Inom ekonomistyrning utgår ekonomer oftast från att målöverensstämmelse existerar och att de anställda arbetar utifrån de uppställda målen med perfekt information. Men informationsasymmetri finns överallt och kan leda till ökade kostnader, att fel uppstår och försenade leveranser. Detta är särskilt intressant inom gruvindustrin eftersom den karakteriseras av komplexitet vilket ökar svårigheter med att förmedla styrningen. Frågan blir; under vilka förutsättningar uppstår informationsasymmetri inom styrning och målöverensstämmelse samt hur kan asymmetrin reduceras inom gruvindustrin? Syftet med examensarbetet blir därmed att öka förståelse och analysera hur informationsasymmetri påverkar ekonomistyrning och målöverensstämmelse inom gruvindustrin samt hur asymmetrin kan reduceras. Arbetet utgår ifrån principal-agent teorin som grundas på antaganden om informationsasymmetri och egen nyttomaximering. Utifrån den målkonflikten grundas hypoteserna om de begrepp som ökar och reducerar målöverensstämmelse genom ökad och minskad informationsasymmetri. De olika teoretisk begreppen som undersöktes var missanpassad information, opportunism, återkoppling, internutbildning och tid. Examensarbetet utfördes genom att använda oss av Cavaye (1996) modell för flerstudieansats (eng. Multifaceted research approach) där vi har först gjort Studie 1 som grundas på kvalitativa intervjuer för att få mer information om företaget och industrin. Sedan i Studie 2 testas begreppen genom en kvantitativ enkät som skickades ut till personer inom företaget utifrån ett strategisk urval. Resultatet från undersökningen var att hypoteserna bekräftades och att agenterna anser att målen är viktiga och internutbildning var de starkaste faktorerna för att reducera informationsasymmetri och öka målöverensstämmelse. / In management control systems economist usually assume perfect information and goal congruence from the top to the bottom of the organization. But information asymmetry is everywhere and often leads to increased costs, missed deadlines and other mistakes. This is particularly interesting in the mining industry as it’s characterized by complexity which increases the difficulty of communicating the control system throughout the organization. The research question then becomes; under which circumstances does information asymmetry occur in control systems and goal congruence and how can the asymmetry be reduced in the mining industry? The purpose of the study is therefore to increase the understanding and analyze how information asymmetry impact control systems and goal congruence in the mining industry and how the asymmetry can be reduced. The study is based on the principal-agent theory is based on the assumptions of information asymmetry and self-interest between the two parties. Based on that goal conflict our hypothesis of the variables that increase and reduce goal congruence through increased and decreased information asymmetry is formed. The investigated variables were miss adapted information, opportunism, feedback, workplace education and time. The study was conducted by using Cavaye (1996) model for multifaceted research approach by starting off with Study 1, which was based on qualitative interviews to get more information about the company and the mining industry. Study 2 later tested the variables impact by conducting a quantitative study though the use of a survey that was sent to people of interest within the company though a strategic selection. The result of the study was that the hypotheses were confirmed and that workplace education training and valuing the importance of the goals where the most important variables to reduce information asymmetry and increase goal congruence.

Данное диссертационное исследование посвящено выявлению и обоснованию особого вида оппортунизма – оппортунизм розничного покупателя (ОРП). В работе выявлены отличительные особенности ОРП от экономического оппортунизма и потребительского экстремизма, маркетинговые факторы проявления данного феномена, предложена классификация явления и приведена типологизация потребительского поведения в зависимости от степени проявления оппортунистических реакций. Практическим результатом исследования послужило формулирование маркетинговой характеристики покупателя-оппортуниста и разработка алгоритма взаимодействия с покупателями, снижающего риски проявления ОРП, внедренного в деятельность компании посредством проектного управления. / This thesis research is devoted identification and justification specific type of opportunism – opportunism of retail buyer (ORB). In paper is identification distinctive features ORB from economy opportunism and customer’s extremism, marketing factors appearance this phenom, introduce classification of event and typologisation customer’s behavior depending on the degree of appearance opportunistic reactions. Practical result of research is marketing characteristic of opportunistic buyers and making algorithm interaction with customers which reducing appearance ORB, which using in active of company with help project management.

This dissertation uses a Sociological approach to analyse the risks associated with the practice of securities lending. Risks are those factors that inhibit the development of trust, and trust is essential for people to participate in financial transactions like securities lending. In this dissertation we show that, although there are a number of risks, individual and systemic, that are associated with securities lending, practitioners have, over time, developed an array of risk management procedures and practices to keep these risks at acceptable levels. Securities lending is however not practiced in a vacuum and the relevance of these risk management procedures is largely determined by the cultural environment in which it is practised. Values, norms and sanctions are crucial as social controls over behaviour that transpires in social structures. The presence of structural conditions necessary for the development of a culture of extreme opportunism is shown as arguably the greatest source of risk facing those who participate in financial transactions like securities lending. / Sociology / M.A.

Under de senaste årtiondena har ansvarfullt företagande (CSR) varit ett ämne som erhållit allt mer fokus inom forskning och således även för företag och samhället i stort. CSR är ett ämne som är högst aktuellt då globalisering är ett faktum och medför att de företag som är verksamma idag bär ett globalt ansvar, då dessa är stora aktörer i en värld som kantas av ekonomiska kriser, miljöproblem och humanitär försummelse. Det ökade intresset från samhället för CSR har medfört att företagen idag ser detta som en strategisk investering och företags satsning i hållbarhetsaktiviteter har kommit att erhålla en allt större del av företags verksamhet. Frågan kvarstår om detta endast är en investering som ökar företagets etik och moral eller om det faktiskt är lönsamt, och även om lönsamma företag ökar sin investering i hållbarhetsarbete. En stor mängd forskning har utförts för att undersöka förhållandena mellan hållbarhet och lönsamhet, dock utan att konsensus i forskningsgrenen har uppkommit.       Grundat på den nuvarande forskningssituationen syftade denna studie till att undersöka vilken effekt ansvarsfullt företagande har på olika lönsamhetsmått, samt vilken effekt de olika lönsamhetsmåtten har på ansvarsfullt företagande, i företag registrerade på large cap och mid cap på Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. För att besvara studiens problemformulering och uppfylla studiens syfte har en kvantitativ forskningsansats brukats och ett urval av företag listade på large och mid cap Nasdaq OMX Stockholm har undersökts. För att sätta ett mått på ansvarsfullt företagande (CSP) har en innehållsanalys av företags årsrapporter och hållbarhetsrapporter genomförts, lönsamhetsmåtten (CFP) har utgått från redovisningsbaserade mått (ROE och ROA) samt ett marknadsbaserat mått (total avkastning). Vidare undersöks även relationen mellan variablerna, CSP och CFP, med en tidsaspekt och kontrollvariablerna storlek, risk, FoU och industritillhörighet har brukats. De teorier som har använts för att förklara CFP:s effekt på CSP är slappa resurser och direktörsopportunism, och effekten CSP har på CFP har teorierna intressentteorin, resursbaserad synvinkel och kompromissteorin använts.  Det resultat som framkommit genom de multipla regressionerna som testat studiens hypoteser visar att ROE:s effekt på CSP är positiv, medan både ROA:s och avkastningens effekt på CSP är neutral. Slutsatsen blir således delad då lönsamhetsmåttet ROE visar att företag som har en högre lönsamhet kommer investera mer i hållbarhet, denna effekt knyts samman med teorin om slappa resurser. Å andra sidan visar både ROA och avkastning på en neutral effekt på CSP vilket ej kan knytas till varken slappa resurser eller direktöropportunism. Vidare när istället CSP:s effekt på ROE, ROA och avkastning undersökts visar samtliga på en neutral påverkan. Den slutsats som kan dras från detta resultat är att hållbarhetsarbete ej empiriskt kan säkerställa en högre eller lägre lönsamhet, och varken intressentteorin, resursbaserad synvinkel eller kompromissteorin kan förklara resultatet. Med icke-konklusiva resultat föreslår författarna för vidare forskning inom området där mer forskning i den svenska kontexten är nödvändig.

L’objectif central de cette thèse est de montrer que les contrats de mariage religieux de cinq communautés libanaises s’identifient aux contrats de distribution sélective et que les comportements des ménages (en termes de prise de décision, d’offre de travail et de fertilité) sont largement expliqués par cette proximité législative. L’analogie entre ces deux types de contrats apparaît clairement au niveau des points suivants : d’abord, au niveau de l’objet du contrat, contrat d’échange et de réciprocité. Ensuite, au niveau des rapports entre les parties, la femme est assimilée au concessionnaire et l’époux au concédant, il est question de collaboration et d’interdépendance. En outre, au niveau de l’asymétrie dans les obligations des parties, tout comme le contrat de distribution sélective est dit contrat léonin au profit du concédant le contrat de mariage renferme des clauses patriarcales. Enfin, la rupture du contrat pose le problème de la précarité de la situation du concessionnaire. C’est la dimension « asymétrie dans les droits et les obligations » entre les parties qui détermine la proximité de chaque type de contrat de mariage de la distribution sélective. Et c’est par rapport à ce prisme que les choix des ménages seront analysés. Dans cette perspective, l’approche entrepreneuriale de la famille est retenue parmi les modèles d’analyse économique de la famille. Cette approche a l’avantage de considérer que la relation matrimoniale tout comme la relation commerciale est régie par un contrat. Une enquête est menée pour vérifier l’impact de la législation matrimoniale sur les choix des ménages. Les Beyrouthins semblent être les plus sensibles aux clauses contractuelles. / This thesis attempts to look at religious marriage contracts of five Lebanese communities as selective distribution contracts and to explain the economic behavior of households (in terms of decision making, labor supply and fertility) by the proximity between the two legislations. The analogy between these two types of contracts is clear in the following points: First, the analogy is conceived in terms of the purpose of the contract, contract of exchange and reciprocity. Then, at the relationship between the parties, the woman is the dealer and the spouse is the manufacturer, it is about collaboration and interdependence. On the asymmetry in obligations of the parties, as the selective distribution contract is said one-sided contract in favor of the grantor, the marriage contract contains also patriarchal clauses. And finally, the precarious situation of the dealer for breach of contract. This is the “asymmetry in the rights and obligations "between the parties that determines the proximity of each type of religious marriage contract to the selective distribution contract. And it is from this prism that the economic choice of households will be analyzed. In this perspective, the entrepreneurial approach of the family is selected as a model for economic analysis of the family. This approach has the advantage of considering the marital relationship as a relation governed by a contract, as is the case of a trade contract. A survey has been conducted to justify the impact of legislation on the economic choice of Lebanese households. The inhabitants of Beirut seem to be most sensitive to the contractual terms.

Cette thèse vise à identifier les contraintes institutionnelles et réglementaires qui limitent le développement des unités informelles à Djibouti en faisant à la fois une analyse microéconomique et macroéconomique. L’examen des institutions montre que des habitudes (corruption, passe droit) en matière de règlement de l’administration créent des coûts de transaction et obligent les micro-entreprises à se réfugier dans le secteur informel. Un modèle de régression montre que la qualité de la justice (mesurée par l’indicateur de Rule of Law de la Banque mondiale) est une variable déterminante pour expliquer le poids de l’économie non observée et donc celui du secteur informel, dans le PIB officiel. La dynamique des micro-entreprises est appréhendée à partir de 2 enquêtes (2001 et 2005) portant sur le même échantillon. L’analyse de la mobilité à l’aide de matrices de transition révèle l’existence non pas d’un seul seuil infranchissable, mais plutôt de trois (1 actif, 2-5 actifs, 6-9 actifs et 10 actifs et plus) et confirme la thèse du «missing-middle». L’analyse factorielle discriminante indique que la légalité est une variable déterminante pour expliquer le blocage apparent des micro-entreprises au-delà de 6 à 9 actifs. Enfin, l’enquête 2007 sur les activités de transfert d’argents (hawalas) montre leur impact important sur le plan macroéconomique ; elle suggère la prise en compte de la spécificité et de l’utilité de ces institutions comme un dispositif complémentaire aux banques dont l’intégration dans le système financier formel devrait être facilitée. / This research seeks to detect the institutional and regulatory constraints that limit the development of informal units in Djibouti by both the macroeconomic and microeconomic analysis. The review shows that institutional habits (corruption, going right) in regulation created transaction costs and force small businesses to take refuge in the informal sector. A regression model shows that the quality of justice (as measured by this indicator of Rule of Law of the World Bank) is a determining variable in explaining the weight of the non-observed economy and hence the informal sector in GDP official. The dynamics of micro-enterprises is approached from 2 surveys (2001 and 2005) on the same sample. The analysis of mobility through transition matrices reveals the existence of three thresholds (1 employee, 2-5 employees, 6-9 employees and 10 employees and more) and not only one single threshold, albeit it confirms the thesis of «missing-middle». The discriminating factor analysis indicates that the law is a crucial variable that explains the apparent blocking of micro-enterprises beyond 6 to 9 employees. Finally, the 2007 survey on the money transfer activities (hawalas) shows that these institutions have a significant impact on the macroeconomic level and suggests that their usefulness and specificity should be taken into account in order to integrate this banking device within the formal financial system.

Oscar Bardi de Fourtou est entré dans l’histoire de la vie politique française comme l’Homme du Seize-Mai, ministre de l’Intérieur à poigne, qui ne laisse pas de place à la contestation de ses décisions que l’urgence d’une crise commande. Chargé par le maréchal de Mac-Mahon de mener une lutte contre les républicains, il procède à d’importants mouvements de fonctionnaires afin que l’action gouvernementale soit soutenue localement par des agents fidèles et dévoués. Avec la dissolution de la Chambre des députés en juin 1877, il est chargé de préparer les élections législatives et empêcher les républicains de les gagner. Tous les moyens légaux sont utilisés mais soumis à la pression des différentes composantes de l’alliance conservatrice qui soutiennent l’initiative présidentielle. L’échec électoral provoque la responsabilité évidente d’un ministre trop exposé pendant la crise. Cette condamnation des vainqueurs est aussi perceptible dans les rangs de la droite conservatrice, déçue que Fourtou n’ait pris de résolutions plus radicales. Sa carrière politique est fulgurante. Avocat au barreau de Ribérac, puis maire de la ville, il est élu député de la Dordogne à trente-six ans en février 1871. Inscrit au centre-droit, il se fait remarquer par Thiers qui le nomme ministre des Travaux Publics. Après la chute du président de la République, il se rapproche de la droite dynastique et obtient la confiance de Mac-Mahon qui lui confie le ministère de l’Instruction publique, des Cultes et des Beaux-Arts. Il incarne alors une expression autoritaire du pouvoir qui est en partie la raison de sa nomination place Beauvau en juin 1874 et à nouveau en mai 1877. Parallèlement à cette carrière ministérielle, il poursuit son ancrage local (président de comice agricole, conseiller général) et devient administrateur de la Compagnie de chemin de fer d’Orléans. Fourtou est alors l’une des figures importantes de la droite conservatrice, proche de l’Elysée. Après le Seize-Mai, il poursuit sa carrière politique, malgré la flétrissure et l’invalidation de son élection qui le conduit à se représenter immédiatement et obtenir la confiance de la population. Devenu sénateur, il continue la lutte contre les réformes des opportunistes mais échoue aux différents scrutins nationaux de 1885. A la faveur du boulangisme, il redevient député en 1889 mais propose de jouer la carte de l’apaisement, signe d’une évolution idéologique de l’homme politique. Parlementaire au parcours singulier, il représente, avec d’autres, les interrogations et la recherche identitaire d’une droite française en pleine transformation dans les premières années de la Troisième République. La postérité ne retient, finalement, que la légende noire de l’ancien ministre de l’Intérieur du Seize-Mai. / Oscar Bardi de Fourtou is involved in french political life as the Man of the Seize-Mai, the Home minister with a very special manner leading with authority and his decisions don’t accept any protest. Commissioned by the marechal Mac-Mahon to lead the fight against republicans, he organized a lot of changes inside the civil servant corps, to help the government restore its power in local position. With the dissolution of the Parliament, he had to prepare the next legislative elections in October 1877 to prevent the victory of republicans. All the legal means were used but under the political pressure of the different components of the Conservative forces which maintain the President policy. The electoral failure of the Conservative forces involved the political responsibility of the former Home minister. His bad reputation came from the winner and also in the Conservative camp, disappointed by his attitude during the crisis not taking strong solutions to resolve it. His political career is lightning. As a lawyer in Riberac, and mayor of his home town, he was elected as Member of Parliament on February 1871. Registered as a member of Right Center, he was chosen by Thiers to be the new Public Work of his government. After the of the President, he was closer to the dynastic Right, and got confidence of the new President Mac-Mahon who decided to give him the Public Education ministry. Therefore, Fourtou represents the authoritarian position of one part of the Conservatives and that’s the reason he changed to the Home ministry in June 1874 and of course, in May 1877.At the same time, he continues his local work and became the Orleans railways Company manager. One of the most important politicians of the French Right, he was closely linked to the Elysee palace. After the Seize-Mai, he carried on his political business, despite the stigmatization of the Parliament, and his invalidation, he was elected again. As senator, he fought against the opportunist reforms but didn’t succeed in the different national elections in 1885. Thanks to the Boulanger crisis, he again became a Member of Parliament in 1889 but wants to promote appeasement, as underlined in evidence in his ideological evolution. As a singular Member of Parliament, he represented a new position, with other colleagues, into the Right movement., especially the search for a new French Right identity during important changes in the first years of the Third Republic. In front of the posterity, with hindsight, he remains a dark legend as the Home minister of the Seize-Mai.

Supply chain exchange relationships are complex and sometimes chaotic sociological and organisational phenomena. This complexity is compounded by the boundary spanning necessity of forming supply chain partnerships that are further exacerbated by goal divergence and asymmetric information. One of the main questions for consideration is how these dyadic exchange relationships are maintained and develop over time in response to the various channel behaviours of the actors (the buyer and seller)? In particular, exchange relationships are theorised to be sensitive in some degree to attempts at economic appropriation, and conversely coordinative efforts. Such efforts manifest themselves into the mutually opposing forces broadly labelled as opportunistic and collaborative behavioural paradigms. Drawing from the concepts of Systems and Chaos/Complexity theories, it is theorised that the movement from one form of relational arrangement to another is enacted in a non-linear and dynamic manner with periods of relational equilibrium disrupted by bifurcations resulting in the emergence of new levels of relationship. However, not all exchange relationships are susceptible to constant change, rather, there should be some threshold barrier or relationship inertia that must be overcome before a bifurcation occurs. Yet what is not known is how strong these bonds are to the enactment of opportunistic and collaborative partner behaviours. Hence, 189 manufacturing supply chain relationships were survey-interviewed in order to determine the impact that collaborative and opportunistic behaviours have on supply chain relational movement. The results show that generally exchange relationships do in fact change in response to these enacted behaviours, and that actual levels of supply chain behaviour over a range of 12 variables could be measured. Indeed, the level of opportunistic behaviour experienced by the sample was disturbing. In addition, the level of tolerance (zone of tolerance) for specific behaviours was measured for the first time in the field. Overall, it was found that supply chain exchange relationships do indeed evolve in a non-linear dynamic manner in response to opportunistic and collaborative manoeuvres by the dyadic actors. Finally, these ideas were summarised in the Dynamic Relational Development (DRD) concept that explains how supply chain relationships dynamically change. In addition, the dualistic nature of the collaborative versus opportunistic behaviour choice for exchange actors is tentatively reconciled by the deontological approach of the Supply Chain Citizen theory offered in this research.

論文提要 本文主要研究焦點在於「資訊不對稱性下之政府投機行為」，期以發現公職人員投機行為的共同模式與成因。本研究主要採取個案研究的方式，檢視民國50年至民國87年監察院公報所載公務員貪瀆案件，分析其投機型態、方式及過程，以證實「資訊不對稱性」對於官僚投機行為的影響。 本文計分五部份。第一章說明本文研究主旨，以及本研究所採用相關概念的界定；第二章則檢視組織經濟學者與官僚學者在官僚組織「資訊」問題方面的研究，比較兩者的差異，並參考行政資訊公開制度等實務上的作法；第三章以組織經濟學的代理理論為基礎，參考官僚組織的特性，建構「資訊不對稱性」的官僚投機行為理論模型；第四章則由我國監察院公報所載公務員貪瀆案件中，選擇六個具有代表性的個案做進一步分析研究，並述明研究結果；第五章則針對研究發現提供實務上的改進建議。 檢視台灣地區的政府投機行為後，本研究發現官僚投機行為與官僚人員所掌握的決策資訊程度有關。官僚組織的組織形式與偏重文書的作業方式造成官僚人員在決策資訊上的不對稱性，導致官僚人員藉此從事各種投機行為。當投機行為所涉及的利益龐大，且投機者希望確保該投機行為得以延續時，官僚人員的個人投機行為有逐漸組織化的傾向。若有與非官僚人員勾結情事發生時，更將形成惡質的政商利益輸送關係，以及機關內部的貪瀆風氣。 本研究建議，若欲解決官僚投機問題，必須由擴大官僚組織內部的資訊分享，修改組織設計以整合行政流程，確定「資訊所有權」與「課責」彼此配合，以提高官僚投機成功的難度，降低官僚人員投機的「需求」，並解決政府機關內部的管理問題。 關鍵字：資訊不對稱性、官僚投機行為、官僚組織、資訊、管理關係 目次 序 謝辭 論文提要 第一章 緒論1 第一節 研究動機與研究目的1 第二節 研究問題與研究架構2 壹、 研究問題與假定2 貳、 相關概念釐清4 第三節 研究方法及限制9 第二章 資訊不對稱與官僚投機行為之相關理論與研究10 第一節 組織經濟學的相關理論與研究11 壹、 Arrow之代理理論（agency theory）11 貳、 Williamson與Miller的組織經濟學觀點12 參、 理論比較14 第二節 官僚行為相關理論與研究15 壹、 Downs和Tullock的官僚問題模型15 貳、 Kaufman、Lipsky以及Wilson的官僚行為研究17 參、 理論比較17 第三節 行政實務上的作法：「資訊公開」的謎思18 壹、 「資訊公開制度」的立法背景18 貳、 「資訊公開制度」的主要內容19 參、 「資訊公開制度」的問題與限制20 第四節 小結21 第三章 資訊不對稱性下之官僚投機行為模式23 第一節 代理關係和組織內部的管理關係23 壹、 代理關係與管理關係的比較23 貳、 私人企業與官僚組織管理關係之比較25 第二節 「資訊不對稱性」在官僚組織的意涵與來源30 壹、 「資訊不對稱性」的意涵30 貳、 官僚組織之「資訊不對稱性」來源33 參、 官僚組織形式對「資訊不對稱性」的影響33 第三節 官僚投機行為的類型與方式36 壹、 官僚投機行為的意涵與認定標準36 貳、 官僚投機行為的特性37 參、 官僚投機行為的類型39 第四節 「資訊不對稱性」和「官僚投機行為」的關係43 第五節 官僚投機行為的影響46 第四章 個案研究48 第一節 前言48 壹、 名詞界定48 貳、 個案資料來源48 參、 個案研究的特性與限制49 第二節 個案一：榮民總醫院傳統醫學中心主任鍾傑「假公濟私」弊案53 第三節 個案二：彰化縣政府審計室韓松華課長「公器私用」弊案57 第四節 個案三：西濱快速道路野柳隧道工程弊案60 第五節 個案四：賀伯風災彈劾案66 第六節 個案五：空軍總部採購人員勾結廠商圍標弊案74 第七節 個案六：台北縣三芝鄉土地開發弊案78 第八節 小結84 第五章 結論：官僚投機行為改善之道86 壹、 對民眾政治參與的保障86 貳、 組織設計必須結合決策流程87 參、 建立組織內部的資訊交換場域88 附錄89 參考文獻91 跋、公共行政的理論問題與學科危機 表次 表（1-1）：本文主要分析單位與研究假設3 表（1-2）：Rasmusen資訊分類表5 表（2-1）：Arrow、Williamson及Miller理論比較14 表（2-2）：組織經濟學與官僚行為理論比較18 表（3-1）：代理關係與管理關係之比較25 表（3-2）：官僚組織資訊不對稱性界定標準32 表（3-3）：資訊不對稱性來源表33 表（3-4）：官僚投機行為界定標準37 表（3-5）：管理人員與執行人員「勾結」策略表41 表（3-6）：管理人員與執行人員「弊案舉發」策略表41 表（3-7）：官僚投機行為類型43 表（4-1）：監察院公報所載公務員貪瀆案件統計表51 表（4-2）：個案（一）資訊不對稱性衡量表55 表（4-3）：個案（一）官僚投機行為評量56 表（4-4）：個案（二）資訊不對稱性衡量表59 表（4-5）：個案（二）官僚投機行為評量59 表（4-6）：個案（三）資訊不對稱性衡量表64 表（4-7）：個案（三）官僚投機行為評量65 表（4-8）：個案（四）資訊不對稱性衡量表71 表（4-9）：個案（四）官僚投機行為評量73 表（4-10）：個案（五）資訊不對稱性衡量表76 表（4-11）：個案（五）官僚投機行為評量78 表（4-12）：個案（六）資訊不對稱性衡量表82 表（4-12）：個案（六）官僚投機行為評量83 圖次 圖（1-1）：本研究研究推論圖4 圖（2-1）：Tullock層級節制模型16 圖（3-1）：私人企業管理關係模型29 圖（3-2）：官僚組織管理關係模型29 / Theses Abstract This theses was concentrated on“the bureaucratic opportunism under information asymmetry”. Through research, the author hope to find the homogeneous pattern of bureaucratic opportunism and it's cause. This research reviewed the corruption cases of public service in Taiwan which published on the Control Yuan Official Bulletin since 1961 to 1998. To prove the hypothesis, this research analyzed the patterns, means, and process of these corruption cases. The content divided to five parts. In the chapter one, it presented the research goal and concepts definition. The chapter two reviewed the materials of organization economic, bureaucracy theory, and the Information Free Act of several countries. Based on agency theory and bureaucracy theory, the chapter three presented a theory model of bureaucratic opportunism under information asymmetry. In the chapter four, the author selected six topic cases of public service corruption in Taiwan to do more analyses. Finally, the conclusion suggested several means to solve the bureaucratic opportunism problem. After reviewed the corruption cases in Taiwan, the author has found that “bureaucratic opportunism is related to the information what bureaucrat have”. That is to say that organization design and documentary operation caused the information asymmetry between bureaucrats. Then the bureaucrats would take some opportunistic action by this way. If the opportunistic benefits were so plentiful, and the bureaucrats hope to preserve their benefits, the individual opportunism would become a collective opportunism. If bureaucrats conspire with others (especially private business), the opportunism would become collective corruption, even corruptive culture. The conclusion suggested that improving information share, building an integrated administrative process, to be sure the bureaucrat's information jurisdiction is equal to his accountability, would hinder the opportunism, reduce the need to take an opportunism, and improve the management of bureaucracy. Key Words: Information Asymmetry, Bureaucratic Opportunism, bureaucracy, institution, management relation

The objective of this thesis is to study the sources of discrepancy between the actual traffic in motorways under concession schemes and the traffic forecast ex-ante. The demand forecast for a specific project is the main variable influencing its realization. From a public sector perspective, socio-economic evaluations are driven by demand forecasts, which gives the basis for choose and hierarchy public projects in order to maximise social welfare. From a private sector perspective, traffic forecasts are the base of financial evaluation and toll setting.Despite its importance and the numerous and important developments in the field, the differences of forecast and ex-post traffic are usually very high. Some recent studies show that differences as big as 20% are much more the rule than the exception.A huge amount of uncertainty is associated with the forecasting exercise. First because transport is a derived demand and depends on many exogenous variables, also uncertain; because modelling is and simplification exercise, implies many assumptions and rely on field data, many times incomplete or of low quality; moreover, modelling human (in this case users) behaviour is always a dangerous enterprise.Although these arguments could explain at least the larger part of errors associated with forecasts, one can wonder whether the agents implicated in the forecast would or could use this uncertainty strategically in their favour. In a competition for the field scheme (bids), the bidder may overestimate the demand in order to reduce the toll included in the bid. This strategic behaviour can introduce a high bias in forecasts. Also, overoptimistic (or overpessimistic) forecasters may introduce a bias in the forecast.We propose to focus in turn on the three main groups of agents involved in the demand forecast process. The forecasters, the project promoters and the users. Study all the issues related to them would be a too ambitious (or more concretely impossible) task. We then focus on some particular issues related to the modelling of the actors' behaviour in the context of the demand forecast for toll roads.Regarding the forecaster behaviour, we present the results of the first large sample survey on forecasters' perceptions and opinions about forecasting demand for transport projects, based on an on-line survey. We first describe the main characteristics of forecasters. We then describe the last forecast forecasters prepared. We turn to the models forecasters apply, the errors they declare on past forecasts and the main sources of errors according to them. We then describe the forecast environment in terms of pressure forecasters receive. These unique results provide a picture of the world of forecasters and forecasts, allowing for a better understanding of them. We turn then to the study of the optimism and overconfidence in transport forecasts. Optimism and overconfidence in general are recognized human traits. We analyze the overoptimistic bias by comparing the distribution of stated errors with actual errors found in literature; we also compare the own skilful of subjects in doing forecasts with studies showing self-evaluations of a common skill - driving. We finally propose a regression of the competence, quality and errors on the main forecasters' and projects' specific variables.Results show that the distribution of errors transport forecasters state has a smaller average magnitude and a smaller variance than those found in literature. Comparing forecasters perception of their own competence with the results found in literature about drivers skill self-evaluation, however, we could not find a significant difference, meaning that the forecasters' overconfidence is in line with what could be viewed as a normal human overconfidence level.The pressure for results forecasters receive and the strategic manipulation they affirm exist merit a special attention. They imply that while forecasters' behavioural biases may exist and should be take in account when evaluation forecasts, the project promoter may influence forecasts by pressuring the forecasters to produce results which better fit his expectancies.We then study the bidders' strategic behaviour in auctions for road concessions. We address three questions in turn. First, we investigate the overall effects of the winner's curse on bidding behaviour in such auctions. Second, we examine the effects of the winner's curse on contract auctions with differing levels of common-value components. Third, we investigate how the winner's curse affects bidding behaviour in such auctions when we account for the possibility for bidders to renegotiate. Using a unique, self-constructed, dataset of 49 worldwide road concessions, we show that the winner's curse effect is particularly strong in toll road concession contract auctions. Thus, we show that bidders bid less aggressively in toll road concession auctions when they expect more competition. We observe that this winner's curse effect is even larger for projects where the common uncertainty is greater. Moreover, we show that the winner's curse effect is weaker when the likelihood of renegotiation is higher. While the traditional implication would be that more competition is not always desirable when the winner's curse is particularly strong, we show that, in toll road concession contract auctions, more competition may be always desirable. Modelling aggregated users' behaviour, we study the long term traffic maturity. We argue that traffic maturity results from decreasing marginal utility of transport. The elasticity of individual mobility with respect to the revenue decreases after a certain level of mobility is reached. In order to find evidences of decreasing elasticity we analyse a cross-section time-series sample including 40 French motorways' sections. This analysis shows that decreasing elasticity can be observed in the long term. We then propose a decreasing function for the traffic elasticity with respect to the economic growth, which depends on the traffic level on the road. Although “unconditional” decreasing elasticities were already proposed in the literature, this is the first work, as far as we know, putting this idea in evidence and giving it a functional form. This model provides better interpretation of the coupling between traffic and economic growth, and a better long-term forecast. From the disaggregate perspective, we study the main individual modal choice variable, the value of time. The value of travel time savings is a fundamental concept in transport economics and its size strongly affects the socio-economic evaluation of transport schemes. Financial assessment of tolled roads rely upon the value of time as the main (or even the unique) willingness to pay measure. Values of time estimates, which primarily represent behavioural values, as then increasingly been used as measures of out-of-pocket money. In this setting, one of the main issues regarding the value of time is its distribution over the population. We apply the Logit, the Mixed Logit and the Bayesian Mixed Logit models to estimate the value of time in freight transport in France. Estimations with mixed logit faced many difficulties, as expected. These difficulties could be avoided using the Bayesian procedures, providing also the opportunity of properly integrating a priori beliefs. Results show that 1) using a single constant value of time, representative of an average, can lead to demand overestimation, 2) the estimated average value of time of freight transport in France is about 45 Euro, depending on the load/empty and hire/own account variables, which implies that 3) the standard value recommended in France should be reviewed upwards.