s’est construit en réunissant les enseignements du droit civil – la force obligatoire du contrat – et les leçons du droit public – l’importance de l’intérêt général – se révèle être le domaine d’élection d’un échange technique inédit entre les deux ordres juridictionnels. Cette étude signale le passage d’une période d’indifférence mutuelle à celle d’une attention devenue traditionnelle. A l’instar du dialogue qui existe entre le juge et le législateur en matière sociale, se noue un « dialogue des juges » des deux Hautes Juridictions, pour prévenir des discordances majeures. / This dissertation aims at describing how the two Supreme Institutions — the Board of State and the Court of Cassation —, despite their respective traditions and status were able to make their Jurisprudences convergent. Beginning with an historical Introduction, the study goes in details into the reciprocal attraction of the the Board of State and of the Court of Cassation based on shared goals (Part I). This convergent movement is discussed according to both Jurisprudences (Title 1), then in relation with the Jurisprudences of the Disputes Tribunal of the Constitutional Council and of the European Courts (Title 2). Part II offers a methodological approach explaining how the sources of these Jurisprudences are selected in order to solve normative conflicts (Title 1). A cross-movement consisting in loans and exchanges of technics between both Institutions occurs for the sake of Law unity and in defense of the public and individual Rights (Title 2).

Le droit des organisations internationales a été le lieu d’une belle querelle d’école entre les détracteurs et les adeptes de la normativité relative. Il en va de même des rapports de systèmes, qui divisent la doctrine entre les monistes (en voie de disparition), les dualistes et les non-alignés. Aborder le thème du traitement du droit dérivé par les ordres juridiques internes c’est prendre le risque de s’égarer dans ces tourbillons doctrinaux. Si l’on accepte que le point de vue du juge interne est pertinent pour la détermination de la force normative du droit dérivé, on comprend que le premier débat semble dépassé : le juge admet que le droit institutionnel est du droit, qu’il soit obligatoire ou non. Se pose dès lors la question de la capacité de ce droit à être source de droits et obligations dans l’ordre interne. On remarque qu’à cette fin, l’ensemble des ordres juridiques examinés exige l’incorporation des actes institutionnels, mais aussi que les juges internes accordent de la place à des formes de reconnaissance des effets des actes institutionnels déconnectées de l’incorporation. Ces tendances convergentes démontrent à la fois que le clivage monisme/dualisme n’est pas décisif, mais aussi que la pensée dualiste ne reflète pas fidèlement les modalités d’interaction entre les ordres juridiques dans le monde pluraliste. La reconnaissance participe d’un principe de coordination et non pas de séparation des ordres juridiques, qui se prolonge par ailleurs dans les solutions aux conflits normatifs, ainsi que dans les modalités et les effets du contrôle, par les juges internes, des normes institutionnelles. / The law of international organisations has been the theatre of passionate academic debate between the detractors and the disciples of the relative normativity. The same can be said about the relations between the legal orders, which divide the doctrine into monists, dualists and non-aligned. Analysing the topic of the place of institutional law in domestic legal orders is taking the risk of losing one’s way in these doctrinal whirls. If we take for granted that the point of view of the domestic judge is relevant for appreciating the normative force of institutional law, we may say that the first debate seems outdated : the domestic judge recognizes that the law produced by international organisations is law, whether is binding or not. The following question is to what extent the norms thus produced may be source of rights and obligations in the internal legal orders. The entire range of legal orders examined requires for institutional law to be incorporated for that purpose. The domestic judges leave nonetheless the door opened to other forms for taking into account some of the legal effects of institutional acts. These convergent tendencies show both that the monist/dualist divide is immaterial for the legal status of these acts and that the dualist doctrine does not accurately reflect the modalities of interaction between the legal systems in the world of pluralism. The recognition of unincorporated legal norms, which triggers consequences in terms of conflict of norms and judicial review of institutional law, stands in favour of a model of coordination and not of separation of the legal orders.