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Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In the last two decades, ambivalence has emerged as one of the primary concerns of attitude researchers. The acknowledgement that individuals can simultaneously evaluate an attitude object as both positive and negative has challenged a number of the status quos of the attitude literature. This thesis utilises an unfolding approach to investigate the implications of ambivalence for the conceptualisation of attitudes and their measurement. Firstly, the assumption that ambivalence is at odds with the bipolar understanding of attitudes was investigated. The results suggested that ambivalence is consistent with bipolarity, whereby ambivalent attitudes are located at the centre of the bipolar dimension. Secondly, attitude scales for the abortion, euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians issues were constructed to reflect this bipolar understanding. The fit of these statements to Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional unfolding theory provided evidence that ambivalence is also consistent with the quantitative conceptualisation of attitudes. Together these results provided further validation of the unfolding approach to attitude measurement. These models alleviate many of the problems faced by the ubiquitous method of summated ratings, including the assessment of ambivalent evaluations. Finally, these scales were used to investigate the latent structure of attitudes and its relationship with meta-psychological judgements of ambivalence. The conclusions drawn from these analyses were limited by a number of issues, highlighting the importance of rigorously considering measurement issues for all attitude parameters. Nonetheless, they presented preliminary validation of these scales’ ability to measure ambivalent evaluations and suggested a systematic relationship between proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension and metapsychological ambivalence. Overall, it is concluded that a number of assumptions regarding the implications of ambivalence are misplaced and the proposed solutions are even more troublesome. Suggestions for future research are made, particularly with respect to differentiating between ambivalent, indifferent and uncertain evaluative states. Furthermore, attitude researchers are encouraged to discard their operationalist biases in order to engage with the measurement issues illuminated throughout this thesis. This is necessary to account for the complexity of the attitude construct, which ambivalence is testament to.

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In the last two decades, ambivalence has emerged as one of the primary concerns of attitude researchers. The acknowledgement that individuals can simultaneously evaluate an attitude object as both positive and negative has challenged a number of the status quos of the attitude literature. This thesis utilises an unfolding approach to investigate the implications of ambivalence for the conceptualisation of attitudes and their measurement. Firstly, the assumption that ambivalence is at odds with the bipolar understanding of attitudes was investigated. The results suggested that ambivalence is consistent with bipolarity, whereby ambivalent attitudes are located at the centre of the bipolar dimension. Secondly, attitude scales for the abortion, euthanasia and Aboriginal Australians issues were constructed to reflect this bipolar understanding. The fit of these statements to Coombs’ (1964) unidimensional unfolding theory provided evidence that ambivalence is also consistent with the quantitative conceptualisation of attitudes. Together these results provided further validation of the unfolding approach to attitude measurement. These models alleviate many of the problems faced by the ubiquitous method of summated ratings, including the assessment of ambivalent evaluations. Finally, these scales were used to investigate the latent structure of attitudes and its relationship with meta-psychological judgements of ambivalence. The conclusions drawn from these analyses were limited by a number of issues, highlighting the importance of rigorously considering measurement issues for all attitude parameters. Nonetheless, they presented preliminary validation of these scales’ ability to measure ambivalent evaluations and suggested a systematic relationship between proximity to the centre of the evaluative dimension and metapsychological ambivalence. Overall, it is concluded that a number of assumptions regarding the implications of ambivalence are misplaced and the proposed solutions are even more troublesome. Suggestions for future research are made, particularly with respect to differentiating between ambivalent, indifferent and uncertain evaluative states. Furthermore, attitude researchers are encouraged to discard their operationalist biases in order to engage with the measurement issues illuminated throughout this thesis. This is necessary to account for the complexity of the attitude construct, which ambivalence is testament to.

The term “pragmatism” has been used and abused by doctrines that are even contradictory among them. For the founder of Pragmatism as a philosophicaltradition, Charles Peirce, this situation might seem a sad misunderstanding, and that is why he came up with the term “pragmaticism” in order to distinguish his own particular version of Pragmatism. However, Peirce himself did not leave a systematic treaty that explained what kind of specific conditions distinguish his pragmatism from other versions. In this essay I introduce some criteria that I deem fundamental to disambiguate the meaning of Pragmatism: (1) the use of the logical principle known as the ‘pragmatic maxim’, upon which the corner stone of the tradition should rest; (2) the need to adopt Scholastic Realism and reject Nominalism; and (3), the operationalist character (as opposed to the inferential character) of Peirce’s pragmatism. In addition, I offer some views avowing that in spite of the differences and distinctions that these criteria establish, there is a core of convergence between the different kinds of pragmatisms present in the philosophical tradition. / Distintas doctrinas, incluso contrapuestas entre sí, presumen de ser una forma de “pragmatismo”. Para el fundador del Pragmatismo en tanto tradición filosófica, Charles Peirce, esta situación puede resultar en una lamentable confusión y, por tanto, acuñó el término de ‘pragmaticismo’ para distinguir su particular versión.Sin embargo, Peirce mismo no escribió un texto sistemático en el que explicara qué criterios específicos distinguen su pragmatismo de cualquier otro. En este texto presento algunos de estos criterios que me parecen fundamentales: (1) el uso de una máxima pragmática sobre la cual ha de descansar el principio lógico que fundamenta la tradición, (2) La necesidad de adoptar el realismo escolástico y rechazar el nominalismo; y (3) El caracter operacionalista, opuesto al inferencialista, del pragmatismo de Peirce. Además, presento algunas opiniones que hacen pensar que a pesar de las distinciones que estos criterios establecen hay un núcleo de convergencia entre los distintos tipos de pragmatismos presentes en la tradición filosófica.

Orientador: Jairo Jose da Silva / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-10T16:01:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bassani_DouglasAntonio_D.pdf: 770300 bytes, checksum: 79e160f3634bdee36d2d52581fd9263d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Resumo: Este trabalho visa apresentar e analisar os fundamentos da concepção operacional de significado proposta por P. W. Bridgman (1881-1965). Começo com o operacionalismo na Física, onde se originou, como tentativa de solução de problemas nos fundamentos. Trato da questão da consistência com a experiência dos conceitos, afirmações e teorias da Física. Em seguida, analiso o operacionalismo na Lógica, na Lógica aplicada em contextos físicos e em contextos matemáticos. Apresento o problema do princípio do terceiro excluído e o papel da verificação das afirmações e das verdades nesse contexto. Essas análises explicitam a proximidade do operacionalismo com o intuicionismo de Brouwer em filosofia da matemática. As conseqüências disso e o caráter operacional da matemática serão detalhadamente abordados no trabalho / Abstract: This paper aims to present and analyze the basis of the operational conception of the meaning proposed by P. W. Bridgman (1881-1965). I begin with the operationalism in Physics, where it was first proposed, as a solution attempt to problems in the foundations. I deal with the question of the consistency with the experience of concepts, affirmations and theories of Physics. Then, I analyze the operationalism in Logic, in the Logic apply in physical contexts and in mathematical contexts. I consider the principle of the excluded middle and the role of the checking of the affirmations and the truths in relation with it. This analysis will render it explicit the proximity of operationalism with Brouwer's intuitionism in the philosophy of the mathematics. The consequences of operationalistic theses for mathematics and the alleged operational character of mathematics will be discussed in details in this paper / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

This thesis focuses on the trajectory of the biomedical concept of virulence from 1880 until the present. Following the concept across disciplinary boundaries, from a longue durée history perspective, it explores how virulence was shaped through two distinct, although sometimes overlapping, “styles of reasoning”. Located at the intersection of several distinct research domains in biology and medicine, the concept of virulence provides, in addition, a window into the complex and changing relations between evolutionary biology and the health sciences (broadly construed) over the past two centuries. Moving back and forth between field experiments and the laboratory, this work examines, through the lens of historical epistemology, the emergence of what I call the molecular and the ecological styles, and their respective conceptual practices. It focuses on the ways in which these styles operationalize the distinction between virulent or avirulent organisms in sometimes opposite sense: Whereas in the molecular (or endogenous) style the expression of virulence is explained by properties of internal structures of the infectious agent (e.g. polysaccharide capsule, virulence gene, or pathogenicity island), the concept of virulence in the ecological (or exogenous) style reflects, in contrast, either a lack of adaptation between two species (avirulence hypothesis) or the existence of one or more ecological compromises between, say, the mode of transmission of a pathogen and its host’s recovery rate (trade-off model). Both styles can be said to originate in the medical bacteriology of the late-nineteenth century, but while the former grew mostly out of the work of Louis Pasteur and Robert Koch in Europe, the latter was primarily shaped by Theobald Smith in the United States. Nearly a century later, the introduction of the category of emerging infectious disease within public health discourses in the mid-1990s facilitated a rapprochement between the two styles that had, so far, remained apart. Employing the 1918–1919 influenza pandemic as an example in which to illustrate the trajectory of the molecular and the ecological approaches, the diversity of explanatory schemes developed to account for the pandemic’s exceptional virulence points toward an unresolved, and yet productive, epistemic tension between the two styles, on the one hand, and the intrinsic polarity of the concept of virulence itself, on the other.

In the search to reduce the various divides between the developed and the developing world, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is seen as an enabler in resource-constrained environments. However, the impact of ICT for Development (ICT4D) implementations is contested, and the ability to facilitate sustained change remains elusive. Sustainability emerged as a key lesson from the failure of early ICT4D projects, and has served as a focal point in facilitating ICT4D success. However, interpretation of the concepts of sustainability and sustainable development seems to be multiple and disconnected from practice, and is rarely translated into a useful construct for guiding project-level actions. The focus of international development is gradually shifting from donated aid towards capability and choice, empowerment, and per-poor initiatives. However, the reality remains that multiple organisations with varying levels of power, resources, and influence determine the outcomes and the sustainability of benefits from a development intervention. This research investigates mechanisms to sustain benefit by exploring the interface between various role players through the lens of decision-making. It builds on the view that the value created by the virtual ‘organisation’ of stakeholders in an ICT4D implementation results from the sum of its decisions, and develops a framework for decision-making with a view on sustaining benefits. The work follows a Design Science Research methodology, comprising an iterative process for the development, testing, and improvement of the framework based on three literature reviews, two case studies, and an expert review. The research answers the primary research question, namely: What are the elements of a framework that support strategic decision-making for the design and implementation of ICT4D interventions in resource-constrained environments, in support of sustained benefit? The knowledge contribution is primarily at the concept and methodological level. In addition to framework development, the decision problem in ICT4D is defined, andthe concept of sustained benefit is proposed as a means of operationalizing sustainability. This research illustrates the role of decision concepts in structuring the complexity of ICT4D problems. It introduces an alternative perspective into the debate on sustainability in ICT4D, and provides a basis for the future development of theory. / Information Systems / D. Litt. et Phil. (Information Systems)

Philosophes et scientifiques ont souvent adopté la version orthodoxe de l’étalonnage qui consiste à normaliser un instrument en utilisant un phénomène connu. Le lien essentiel entre concepts théoriques et données empiriques, en philosophie de la mesure, a engendré la formulation de principes de coordination, synthétiques a priori, et révisables. La pensée opérationaliste a voulu limiter l’étendue des concepts aux opérations de mesure effectivement réalisables. La perspective cohérentiste en philosophie de la mesure a opéré une récupération de l’épistémologie coordinationniste et de l’opérationalisme, en s’appuyant sur un nombre minime de principes ontologiques. Les modèles d’un instrument impliquent un engagement à la séparation entre les théories idéalisées et les choses matérielles. Toutefois, philosophes et métrologues ont préconisé l’exigence d’un riche contenu théorique dans la modélisation des instruments de mesure. Selon d’autres contributions, le privilège épistémique de la mesure précède une théorie d’arrière-plan et sa robustesse réside dans le libre contact avec les données empiriques. De plus, le régime d’applicabilité d’une théorie dicte ses conditions aux limites, qui guident l’expérimentateur dans la conception d’instruments de mesure et fournissent le fondement de l’opérationnalisation du sens des termes théoriques. Je soutiens un pluralisme opérationnel, des opérations de mesure impliquant différents indicateurs physiques, accompagné d'un cohérentisme dynamique. Le programme d’étalonnage du télescope spatial James Webb est un cas significatif. Les observations des étoiles d’étalonnage par différents procédés sont utilisées pour calculer les facteurs qui convertissent une mesure en unités instrumentales en unités physiques. / Philosophers and scientists have often adopted the orthodox version of calibration which involves standardizing an instrument using a known phenomenon. The essential link between theoretical concepts and empirical data, in the philosophy of measurement, has generated the formulation of principles of coordination, synthetic a priori, and revisables. Operationalist thinking wanted to limit the scope of concepts to operations of measurement that are actually achievable. The coherentist perspective in the philosophy of measurement has operated a recovery of coordinationist epistemology and operationalism, relying on a minimal number of ontological principles. Models of an instrument involve a commitment to separation between idealized theories and material things. However, philosophers and metrologists have advocated the requirement of a rich theoretical content in the modeling of measuring instruments. According to other contributions, the epistemic privilege of measurement precedes a background theory and its robustness lies in the free contact with empirical data. Moreover, the applicability regime of a theory dictates its boundary conditions, which guide the experimenter in the design of measuring instruments and provide the basis for operationalizing the meaning of theoretical terms. I support operational pluralism, measurement operations involving different physical indicators, accompanied by dynamic coherentism. The James Webb Space Telescope calibration program is a significant case. Observations of calibration stars by various methods are used to calculate the factors that convert a measurement in instrumental units to physical units.

The thesis deals with significant moments in the relationship between methodology of economics and implications of the financial crisis culminating in 2008 and 2009. Its key insight rests upon the claim that some theoretical concepts developed within mainstream economics do not tackle the reality adequately and contributed in a significant way to the sequence of events leading to the financial crisis. Most of those concepts were introduced in the second half of the 20th century, during a "high tide" of positivistic ideas in the domain of methodology of mainstream economics. Though the same ideas had been already discredited to a large extent by the philosophy of science at the time, mainstream economists did not reflect it satisfactorily. Aside from a historical expose the thesis consists also of an outline of a possible future development of the prevailing form of economic theory; four scenarios of future potential development are presented. In the final parts of the thesis, which are focused more specifically, the author appraises negatively options of the Austrian School as well as post-Keynesianism to influence in a more significant manner the mainstream economics during the post-crisis era.