The Normativity of the Mental and the Role of the Second Person’s Standpoint. On Davidson’s Footsteps”. I offer in this paper an elucidation of the normativity of the mental in terms of the second person’s standpoint, with the hope of opening a conceptual horizon that will allow us to go beyond Donald Davidson. Aiming at this, the paper is structured as follows. In the first part I present Davidson’s original response to the mind/body problem and reconstruct his argument in favour of the irreducibility of mental concepts thesis. In the second part I deal with the feature that the peculiarity of the mental bears in his system, that is, normativity. In the third section I explore and assess the davidsonian treatment of the first, second and third person standpoints with the aim of finally narrowing down my proposal. / En este trabajo ofrezco una elucidación de la normatividad de lo mental en términos de la perspectiva de segunda persona, con la esperanza de abrir un horizonte conceptual que nos permita ir más allá de Donald Davidson. A tal efecto, el artículo tiene la siguiente estructura. En la primera parte presento su original respuesta al problema mente/cuerpo y reconstruyo su argumentación a favor de la tesis de la irreducibilidad de los conceptos mentales. En la segunda parte me ocupo del rasgo que, en su sistema, porta la peculiaridad de lo mental, a saber: la normatividad. En la tercera sección exploro y evalúo el tratamiento davidsoniano de las perspectivas de primera, segunda y tercera persona con vistas a precisar, finalmente, mi propuesta.

This work discusses a way of thinking the normative practices as a phenomenon better understood through a pragmatic account of social practices. We claim that an appropriate approach to normativity should accept the presence, in the normative creature, of natural capacities intrinsically related to norm-governed activities, especially what we call a normative attitude. Thus, we present a discussion on the rule-based account of normativity understood as a sort of intersubjective practice grounded in practical skills and learning processes as well. We also indicate why the pragmatic model appropriately fits with a connectionist model of cognition. Finally, we argue that normative practices should be understood primarily in terms of internal patterns, functionally defined, instituted as nonexplicit, non-conscious individual processes. The consequence is a practical, inferentialist, connectionist, and implicit approach to the normativity. / Este trabalho discute um modo de pensar as práticas normativas como um fenômeno melhor entendido através de uma explicação pragmática das praticas sociais. Afirmamos que uma estratégia apropriada para entender a normatividade deve aceitar a presença, nas criaturas normativas, de capacidades naturais intrinsecamente relacionadas às atividades governadas por normas, especialmente o que chamamos de atitudes normativas. Assim, apresentamos uma discussão de uma abordagem da normatividade baseada em regras entendidas como um tipo de prática intersubjetiva fundada em habilidades práticas e, também, em processes de aprendizado. Indicamos, então, por que um modelo pragmático se adéqua apropriadamente a um modelo conexionista de cognição. Finalmente, argumentamos que as práticas normativas devem ser entendidas primeiramente em termos de padrões internos, funcionalmente definidos, instituídos como processos individuais não explícitos e não conscientes. A consequência é uma explicação prática, inferencialista, conexionista e implícita da normatividade.

A presente pesquisa pretende sustentar que a reflexão precoce sobre a sociologia durkheimeana cumpre um papel fundamental no desenvolvimento do pensamento de Georges Canguilhem sobre as ciências da vida e, por conseguinte, na elaboração da sua filosofia biológica. Como se buscará mostrar, essa importância se deve ao fato de que a teoria social de Durkheim procurou satisfazer às exigências científicas de objetividade e de quantificação dos fenômenos incorporando da biologia de Comte e da fisiologia de Claude Bernard a teoria da identidade essencial entre os estados normais e patológicos. Será a partir da crítica a essa teoria que o conceito de normatividade vital, núcleo da filosofia da vida canguilhemeana, se elaborará na tese de doutoramento de Canguilhem, em 1943, Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique. Finalmente, concluiremos sugerindo que essa nova concepção de vida permitirá ao filósofo retornar ao campo da teoria social, nas Nouvelles réflexions, para recusar a identificação entre organismo e sociedade que ele denunciara em Durkheim. / The present research intends to sustain that the early reflection on Durkheims sociology plays an important role in the evolution of George Canguilhems thought about the life sciences, and, consequently, in the development of his biological philosophy. As this research purports to show, this importance arises from the fact that Durkheims social theory attempted to satisfy the scientific demands for the objectivity and quantification of the phenomena by incorporating, from Comtes biology and Claude Bernards physiology, a theory about the essential identity between normal and pathological states. It is by taking the critique of this theory as a starting point, that the core of Canguilhems life philosophy, namely, his concept of vital normativity, will be developed in his 1943 doctorate thesis, Essai sur quelques problèmes concernant le normal et le pathologique. Finally, by way of conclusion, we suggest that this new conception of life will allow the French philosopher to return, in his Nouvelles réflexions, to the social theory field, in order to deny the same identification between organisms and society that he denounced in Durkheim.

A distinção entre ser obrigado a fazer alguma coisa por meio de coerção e ter a obrigação jurídica de fazê-la foi apresentada por H. L. A. Hart como a distinção entre atos coercitivos praticados com ou sem o respaldo de uma regra jurídica válida. Para o esse autor, a validade jurídica de uma regra está condicionada à aceitação do ordenamento ao qual pertence por parte significativa da sociedade, principalmente das autoridades responsáveis por aplicar as sanções correspondentes ao seu descumprimento. A aceitação, por seu turno, pode ter fundamento nos mais diversos tipos de razão, não sendo necessária a concordância moral. Ainda que essa possa ser uma boa descrição do funcionamento do direito enquanto prática social, ela carece de elementos para justificar certos atos coercitivos praticados pelos aparatos estatais como a imposição de deveres jurídicos autênticos àqueles que porventura não os percebam assim. Esta tese busca esclarecer quais seriam os requisitos para a justificação da imposição de tais deveres e a importância dessa investigação na fundamentação das decisões judiciais. / The distinction between being obliged to do something by coercion and having the legal obligation of doing it was presented by H. L. A. Hart as the distinction between coercive acts either backed or not by a valid legal rule. According to him, the legal validity of a rule is conditioned to the acceptation of the legal system to which it belongs by a large part of the society, especially by the officials who are responsible for the application of the sanctions related to their infringement. The acceptation, in turn, may be founded in several kinds of reasons, which do not entail moral approbation. Even though that might be a good description of law as a social practice, it lacks the necessary elements to justify certain coercive acts practised by the officials as the imposition of authentic legal duties to those who happen to see them as mere acts of violence. This dissertation seeks to elucidate the requirements for justifying the imposition of legal duties and the importance of this investigation to the justification in judgements.

Le travail propose d’abord trois états des lieux : celui des études sur la construction des identités de genre à la Renaissance ; celui des connaissances actuelles en matière de rapports sociaux de sexe entre le Moyen Âge central et la fin du XVIe siècle ; celui de la production textuelle de l’époque sur la question accompagné d’une annexe listant 324 textes didactiques, édifiants et polémiques imprimés entre 1475 et 1594, susceptibles d’avoir participé à la construction des identités de genre et d’avoir diffusé les normes et idéaux en matière de relations femmes-hommes pendant cette période. La deuxième partie de la thèse s’attache à décrire un corpus constitué des trois œuvres les plus diffusées de chacune des sept catégories établies au sein du premier corpus : institutions des princes et des grands, traités de bonnes mœurs et civilité, institutions des femmes, recueils de modèles/ Vies d’hommes et de femmes célèbres, et enfin textes sur, pour ou contre les femmes, le mariage et l’amour. Les œuvres retenues sont présentées dans leurs contextes de rédaction et de réception, du point de vue des discours tenus par les différentes instances qui les présentent, de leur apparence matérielle, des traditions dans lesquelles elles s’inscrivaient, des sources utilisées par leurs auteurs et des différents lectorats qu’ils visaient. La dernière partie s’attache aux injonctions émises par leurs auteurs, à leurs opinions sur la formation des individus et les relations entre les sexes. Elle montre le haut niveau de confrontation entre partisans et adversaires de l’égalité, la complexité et les contradictions des messages diffusés. / To begin, this work proposes an inquiry into three interrelated areas of interest : a review of studies on gender construction during the Renaissance period ; an overview of current knowledge concerning social relations between the sexes extending from the central Middle Ages to the end of the XVIth century ; a review of textual production of the period and the indexed cataloguing of some 324 didactic, moralizing and polemical documents printed between 1475 and 1594, which contributed to the construction of gender identities and to the codification of social norms and ideals on the question of male-female relations during this period.The second part of this thesis is concerned with the description of a corpus represented by the three most widely distributed works in each of seven distinct categories: princely institutions, moral treatises, women’s institutions, model compilations on the lives of noteworthy men and women, and finally texts devoted to the question of women, marriage and love. The selected works are presented in their historical context (publication and reception), taking into account their subjective point of view, their material nature, the traditions according to which they are inscribed, the sources available to authors, and the distinct readerships. The final part of this work will concern itself with the various injunctions formulated by authors, and with the latter’s expressed opinions on education and gender relations. This part will examine the level of intense confrontation existing between partisans and adversaries of gender equality, as well as the complexity and contradictions that characterise the selected discursive examples.

Le Corbusier est un architecte qui non seulement construit, mais qui n’a de cesse de dire comment on doit construire. Faisant le pari de la force et de la cohérence de la pensée corbuséenne, le présent travail vise à interroger l’œuvre théorique de l’architecte au prisme de l’une des ses «colorations» les plus propres, à savoir sa dimension foncièrement normative. À partir d’un tel essai de reconstruction de la pensée corbuséenne par le biais du concept de norme, il s’agira de poursuivre un triple objectif : premièrement, chercher à comprendre pourquoi Le Corbusier rejette les normes sur lesquelles reposait l’architecture académique de son temps et pour quelles raisons il entend lui substituer une architecture authentiquement moderne ; deuxièmement, montrer en quoi et selon quelles modalités théoriques et pratiques l’œuvre de Le Corbusier constitue une tentative de refondation ou de recommencement de la discipline architecturale sur des bases normatives renouvelées ; enfin, tenter de saisir les rapports entre le domaine de la norme et ce qui l’excède, à savoir le champ du «hors-norme» (la beauté, le génie, l’espace indicible). / Le Corbusier is an architect who not only builds, but also never stops to tell us how to build. The present work aims at questioning the architect’s theoretical work through one of its most singular dimension, i.e. its fundamentally normative aspect. By trying to reconstruct the corbusean thought by the use of the concept of norm, I pursue a triple purpose : firstly, trying to understand why Le Corbusier rejects the normative basis underpinning the historicist architecture of its time and why he wants to substitute an authentic modern architecture for it ; secondly, trying to demonstrate how Le Corbusier’s theoretical and practical work constitutes an attempt at rebuilding the architectural discipline on brand new normative standards (the ‘échelle humaine’) ; finally, I try to grasp the relations between what is part of the normative realm and what necessarily exceeds this sphere according to the architect (beauty, genius, ineffable space).

The following thesis examines factors that affect children’s imitation, and presents evidence that imitation is a composite ability which involves multiple mechanisms developing throughout childhood. In Chapter 1 previous findings are reviewed to highlight the mechanisms underlying the ability to reproduce other people’s actions. The evidence suggests that imitation, whilst based on basic action control mechanisms in infancy, is also affected by higher-order cognitive processes in later childhood. Previous literature is still unclear on how the influence of such processes changes at different ages. Chapter 2 used a successive-models task with children aged 2 to 12 years to reveal how children’s imitation changes with age. Results showed that whilst children under the age of 5 years did not imitate deviant models as much as the first model, children above the age of 6 years begin to copy multiple models faithfully, particularly after the age of 10 years. Chapter 3 investigated the role of multiple factors that may have made children under the age of 5 years imitate deviant models less than the original model. In particular, it was found that model evaluations, object associations, and motor inhibitory skills all affect children’s imitation of multiple models. These findings support the interpretation that imitation requires different abilities depending on the type of action that is being imitated. Chapter 4 shows that children’s imitation also depends on the type of goal that they associate with the action. By pre-school age children will imitate actions faithfully if they believe that the goal of the action was the movement itself. The results of the thesis support the idea that imitation, while involving general processes of action control, is also affected in a top-down manner by higher-order cognitive abilities after infancy.

Au cours de la relation thérapeutique qui unit le médecin et le malade dans un processus de soin, il arrive que le médecin estime le malade guéri alors que ce dernier ne se considère pas comme tel, ou, à l'inverse, que le malade s'estime guéri alors que le médecin pense le contraire. Cette situation paradoxale constitue l'antinomie de la relation thérapeutique. Elle est la conséquence de ce que la guérison n'est pas un retour à l'état de santé d'avant la maladie, mais est au contraire la constitution d'une nouvelle norme de vie, processus que Georges Canguilhem a désigné sous le nom de normativité.Résoudre l'antinomie de la relation thérapeutique nécessite de placer la normativité au cœur de cette relation, et l'humilité rend ce processus possible.L'humilité est une vertu trop souvent tenue pour suspecte, fréquemment réduite à une variante du mysticisme ou assimilée à un dénigrement de soi. Un examen critique de l'humilité permet de réfuter ce lieu commun. L'humilité, qui semble absente du corpus hippocratique et de la philosophie médicale héritée de la Grèce antique, est une vertu morale et intellectuelle, qui se cache derrière la maïeutique socratique et l'éthique aristotélicienne. La critique kantienne de la faculté de juger démontre que l'humilité possède une fonction schématique qui lui permet d'offrir à l'homme une ouverture de son être et de lui dévoiler que la maladie est une épreuve de vie apparentée au sublime.L'étude de plusieurs situations cliniques permet de montrer que l'humilité, prise comme maxime d'action de la pratique médicale, est en mesure de résoudre l'antinomie de la relation thérapeutique. / During the therapeutic relationship wich brings together the doctor and the patient, it sometimes occur that the doctor considers the patient to be cured, though the patient does not feel so, or, on the contrary, that the patient considers to be cured even though the doctor thinks the opposite. This paradoxical situation is what can be called the antinomy of the therapeutic relationship. It is the consequence of the fact that healing is not returning to the state of health prior to the illness, but is the implementation of a new norm of life, process named normativity by Georges Canguilhem.Solving the antinomy of the therapeutic relationship requires to put normativity at the center of this relationship, and humility makes this process possible.Humility is a too often held under suspicion, frequently reduced to a form of mysticism or considered as self-deprecation. A critical examination of humility refutes such a commonly-held opinion. Humility, wich seems excluded from the hippocratical corpus and the philosophy of medicine inherited from ancient Greece, is an intelectual and moral virtue, wich hides behind Socrate's maieutic and Aristotle's ethic. Immanuel Kant's Critique of judgement shows that humility is also a scheme wich allows man an opening of his being and wich reveals to him that illness is a trial of life wich is similar to the sublime.A examination of several clinical cases shows that humility, taken as maxim of action of medical practice, is able to solve the antinomy of therapeutic relationship.

No description available.

How do the media react in the face of a violent phenomenon involving actors both embraced and marginalized by society? One such phenomena – the McArthur murders – encapsulates this dynamic considering how the media explained the murders to their audiences. McArthur, a white LGBTQ+ man, murdered over a seven-year period specifically targeting male victims of South Asian or Middle Eastern descent associated with the LGBTQ+ community and geographic area in Toronto, Canada. The victims embodied a variety of marginalized identities including race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, immigration status and houselessness. It is in this context that this qualitative study finds itself, investigating media coverage of the McArthur murders in two mediums/Canadian outlets. The Toronto Star, Canada’s largest daily newspaper representing newspaper coverage, and a podcast produced by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), Uncover: The Village representing podcast (or audio) media. Considering the context of the McArthur murders and the identities of the actors involved, the study is focused on how normativity and deviancy are constructed through mediatized eyes (or frames). Through a blend of deductive and inductive framing analysis relying on a queer phenomenologically-inspired theoretical framework, the study’s aim is threefold: (1) to uncover what frames are most prevalent across both outlets, (2) to understand, using deductively applied frames, how both outlets construct the events of the McArthur murders and, (3) to understand the interplay between mediatized reification or mitigation of normativity. The analysis found that both newspaper and podcast were most concerned with attributing responsibility in their coverage, which introduced the queer phenomenological understanding of institutions into the analysis, a pattern which continued throughout each deductively applied frame. Moreover, connections to analogous sets of murders in 1970s Toronto broadened the implications of the study across time. Finally, the analysis showed that rather than solely reifying or mitigating normativity, both outlets’ coverage despite similarities and differences, are illustrative of normativity and deviancy’s ongoing orientation towards one another. The conflict between societally standard and aberrant is shown to be a constant over time, after death, and across contexts – a dynamic relationship which has significance for how media scholars might approach cross-medium analyses of complex phenomena in further research.