This study examines the factors to consider in establishing an effective tax Ombudsman in South Africa. It seeks to establish how the democratic protection institutions such as the South African Public Protector and the South African Human Rights Commission and the Courts created in terms of the 1996 Constitution vis-à-vis the ways the South African Revenue Service‟ (hereinafter referred to as SARS) new court rules and Service Monitoring Offices safeguard and protect taxpayers rights against SARS‟ administrative abuses. The researcher reviews and analyses literature gathered from the following sources: the Australian and Canadian tax Ombudsman, the United Kingdom‟s tax adjudicator, the South African motor industry Ombudsman, the South African banking services Ombudsman, the South African Public Protector, the Tax Administration Act (28 of 2011) (hereinafter referred to as the TAA), the South African Constitution (108 of 1996), and other popular scientific articles and reports on the introduction of the tax Ombudsman in South Africa. The findings reveal the core factors that underscore the establishment of an effective tax Ombud in South Africa to include: independence, neutrality, credible review process and confidentiality. Other auxiliary factors with regard to the appointment of the tax Ombud are: leadership skills, honesty, integrity and courage. Furthermore, the provisions of the TAA, in relation to the appointment of the tax Ombud‟s funding, staffing, location, and powers with particular reference to cost recovery and disclosure of taxpayers‟ confidential information, impede on the tax Ombud‟s independence. It also emerged from this study that the independence of the tax Ombud‟s office is being over-emphasised, leaving other pertinent issues of equal importance, such as education and publicity, unattended to. The recommendations for this study revolve on the tax Ombud‟s appointment, budget and recruitment of its own staff, building a reputation of independence through public education and the power to recover costs. / MCom (South African and International Taxation), North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2014

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The recent political conflict in Zimbabwe has attracted the attention of policymakers, academics and the media alike in the neighbouring countries of the region, across the African continent and internationally. While the story of an ageing African liberation hero turned dictator who, through autocratic rule, has governed his country and his people to the ground in order to maintain power is captivating, a key element of the fascination is the critical diplomatic role played by South Africa from 2000 onward. Foreign policy in post-apartheid South Africa on paper is driven by human rights and democracy, conflict prevention and conflict resolution through peaceful means, and the promotion of African interests in world affairs. However, after observing South Africa’s involvement in the Zimbabwe conflict between 2000 and 2009, South Africa’s foreign policy appears to be propelled more by African solidarity and sovereignty, anti-imperialism, and a softer interpretation of preventive diplomacy than its international counterparts. Thabo Mbeki’s preventive diplomacy toward Zimbabwe during his presidency was slow to produce results, lacked transparency and frustrated many, yet, when examined under a preventive diplomacy theoretical lens, Mbeki’s policy did eventually garner success through the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and the formation of an inclusive government in Zimbabwe. This dissertation examines the role of preventive diplomacy in South Africa’s foreign policy toward Zimbabwe under Mbeki’s leadership and determines the point at which South Africa switched from an approach of preventive diplomacy to one of conflict resolution and conflict management. The concept of ‘preventive diplomacy’ is often focused on government-to-government relations or the high level diplomacy of intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN). Multi-track diplomacy expands on this traditional interpretation and considers the preventive diplomacy contributions of a variety of non-state actors to the practice of conflict prevention. This dissertation uniquely moulds the preventive diplomacy theoretical framework of Michael Lund with Kumar Rupesinghe’s concept of multi-track diplomacy to form a more comprehensive illustration of the role of preventive diplomacy in the approach of multiple actors towards the Zimbabwe conflict. The more inclusive preventive diplomacy theoretical framework is then applied to the conflict in Zimbabwe between 2000 and 2009. Through the application of a preventive diplomacy framework which incorporates the concept of multi-track diplomacy it is then possible to observe the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach toward Zimbabwe first between 2000 and 2007 and then as mandated by SADC between 2007 and 2009 and finally compare it with the diplomacy of multi-track actors such as the UN, Zimbabwe-based and South African-based civil society organizations, the Zimbabwean Diaspora, religious groups, and financial institutions. The examination of the larger role of preventive diplomacy in the Zimbabwe conflict situation leads to the understanding that each diplomatic effort is interlinked. Therefore the culminating event of the South African government’s preventive diplomacy approach in the Global Political Agreement could not have been achieved without the preventive diplomacy efforts of a multitude of actors who were also committed to preventing violence and finding a lasting solution to the conflict in Zimbabwe. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Political Sciences / unrestricted