Pavlovian cues can influence ongoing instrumental behaviour via Pavlovian-toinstrumental transfer (PIT) processes. While appetitive Pavlovian cues tend to promote instrumental approach, they are detrimental when avoidance behaviour is required, and vice versa for aversive cues. We recently reported that susceptibility to interference between Pavlovian and instrumental control assessed via a PIT task was associated with risky alcohol use at age 18. We now investigated whether such susceptibility also predicts drinking trajectories until age 24, based on AUDIT (Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test) consumption and binge drinking (gramme alcohol/drinking occasion) scores. The interference PIT effect, assessed at ages 18 and 21 during fMRI, was characterized by increased error rates (ER) and enhanced neural responses in the ventral striatum (VS), the lateral and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices (dmPFC) during conflict, that is, when an instrumental approach was required in the presence of an aversive Pavlovian cue or vice versa. We found that a stronger VS response during conflict at age 18 was associated with a higher starting point of both drinking trajectories but predicted a decrease in binge drinking. At age 21, high ER and enhanced neural responses in the dmPFC were associated with increasing AUDIT-C scores over the next 3 years until age 24. Overall, susceptibility to interference between Pavlovian and instrumental control might be viewed as a predisposing mechanism towards hazardous alcohol use during young adulthood, and the identified high-risk group may profit from targeted interventions.

Die Alkoholsucht ist ein global verbreitetes Phänomen und kennzeichnet sich durch eine Transition von kontrolliertem zu zwanghaftem Alkoholkonsum.Die Tendenz, einem neutralen Reiz eine Anreizwirkung zuzuschreiben, ist individuell unterschiedlich und stellt einen Risikofaktor für die Entwicklung einer Abhängigkeit dar.Zur Entwicklung spezifischer Präventionsstrategien ist ein besseres Verständnis der Zusammenhänge zwischen der Anreizsalienz und Alkoholabhängigkeit erforderlich.Der Übergang von mäßigem zu zwanghaftem Alkoholkonsum wurde durch das Modell des Alkoholentzugseffekts simuliert, das den menschlichen Alkoholrückfall nachahmt.Die Ratten erhielten freiwilligen Zugang zu verschieden Alkohollösungen mit wiederholten Deprivations- und Alkoholphasen.Die Ratten durchliefen zusätzlich den Pavlovian Conditioned Approach getestet, welcher die individuellen Tendenzen auf einen bedingten Reiz/Belohnung quantifiziert.Während des letzten ADE-Zyklus wurde mit Geschmacksverfälschung zwanghaftes Trinken ermittelt.Nach der Identifizierung zuverlässiger Prädiktoren für Suchtverhalten wurde präventive Neurostimulation durchgeführt, um die Tendenz der Tiere alkoholbezogenen Reizen eine motivationale Bedeutung beizumessen, zu beeinflussen, und die Manifestation eines Abhängigkeitsverhaltens zu verhindern. Weibchen tranken mehr Alkohol als Männchen und zeigten ST Verhalten im PavCA, während Männchen GT aufwiesen.Die Anwendung von transkranieller Gleichstromstimulation während PavCA führte zu mehr GT-Verhalten bei stimulierten Ratten.Frühe tDCS während des Trinkens hatte keinen Einfluss auf das akute und das Langzeit-Trinken. Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine komplexere Beziehung zwischen Anreizsalienz und Alkoholsucht und unterstreichen,individuelle Unterschiede und beide Geschlechter in der präklinischen Forschung zu berücksichtigen. / The consequences of alcohol dependence cause the global deaths of million people yearly.The ability of the environment can trigger dependent behavior and promote drinking.The tendency to attribute incentive salience to cues differs between subjects.By forming a cue-alcohol association, neutral cues receive motivational value,thereby predicting the likelihood of alcohol reward occurrence,known as Pavlovian learning.Understanding the relationship between incentive salience and alcohol addiction help inform treatment strategies.We study the relationship between incentive salience and alcohol addiction.The transition from moderate to compulsive alcohol intake can be captured by the alcohol deprivation effect rat model (mimics alcohol relapse in humans).Rats were given voluntary access to alcohol solutions with repeated abstinence/reintroduction phases.Further,rats were tested in the PavCA,which quantifies individual tendency toward a conditional cue and the reward, thus allowing to trace the process of attributing incentive salience to rewardcues.During the final ADE cycle,rats underwent a bitter taste adulteration test to assess for compulsive-like behavior.After identifying reliable predictors of addictive behavior,preventive tDCS was performed to influence the tendency of animals to attach motivational importance to alcohol-related stimuli,and to prevent the manifestation of alcohol addictive behavior.Females drank more alcohol than males and exhibited more ST behavior in the PavCA, whereas males showed GT behavior.PavCA phenotypes emerged early and remained stable.The application of tDCS during PavCA results in high GT numbers in stimulated rats.Early tDCS on drinking does not affect acute or long-term drinking.Our findings indicate a complex relationship between incentive salience and alcohol addiction and emphasize the importance of considering individual differences and both sexes in preclinical research.

La plasticité synaptique est une propriété indispensable à l’acquisition de la mémoire chez toutes les espèces étudiées, des invertébrés aux primates. La formation d’une mémoire débute par une phase de plasticité qui inclut une restructuration synaptique ; ensuite elle se poursuit par la consolidation de ces modifications, contribuant à la mémoire à long terme. Certaines mémoires redeviennent malléables lorsqu’elles sont rappelées. La trace mnésique entre alors dans une nouvelle de phase de plasticité, au cours de laquelle certaines composantes de la mémoire peuvent être mises à jour, puis reconsolidées. L’objectif de la présente thèse est d’étudier les mécanismes cellulaires et moléculaires qui sont activés lors du rappel d’une mémoire. Nous avons utilisé un modèle de conditionnement Pavlovien, combiné à l’administration d’agents pharmacologiques et à l’analyse quantitative de marqueurs de plasticité synaptique, afin d’étudier la dynamique de la mémoire de peur auditive chez des rats Sprague Dawley. La circuiterie neuronale et les mécanismes associatifs impliqués dans la neurobiologie de cette mémoire sont bien caractérisés, en particulier le rôle des récepteurs glutamatergiques de type NMDA et AMPA dans la plasticité synaptique et la consolidation. Nos résultats démontrent que le retour de la trace mnésique à un état de labilité nécessite l’activation des récepteurs NMDA dans l’amygdale baso-latérale à l’instant même du rappel, alors que les récepteurs AMPA sont requis pour l’expression comportementale de la réponse de peur conditionnée. D’autre part, les résultats identifient le rappel comme une phase bien plus dynamique que présumée, et suggèrent que l’expression de la peur conditionnée mette en jeu la régulation du trafic des récepteurs AMPA par les récepteurs NMDA. Le présent travail espère contribuer à la compréhension de la neurobiologie fondamentale de la mémoire. De plus, il propose une intégration des résultats aux modèles animaux d’étude des troubles psychologiques conséquents aux mémoires traumatiques chez l’humain, tels que les phobies et les syndromes de stress post-traumatiques. / Synaptic plasticity is necessary for the acquisition of memory in all studied species, from invertebrates to primates. Memory formation starts with a phase of plasticity that entails synaptic remodeling ; then follows the consolidation of these modifications, which contributes to long-term memory. Some memories return to a malleable state upon retrieval. Consequently, the memory trace enters a new phase of plasticity, during which some memory components are eventually updated, then reconsolidated. The aim of the present thesis was to study the cellular and molecular mechanisms that are engaged during memory retrieval. We used a model of Pavlovian conditioning in Sprague Dawley rats, combined to pharmacological manipulations and quantitative analysis of synaptic plasticity markers, in order to study the dynamics of auditory fear memory. The neuronal circuitry and the associative mechanisms involved in the neurobiology of this memory are well characterized, in particular the role of NMDA and AMPA glutamatergic receptors in synaptic plasticity and consolidation. Our results show that the return of the memory trace to lability requires activation of NMDA receptors in the basolateral amygdala during retrieval, whereas AMPA receptors are necessary for the behavioral expression of the conditioned fear response. Furthermore, the data identify retrieval as being much more dynamic than recognized, and suggest that conditioned fear expression involves NMDA receptor-dependent regulation of AMPA receptors’ trafficking. The present work attempts to advance our understanding of the fundamental neurobiology of memory. In addition, it offers an integrative view of the data with regards to animal modeling of human clinical issues related to traumatic memories, like phobias and post-traumatic stress disorders.

Cette thèse repose sur l’idée que les individus prennent des décisions en assignant des valeurs aux conséquences appétitives (récompenses) et aversives (punitions) associées aux différentes options proposées, puis comparent ces valeurs pour sélectionner l’une d’elles. Dans la plupart des cas, ces valeurs sont apprises par essais et erreurs. En neuroscience et neuro-économie, il a été proposé que le cerveau représente ces valeurs de manière abstraite dans une échelle de valeur commune indépendante de la nature des conséquences attendues. Cette hypothèse est soutenue par un grand nombre d’études qui se sont intéressées à l’évaluation et à l’apprentissage des récompenses. Ces études mettent en évidence une implication du mésencéphale, du striatum et du cortex préfrontal dans le traitement de récompense primaires, monétaires, morales ou sociales. Beaucoup moins de travaux se sont intéressés au traitement des punitions. L’objectif de cette thèse est donc de comparer les corrélats cérébraux des processus d’évaluation des stimuli appétitifs et aversifs. Dans un premier temps nous avons utilisé un paradigme d’apprentissage par conditionnement pavlovien pour comparer les régions cérébrales impliquées dans la représentation de l’erreur de prédiction au cours de l’apprentissage avec des récompenses et des punitions gustatives, visuelles et monétaires. Ensuite nous nous sommes intéressés aux régions cérébrales impliquées dans traitement de récompenses et punitions plus abstraites tel que l’approbation sociale ou les considérations morales, dans un contexte de prise de décision pro-sociale. Ces études nous ont permis de démontrer que l’erreur de prédiction et l’évaluation liées à des stimuli appétitifs et aversifs étaient, en partie, sous-tendus par des réseaux cérébraux communs. / There is a growing consensus in behavioral neuroscience and neuroeconomic that individuals make decisions by assigning values to different options and comparing them to make a choice. Most often, these values are acquired on the basis of trial and error learning. A long-held view is that the brain assigns values to the different goods using an abstract signal that is encoded in a common currency. Multiple studies have found evidence for such value signals in midbrain, striatum and prefrontal cortex during learning or decision making involving primary or secondary rewards. An important open question is whether aversive outcomes expectation and learning engage the same or different valuation networks. The goal of this thesis is thus to compare the brain network involved in appetitive and aversive stimuli valuation. First we used a pavlovian conditioning paradigm to compare the cerebral correlates of prediction error during learning with gustative, visual and monetary rewards and punishments. Second, we investigated the brain regions involved in moral and social rewards and punishments in prosocial decision making. Overall, we found that prediction error and valuation related to appetitive and aversive stimuli are processed in part by common brain networks.

O dilema do prisioneiro (DP) é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DP é repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperação comparado à cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Isso é consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições. / Prisoner\'s dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner\'s dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produced a formulation for the evolution of the mean cooperation level and for the critical temptation values (temptation values that promote abrupt modifications in the cooperation level). In continuous prisoner\'s dilemma (CPD), each player has a level of cooperation that defines his/her degree of cooperation. We used the CPD to study the effect of the players\' personality on the emergence of cooperation. For this, we propose new strategies: one based on the players\' personality and two others based on the comparison between the player\'s obtained payoff and the desire one. All strategies present some mechanism that copies the state of the neighbor with the highest payoff in the neighborhood, mechanism inherited from the Darwinian strategy. The results showed that the CPD increases the average cooperation level of the system when compared to DPD. However, different strategies do not increased the cooperation compared to cooperation obtained with the Darwinian strategy. So, we propose the use of cluster coefficient, Gini coefficient and entropy of Shannon, Tsallis and Kullback-Leibler as classifiers to classify systems, in which the individuals play DPD with Darwinian strategy, by the cooperation level. As configurational averages were analyzed, such classifiers were not efficient in classifying the systems. This is due to the existence of distributions with extreme values of the results that compose the means. Distributions with extremes values emerged a discussion about the definition of the cooperation state in the prisoner\'s dilemma. We also discussed the consequences of using only average results in the analysis ignoring their deviations and distributions.

La plasticité synaptique est une propriété indispensable à l’acquisition de la mémoire chez toutes les espèces étudiées, des invertébrés aux primates. La formation d’une mémoire débute par une phase de plasticité qui inclut une restructuration synaptique ; ensuite elle se poursuit par la consolidation de ces modifications, contribuant à la mémoire à long terme. Certaines mémoires redeviennent malléables lorsqu’elles sont rappelées. La trace mnésique entre alors dans une nouvelle de phase de plasticité, au cours de laquelle certaines composantes de la mémoire peuvent être mises à jour, puis reconsolidées. L’objectif de la présente thèse est d’étudier les mécanismes cellulaires et moléculaires qui sont activés lors du rappel d’une mémoire. Nous avons utilisé un modèle de conditionnement Pavlovien, combiné à l’administration d’agents pharmacologiques et à l’analyse quantitative de marqueurs de plasticité synaptique, afin d’étudier la dynamique de la mémoire de peur auditive chez des rats Sprague Dawley. La circuiterie neuronale et les mécanismes associatifs impliqués dans la neurobiologie de cette mémoire sont bien caractérisés, en particulier le rôle des récepteurs glutamatergiques de type NMDA et AMPA dans la plasticité synaptique et la consolidation. Nos résultats démontrent que le retour de la trace mnésique à un état de labilité nécessite l’activation des récepteurs NMDA dans l’amygdale baso-latérale à l’instant même du rappel, alors que les récepteurs AMPA sont requis pour l’expression comportementale de la réponse de peur conditionnée. D’autre part, les résultats identifient le rappel comme une phase bien plus dynamique que présumée, et suggèrent que l’expression de la peur conditionnée mette en jeu la régulation du trafic des récepteurs AMPA par les récepteurs NMDA. Le présent travail espère contribuer à la compréhension de la neurobiologie fondamentale de la mémoire. De plus, il propose une intégration des résultats aux modèles animaux d’étude des troubles psychologiques conséquents aux mémoires traumatiques chez l’humain, tels que les phobies et les syndromes de stress post-traumatiques. / Synaptic plasticity is necessary for the acquisition of memory in all studied species, from invertebrates to primates. Memory formation starts with a phase of plasticity that entails synaptic remodeling ; then follows the consolidation of these modifications, which contributes to long-term memory. Some memories return to a malleable state upon retrieval. Consequently, the memory trace enters a new phase of plasticity, during which some memory components are eventually updated, then reconsolidated. The aim of the present thesis was to study the cellular and molecular mechanisms that are engaged during memory retrieval. We used a model of Pavlovian conditioning in Sprague Dawley rats, combined to pharmacological manipulations and quantitative analysis of synaptic plasticity markers, in order to study the dynamics of auditory fear memory. The neuronal circuitry and the associative mechanisms involved in the neurobiology of this memory are well characterized, in particular the role of NMDA and AMPA glutamatergic receptors in synaptic plasticity and consolidation. Our results show that the return of the memory trace to lability requires activation of NMDA receptors in the basolateral amygdala during retrieval, whereas AMPA receptors are necessary for the behavioral expression of the conditioned fear response. Furthermore, the data identify retrieval as being much more dynamic than recognized, and suggest that conditioned fear expression involves NMDA receptor-dependent regulation of AMPA receptors’ trafficking. The present work attempts to advance our understanding of the fundamental neurobiology of memory. In addition, it offers an integrative view of the data with regards to animal modeling of human clinical issues related to traumatic memories, like phobias and post-traumatic stress disorders.

O dilema do prisioneiro (DP) é um dos principais jogos da teoria dos jogos. No dilema do prisioneiro discreto (DPD), dois prisioneiros têm as opções de cooperar ou desertar. Um jogador cooperador não delata seu comparsa, já um desertor delata. Se um cooperar e o outro desertar, o cooperador fica preso por cinco anos e o desertor fica livre. Se ambos cooperarem, ficam presos por um ano e, se ambos desertarem, ficam presos por três anos. Quando o DP é repetido, a cooperação pode emergir entre agentes egoístas. Realizamos um estudo analítico para o DPD, que produziu uma formulação da evolução do nível médio de cooperação e da tentação crítica (valor de tentação que causa mudança abrupta do nível de cooperação). No dilema do prisioneiro contínuo (DPC), cada jogador apresenta um nível de cooperação que define o grau de cooperação. Utilizamos o DPC para estudar o efeito da personalidade dos jogadores sobre a emergência da cooperação. Para isso, propusemos novas estratégias: uma baseada na personalidade dos jogadores e outras duas baseadas na comparação entre o ganho obtido e a aspiração do jogador. Todas as estratégias apresentavam algum mecanismo de cópia do estado do vizinho com maior ganho na vizinhança, mecanismo este, herdado da estratégia darwiniana. Os resultados mostraram que o DPC aumenta o nível médio de cooperação do sistema, quando comparado ao DPD. No entanto, as diferentes estratégias não aumentaram a cooperação comparado à cooperação obtida com a estratégia darwiniana. Então propusemos o uso do coeficiente de agrupamentos, coeficiente de Gini e entropias de Shannon, Tsallis e Kullback-Leibler para classificar os sistemas, em que os agentes jogam o DPD com a estratégia darwiniana, quanto ao nível de cooperação. Como analisamos valores de médias configuracionais, tais classificadores não foram eficientes ao classificar os sistemas. Isso é consequência da existência de distribuições de extremos nos resultados que compõem as médias. As distribuições de extremos suscitaram uma discussão acerca da definição do regime de cooperação no dilema do prisioneiro. Discutimos também as consequências de utilizar apenas valores médios nos resultados ignorando seus desvios e as distribuições. / Prisoner\'s dilemma (PD) is one of the main games of game theory. In discrete prisoner\'s dilemma (DPD), two prisoners have the options to cooperate or to defect. A cooperator player does not defect his accomplice, while a defector does. If one player cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator gets jailed for five years and the defector goes free. If both cooperate, they get jailed during one year and if both defect, they get jailed during three years. When this game is repeated, cooperation may emerge among selfish individuals. We perform an analytical study for the DPD, that produced a formulation for the evolution of the mean cooperation level and for the critical temptation values (temptation values that promote abrupt modifications in the cooperation level). In continuous prisoner\'s dilemma (CPD), each player has a level of cooperation that defines his/her degree of cooperation. We used the CPD to study the effect of the players\' personality on the emergence of cooperation. For this, we propose new strategies: one based on the players\' personality and two others based on the comparison between the player\'s obtained payoff and the desire one. All strategies present some mechanism that copies the state of the neighbor with the highest payoff in the neighborhood, mechanism inherited from the Darwinian strategy. The results showed that the CPD increases the average cooperation level of the system when compared to DPD. However, different strategies do not increased the cooperation compared to cooperation obtained with the Darwinian strategy. So, we propose the use of cluster coefficient, Gini coefficient and entropy of Shannon, Tsallis and Kullback-Leibler as classifiers to classify systems, in which the individuals play DPD with Darwinian strategy, by the cooperation level. As configurational averages were analyzed, such classifiers were not efficient in classifying the systems. This is due to the existence of distributions with extreme values of the results that compose the means. Distributions with extremes values emerged a discussion about the definition of the cooperation state in the prisoner\'s dilemma. We also discussed the consequences of using only average results in the analysis ignoring their deviations and distributions.

本論文の目的は、外科手術を必要としない、非侵襲人工内耳の開発である。スナネズミを対象とした基礎研究からヒトを対象とした応用研究まで包括的に行うことで、赤外光レーザー刺激を用いて音声知覚を再現する刺激手法の確立を目指した。スナネズミを対象とした実験によりレーザー刺激が生み出す音の「聞こえ」を明らかにし、ヒトを対象とした実験で、レーザー人工内耳で言語知覚を生み出す刺激アルゴリズムを提案した。 / This study aimed to develop a laser auditory prosthesis that can produce intelligible speech perception by stimulating auditory nerves from the outer ear. I investigated laser-evoked auditory perception using Mongolian gerbil. Subsequently, I synthesized a CMS based on animal research using Mongolian gerbils as a simulated sound of the laser auditory prosthesis to propose a speech encoding scheme using laser stimulation. The results showed that all human participants could comprehend the CMS contents by replicating the original sound's formant frequency transition and amplitude envelopes, suggesting that laser auditory prostheses with the CMS could restore speech perception. / 博士(工学) / Doctor of Philosophy in Engineering / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University

O Dilema do Prisioneiro (DP) é o jogo mais proeminente da Teoria dos Jogos devido à emergência da cooperação entre jogadores egoístas. O comportamento de cada jogador depende da estratégia que ele adotada e do seu ganho, que é determinado em função dos parâmetros do DP (T, R, P e S) e do número z de vizinhos com que ele joga. Portanto, a estrutura espacial dos jogadores não é relevante. Em nosso trabalho, utilizamos um autômato celular unidimensional onde cada jogador pode cooperar ou desertar ao interagir, simetricamente, com seus z vizinhos mais próximos. O sistema proposto nos permitiu realizar um estudo exaustivo do espaço de parâmetros para as estratégias evolucionárias Darwiniana (EED) e a Pavloviana (EEP) e compara-las. A geometria unidimensional nos possibilita obter os mesmos resultados dos sistemas em dimensionalidade arbitrária d, além de apresentar várias vantagens em relação a elas. No sistema que propomos os efeitos de borda são menores, exige menos tempo para a execução das simulações numéricas, permite variar o valor de z e é fácil obter uma representação visual da evolução temporal do sistema. Tal visualização simplifica a compreensão das interações entre os jogadores, pois surgem padrões nos agrupamentos de cooperadores/desertores, semelhantes aos pertencentes às classes dos autômatos celulares elementares. O estudo destes padrões nos permite compreender simplesmente a emergência da cooperação ou deserção nos sistemas. A evolução temporal do sistema que adota a EED gera um diagrama de fases muito rico com a presença das fases cooperadora, desertora e caótica. Já para a EEP, obtivemos um novo resultado analítico para as transições de fase, que neste caso são: cooperadora e quasi-regular. O estudo numérico exaustivo determinou as regiões do espaço de parâmetros onde acontecem cada uma das fases, e os efeitos da auto-interação podendo assim validar os resultados teóricos. O estudo do caso particular T = 1, tradicionalmente considerado como trivial, mostrou que ele apresenta comportamentos inusitados. Nossa principal contribuição para o estudo do DP é a obtenção de um novo paradigma. A geometria unidimensional com interação de vizinhos simétricos permitiu a visualização da evolução de padrões de cooperadores e desertores, o cálculo analítico de Tc para a EEP e o estudo de T = 1 para tais sistemas. / The Prisoner Dilemma (PD) is the most prominent game of the Game Theory due to emergency of the cooperation between selfish players. The behavior of each player depends on his/her strategy and the payoff, which is determined in function of the PD parameters (T, R, P and S) and by the number z of neighbors with whom he/she plays. Therefore, the spatial structure of the players does not matter. In our work, we have used a one-dimensional cellular automaton where each player can cooperate or defect when interacting, symmetrically, with his/her z nearest neighbors. The considered system allowed us to carry out an exhaustive exploration of the parameters space for the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy (EED) and Pavlovian (EEP) and compares them. One-dimensional geometry makes possible to us get the same results of the systems in arbitrary d dimensional networks, besides, it presents some advantages. For the system that we proposed compared to the others dimensional networks, the boundary effects are less present, it needs less time for run the numerical simulations, it allows to vary the z value and is easier to get the visual representation of the system temporal evolution. Such visualization simplifies the understanding of the interactions between the players, therefore patterns appear in the clusters of cooperator/defectors, and these patterns belong to the elementary cellular automata classes. The study of these patterns allows them to understand in an easy way the emergence of the cooperation or defection in the systems. The temporal evolution of the system that adopts the EED yields a very rich phases diagram with the presence of cooperative, defective and chaotic phases. By the other hand, for the EEP, we have got a new analytical result for the phase transitions that in this case are: quasi-regular and cooperative. The exhaustive exploration study determines the regions on the parameters space where happen each phases occurs, and the effect of the self-interaction and thus validate the theoretical results. The study of the particular case T = 1, traditionally considered as trivial one, showed that it presents unusual behaviors, that we will present. Our main contribution for the study of the DP is the attainment of a new paradigm. One-dimensional geometry with interaction of symmetrical neighbors allowed to visualizes the evolution of cooperators and defectors patterns, the analytical result for Tc for the EEP and the study of T = 1 for such systems.

O Dilema do Prisioneiro (DP) é o jogo mais proeminente da Teoria dos Jogos devido à emergência da cooperação entre jogadores egoístas. O comportamento de cada jogador depende da estratégia que ele adotada e do seu ganho, que é determinado em função dos parâmetros do DP (T, R, P e S) e do número z de vizinhos com que ele joga. Portanto, a estrutura espacial dos jogadores não é relevante. Em nosso trabalho, utilizamos um autômato celular unidimensional onde cada jogador pode cooperar ou desertar ao interagir, simetricamente, com seus z vizinhos mais próximos. O sistema proposto nos permitiu realizar um estudo exaustivo do espaço de parâmetros para as estratégias evolucionárias Darwiniana (EED) e a Pavloviana (EEP) e compara-las. A geometria unidimensional nos possibilita obter os mesmos resultados dos sistemas em dimensionalidade arbitrária d, além de apresentar várias vantagens em relação a elas. No sistema que propomos os efeitos de borda são menores, exige menos tempo para a execução das simulações numéricas, permite variar o valor de z e é fácil obter uma representação visual da evolução temporal do sistema. Tal visualização simplifica a compreensão das interações entre os jogadores, pois surgem padrões nos agrupamentos de cooperadores/desertores, semelhantes aos pertencentes às classes dos autômatos celulares elementares. O estudo destes padrões nos permite compreender simplesmente a emergência da cooperação ou deserção nos sistemas. A evolução temporal do sistema que adota a EED gera um diagrama de fases muito rico com a presença das fases cooperadora, desertora e caótica. Já para a EEP, obtivemos um novo resultado analítico para as transições de fase, que neste caso são: cooperadora e quasi-regular. O estudo numérico exaustivo determinou as regiões do espaço de parâmetros onde acontecem cada uma das fases, e os efeitos da auto-interação podendo assim validar os resultados teóricos. O estudo do caso particular T = 1, tradicionalmente considerado como trivial, mostrou que ele apresenta comportamentos inusitados. Nossa principal contribuição para o estudo do DP é a obtenção de um novo paradigma. A geometria unidimensional com interação de vizinhos simétricos permitiu a visualização da evolução de padrões de cooperadores e desertores, o cálculo analítico de Tc para a EEP e o estudo de T = 1 para tais sistemas. / The Prisoner Dilemma (PD) is the most prominent game of the Game Theory due to emergency of the cooperation between selfish players. The behavior of each player depends on his/her strategy and the payoff, which is determined in function of the PD parameters (T, R, P and S) and by the number z of neighbors with whom he/she plays. Therefore, the spatial structure of the players does not matter. In our work, we have used a one-dimensional cellular automaton where each player can cooperate or defect when interacting, symmetrically, with his/her z nearest neighbors. The considered system allowed us to carry out an exhaustive exploration of the parameters space for the Darwinian Evolutionary Strategy (EED) and Pavlovian (EEP) and compares them. One-dimensional geometry makes possible to us get the same results of the systems in arbitrary d dimensional networks, besides, it presents some advantages. For the system that we proposed compared to the others dimensional networks, the boundary effects are less present, it needs less time for run the numerical simulations, it allows to vary the z value and is easier to get the visual representation of the system temporal evolution. Such visualization simplifies the understanding of the interactions between the players, therefore patterns appear in the clusters of cooperator/defectors, and these patterns belong to the elementary cellular automata classes. The study of these patterns allows them to understand in an easy way the emergence of the cooperation or defection in the systems. The temporal evolution of the system that adopts the EED yields a very rich phases diagram with the presence of cooperative, defective and chaotic phases. By the other hand, for the EEP, we have got a new analytical result for the phase transitions that in this case are: quasi-regular and cooperative. The exhaustive exploration study determines the regions on the parameters space where happen each phases occurs, and the effect of the self-interaction and thus validate the theoretical results. The study of the particular case T = 1, traditionally considered as trivial one, showed that it presents unusual behaviors, that we will present. Our main contribution for the study of the DP is the attainment of a new paradigm. One-dimensional geometry with interaction of symmetrical neighbors allowed to visualizes the evolution of cooperators and defectors patterns, the analytical result for Tc for the EEP and the study of T = 1 for such systems.