Contemporary philosopher, Joseph Levine, has argued that human phenomenological experience cannot be explained solely through the resources of neuroscience, and that a significant ‘explanatory gap’ exists between the rich features of human experience and scientific explanations of the mind. This thesis examines Guiseppina D’Oro’s novel suggestion that the gap exists, but that it is a semantic rather than an empirical problem. D’Oro argues that the ‘gap’ is a persistent philosophical problem because of its semantic nature, and that advances in neuroscience will fail to resolve the gap because its source is a conceptual distinction that is not marked by empirical difference. In the thesis I will discuss some virtues and difficulties with D’Oro’s thesis, and the implications her claim has more broadly for philosophers of mind. / Graduate / 0422

Réduit à sa plus simple expression, ce travail de recherche met face à face deux acteurs s’affrontant dans un duel philosophique : le physicalisme et l’argument de la connaissance de Franck Jackson. La question clé autour de laquelle s’agencera notre discussion ici est (1) Est-il vrai que « Tout est physique » ? Le coeur de la thèse que nous défendons peut être résumé ainsi : (T) Le clivage post-platonicien (tacite) entre les formes objectivées et les formes subjectivées de la pensée, provoque des fossés explicatifs (explicites), qui sont franchis (très souvent) via des sauts conceptuels (mystérieux), intercalés entre les étapes d’une argumentation. Il sera argumenté ici que la distribution actuelle des débats sur l’axe états physiques (objectifs) / états qualitatifs (subjectifs) subit une pression souterraine post-platonicienne. Conséquemment, une bonne partie de l’énergie des penseurs actuels est dépensée à la recherche du « bon saut » ou « crochet » conceptuel permettant d’attacher les rives du mental à celui du physique. Nous soutiendrons que le coeur du problème ne consiste pas à résoudre le différend entre les physicalistes et les avocats des qualia, mais plutôt à trouver la réponse à la question : pourquoi en sommes-nous arrivés là, i.e., à ce clivage sur l’axe phénoménal/physique ? / “Everything is physical” physicalists claim. “Everything except qualia” reply the defenders of the Knowledge Argument. This thesis argues that both parties to this debate are committed to a traditional picture according to which one can tacitly adopt the standpoint of an off-stage narrator, capable of distinguishing ab initio between the different items in this conceptual scenario. The main claim here is that every time we artificially introduce a sharp conceptual distinction separating these two items or levels (mental and physical), we must automatically make a sophisticated conceptual leap in order to link the first-person qualitative perspective with the external physical world. Thus the physicalism/qualia dispute is only a by-product of an extended theoretical conception of the mind/world link which entails two distinct kinds of problems: (i) structural problems (to define and determine conceptually dual items like thought/matter, reason/senses, subject/object, etc.). Such problems require us to question “how are these items supposed to work together?” and this leads us to the second group of problems: (ii) mediation problems. The first group of problems inevitably leads to explanatory gaps; the second ends up needing to appeal to conceptual leaps in order to ensure the necessary link between two separate items. This exerts a powerful influence over the cast of our thoughts: seen from this angle, all philosophical enterprise comes down to the question of where to place the three following parameters: the world as it is, the conceptual picture which aims to represent the world as it is and the theorist-painter gifted with the ability to capture the world picture as it is. We also face the problem of finding the right mediators to assure coherence among the members of this trio, and the problem of setting the valid criteria guaranteeing the theorist-painter that what is captured on his conceptual canvas does indeed correspond to the world as it is, i.e. that he is not laboring under the delusions of an evil genie. In this thesis I argue against this way of putting things.

abstract: Emergentism offers a promising compromise in the philosophy of mind between Cartesian substance dualism and reductivistic physicalism. The ontological emergentist holds that conscious mental phenomena supervene on physical phenomena, but that they have a nature over and above the physical. However, emergentist views have been subjected to a variety of powerful objections: they are alleged to be self-contradictory, incompatible with mental causation, justified by unreliable intuitions, and in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I defend the emergentist position against these objections. I clarify the concepts of supervenience and of ontological novelty in a way that ensures the emergentist position is coherent, while remaining distinct from physicalism and traditional dualism. Making note of the equivocal way in which the concept of sufficiency is used in Jaegwon Kim's arguments against emergent mental causation, I argue that downward causation does not entail widespread overdetermination. I argue that considerations of ideal a priori deducibility from some physical base, or "Cosmic Hermeneutics", will not themselves provide answers to where the cuts in the structure of nature lie. Instead, I propose reconsidering the question of Cosmic Hermeneutics in terms of which cognitive resources would be required for the ideal reasoner to perform the deduction. Lastly, I respond to the objection that emergence in the philosophy of mind is in conflict with our contemporary scientific understanding of the world. I suggest that a kind of weak ontological emergence is a viable form of explanation in many fields, and discuss current applications of emergence in biology, sociology, and the study of complex systems. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Philosophy 2013

I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020. / University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018) / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

This dissertation explores the relationship between mental properties and physicalism to confront the apparent inconsistency between mental realism and the tenets of physicalism. As I see it, the major obstacle to fully integrating mental properties into physicalism is the feasibility of downward mental causation. Specifically, stringent physicalists find it contradictory to maintain that the mind can affect the body without contradicting the tenets of physicalism. This inconsistency claim is most notably addressed in the Causal Exclusion Argument. Though I am not personally committed to physicalism as an absolute worldview, I respect its prevalence and the reasons for its dominance. Rather than reject physicalism, I approach the puzzle with epistemological humility and attempt to work within the scope of physicalism. This exploration involves critically examining physicalism’s leading mental-physical relationships, focusing on emergence as a plausible means to reconcile mental and physical properties without undermining either. Ultimately, I propose a modified form of physicalism that maintains its metaphysical and epistemological theses but in a milder form that is more conducive to emergent mental phenomena and the aspects of reality that are nonlinear and indeterminate. Guided by the work of Jaegwon Kim and Gerald Vision, this dissertation moves beyond their ideas, challenging reductionist perspectives within physicalism. The key contribution is the introduction of Dynamically Stable Causal Holism (or DSC Holism in brief), which represents a significant departure from traditional reductionist approaches, promoting a more holistic understanding of physicalism. Through nonlinear emergence and DSC Holism, I confront the Causal Exclusion Argument. A secondary original contribution is my approach to these puzzles. I integrate and synthesize concepts from the philosophy of science and special sciences to offer a fresh perspective on physically compatible mental realism and downward causation. / Philosophy

Russellian panpsychism is often regarded as a theory of mind that bears promise of integrating conscious experience into the physical causal order. In a recent article by Howell, this is questioned. I will argue that failure to address Howell´s challenge properly has deeper consequences than it might initially appear; epiphenomenal micro-qualia means that we have lost a unique opportunity to gain insight into necessities in nature. In order to make use of this opportunity, however, some initial assumptions commonly made must be dropped: most crucially, the assumption of mind-body distinctness. In what follows, I try to provide a sketch of how a slightly different version of Russellian panpsychism can be formulated that builds around identity instead of mind-body distinctness. This version of panpsychism can meet Howell's challenge, but what is more, it can be met in a way that fully makes use of the special place occupied by panpsychism regarding the mysterious nature of the “necessary connection” between cause and effect.

Le physicalisme explique scientifiquement le problème de la conscience et peut se définir comme étant le problème résiduel de toutes les tentatives de réduction. Le physicalisme, dès lors, doit-il être toujours considéré comme la position métaphysique dominante et comme la méthodologie incontournable de toute théorie de la conscience ? Les tenants d’un physicalisme matérialiste radical réfutent le caractère irréductible du ressenti de conscience sur les processus neurobiolologiques. Cependant, éliminer la réalité idéelle du ressenti subjectif de l’expérience consciente semble n’aboutir qu’à l’échec du physicalisme dans sa vision matérialiste radicale car la seule analyse structurelle et perceptuelle des caractères phénoménaux d’un organisme ne peut traiter de manière explicite le caractère subjectif de l’expérience consciente. Les philosophes non réductionnistes et les dualistes postulent, donc, le dépassement du physicalisme à travers un néo-dualisme moderne. Dès lors, le ressenti de conscience doit-il être considéré comme un simple dépassement du physicalisme ou devons-nous le considérer comme étant au-delà du physicalisme ? La question essentielle qui se posera tout au long de notre thèse sur le ressenti de conscience est de savoir pourquoi le ressenti de conscience existe et pas seulement comment il existe ? Le pourquoi du ressenti de conscience nous entraine à travers le rôle imparti dans l’émergence de la conscience que représente le fossé explicatif physico-psychique sur ce que l’on nomme le « hard problem of consciousness ». / Physicalism scientifically explains the problem of consciousness and can be defined as the residual problem of all attempts of reduction. So, can physicalism always be considered as the supreme metaphysical stance and the unavoidable methodology of all theory of consciousness ? The supporters of a radical materialistic methodology deny the ireductible character of the perception of consciousness. So, they rule out any mental causality and any dualist vision of consciousness through the elimination of the perception of consciousness as a conscious experience and they argue that any physical effect is only terminated by the physical aspect.However, ruling out the ideal reality from the subjective perception seems only to result in the failure of physicalim in its radical materialistic vision, because the structural and perceptual of the phenomenal characters of an organism only cannot explicitly deal with the subjective character of a conscious experience.The non reductionist philosophers and the dualists assume the concept exceeding of physicalism through a modern neo-dualism. The basic issue of our dissertation is to know why the perception of consciousness exists and not only why it exists. The reasons of the perception of consciousness carries us, through the part played in the emergence of consciousness by the physico-psychic explanatory gap, to what is called "the hard problem of consciousness".So, in our dissertation, we shall try to rebut the conclusions of eliminativist physicalism and assume the emergence of the dualism of properties and a modern neo-dualism through the two key questions.

It has often been argued that John Searle’s theory of mind, biological naturalism, due to its commitment to mental irreducibility amounts to no more than disguised property dualism. I suggest that a thorough analysis of Searle’s somewhat unusual views on the nature of reduction reveals this irreducibility to be not a metaphysical relation between mental properties and physical but one concerned only with the semantics of the respective terms used to refer to these. As a result, I argue, irreducibility in his sense is insufficient to support a metaphysical conclusion like property dualism. Finally, to reinforce this point I give a concrete example of a potential physicalist view which is compatible with the analysis of irreducibility as semantic but not as metaphysical and hence on my reasoning remains open to Searle.

L’expérience consciente pose un problème au physicalisme métaphysique. Il semble en effet difficile de comprendre comment une chose purement physique, telle que le cerveau, peut avoir des expériences conscientes. La stratégie des concepts phénoménaux constitue la voie actuellement la plus suivie par ceux qui désirent répondre à cette difficulté et défendre le physicalisme métaphysique. Elle consiste à rendre compte de nos intuitions anti-physicalistes concernant la conscience dans un cadre purement physicaliste, par une théorie de nos concepts d’expériences conscientes. Ce travail de thèse consiste en une présentation et en une discussion critique de cette stratégie. Ce travail montre que les différentes versions actuelles de cette stratégie échouent toutes à rendre compte de nos intuitions anti-physicalistes, parce qu’elles ne parviennent pas à rendre compte du caractère cognitivement substantiel de notre saisie de la conscience, et parce qu’elles manquent d’expliquer la robustesse conceptuelle de ces intuitions. Ce travail de thèse propose également une nouvelle théorie des concepts phénoménaux qui résout ces difficultés. Cette théorie analyse les concepts phénoménaux comme des concepts dotés d’un contenu cognitif substantiel, en vertu duquel ces concepts caractérisent les expériences conscientes comme des états mentaux situés dans une relation épistémologique particulièrement intime à l’égard du sujet dont ce sont les expériences. Cette théorie permet de dissoudre le problème métaphysique de la conscience d’une manière satisfaisante. / Conscious experience constitutes a problem for physicalism. Indeed, it seems difficult to understand how something purely physical (such as the brain) can have conscious experiences. The phenomenal concept strategy is perhaps the most popular strategy for those who want to address this problem and defend physicalism. This strategy tries to account for our anti-physicalist intuitions regarding consciousness from within a purely physicalist framework, by way of a theory of our concepts of conscious experiences. This dissertation consists firstly in a presentation and a critical discussion of current versions of the phenomenal concept strategy. It tries to show that the various theories belonging to this strategy (broadly construed) all fail to give a satisfying account of anti-physicalist intuitions regarding consciousness; first, because they cannot give an account of our cognitively substantial grasp of consciousness (a grasp which is at the basis of our anti-physicalist intuitions); second, because they cannot explain the conceptual robustness of those intuitions. This dissertation also seeks to put forth a new theory of phenomenal concepts, one able to address those difficulties. This new theory describes phenomenal concepts as concepts that possess substantial cognitive content, in virtue of which they characterize conscious experiences as mental states which stand in a particularly intimate epistemological relation with the subject who has them. I argue that this theory manages to solve the various difficulties encountered by other theories of phenomenal concepts, thus allowing us to dissolve the metaphysical problem of consciousness in a satisfying way.

This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations. I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism. The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.