A partir do exame da formação e identificação da norma consuetudinária, consoante os pressupostos da teoria dos dois elementos, investiga-se a índole consuetudinária das intervenções humanitárias no contexto do Direito Internacional Contemporâneo, a fim de verificar se tais práticas estatais teriam se constituído em um costume internacional e, por conseguinte, se elas ampliaram o rol das exceções ao princípio da proibição do uso da força pelos Estados nas relações internacionais esculpido no artigo 2 (4) da Carta das Nações Unidas. Dada a polissemia existente para a expressão intervenção humanitária, esta pode ser compreendida como o recurso à força armada por um Estado, ou grupo de Estados, para além das suas fronteiras, conforme discricionariedade própria, ou seja, sem a autorização do CSNU, com o propósito de cessar práticas em largas escalas, persistentes e generalizadas, comissivas ou omissivas, de graves violações dos Direito Humanos e Internacional Humanitário. A partir da apuração dos elementos que conformam esse conceito estabelecido, do exame dos casos de ocorrência e das justificativas legais apresentadas pelos Estados interventores para essa prática interventiva, conjugado com a reação dos demais Estados à essa conduta, por uma considerável e persistente falta de expresso reconhecimento do caráter de direito para a intervenção humanitária, é possível afirmar que os Estados sucessivamente reafirmaram o reconhecimento do princípio da interdição do uso da força pelos Estados nas suas relações internacionais e, que nos quadros do Direito Internacional contemporâneo, a este tipo de intervenção não é um costume internacional porque carece de opinio iuris. / From the examination of the formation and identification of international customary, depending on the assumptions of the theory of the two elements, investigates the customary nature of humanitarian interventions in the context of Contemporary International Law, in order to verify whether such State practice would have incurred an international custom and, therefore, if they expanded the list of exceptions to the principle of prohibition of the use of force in international relations States carved in article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Given the existing polysemy for the term humanitarian intervention, this can be understood as the use of armed force by a State or group of States, beyond its borders, according to own discretion, i.e. without the permission of the UNSC, to cease practices in wide ranges, persistent and widespread, comissivas or omissivas, of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The examination of the elements that make up this concept established and the cases and legal justifications submitted by States interveners to this practice interventional, combined with the reaction of other States that conduct by a considerable and persistent lack of expressed recognition of the character of the right to humanitarian intervention, it is possible to affirm that the States successively reaffirmed recognition of the principle of prohibition of the use of force by States in their international relations and, that in the frames of contemporary international law, this type of intervention is not a customary international because lacks opinio iuris.

A partir do exame da formação e identificação da norma consuetudinária, consoante os pressupostos da teoria dos dois elementos, investiga-se a índole consuetudinária das intervenções humanitárias no contexto do Direito Internacional Contemporâneo, a fim de verificar se tais práticas estatais teriam se constituído em um costume internacional e, por conseguinte, se elas ampliaram o rol das exceções ao princípio da proibição do uso da força pelos Estados nas relações internacionais esculpido no artigo 2 (4) da Carta das Nações Unidas. Dada a polissemia existente para a expressão intervenção humanitária, esta pode ser compreendida como o recurso à força armada por um Estado, ou grupo de Estados, para além das suas fronteiras, conforme discricionariedade própria, ou seja, sem a autorização do CSNU, com o propósito de cessar práticas em largas escalas, persistentes e generalizadas, comissivas ou omissivas, de graves violações dos Direito Humanos e Internacional Humanitário. A partir da apuração dos elementos que conformam esse conceito estabelecido, do exame dos casos de ocorrência e das justificativas legais apresentadas pelos Estados interventores para essa prática interventiva, conjugado com a reação dos demais Estados à essa conduta, por uma considerável e persistente falta de expresso reconhecimento do caráter de direito para a intervenção humanitária, é possível afirmar que os Estados sucessivamente reafirmaram o reconhecimento do princípio da interdição do uso da força pelos Estados nas suas relações internacionais e, que nos quadros do Direito Internacional contemporâneo, a este tipo de intervenção não é um costume internacional porque carece de opinio iuris. / From the examination of the formation and identification of international customary, depending on the assumptions of the theory of the two elements, investigates the customary nature of humanitarian interventions in the context of Contemporary International Law, in order to verify whether such State practice would have incurred an international custom and, therefore, if they expanded the list of exceptions to the principle of prohibition of the use of force in international relations States carved in article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations. Given the existing polysemy for the term humanitarian intervention, this can be understood as the use of armed force by a State or group of States, beyond its borders, according to own discretion, i.e. without the permission of the UNSC, to cease practices in wide ranges, persistent and widespread, comissivas or omissivas, of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The examination of the elements that make up this concept established and the cases and legal justifications submitted by States interveners to this practice interventional, combined with the reaction of other States that conduct by a considerable and persistent lack of expressed recognition of the character of the right to humanitarian intervention, it is possible to affirm that the States successively reaffirmed recognition of the principle of prohibition of the use of force by States in their international relations and, that in the frames of contemporary international law, this type of intervention is not a customary international because lacks opinio iuris.

O objetivo desta tese é determinar se é possível considerar as obras de decisiones como um gênero específico da literatura jurídica portuguesa no Antigo regime, para, em seguida, tentar traçar um perfil das características e dos elementos que as diferenciem dos demais gêneros doutrinários, especialmente dos consilia. O trabalho foi dividido em três partes. A primeira será dedicada aos pressupostos da discussão, que envolvem a opinio communis e a pluralidade de contribuições doutrinárias, característica fundamental do ius commune, e o desenvolvimento da alta jurisdição na Europa do final do Medievo e no começo da Modernidade, focando na tensão entre a indeterminação do direito certo e a existência de tribunais com poderes de decidir em última instância. Em seguida, serão apresentadas as principais características das decisiones no contexto europeu, partindo da comparação entre as obras dos autores mais importantes, como Matthaeus De Afflictis, Guido Papa, Octavianus Cacherano dOsasco, etc, e diferenciando essas obras de gêneros próximos. A segunda parte consistirá na análise aprofundada das obras dos seis mais importantes autores de decisiones em Portugal entre os séculos XVI e XVII (António da Gama, Álvaro Valasco, Jorge de Cabedo, Belchior Febo, Gabriel Pereira de Castro e António de Sousa de Macedo). De cada uma das obras se falará sobre a biografia do autor, os aspectos gerais da obra (quantidade de edições e locais de impressão, por exemplo), a estrutura formal dos textos, o uso dos fundamentos para a construção da argumentação (precedentes, legislação e doutrina) e as matérias abordadas nas decisiones. Por fim, a terceira parte tentará estabelecer as relações entre as decisiones portuguesas do período e o Brasil colonial. / The main purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not are the decisiones a specific genre in Portuguese legal literature during the Ancient Régime, and then try to describe the most important characteristics and elements that differentiate them from other doctrinal genres. This work is divided into three parts. The first one will deal with the premises of this text, the opinion communis and its plurality of doctrinal works, which was a key feature of ius commune, and the development of high jurisdiction in Europe at the end of Middle Ages and Early Modernity; the focus will be the tension between indeterminacy of ius certum and the existence of certain courts with powers to decide ultimately. Then the main features of European decisiones will be presented from the comparison among the works of the most importante authors such as Matthaeus De Afflictis, Guido Papa, Octavianus Cacherano dOsasco, etc, and later distinguishing these works from some similar genres. The second part will consist in an analysis of the six most important Portuguese works on decisiones during 16th and 17th centuries (António da Gama, Álvaro Valasco, Jorge de Cabedo, Belchior Febo, Gabriel Pereira de Castro and António de Sousa de Macedo); each analyse will approach the following points: authors biography, general aspects of the book (amount of editions and place of the printings, for exemple), the formal strucute of the texts, the arguments in which the decisiones are grounded (Case Law, Statutes/Statutory Law and legal literature) and the subject of the decisio (Public Law, Civil Procedure, Private Law and Criminal Law). Finally, the third part will try to establish the relationship between the Portuguese decisiones and Colonial Brazil.

O objetivo desta tese é determinar se é possível considerar as obras de decisiones como um gênero específico da literatura jurídica portuguesa no Antigo regime, para, em seguida, tentar traçar um perfil das características e dos elementos que as diferenciem dos demais gêneros doutrinários, especialmente dos consilia. O trabalho foi dividido em três partes. A primeira será dedicada aos pressupostos da discussão, que envolvem a opinio communis e a pluralidade de contribuições doutrinárias, característica fundamental do ius commune, e o desenvolvimento da alta jurisdição na Europa do final do Medievo e no começo da Modernidade, focando na tensão entre a indeterminação do direito certo e a existência de tribunais com poderes de decidir em última instância. Em seguida, serão apresentadas as principais características das decisiones no contexto europeu, partindo da comparação entre as obras dos autores mais importantes, como Matthaeus De Afflictis, Guido Papa, Octavianus Cacherano dOsasco, etc, e diferenciando essas obras de gêneros próximos. A segunda parte consistirá na análise aprofundada das obras dos seis mais importantes autores de decisiones em Portugal entre os séculos XVI e XVII (António da Gama, Álvaro Valasco, Jorge de Cabedo, Belchior Febo, Gabriel Pereira de Castro e António de Sousa de Macedo). De cada uma das obras se falará sobre a biografia do autor, os aspectos gerais da obra (quantidade de edições e locais de impressão, por exemplo), a estrutura formal dos textos, o uso dos fundamentos para a construção da argumentação (precedentes, legislação e doutrina) e as matérias abordadas nas decisiones. Por fim, a terceira parte tentará estabelecer as relações entre as decisiones portuguesas do período e o Brasil colonial. / The main purpose of this thesis is to determine whether or not are the decisiones a specific genre in Portuguese legal literature during the Ancient Régime, and then try to describe the most important characteristics and elements that differentiate them from other doctrinal genres. This work is divided into three parts. The first one will deal with the premises of this text, the opinion communis and its plurality of doctrinal works, which was a key feature of ius commune, and the development of high jurisdiction in Europe at the end of Middle Ages and Early Modernity; the focus will be the tension between indeterminacy of ius certum and the existence of certain courts with powers to decide ultimately. Then the main features of European decisiones will be presented from the comparison among the works of the most importante authors such as Matthaeus De Afflictis, Guido Papa, Octavianus Cacherano dOsasco, etc, and later distinguishing these works from some similar genres. The second part will consist in an analysis of the six most important Portuguese works on decisiones during 16th and 17th centuries (António da Gama, Álvaro Valasco, Jorge de Cabedo, Belchior Febo, Gabriel Pereira de Castro and António de Sousa de Macedo); each analyse will approach the following points: authors biography, general aspects of the book (amount of editions and place of the printings, for exemple), the formal strucute of the texts, the arguments in which the decisiones are grounded (Case Law, Statutes/Statutory Law and legal literature) and the subject of the decisio (Public Law, Civil Procedure, Private Law and Criminal Law). Finally, the third part will try to establish the relationship between the Portuguese decisiones and Colonial Brazil.

La tesi mira a verificare l'effettiva esistenza del diritto umano all'acqua potabile. A questo fine viene studiata l'evoluzione del pensiero giuridico sull'accesso all'acqua potabile attraverso i principali strumenti di soft law, i le posizioni della dottrina e della giurisprudenza. Dal momento che l'accesso all'acqua potabile non compare nelle principali convenzioni dedicate ai diritti umani viene studiato il processo inferenziale che ha portato buona parte della dottrina a sostenere l'esistenza di tale diritto. Una volta individuato una comune definizione di diritto all'acqua, se ne analizzano le componenti, le obbligazioni ad esso relative e i legami tra tale diritto e gli altri diritti umani; a questo proposito viene proposta una breve analisi dell'esistenza di un diritto di accesso a fini agricoli. La conclusione si articola intorno all'ipotesi di un processo consuetudinario di formazione del diritto. Particolare attenzione a questo riguardo è posto sulle opinio iuris degli Stati che si sono espressi sul diritto all'acqua nelle più recenti risoluzioni dell'Assemblea Generale delle Nazioni Unite e del Consiglio per i Diritti dell'Uomo. / This thesis aims to investigate the existence of a human right to safe and potable water within the international law. As none of the main covenant related to human rights explicitly mentions the right to water, an inferential process used by doctrine had to be analysed in order to verify whether it was consistent with the purpose of affirming the existence of such a human right. Also main instruments of soft law have been studied. Particularly the latest resolution of the United Nations General Assembly and Human Rights Council have been accurately studied in order to verify the existence of a common "opinio iuris" among States. We consider that today a common opinion has actually emerged and therefore we suggest in conclusion to address a future research on the issue towards the analysis of State practices in order to verify the emerging of a customary right.

Paprotys - vienas reikšmingiausių ir seniausių teisės šaltinių. Kartu, nepaisant egzistuojančių priešingų nuomonių, tai vienas reikšmingiausių tarptautinės teisės šaltinių. Tarptautinį paprotį sudaro du elementai: 1. objektyvus - valstybių praktika, kuri turi atitikti bendrumo, vieningumo, nuoseklumo, trukmės reikalavimus; 2. subjektyvus - atitinkamos praktikos pripažinimas teisiškai privaloma. Abu minėti elementai yra reikšmingi ir būtini paprotinės normos susiformavimui. Kartu tarptautinis paprotys yra glaudžiai susijęs su "pastovaus prieštarautojo", "greito" papročio bei jus cogens normų doktrinomis. Pažymėtina, jog, nepaisant egzistuojančių kodifikavimo tendencijų, tarptautinis paprotys išlieka reikšmingu tarptautinės teisės šaltiniu. / Custom is one of the oldest and widely recognized legal sources. In addition, despite existing different approaches, custom is considered to be one of the most significant legal sources of international law. International custom consists of two elements: 1. objective - state practice, which must also fulfill the requirements of consistency, repetition, duration and generality; 2. subjective - the recognition of certain practice as legally binding. Both above mentioned elements are of significant importance in the formation of customary rule. International custom is also closely related to the doctrines of "persistent objector", "instant" custom and jus cogens norms. Finally, it must be noticed that, despite the existing codification tendencies, international custom still remains a very important source of international law.

Magister Legum - LLM / Even though sexual violence has always been a part and parcel of conflicts and atrocities throughout the ages, it never found any interpretation by subsequent tribunals who were responsible for prosecuting offenders.The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first of its kind to give jurisprudential recognition and interpretation to sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide respectively. This case was important for the following reasons:1. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to an act of genocide; 2. It acknowledged that sexual violence can amount to a crime against humanity; and 3. It was the first case to define rape within an international context.Following the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu many tribunals gave recognition to the extent of which sexual violence takes place during atrocities by correctly convicting accused for either participating in sexual violence or aiding and abetting to sexual violence. Amidst the various interpretations on what constitutes sexual violence and how it is defined, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone all either conceptualised sexual violence as genocide, war crimes or/ and crimes against humanity.At the same time, the development of sexual violence as either a crime against humanity or a war crime did not end with the courts. The case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu sparked a fire in the international community, which led to it paying more attention to the place of sexual violence in treaty law. Taking into account that rape is listed as a crime against humanity in both the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda statutes, the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the International Criminal Court statutes both list more than one form of sexual violence as a crime against humanity. It is interesting to note that the latter two treaty developments took place only after the International Criminal Tribunal conceptualised sexual violence as a crime against humanity.Thus apart from merely listing rape as a crime against humanity, the Statute establishing the Special Court for Sierra Leone, states in article 2(g) that sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy and any other form of sexual violence constitutes a crime against humanity. The Statute establishing the International Criminal Court states in article 7(1)(g) that rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity constitutes a crime against humanity. The interpretation of these acts is further guided by the ‘Elements of Crimes’ which are annexed to the International Criminal Court statute.Once again it is interesting to note that the ‘Elements of Crimes’ for these acts are similar to how the International Criminal Tribunals (both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals) conceptualised various acts of sexual violence.On the other hand, the definition of genocide remained the same as it was defined in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. This definition does not expressly mention any form of sexual violence as a form of genocide.However, once again, the trial chamber in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu set the benchmark for sexual violence to constitute a form of genocide by way of interpretation. The definition of genocide did not subsequently change in the Statute establishing the International Criminal Court.Based on these premises, this thesis attempts to investigate the similarities and differences in sexual violence as a form of both genocide and a crime against humanity,by addressing the following question:What are the essential and practical differences between sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide and what is the legal effect of the differences, should there be any? Chapter 1 highlights the historical overview and developments of sexual violence as genocide and crimes against humanity, while chapter 2 investigates how sexual violence can amount to a form of genocide. Chapter 3 assesses the advances made in sexual violence as a crime against humanity, while chapter 4 importantly draws a comparative analysis between sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity. Chapter 4 draws this comparison by weighing up four differences and four similarities in sexual violence as genocide and a crime against humanity.Chapter 5 highlights the conclusion and provides an answer for the research question that is posed above. Here it is concluded that even though there exist multiple differences in sexual violence as crimes against humanity and genocide, there are also multiple similarities which could possibly amount to a better chance for conviction of an accused under a crime against humanity than genocide. Chapter 5 also provide possible recommendations for the consequences that might flow should sexual violence as a crime against humanity be fairly similar to sexual violence as genocide.

The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.

zweimal im Jahr erscheinende Zeitschrift über aktuelle Themen der TU Chemnitz, ergänzt von Sonderheft(en)

zweimal im Jahr erscheinende Zeitschrift über aktuelle Themen der TU Chemnitz, ergänzt von Sonderheft(en)