- 145 - Abstract Role of the Parliamentary Party Groups in the Constitutional system of the Czech Republic The ultimate goal of my work was to fill in the blank spaces on the map of the Constitutional system of the Czech Republic by thorough examination and detailed description of the role and the status of the parliamentary party groups (PPGs) in it. However, this thesis is not just a general introduction, but a complex study of the actors of such importance and influence that it keeps one wondering, why they had remained out of a scope of the mainstream scientific research in our country for so long. After the necessary theoretical introduction to the subject of the parliamentary party groups within the field of the legal and political sciences, I examined the existence of the PPGs within the Chamber of Deputies, their relationships, interdependence and interconnections with the political parties and finally their inner functioning in close detail. It was necessary to deal with a number of serious issues and answer several important questions during my research, most notably: the question of the nature of the parliamentary party groups, i.e. whether they are bodies of the Chamber of Deputies, bodies of the political parties or whether they even possess their own legal personality. It was necessary to deal...

This dissertation explores political representation and its manifestation within the European Union (EU). The main purpose is to examine the representative roles of Members of the European Parliament (MEP) in the context of cross–pressure between the national level and the EU level. This involves an analysis of how the MEPs under-stand their roles, how they organize their work, and how they have voted in the European Parliament (EP) in 1999-2002. It also includes a study of how national party organizations adapt to the EU environment and how this influences the MEPs link to the national arena. The study is based on various sources, such as interviews, formal documents and voting data. The most under-researched part of the cross-pressure has been the national link and the empirical focus of the thesis is on that link. It is a comparative study of parties in Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden. In each country, three parties were selected (social democratic, right-wing and green parties). By using a focused comparative method, and by controlling for certain independent variables, the ambition is to go beyond description and identify explanations for why MEPs adopt certain roles. The overall picture that emerges is of a relatively weak link between MEPs and the national level. To a certain extent, MEPs express frustration over their limited role in the national arena and over the lack of input from the national arena in their work at the European level. Most of the parties struggle to include MEPs in their organizational set-up, and the MEPs experience a growing hostility within the parties toward them. In general, the lack of interest and knowledge in the national arena, concerning the EU in general and specifically the work of the MEPs, obscures the role of the MEPs. They become EU ambassadors at the national level, rather than elected representatives at the EU level. The dissertation also tests variables that are thought to influence MEPs’ roles: the type of electoral system, popular opinion on EU issues, whether their party is in government, the party’s ideological heritage, and if the party organizes more advanced coordination mechanisms. The main result is that the working assumption that MEPs are influenced by characteristics in the national arena is shown to be largely correct. That is, some of the identified aspects of the national political context do influence how the MEPs understand their roles. For example, the character of the electoral system influences attitudes among the MEPs. However, that relationship is not as simple and straightforward as much of the literature suggests. Rather, the results in this study suggest that the most important aspect of the relationship between the national level and the MEPs is whether parties or others (such as national parliamentarians) actively engage in the work of the MEPs. It matters how parties design the relationship between the levels, especially for how and where MEPs direct their main attention, but also in terms of how MEPs vote in the EP. The conclusion emphasizes the importance of further research into how parties facilitate the link between the national and the EU level.

Depuis 1958, les parlementaires, quels que soient leur assemblée ou leur groupe, manifestent une unité de vote exemplaire. Celle-ci est la manifestation de la discipline de vote, phénomène complexe que certains, notamment, les parlementaires et ceux qui ont vocation à les assister, définissent comme une autodiscipline. Elle apparaît, cependant, comme le résultat d’un conditionnement mâtiné de contraintes exercées par des structures, groupes parlementaires, partis politiques et Gouvernement, qui ont intérêt au maintien de l’unité. Tous agissent en direction des élus qui, s’ils adhèrent par principe à la consigne de vote élaborée dans le cadre du groupe, sous le contrôle du parti et/ou du pouvoir exécutif, peuvent parfois exprimer quelques réticences. Ces actions, cumulées, prennent la forme de pressions et confortent l’existence de la discipline de vote.Au-delà de la pratique parlementaire, et parce qu’elle assure la collaboration des pouvoirs propre au régime parlementaire, la discipline de vote est devenue, comme le démontre sa constance, une caractéristique de la Cinquième République. Une pratique institutionnelle qui semblait pourtant contraire aux principes du régime représentatif, forgés à la Révolution. Si la discipline de vote est aujourd’hui considérée comme, sinon conforme, du moins compatible avec eux, c’est qu’elle révèle une lecture rénovée du régime parlementaire, fondée non plus sur la division, mais sur la fusion des pouvoirs / Since 1958 MPs’, whatever their assembly or their group, show an exemplary unity of vote. The latter is the result of party discipline, a compound subject, which some, in particular, MPs’ and those who have authority to assist them, define as self-discipline. Party discipline appears, however, as the outcome of a conditioning mixed with constraints exercised by organizations, parliamentary groups, political parties and Government. Their common interest is to maintain unity. They all act towards the elected members. The latter, on principle, subscribe to the voting instructions, worked out within the scope of the group, under the party and/or the executive power control. Nevertheless, the elected members may sometimes be reluctant.All these actions become pressure, confirming that unity is not only the result of cohesion but really of party discipline. Beyond the parliamentary practice, and because it guarantees powers’ collaboration, which is peculiar to the parliamentary system, party discipline has become, as its constancy shows, a major characteristic of the French Fifth Republic. An institutional practice that appeared, however, to go against the French representative system’s principles, established during the Revolution. If party discipline is now considered as, if not in accordance with, but at least compatible with them, it is that it reveals a new way to define the parliamentary system, based not on powers’ divisions anymore, but on their fusion