De acuerdo con la así llamada concepción platonista de la naturaleza de las entidades matemáticas, las afirmaciones matemáticas son análogas a las afirmaciones acerca de objetos físicos reales y sus relaciones, con la diferencia decisiva de que las entidades matemáticas no son ni físicas ni espacio temporalmente individuales, y, por tanto, no son percibidas sensorialmente. El platonismo matemático es, por lo tanto, de la misma índole que el platonismo en general, el cual postula la tesis de un mundo ideal de entidades –eídē– que a la vez están separadas (chōristón) y son el fundamento cognitivo y ontológico del mundo real de cosas físicas que poseen propiedades espacio-temporales. Mientras que la no-identidad entre la concepción platonista de las entidades matemáticas y el platonismo del Platón histórico” es frecuentemente reconocida tácita o explícitamente tanto por sus defensores como por sus críticos, su conexión conla crítica del Aristóteles histórico” a la filosofía de Platón frecuentemente no es reconocida. Este artículo llama la atención sobre la conexión de Aristóteles con el así llamado platonismo tradicionalmente concebido y reconstruye un aspecto crucial de su crítica a la tesis originaria del chōrismós platónico que se pierde de vista a menos que se reconozca el objetivo verdadero de su crítica, la descripción platónica igualmente originaria de los números eidéticos.---The Source of Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics Revisited: Aristotle’s Critique of Eidetic Numbers”. According to the so-called Platonistic conception of the nature of mathematical entities, mathematical statements are analogous to statements about real physical objects and their relations, with the one decisive difference that mathematical entities are neither physical nor individuated spatio-temporally and, thus, not perceived sensuously. Mathematical Platonism is therefore of a piece with Platonism in general, which posits the thesis of an ideal world of entities –eídē– that are both separate (chōristón) from and the cognitive and ontological foundations of the real world of physical things possessing spatio-temporal properties. While the non-identity of the Platonistic conception of mathematical entities with the Platonism of the historical” Plato is usually either tacitly or explicitly acknowledged by its defenders and critics alike, its connection with the historical” Aristotle’s critique of Plato’s philosophy usually goes unacknowledged. This paper both calls attention to Aristotle’s connection with the so-called Platonism traditionally conceived and reconstructs a crucial aspect of his critique of the original Platonic chōrismós thesis, an aspect that is missed unless the true target of this critique, the equally original Platonic account of eidetic numbers, is recognized.

This essay explores the concept of soul in the theology of Sarah Coakley. This is done by analyzing the ideas in Coakleys work descriptively. The notion of soul has been found to have a close connection to two of Coakleys main ideas, those of desire and asceticism. From these ideas I have tried to add a concept of soul to Coakleys theological work.  The notion of the soul has its basis in the material body and its desires. Coakley understands the desires of the body as both sexual desire and desire for God. In her theology desire can be understood as a metaphor for the soul´s longing for God. From the desires of the material body this essay have shown that one can design a concept of soul in Coakleys theology. I argue that you can understand Coakleys theology better theoretically by engaging a concept of soul instead of just focusing on contemplative prayer as a way of reaching God and do academic theology. With a concept of soul in Coakleys theology it can work regardless of confession or religious practice and it makes the academic theology possible without depending on contemplation.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lucas Kattah Macedo.pdf: 706900 bytes, checksum: da3ca8b84a3cccb7d501d2844e463b34 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-03-31 / This text aims to present a translation of the Chapter "The World of Ideas" of Hermann Lotze's Logic (1874), along with the translation of other extracts and with an introductory study for their understanding. Realize the importance of such work to the extent that we can grasp the concept of the philosopher's own logic, characterized by a theory of validity and an anti-psychologism / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo apresentar uma tradução do Capítulo O Mundo das Ideias da Lógica de Hermann Lotze (1874), juntamente com a tradução de outros excertos e com um estudo introdutório para a compreensão dos mesmos. Percebe-se a importância de tal trabalho na medida em que buscamos compreender a noção de lógica própria do autor, caracterizada por uma teoria da validade e por um anti-psicologismo

The present study aims at analyzing the so-called Tarski proposal, a proposal about which objects should be considered as logical. My analysis has two parts: the first part, more historically oriented, compares Tarskis evolving methodology to Carnaps and Quines, in particular with the dierent conceptions of these latter two regarding that which they called explication. The second, more argumentative part, attempts to show that the most natural environment for this proposal is a platonic metaphysics of a neo-Fregean variety. / O presente estudo tem por objetivo analisar a assim chamada proposta de Tarski, a qual visa fornecer uma resposta à pergunta: quais objetos são lógicos? Nossa análise consiste em duas partes: uma primeira, mais histórica, compara a metodologia de Tarski àquela de Carnap e de Quine, se atentando principalmente às diferentes acepções que cada um deles atribui à noção de explicação (explication). A segunda parte, mais argumentativa, procura mostrar que um ambiente natural para essa proposta é uma metafísica platônica de franca inspiração neo-fregeana.

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Several commentators make the claim that Augustine is not a systematic thinker. The purpose of this thesis is to refute that claim in one specific area of Augustine's thought, the metaphysical foundations underlying his solutions to the problem of evil. Through an exegetical examination of various works in which Augustine writes on evil, I show that his solutions for both natural and moral evil rely on a coherent metaphysical system, conceived of and expounded upon within a Platonically influenced Christian context.

Augustine, the fourth-century Christian philosopher, is perhaps best-known for his spiritual autobiography Confessions. Two aspects of the problem of evil are arguably critical for comprehending his life in Books 1 through 9 of the work. His search for the nature and origin of evil in the various philosophies that he encounters (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own weaknesses (the experiential aspect) are windows for understanding the actual dynamics of his sojourn. I defend the idea above by providing a fuller examination of the key role that both aspects play in his spiritual journey. Examining relevant events from Augustine's life chronologically, I analyze his philosophical wanderings from his encounter with Cicero's work Hortensius through his eventual disillusionment with the Manichaean religion, and finally, his move in the direction of Christian teachings with the help of Neo-Platonism. Along the way his philosophical questions (the intellectual aspect) and his struggles with his own depravity (the experiential aspect) have an effect on each other until his ultimate move toward Christianity resolves both problems of evil.

In both the Meno and the Protagoras, Plato investigates the unity, acquisition and nature of virtue (ἀρετή). Although these dialogues appear to reach opposing conclusions—the Protagoras that virtue is knowledge and the Meno that virtue is divinely dispensed true opinion—in fact they both articulate the same moral principle. Both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good. I investigate these two dialogues independently and on their own respective terms, dedicating Chapter 2 to the Protagoras and Chapter 3 to the Meno. Although both dialogues argue that virtue is knowledge of the good, neither offers an account of the good. This is because each dialogue is but a single part of a larger argument which culminates in the Republic, wherein we find a more complete explanation of knowledge of the good in the description of the philosopher-king.

Much has been said about the influence of Plotinus, the Platonist philosopher, on the ideas of Augustine of Hippo, the Western Church Father whose writings had the largest impact on Western Europe in the Middle Ages. This thesis considers both writers’ ideas concerning matter, evil, and language. It then considers the way in which these writers’ ideas influenced their style of writing in the Enneads and the Confessions. Plotinus’ more straightforward negative attitude towards the material word and its relationship to the One ultimately makes his writing more academic and less emotionally powerful. Augustine’s more complicated understanding of the material world and its relationship to God results in a more mystical and more emotionally powerful style, which derives its effectiveness especially from its use of antithesis and the first and second person.