Dans une économie globalisée actuelle, où l’environnement entrepreneurial est défini comme incertain et turbulent, les entreprises choisissent les stratégies de coopétition pour avoir des avantages et performances. Mais, selon la littérature spécialisée, si les avantages et les performances, sont mis en avant pour justifier la pertinence des stratégies de coopétition, la notion d’opportunisme du partenaire est elle aussi largement investie et identifiée par des recherches comme un frein à la coopétition. C’est de cette façon, qu’on peut constater dans cette littérature, deux thèses différenciées qui caractérisent les analyses sur la coopétition ; une relation entre concurrents, source de performances hors normes et une relation fragile et instable à tout instant, à raison de l’opportunisme présumé du partenaire. L’opportunisme du partenaire s’avère particulièrement problématique en ce qu’il conduirait à limiter les performances et avantages attendus de la coopétition. L’objectif de cette recherche est d’établir un lien entre la performance de la coopétition et le capital social. Partant de l’opportunisme du partenaire, nous avons posé que la performance d’une coopétition est fonction de deux préalables : la réduction de l’opportunisme et l’augmentation de l’engagement des acteurs en relation. Une étude empirique est menée auprès des coopétitions des TPE minières exploitant le diamant au Kasaï, en République Démocratique du Congo. Une méthodologie qualitative permet le recueil des données par entretiens semi-directs, puis l’exploitation des termes des discours en se servant de l’outil lexicometrique, « Iramuteq ». L’objectif est de repérer les éléments déterminés de manière théorique, et qui traduisent soit les enjeux de la coopétition pour les TPE d’un environnement difficile, soit la pertinence du capital social dans la performance de la coopétition. Des liens établis entre la réduction de l’opportunisme, l’augmentation de l’engagement et les avantages tirés de la coopétition avec le capital social, constituent l’apport de cette recherche. Apport qui concerne les connaissances tant en management de la coopétition, que relatives aux TPE de contexte difficile. La variable-clé, « opportunisme » du partenaire, est la source du lien constaté entre la performance de la coopétition et le capital social. La logique suivie se décline en réponse aux interrogations formulées dans la littérature par différents auteurs au sujet de l’opportunsme qui conduit à la fragilité et à l’instabilité de la coopétition. Ce qui nous autorise de formuler un modèle vertueux de la performance de la coopétition par le capital social. A l’issu de notre étude empirique, une discussion sur des implications managériales est menée, aboutissant à une forme spécifique de coopétition mobilisant deux niveaux de réseau et des préconisations sont envisagées. / In today’s global economy, where the entrepreneurial environment is defined as uncertain and turbulent, companies choses coopétition strategies to have advantage and performance. But, according to the specialized literature, if the advantage and the performance are highlighted to justify the relevance of the strategies of coopetition, the notion of opportunism of the partner is also widely invested and identified by research as a brake on coopetition. It is in this way that we can see in this literature two differentiated theses which goods the analyses on coopetition; a relationship between competitors, a source of exceptional performance and a fragile and unstable relationship at all times, on account of the supposed opportunism of the partner. The opportunism of the partner is particularly problematic in that it would lead to limiting the performance and advantages from expected coopetition. The aim of the research is to establish a link between the performance of coopetition and social capital. Based on the opportunism of the partner, we have posited that the performance of a coopetition depends on two prerequisites: the reduction of opportunism and the increase in the commitment of the actors in relationships. Year empirical study is being carried out on the coopetition of very small mining companies of diamond in kasaï in Democratic Republic of Congo. A qualitative methodology allows the collection of data by semi direct interviews and the operation of the terms of speech using the lexicon metric tool “Iramuteq”. The objective is to identify the theoretically determined elements, which reflect either the stakes of coopétition for very small mining companies in a difficult environment or the relevance of social capital in the performance of coopetition. The link between the reduction of opportunism, the increase in commitment and the advantages of coopetition with social capital are the contribution of the research, contribution that concerns the knowledge both in management if coopetition, and relating to the very small mining companies of difficult context. The key variable “opportunism” of the partner is the source of the link between the performance of coopetition and social capital. The logic followed us in response to the questions raised in the literature by different authors about the risk of opportunism that leads to the fragility and instability of coopetition. This allows us to formulate a virtuous model of the performance of coopetition through social capital. At the end of our empirical study, a discussion on managerial implications is conducted; leading to a specific form of coopetition invoicing two levels of network and recommendations are envisaged.

As negociações na fase pré-contratual permitem às partes determinarem de que forma certa operação econômica será concretizada e cumprida por cada um dos particulares, materializando-se como importante ferramenta para as partes estabelecerem, consensual e racionalmente, as melhores alternativas em termos de eficiência que estão à disposição. Inexistem rigidez e regramento específico no processo negocial, estando seu desenvolvimento submetido aos interesses e às pretensões de cada um dos negociantes, e o seu resultado varia de acordo com o tipo de negociação, as estratégias adotadas e o poder de barganha individual. Não obstante, há outros fatores que também condicionam o desenrolar e o desfecho deste processo, mas em geral impedindo a obtenção de resultados tão benéficos quanto os que poderiam ser alcançados em um paralelo livre de ineficiências. Em um mundo factual as partes precisam lidar com as adversidades existentes nas negociações se desejarem concluir o contrato e dele se beneficiar, seja por meio de medidas particulares ou por intermédio de soluções regulatórias, as quais têm a missão de fornecerem adequados incentivos para sua aplicação tornar-se socialmente desejável. Além disso, em virtude de as negociações serem norteadas pela autonomia de vontade e liberdade contratual, sem deveres de vinculação, os atos de exercício destes direitos devem ser medidos para que não produzam lesões ao patrimônio jurídico dos demais envolvidos nas tratativas. Tal controle é exercido pela incidência da boa-fé objetiva na fase pré-contratual, a qual impõe deveres de conduta aos particulares durante as negociações. Também é a regra da boa-fé o supedâneo da responsabilidade civil para recomposição dos prejuízos advindos de situações que malfiram a confiança gerada ao longo das tratativas, daí que o conteúdo da indenização nestas hipóteses deve considerar as justas expectativas criadas pelas partes e ser balizado para que o lesado não acabe em situação melhor do que estaria se o eventual contrato tivesse sido concluído e integralmente cumprido. / Negotiations in the pre-contractual stage allow the parties to determine how a certain economic operation will be carried out and fulfilled by each of the individuals, and is an important tool for the parties to establish, in a consensual and rational manner, the best alternatives available in terms of efficiency. There is no rigidity or specific regulation in the negotiation process, in such way that its development is submitted to the interests and the pretensions of each one of the traders, and its result varies according to the type of negotiation, strategies adopted and individual bargaining power. There are other factors that also condition the unfolding and outcome of this process, but generally preventing the achievement of results as beneficial as those that could be achieved in an inefficiency-free parallel. In a factual world, the parties need to deal with the adversities in the negotiations if they wish to conclude the contract and benefit from it, either through particular measures or through regulatory solutions, which have the task of providing adequate incentives so that their implementation is socially desirable. Moreover, because the negotiations are guided by the autonomy of will and contractual freedom, without binding obligations, the exercise of these rights must be measured so that they do not produce damages to the legal patrimony of others involved in the negotiations. Such control is exercised by the incidence of objective good faith in the pre-contractual phase, which imposes conduct duties on individuals during the negotiations. It is also the rule of good faith the foundation of civil liability for the recovery of damages arising from situations that mislead the confidence generated during the negotiations, hence the content of compensation in these cases must consider the fair expectations created by the parties and be restricted so that the injured party does not end up in a better situation than it would have been if the contract had been completed and fully complied with.

As negociações na fase pré-contratual permitem às partes determinarem de que forma certa operação econômica será concretizada e cumprida por cada um dos particulares, materializando-se como importante ferramenta para as partes estabelecerem, consensual e racionalmente, as melhores alternativas em termos de eficiência que estão à disposição. Inexistem rigidez e regramento específico no processo negocial, estando seu desenvolvimento submetido aos interesses e às pretensões de cada um dos negociantes, e o seu resultado varia de acordo com o tipo de negociação, as estratégias adotadas e o poder de barganha individual. Não obstante, há outros fatores que também condicionam o desenrolar e o desfecho deste processo, mas em geral impedindo a obtenção de resultados tão benéficos quanto os que poderiam ser alcançados em um paralelo livre de ineficiências. Em um mundo factual as partes precisam lidar com as adversidades existentes nas negociações se desejarem concluir o contrato e dele se beneficiar, seja por meio de medidas particulares ou por intermédio de soluções regulatórias, as quais têm a missão de fornecerem adequados incentivos para sua aplicação tornar-se socialmente desejável. Além disso, em virtude de as negociações serem norteadas pela autonomia de vontade e liberdade contratual, sem deveres de vinculação, os atos de exercício destes direitos devem ser medidos para que não produzam lesões ao patrimônio jurídico dos demais envolvidos nas tratativas. Tal controle é exercido pela incidência da boa-fé objetiva na fase pré-contratual, a qual impõe deveres de conduta aos particulares durante as negociações. Também é a regra da boa-fé o supedâneo da responsabilidade civil para recomposição dos prejuízos advindos de situações que malfiram a confiança gerada ao longo das tratativas, daí que o conteúdo da indenização nestas hipóteses deve considerar as justas expectativas criadas pelas partes e ser balizado para que o lesado não acabe em situação melhor do que estaria se o eventual contrato tivesse sido concluído e integralmente cumprido. / Negotiations in the pre-contractual stage allow the parties to determine how a certain economic operation will be carried out and fulfilled by each of the individuals, and is an important tool for the parties to establish, in a consensual and rational manner, the best alternatives available in terms of efficiency. There is no rigidity or specific regulation in the negotiation process, in such way that its development is submitted to the interests and the pretensions of each one of the traders, and its result varies according to the type of negotiation, strategies adopted and individual bargaining power. There are other factors that also condition the unfolding and outcome of this process, but generally preventing the achievement of results as beneficial as those that could be achieved in an inefficiency-free parallel. In a factual world, the parties need to deal with the adversities in the negotiations if they wish to conclude the contract and benefit from it, either through particular measures or through regulatory solutions, which have the task of providing adequate incentives so that their implementation is socially desirable. Moreover, because the negotiations are guided by the autonomy of will and contractual freedom, without binding obligations, the exercise of these rights must be measured so that they do not produce damages to the legal patrimony of others involved in the negotiations. Such control is exercised by the incidence of objective good faith in the pre-contractual phase, which imposes conduct duties on individuals during the negotiations. It is also the rule of good faith the foundation of civil liability for the recovery of damages arising from situations that mislead the confidence generated during the negotiations, hence the content of compensation in these cases must consider the fair expectations created by the parties and be restricted so that the injured party does not end up in a better situation than it would have been if the contract had been completed and fully complied with.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Neste trabalho tivemos como objetivo caracterizar a dieta, uso do habitat e padrões comportamentais de Astyanax taeniatus da bacia do Rio Mato Grosso, que encontra-se na porção leste do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (22 52 S; 42 40 W e 22 53 S; 42 34 W). Para a análise da dieta, os exemplares foram coletados bimestralmente entre março de 2006 e janeiro de 2007 em três localidades que diferiram pelas variáveis físicas. As observações de uso dos recursos do habitat foram realizadas por observação subaquática, na posição focal dos exemplares avistados, enquanto a quantificação da disponibilidade foi realizada em 50 quadrats de 20x20cm (400cm2) ao longo dos mesmos 50m onde foi realizada a observação sub-aquática. A análise do conteúdo estomacal de 651 exemplares foi realizada sob microscópio estereoscópico de acordo com métodos qualitativos e quantitativos (Freqüência de Ocorrência e Volumétrica). A participação relativa de cada item registrado nos estômagos em relação à totalidade da dieta foi analisada através do Índice Alimentar (IAi). Para verificar possíveis diferenças entre as proporções dos itens de origem animal e vegetal, autóctone e alóctone, os valores proporcionais foram testados pelo 2 de contingência. A partir dos dados de comprimento padrão e comprimento do intestino, foi calculado o valor do quociente intestinal. Os itens de origem vegetal tiveram maior contribuição na dieta da espécie para as localidades com maior altitude, enquanto os itens animais tiveram maior contribuição na localidade baixa. A diferença na contribuição dos itens de origem autóctone e alóctone também foi significativa. Na dieta de jovens e adultos, houve diferença significativa na contribuição de itens de origem vegetal e animal somente na localidade mais alta, onde os adultos consumiram maior quantidade de matéria vegetal. Os valores médios de quociente intestinal em jovens e adultos foram significativamente diferentes nas localidades de maior altitude, com valores maiores para indivíduos adultos. Observamos 52% dos indivíduos em profundidades entre 30 e 45 cm, 72% em áreas de rápido, 72% em velocidades entre 0 e 0,5km/h, 66% encontravam-se distantes da margem entre 40 e 120 cm, 37,6% em substrato do tipo areia e 34,4% em substrato do tipo pedra. De todos os padrões comportamentais observados, aquele que mais se destacou foi o forrageamento, onde 70,91% dos indivíduos estavam forrageando no meio da coluna dágua. Os resultados da dieta reforçam a idéia de as espécies de Astyanax têm hábito alimentar onívoro e oportunista, onde a espécie alimentou-se dos recursos disponíveis no ambiente evidenciando sua alta plasticidade alimentar ao longo do riacho. Espécies do gênero Astyanax são consideradas generalistas em relação ao uso do habitat e altamente ativas, corroborando com os resultados do presente estudo. / In this work we aimed to characterize the diet, habitat use and behavior patterns of Astyanax taeniatus at Mato Grosso River Basin. This basin is located in the eastern portion of the State of Rio de Janeiro (22 52 'S; 42 40' W and 22 53 'S; 42 34' W). For the diet analysis, the specimens were collected bimonthly between March 2006 and January 2007 in three locations that differed by physical variables. Observations of resource "use" on the habitat were made by underwater observations, on the focal position of the specimens, while the quantification of resource "availability" was performed in 50 quadrats 20x20cm (400cm2) over the same 50m where the underwater observation was made. The analysis of stomach contents of 651 specimens was performed under a stereomicroscope according to qualitative and quantitative methods (Frequency of Occurrence and Volumetric). The proportional contribution of each item recorded in the stomachs for the whole diet was assessed through the Alimentary Index (IAi). To verify possible differences between the proportions of items of animal and vegetable, autochthonous and allochthonous, we used 2 contingency test. From the data of standard length and length of the intestine, we calculated the value of intestinal quotient. Items of plant origin were the major contributors in the diet of the species for locations with higher altitude, while the animal items were the major contributors in the low altitude locality. The difference in the contribution of autochthonous items and allochthonous was also significant. In the diet of youngers and adults, there was a difference in the contribution of items of plant and animal origin only in the highest location, where adults consumed greater amount of vegetable detritus. Mean values of intestinal quotient in youngers and adults were significantly different in places of higher altitude, with higher values for adults. We observed 52% of the individuals at depths between 30 and 45 cm, 72% in areas of rapid, 72% at water velocities between 0 and 0.5 km / h, 66% were distant from the margin between 40 and 120 cm, 37.6 % in the sand substrate and 34.4% in substrate with stones. Of all the behavioral patterns, the one that stood out was the foraging, where 70.91% of individuals were foraging in the middle of the water column. Diet results reinforce the idea of the Astyanax species are omnivorous and opportunistic, where the specie fed the resources available in their environment showing high feeding plasticity along the stream. Species of the genus Astyanax are considered generalists in relation to habitat use and highly active, corroborating the results of this study.

This paper proposes an agency model for headquarters subsidiary relationships in multinational organizations with headquarters as the principal and the subsidiary as the agent. As a departure from classical agency theory, our model is developed for the unit level of analysis and considers two root causes of the agency problem - self-interest and bounded rationality. We argue that in the organizational setting, one cannot assume absolute self-interest and perfect rationality of agents (subsidiaries) but should allow them to vary. We explain subsidiary level variation through a set of internal organizational and external social conditions in which the headquarters-subsidiary agency dyad is embedded. We then discuss several agency scenarios reflecting various levels of selfinterest and rationality that lead to different manifestations of the agency problem. The proposed framework can inform more relevant applications of the agency perspective in organizational studies and motivate future research.

No description available.

Background: Studies of complex and big-ticket tenders such as construction contracts have been the main research focus of public procurement. The efficiency of these low frequency transactionsis inherently hard to study, since the real world offers a wide range of variables that could explain the discrepancies. What is not studied to large extents are high frequency transactions, with low transaction volume, of common goods. These purchases are mostly overlooked due to the lack of documentation that exists, primarily explained by the low degree of digitalization and transparency on smaller contracts/transaction that fall below the EU reporting thresholds.Purpose: The purpose of this research is to examine the existence of price discrepancies for homogenous goods in public procurement between Swedish municipalities. Furthermore, provide insight and possible explanations to this phenomenon in accordance with economic theory.Method: This study opted to use a quantitative method of research to look at different municipalities and their procurement invoices. The quantitative data has been compiled and adjusted to comparable numbers, so that differences can be identified with clarity.Conclusions: The study concludes that there are significant price discrepancies for homogenous goods in the public procurement sector. With price variations ranging from being negligible to paying twice the price. The selected theoretical framework points towards opportunism and asymmetric information being the main sources of the price discrepancies. Improvement could possibly be made by shifting policies towards further digitalization of the procurement process and horizontally integrating the public sphere. In turn reducing asymmetric information and transaction costs, making less room for opportunistic behavior due to improvements in ex ante and ex post costs. From the results of the empirics, a speculative cost saving potential of 7.90 % is estimated.

Yes / Although scholars have recognized that alertness is critical in identifying and exploring opportunities, empirical studies exploring when alertness drives innovation are lacking. Drawing insights from the cognitive and contingency perspectives, the current study addresses this gap in by arguing that variations in firm product innovativeness is a function of degree of entrepreneurial alertness and levels of internal firm capabilities and environmental conditions. Data were collected from from 385 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Ghana. This study used the hierarchical regression estimation technique to analyses the data and found that a significant positive relationship between entrepreneurial alertness and firm product innovativeness. Moreover, the findings showed that entrepreneurial alertness is beneficial for firms to innovate when pressures from customers and competitors are intense. Finally, the results revealed that stronger market information sharing and technological opportunism also amplify the alertness-innovativeness relationship.

<p>Studiens första syfte är att med institutionell teori kartlägga det kontraktsnät som konstituerar den europeiska marknaden för professionella herrgolfare. Det andra syftet är att analysera och diskutera vissa utvalda aspekter av detta kontraktsnät som utmärker Europatouren från traditionella vinstmaximerande företag. </p><p>Den europeiska marknaden för proffsgolfare har organiserats i ett företag för att det är ekonomiskt fördelaktigt. Med Europatouren som en sammanhållande länk begränsas transaktionskostnaderna bl.a. genom att antalet kontraktsvägar reduceras och genom att utrymme för långsiktiga relationer med viktiga parter skapas. </p><p>Europatourens prissummemaximerande huvudmål förenar och tjänar de flesta, om inte samtliga,intressenters delmål i kontraktsnätet. I ambitionen att tillfredsställa alla intressenter har en gigantisk institutionsapparat formats på Europatouren. Institutionernas uppgift är att hålla tillbaka transaktionskostnaderna, motverka ett opportunistiskt beteende hos spelarna och bevara sportens konformitet och gentlemannaapproach. </p><p>Stjärnspelarna är de som gör Europatouren attraktiv och för att lyckas behålla dem i den konkurrens man möter från USA-touren har ett favoriseringssystem skapats som innebär att de erhåller appearance money och bättre service. Förekomsten av appearance money berättigas av deras viktiga funktioner i kontraktsnätet. </p><p>Flera faktorer pekar på att ett icke traditionellt riskförhållande råder på en proffstour för golf, d.v.s. att spelaren (agenten) är riskbenägen och att Europatouren (principalen) är riskneutral. Med föreliggande riskförhållande skapas drivkrafter hos spelarna att alltid göra sitt yttersta på träning och tävling, och begränsas utrymmet för opportunistiskt beteende. Dessa faktorer ger en högkvalitativ tour, vilket är nödvändigt för att alla involverade intressenters mål ska bli uppfyllda.</p> / <p>The first object of this study is to, with institutional theory, map out the nexus of contracts which constitutes the European market for professional male golfers. The second object is to analyze and discuss some chosen aspects of this nexus of contracts which characterize the European Tour in comparison with traditional profit-maximizing firms. </p><p>The European market for professional golfers has been organized as a firm because of more economically favourable reasons. With the European Tour as a connecting link the transaction costs are lowered among other things, by the fact that the number of contract ways is reduced and that room for long-term relationships with important parties is created. </p><p>The price money maximizing purpose of the European Tour unite and serve most, if not all, intermediate aims of the parties included in the nexus of contracts. In the ambition to satisfy all parties a huge formal and informal apparatus of institutions has been formedon the European Tour. The task of the institutions is to reduce transaction costs, to counteract opportunistic behaviour from the players and to preserve the conformity and the gentlemanlike approach of the sport. </p><p>The star players are what makes the European Tour attractive and to be able to keep them in the competition with the USA Tour a favouring system has been created, which implies that they receive appearance money and better service. The occurrence of appearance money is justified by the players’ importance in the nexus of contracts. </p><p>Many factors indicate that there is no traditional risk relationship on a professional tour for golf. That is, the player (the agent) is risk loving while the European Tour (the principal) is risk neutral. With the existing risk relationship driving forces are created in the players to always perform their utmost during training and competition, and opportunistic behaviour is thereby restricted. These factors give a high-quality tour, which is necessary for the goals of all involved parties will be reached.</p>

Studiens första syfte är att med institutionell teori kartlägga det kontraktsnät som konstituerar den europeiska marknaden för professionella herrgolfare. Det andra syftet är att analysera och diskutera vissa utvalda aspekter av detta kontraktsnät som utmärker Europatouren från traditionella vinstmaximerande företag. Den europeiska marknaden för proffsgolfare har organiserats i ett företag för att det är ekonomiskt fördelaktigt. Med Europatouren som en sammanhållande länk begränsas transaktionskostnaderna bl.a. genom att antalet kontraktsvägar reduceras och genom att utrymme för långsiktiga relationer med viktiga parter skapas. Europatourens prissummemaximerande huvudmål förenar och tjänar de flesta, om inte samtliga,intressenters delmål i kontraktsnätet. I ambitionen att tillfredsställa alla intressenter har en gigantisk institutionsapparat formats på Europatouren. Institutionernas uppgift är att hålla tillbaka transaktionskostnaderna, motverka ett opportunistiskt beteende hos spelarna och bevara sportens konformitet och gentlemannaapproach. Stjärnspelarna är de som gör Europatouren attraktiv och för att lyckas behålla dem i den konkurrens man möter från USA-touren har ett favoriseringssystem skapats som innebär att de erhåller appearance money och bättre service. Förekomsten av appearance money berättigas av deras viktiga funktioner i kontraktsnätet. Flera faktorer pekar på att ett icke traditionellt riskförhållande råder på en proffstour för golf, d.v.s. att spelaren (agenten) är riskbenägen och att Europatouren (principalen) är riskneutral. Med föreliggande riskförhållande skapas drivkrafter hos spelarna att alltid göra sitt yttersta på träning och tävling, och begränsas utrymmet för opportunistiskt beteende. Dessa faktorer ger en högkvalitativ tour, vilket är nödvändigt för att alla involverade intressenters mål ska bli uppfyllda. / The first object of this study is to, with institutional theory, map out the nexus of contracts which constitutes the European market for professional male golfers. The second object is to analyze and discuss some chosen aspects of this nexus of contracts which characterize the European Tour in comparison with traditional profit-maximizing firms. The European market for professional golfers has been organized as a firm because of more economically favourable reasons. With the European Tour as a connecting link the transaction costs are lowered among other things, by the fact that the number of contract ways is reduced and that room for long-term relationships with important parties is created. The price money maximizing purpose of the European Tour unite and serve most, if not all, intermediate aims of the parties included in the nexus of contracts. In the ambition to satisfy all parties a huge formal and informal apparatus of institutions has been formedon the European Tour. The task of the institutions is to reduce transaction costs, to counteract opportunistic behaviour from the players and to preserve the conformity and the gentlemanlike approach of the sport. The star players are what makes the European Tour attractive and to be able to keep them in the competition with the USA Tour a favouring system has been created, which implies that they receive appearance money and better service. The occurrence of appearance money is justified by the players’ importance in the nexus of contracts. Many factors indicate that there is no traditional risk relationship on a professional tour for golf. That is, the player (the agent) is risk loving while the European Tour (the principal) is risk neutral. With the existing risk relationship driving forces are created in the players to always perform their utmost during training and competition, and opportunistic behaviour is thereby restricted. These factors give a high-quality tour, which is necessary for the goals of all involved parties will be reached.