This thesis offers an analysis of a particular issue concerning the normativity of the ethics of care which is presently ever more relevant for this branch of ethics. This is the issue of how one could describe the normative content of the ethics of care and its specificity and what could be a normative foundation for this ethics. The goal of this thesis is to scrutinize main theoretical tendencies of the normative development of the ethics of care and to put forward the new developmental possibilities. In order to achieve this objective several steps are made. First of all, the works of first care ethicists (Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Sara Ruddick, etc.) are analysed so as to reconstruct the ethical meaning of the notion of care and the constitutive factors of it. It is argued that the specificity of the ethics of care is established by the relational ethical approach: the point of departure in this case is relation and relational moral agency. The analysis of the subsequent discourse of the ethics of care provides a critical view towards the tendency apply traditional moral theories, mostly virtue and sentimentalist ethics, for the normative purposes. It is argued that the attempts to conceptualise normative vocabulary of the ethics of care applying the concepts from other moral theories conceal the relational character of this branch of ethics. In order to find sufficient conceptual recourses for the development of the normative content of the relational ethics of care... [to full text] / Disertacijoje keliamas šiuo metu vis aktualesniu tampantis rūpesčio etikos normatyvinis klausimas: kaip galima aiškiau apibrėžti normatyvinį šios etikos turinį ir koks galėtų būti jos normatyvinis pagrindas. Disertacijos tikslas – ištirti pagrindines teorines rūpesčio etikos normatyvinio plėtojimo tendencijas ir išryškinti naujas jos vystymo galimybes. Siekiant šių tikslų, analizuojami pirmųjų rūpesčio etikos kūrėjų (Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, Eva Feder Kittay etc.) darbai. Nagrinėjant jų idėjas, rekonstruojama etinė rūpesčio/rūpinimosi sąvokos reikšmė, rūpestį/rūpinimąsi konstituojantys veiksniai. Teigiama, kad rūpesčio etikos specifiką formuoja reliacinė etinė prieiga, t. y. šios etikos išeities taškas yra santykiai, santykių konstituojamas moralinis veikimas. Analizuojant vėlesnių rūpesčio etikos plėtotojų (Michael Slote, Raja Halwani) idėjas, kritiškai nagrinėjama tendencija normatyvinei rūpesčio etikos plėtrai pasitelkti tradicinių moralės teorijų – dorybių ir sentimentalizmo etikos – sąvokas. Teigiama, kad bandymai konceptualizuoti normatyvinį rūpesčio etikos žodyną kitų moralės teorijų sąvokomis užgožia reliacinį rūpinimosi pobūdį. Ieškant konceptualinių resursų, kurie padėtų plėtoti normatyvinį reliacinės rūpesčio etikos turinį, nagrinėjamos filosofų Simone Weil, Iris Murdoch, Soran Reader, Emmanuelio Levino idėjos. Ginama tezė, kad rūpesčio etikos specifiką atskleidžia normatyvinis žodynas, leidžiantis konceptualizuoti moralinius rūpinimosi reikalavimus... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

Moral judgments have tended to be made through the application of certain moral principles and it seems we think we need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. However, the theory of moral particularism, as put forward by Jonathan Dancy (2004), calls this into question and challenges the traditional principled approaches to moral reasoning. This challenge naturally began a debate between those who adhere to principled accounts of moral rationality, and those who advocate a particularist approach. The aim of this thesis is thus to assess the theory of moral particularism as recently put forward by Jonathan Dancy. In pursuing this project I initially set up a survey of the field of environmental ethics within which to explore traditional approaches to applied ethics. This survey suggests that applied ethical problems have traditionally been solved using various principled approaches and if we are inclined to take the particularist challenge seriously, this suggests a philosophical conundrum. On the one hand, increasingly important and pressing applied environmental ethical concerns suggest there is a practical need for ethical principles, whilst on the other hand, the particularist claim is that we do not need principles in order to make sound moral judgments. The survey of environmental ethics then establishes the first side of the philosophical conundrum. I then move to explore the second side of the conundrum; the theory of moral particularism, looking at why the challenge it presents to traditional principled approaches needs to be taken seriously. I then move to explore theoretical challenges to moral particularism; this is done to establish the current state of the theoretical debate between the particularist and the generalist. I conclude from this that the theoretical debate between the two has currently reached a stalemate; it is, at present, simply not clear which account is correct. As the main goal of this study is to evaluate particularism, this apparent stalemate led me to explore certain practical challenges to particularist theory as a means of advancing the debate. As particularism is a theory that challenges our traditional conception of how to make moral judgments, there will be important implications for applied ethics if particularism turns out to be correct, and 1 thus finally apply particularism to a practical environmental problem in order to assess the validity of practical challenges to particularism. In order to do this, a particularist ethic is applied to the question of whether or not to allow mining in Kakadu National Park in Australia. This provides a means of seeing what an applied particularist ethic could look like, as well as providing something of an answer to the practical challenge to particularism and achieving the goal of evaluating it within the applied context of environmental ethics. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

The cognitive models that research on conceptual change has generated have been the subject of criticism, suggesting that these reflect an unrealistic view of learning as an overly “cold” and isolated process. Accordingly, representatives of this criticism suggest that research on conceptual change should investigate to what extent the cold cognition relates to “warm” affective constructs. In the present thesis, the warmth is not considered as prior to conceptual change, but is inferred from the very process of conceptual change itself. The aim is to investigate and describe how this warmth – in terms of normativity – is expressed in conceptual change and how individuals, in these processes, emerge as subjects in their interchange with the environment. This is done by exploring what students do when they make meaning of gender and nation in interviews and exam papers. The results show that the students mainly relate to two different norm-systems, including six normative aspects of conceptual change. The first system includes the goal to challenge or emancipate, the means to problematize, and engagement in the interviews or exams. Furthermore, it includes critical theory as an ideal, social structures and power as values, and me as a social being and actions as part of a tradition as what to make meaning of. The second system includes the goal to preserve, the means to claim how it “is”, and engagement in the interviews or exams. Furthermore, it includes psychological/biological reductionism as an ideal, essences and a natural order as values, and me as an individual and actions as an outcome of intentions as what to make meaning of. By understanding what the students do as interfering with these normative aspects, it becomes possible to understand them as negotiating norms that are brought to the fore. With this, “coldness” appears to be a misleading epithet of conceptual change. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 1: Submitted. Paper 2: Accepted. Paper 3: Submitted.</p>

This dissertation brings together a variety of interpretive theoretical perspectives born of the fields of disability studies, critical race theory, cultural studies and queer and feminist studies to analyze the social significance and productive effects of cultural representations of autism. Specifically, this work addresses contemporary enactments of autism advocacy as found in the mass media, education literature and policy as well as in fundraising campaigns. In response to a global/izing economy that privileges the fast, efficient exchange of information and knowledge, I attend to how autism appears in the field of autism advocacy as an abbreviation; its multiple meaning distilled down to a series of ‘red flags’ in awareness campaigns, bulleted ‘facts’ in information pamphlets, statistics in policy reports. I analyze the relationships between these fragmentary enactments of autism and trace their continuities so as to make legible an underlying logic: a powerful and ubiquitous logic that casts autism as a pathological threat to normative life, and advocacy as that which must eliminate this threat, thus, limiting the role of the ‘good’ autism advocate to one positioned ‘against’ autism. This dissertation shows how dominant, contemporary discourses of autism advocacy that narrate autism as some ‘thing’ to be ‘fought’, ‘combated’, or ‘warred against’ function to shape ‘life’ as conditional and cast autism as (one of) its condition(s). As autism is discursively and ideologically made separate from the vital category of life itself, and as bodies and minds of living people are relentlessly divided up into vital and non-vital parts, individual and collective life ‘with’ (the condition of) autism becomes life that is conceptualized as ‘almost living’ or ‘mostly dead’. I demonstrate how such an understanding of the conditionality of life is a necessary pre-condition for normative acts of violence – violence enacted in the name of securing the norm and violence that is normalized as necessary.

This dissertation brings together a variety of interpretive theoretical perspectives born of the fields of disability studies, critical race theory, cultural studies and queer and feminist studies to analyze the social significance and productive effects of cultural representations of autism. Specifically, this work addresses contemporary enactments of autism advocacy as found in the mass media, education literature and policy as well as in fundraising campaigns. In response to a global/izing economy that privileges the fast, efficient exchange of information and knowledge, I attend to how autism appears in the field of autism advocacy as an abbreviation; its multiple meaning distilled down to a series of ‘red flags’ in awareness campaigns, bulleted ‘facts’ in information pamphlets, statistics in policy reports. I analyze the relationships between these fragmentary enactments of autism and trace their continuities so as to make legible an underlying logic: a powerful and ubiquitous logic that casts autism as a pathological threat to normative life, and advocacy as that which must eliminate this threat, thus, limiting the role of the ‘good’ autism advocate to one positioned ‘against’ autism. This dissertation shows how dominant, contemporary discourses of autism advocacy that narrate autism as some ‘thing’ to be ‘fought’, ‘combated’, or ‘warred against’ function to shape ‘life’ as conditional and cast autism as (one of) its condition(s). As autism is discursively and ideologically made separate from the vital category of life itself, and as bodies and minds of living people are relentlessly divided up into vital and non-vital parts, individual and collective life ‘with’ (the condition of) autism becomes life that is conceptualized as ‘almost living’ or ‘mostly dead’. I demonstrate how such an understanding of the conditionality of life is a necessary pre-condition for normative acts of violence – violence enacted in the name of securing the norm and violence that is normalized as necessary.

Thèse (Ph. D.)--University of London, 1996. / In MyiLibrary. Titre de l'écran-titre (visionné le 10 juin 2008). Description based on print version record. Bibliogr.: p. 281-292.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of London, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 281-292) and index.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In Being and Time, Heidegger places the question of the meaning of being in order to develop the project of fundamental ontology. Generically, the meaning of being can be characterized as an ontological standard from which the entities present with certain ontological identities. Because the human being is the entity that understand the various senses of being, the project of elaborating the fundamental ontology unfolds initially in terms of the analytic of existence, encompassing both divisions of Being and Time. Recently, the question of the meaning of being has been interpreted as tantamount to question the intelligibility of something. For this interpretation, all intelligibility involves conditions of satisfaction from which something can be identified as something. In other words, with the recognition of norms that establish the criteria for entities s identity are possible understand something as something. More precisely, Robert Brandom attributes to the analytic s of the existence a commitment to what he termed "pragmatism normativist". Generically, the normative pragmatism is characterized by recognizing that the normativity s domain is more basic than the factual one and that standards need not be present linguistically formulated as principles or rules. The pragmatist reception have trouble in linking themes and concepts of Division II of Being and Time to question on intelligibility of something. Precisely in order to overcome this limitation interpretive, John Haugeland presented what he called "transcendental existentialism". In general, this consists of existentialism link to existential death with truth qua unveiling. Thus, the intelligibility of beings is elucidated from the existing commitment to have their own identities and the rules that structures it. Following the interpretation of Haugeland, Crowell interpreted the analytic of existence from the horizon of transcendental philosophy. Thus, the themes of Division II are interpreted in light of their contribution to the normativity of meaning. To do so, we must recognize the role that the irreducible first-person perspective would play in Being and Time. The overall objective of this dissertation is to reconstruct and articulate receptions binding sense with normativity. Furthermore, with the open receptions for these interpretative perspective Heidegger seeks to shed light on the issues of the second division of Being and Time. / Em Ser e Tempo, Heidegger recoloca a questão acerca do sentido do ser com o intuito de elaborar o projeto da ontologia fundamental. Em linhas gerais, o sentido do ser pode ser caracterizado como um padrão ontológico a partir do qual os entes apresentamse com identidades ontológicas determinadas. Na medida em que o existente humano é o ente caracterizado por compreender os diversos sentidos do ser, o projeto de elaborar a ontologia fundamental desdobra-se inicialmente em termos da analítica da existência, que abarca ambas as Divisões de Ser e Tempo. Recentemente, a pergunta pelo sentido do ser foi interpretada como equivalente à pergunta pela inteligibilidade de algo. Para esta interpretação, toda inteligibilidade envolve condições de satisfação a partir das quais algo pode ser identificado como algo determinado. Dito de outro modo, é a partir do reconhecimento de normas que estabelecem os critérios de identidade dos entes que o existente os compreende como entes determinados. Mais precisamente, Robert Brandom atribui à analítica da existência o comprometimento com o que ele denominou pragmatismo normativo . Em linhas gerais, o pragmatismo normativo caracteriza-se por reconhecer que o domínio da normatividade é mais básico que o domínio factual e que as normas não precisam se apresentar linguisticamente formuladas como princípios ou regras. A recepção pragmatista têm dificuldades para vincular os temas e conceitos da Divisão II de Ser e Tempo com a pergunta pela inteligibilidade de algo. Precisamente tendo em vista superar esta limitação interpretativa, John Haugeland apresentou o que ele denominou existencialismo transcendental . Em linhas gerais, este existencialismo consiste em vincular a morte existencial com a verdade qua desvelamento. Desse modo, a inteligibilidade dos entes é elucidada a partir do comprometimento que os existentes têm com suas próprias identidades e com as normas que as estruturam. Seguindo a interpretação de Haugeland, Crowell interpretou a analítica da existência a partir do horizonte da filosofia transcendental. Assim, os temas da Divisão II são interpretados à luz de sua contribuição para a normatividade do sentido. Para tanto, é preciso reconhecer o papel irredutível que a perspectiva em primeira pessoa desempenharia em Ser e Tempo. O objetivo geral desta dissertação é reconstruir e articular as recepções que vinculam sentido com normatividade. Além disso, com a perspectiva aberta por estas recepções interpretativas de Heidegger procura-se lançar luz sobre os temas da segunda divisão de Ser e Tempo.

The aim of this study is to investigate teachers’ attitudes and approaches to linguistic varieties in teaching and also to find out how they are represented in the classroom. The study was made from a sociolinguistic perspective. The study includes the methods, interviews and observations. The methods are used to investigate attitudes towards and teachers‘ approach to different varieties in the language. Furthermore the aim is to create an image of how the language varieties takes expression in teaching situations. The results of the study proves a mostly positive attitudes towards varieties in spoken language. The study also shows occasions when the varieties are seen as something negative, and some occasions where the correct way of using language are more preferably. A part of this study was to investigate different generations perspective of spoken language, which is presented and discussed. The outcome was something else then the hypothesis. The respondents of this investigation are connecting the concepts “youth language” and “bad language”. They also emphasizes that swearing is increasing in school. However, they point out, that the early years of primary school is relatively liberated from the bad language and that an increase occurs at the transition to middle school. The study also includes how teachers are working with language switching and appreciation of different variates. / Syftet med examensarbetet är att undersöka attityder och förhållningsätt till olika talspråkliga varieteter och hur de representeras i klassrummet. Arbetet tar avstamp utifrån ett sociolingvistiskt perspektiv. Metoder som används i arbetet är intervju samt observation. Metoderna används för att undersöka attityder, synen och lärarnas förhållningssätt till olika varieteter i språket samt för att skapa en bild av hur undervisningssituationer ser ut i praktiken. Resultaten i studien påvisar en övervägande positiv syn gentemot varieteter i talat språk. Studien identifierar dock tillfällen då dessa varieteter uppfattas som negativt och standardspråket framställs som det korrekta språkbruket. Ett av studien teman behandlar skillnader mellan olika generationers syn på språkbruket, vilket diskuteras och presenteras. Hypotesen att det skulle uppkomma stora skillnader visade sig få ett annat utfall. Deltagarna i studien sammanlänkar begreppen ungdomsspråk och svordomar. Vidare så framhäver de att svordomar har ökat i skolan. De poängterar dock att lågstadiet är relativt befriad från det fula språket och att en ökning sker vid övergången till mellanstadiet. Studiens resultat visar även metoder och arbetssätt som lärare använder sig av i sin undervisning vilka grundar sig i språkväxling och uppskattning av olika talspråkliga varieteter. Studien diskuterar slutligen teman av språknormativ karaktär.

La notion d'incitation est au cœur des théories économiques modernes. Elle vise à obtenir des agents concernés un certain comportement par la promesse d’une récompense, comportement qu'il n'aurait pas été rationnel pour eux d’adopter sans la présence de cet avantage. En tant que dispositif juridique, l’incitation peut être définie comme un mécanisme cherchant à orienter le comportement de ses destinataires dans un sens déterminé, par la promesse d’une contrepartie avantageuse. Ces dispositifs incitatifs se développent dans l’ensemble des matières juridiques. Il est toutefois un domaine particulier du droit dans lequel il est particulièrement intéressant à étudier : le droit social. Si le législateur laisse au destinataire de la règle le choix d’adopter ou non le comportement incité, il n’en compte pas moins sur le raisonnement rationnel de ce dernier qui devrait se laisser convaincre par la perspective de l’avantage promis. Il est donc improbable, a priori, de trouver ce type de règles dans les matières largement régies par des dispositions d’ordre public.À travers l’analyse du dispositif juridique incitatif dans un domaine aussi vaste et complexe que le droit social, c’est en définitive à une étude des transformations de la normativité juridique que nous nous livrons. Cet instrument des conduites juridiques, si particulier et pourtant si présent dans le droit, donne à voir toute la richesse que peut offrir le droit, en même temps qu’il révèle les dédales obscurs que doivent parcourir ses élaborateurs pour produire, sans effets pervers, les effets escomptés. / The concept of incentive is at the heart of modern economic theories. It aims to get involved some behavior by the promise of a reward, behavior that would not be rational for agents to adopt without the presence of this advantage. As a legal rule, the incentive can be defined as a mechanism seeking to guide the behavior of its recipients in a given direction, with the promise of a reward. These incentives are developed in all legal matters. However, it is a particular area of law in which they are particularly interested to study: social law. If the legislature let the recipient free to adopt or not the behavior encouraged, it does not count less on rational reasoning. It is unlikely to find such rules in matters largely governed by the public order.Through the analysis of the incentive legal system in an area as vast and complex as the social law, it is a study of the transformation of legal normativity that we deliver. This legal instrument gives to see the richness that can provide the law at the same time it reveals the several ways its developers have to take to produce the expected effects.