A presente tese tem como intuito inicial investigar as asserções aparentemente conflituosas que Kant faz sobre as coisas em si mesmas, ora em sentido estritamente negativo, como a representação problemática de algo completamente indeterminado, ora em sentido positivo como fundamento ou causa dos fenômenos. Partindo de interpretações que compreendem esse conflito entre asserções sobre as coisas em si mesmas como tendo sua origem nos dois problemas que a filosofia crítica procura solucionar a possibilidade do conhecimento especulativo e a fundamentação da moral , procura-se reconstruir, num primeiro momento, o vínculo entre a crítica da razão e os diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas. Argumentamos que a diferenciação da faculdade racional em duas atividades ou espontaneidades, entendimento e razão, que são expostas pela crítica como produtoras de conceitos e legislações distintas, exige duas maneiras de formular, criticamente, o conceito de númeno. A primeira formulação é feita pelo entendimento mediante a abstração das condições sensíveis de aplicação das categorias, dada sua originariedade em relação à sensibilidade. Este conceito tem de permanecer, contudo, em um sentido estritamente negativo e problemático, visto as categorias consistirem apenas em funções de síntese de representações sensíveis e estarem limitadas, por isso, a um uso empírico. A segunda formulação é feita, em contrapartida, pelas idéias da razão, que pressupõem um prolongamento da síntese pensada nas categorias até o incondicionado. Ainda que envolva uma aparência transcendental essas idéias se fazem necessárias, principalmente, em vista do uso prático da razão. Num segundo momento, porém, voltando nossa atenção ao esforço de Kant em articular sistematicamente esses diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas no interior da filosofia crítica, procuramos mostrar como a elaboração do conceito de autonomia na passagem para o uso prático, possibilita uma maneira de operar com a aparência transcendental presente nas ideias, sem violar a limitação das categorias ao uso empírico. Nesse sentido, explicitamos como a crítica da razão em seu uso prático desvela um novo caminho para a faculdade de julgar, em que lhe é permitido aplicar legitimamente a categoria de causalidade com referência aos númenos. / The initial aim of this thesis is to investigate the apparently conflicting claims that Kant makes about the things in themselves, sometimes in a strictly negative sense, as a problematic representation of something completely undetermined, sometimes in a positive sense as the ground or the cause of the appearances. Starting with interpretations that understand this conflict between the claims about things in themselves as having its origin in two problems that the critical philosophy aims to solve the possibility of speculative knowledge and the moral foundation our first task is to reconstruct the link between the critique of reason and the different ways of representing things in themselves. We argue that the differentiation of the rational faculty in two activities or spontaneities understanding and reason which are presented by the critical view as producers of distinct concepts and laws, requires two ways to critically formulate the concept of noumenon. The first formulation is made by the understanding by abstraction of sensible conditions of application of the categories, given its originality in relation to sensibility. This concept must remain, however, in a strictly negative and problematic sense, since the categories consist only in synthetic functions of sensible representations and thus are limited to the empirical use. The second formulation, on the other hand, is made by the ideas of reason, which require an extension of the synthesis thought in the categories up to the unconditioned. Those ideas are needed especially in view of the practical use of reason, despite the fact they involve a \"transcendental appearance\". Turning our attention to Kant\'s effort to systematically articulate these different modes of representation of things in themselves within the critical philosophy, the second task of the thesis is to show how the concept of autonomy elaborated in the transition to practical use, provides a way to work with the transcendental appearance present in the ideas, without violating the limitation of the categories to empirical use. In this sense, we elucidate how the critique of reason in its practical use reveals a new path for the faculty of judgment, in which it is legitimately allowed to apply the category of causality with reference to noumena.

Couplage fort VS faible, sécurité réglée VS sécurité gérée, ingénierie VS expertise terrain… Confrontées à des environnements complexes et incertains, les organisations maîtrisent les risques en oscillant entre contrôle rigide et souplesse face aux aléas. Au coeur de cette tension se trouve l'individu, capable de déterminer lorsque les règles ne suffisent plus et de s'adapter. Cela implique de considérer l'individu non plus comme un facteur, de défaillance ou même de fiabilité, mais comme un sujet autonome, capable de prendre des décisions raisonnées et éclairées. Mobilisant la philosophie pratique de Paul Ricoeur, la thèse construit la notion de « sécurité pratique ». Elle propose de préserver la sécurité grâce à la raison pratique des individus plutôt que la rationalité des organisations, de mobiliser la volonté plutôt que l'obéissance. La thèse présente la démonstration de la pertinence et de la possibilité bien réelle d'une telle approche de la sécurité, en l'étayant par des données terrain recueillies au sein d'une grande entreprise du secteur du gaz. / Tight VS loose coupling, managed VS enforced safety, engineering VS field knowledge... As they are now confronted with uncertain, complex environments, organizations manage safety by oscillating between rigid control and the flexibility required to manage hazards. At the heart of this tension rests the individual, who is able to determine whether following the rule is enough or if some level of adaptation is required. Yet this implies that the individual is no longer considered as a factor, neither of failure nor of reliability, but as a person who is autonomous and in a capacity to make enlightened, reasoned decisions. Building on Paul Ricoeur's practical philosophy, we develop the notion of « practical Safety ». It defends the idea that safety can be preserved by relying on people's practical reason rather than on organizational rationality, by mobilizing individual will rather than obedience. The PhD demonstrates that such an approach is both relevant and anchored in reality, using field data gathered within a gas distribution company.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:18:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 fabio_gabriel_breitenbach.pdf: 979915 bytes, checksum: 4fded123c6720e4b745a2e82bd2ebf2f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-15 / All legal systems, are of common law or civil law, dealing with precedent. Brazil, despite the arguably be a country of civil law tradition, also attaches importance to the judicial precedents. In legislative terms, we are on the eve of the new Civil Procedure Code, that positive a precedent system. The law must be consistent, because it is not formed only by the legal texts but also by judicial decisions. Different decisions in similar factual and legal situations reveal an inconsistent, unfair and unreasonable law. The study will demonstrate that mandatory compliance with the precedent, and the binding effect of the conference they constitute tools to ensure equality and predictability in and to the legal system. Faced with a decision, especially when emanating from the Supreme Courts (Supreme Court and High Court of Justice), the society believes that others cases may/must be decided in the same direction. Also the study will show, which is wrong the idea that only the law can give binding effect to judicial decisions emanating from that court. The Supreme Court has the task of telling the meaning and scope of the Constitution of the Brazilian Federal Republic of 1988, including binding effect, while the Supreme Court has the function of guiding how it should be interpreted the federal infra-constitutional legislation and task of unifying the country jurisprudence. This shows that the justice system is designed to be uniform, refuting contradictions between the organs that compose it. The study will present the techniques for proper training, identification, distinction and overcoming of the precedents. It will be suggested that, for proper elaboration of precedents, the Supreme Court and High Court of Justice must modify the way that they decide. It is recognized that, from the same factual and legal context, it is possible to extract more than a specific interpretation; however, it will be shown that it is not rational to keep the divergent position when the responsible courts in conferring the proper interpretation of federal constitutional and infra-constitutional norms have positioned themselves, eliminating the scenario that allowed the divergent interpretations. It will be shown that, in the formation of the precedent, to ensure integrity and consistency, should be guided by the north of the possibility of universal decision. The justification of universality in decision adds value to the theory of the precedents, precisely because that it encompasses, besides the principle of equality or legal certainty, the intention of rationality for judicial decisions. / Todos os ordenamentos jurídicos, sejam de tradição de common law ou de civil law, lidam com precedentes. O Brasil, apesar de indiscutivelmente ser um país de tradição civil law, também confere importância para os precedentes judiciais. No plano normativo, estamos às vésperas da vigência de um novo Código de Processo Civil, que positiva um sistema de precedentes. A ordem jurídica deve ser coerente, pois não é formada apenas pelos textos legais, mas também pelas decisões judiciais. Decisões diferentes em situações fático-jurídicas semelhantes revelam uma ordem jurídica incoerente, injusta e irracional. O estudo demonstrará que a observância obrigatória dos precedentes, e a conferência de efeito vinculante a eles, constituem ferramentas para assegurar isonomia e previsibilidade no e para o ordenamento jurídico. Diante de uma decisão, especialmente quando emanada das Cortes Supremas (Supremo Tribunal Federal e Superior Tribunal de Justiça), a sociedade acredita que outros casos podem/ devem ser decididos no mesmo sentido. O estudo demonstrará, também, que é equivocada a ideia de que somente a lei pode conferir eficácia vinculante às decisões judiciais emanadas de determinado tribunal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal tem a tarefa de dizer o sentido e alcance da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, inclusive com efeito vinculante, enquanto que o Superior Tribunal de Justiça tem o papel de orientar como deve ser interpretada a legislação infraconstitucional federal e a tarefa de unificar a jurisprudência pátria. Isso revela que o sistema judiciário foi criado para ser uniforme, refutando contradições entre os órgãos que o compõem. O estudo apresentará as técnicas para adequada formação, identificação, distinção e superação dos precedentes. Será sugerido que, para adequada formação de precedentes, o STF e o STJ modifiquem a forma como decidem. É reconhecido que, a partir do mesmo contexto fático-jurídico, é possível extrair mais de uma norma concreta; contudo, será demonstrado que não é racional pretender manter a posição divergente quando os tribunais encarregados em conferir a adequada interpretação às normas constitucionais e infraconstitucionais federais já se posicionaram a respeito, eliminando o cenário que possibilitou as interpretações divergentes. Será evidenciado que, na formação do precedente, para garantir integridade e coerência, deve-se ter como norte a possibilidade de universalização da decisão. A justificação da decisão pela universalidade agrega valor à teoria dos precedentes, justamente porque engloba, além do princípio da igualdade ou da segurança jurídica, a pretensão de racionalidade às decisões judiciais.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis has two aims. The first is to assess the cogency of the three most influential theories of intention – namely those of Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson and Michael Bratman. I identify five requirements that a convincing account of intention must fulfil, and then assess each of these theories in light of these five requirements. In the course of this analysis, I demonstrate that, while each of these theories contributes to our understanding of intention, none of them meet all the specified requirements. This leads to the second aim of this thesis, which is to develop an account of intention capable of overcoming the problems inherent in the foregoing theories of intention and hence fulfilling the specified requirements. This account is built around the definition of intention as a complex mental entity, consisting of two components: a revisable pro-attitude and a belief that the agent will try to fulfil this pro-attitude. It must further be possible for the agent to reflexively reconstruct the belief component without external information. I begin by setting out the five requirements for a convincing account of intention. In each case, I explain why it is necessary for a theory of intention to meet the relevant requirement, and elaborate on what is needed for an account of intention to fulfil this requirement. The five requirements for a convincing account of intention are: 1) It must explain the unity of the three seemingly irreconcilable uses of intention; 2) it must explain the epistemic requirements for intention; 3) it must clarify the relationship between intention and motivation, intention and causes, and intention and reasons; 4) it must explain the relationship between intention and practical reasoning, and 5) it must clarify the relationship between intention and moral responsibility. Together, these five requirements form the yardstick against which I evaluate the different theories of intention. With this yardstick in mind, I am then able to assess each of the influential theories of intention developed by Anscombe, Davidson, and Bratman. In each case, I examine how the relevant theory of intention fares in meeting each of the five requirements. This analysis shows that, while each theory provides a number of important insights, none of them succeeds in meeting all five requirements. Such analysis further enables me to identify the specific difficulties that have stymied the attempts of all three thinkers to develop a convincing account of intention. Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the three preceding accounts of intention, I then try to work out an alternative account of intention that would not fall prey to the same complications. Following the same modus operandi as before, I evaluate my proposed account against the five requirements for a convincing theory of intention. In each case, I show that my account not only succeeds in meeting the specified criterion, but also, crucially, that it is able to overcome the difficulties that have plagued previous attempts to fulfil this criterion. I conclude that, while this account is not necessarily conclusive, it does meet the conditions for a convincing account of intention and thereby casts some light into the conceptual darkness surrounding intention that Anscombe identified more than half a century ago. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis het twee oogmerke. Die eerste is om die oortuigingskrag van die drie mees invloedryke teorieë van intensie te beoordeel – naamlik die van Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson en Michael Bratman. Ek identifiseer vyf vereistes waaraan ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie moet voldoen en beoordeel dan elk van hierdie teorieë aan die hand van hierdie vyf vereistes. In die loop van hierdie analise wys ek dat, alhoewel elkeen van hierdie teorieë tot ons verstaan van intensie bydra, geeneen aan al die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen nie. Dit lei tot die tweede oogmerk van die tesis, wat die ontwikkeling van ‘n teorie van intensie behels wat daartoe in staat is om die probleme wat inherent aan die voorgenoemde teorieë is, te oorkom en wat dus aan die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen. Hierdie teorie berus op die definisie van intensie as ‘n komplekse mentale entiteit wat uit twee komponente bestaan: ‘n wysigbare pro-houding en ‘n oortuiging dat die agent hierdie pro-houding sal probeer vervul. Dit moet verder ook vir die agent moontlik wees om die oortuigingskomponent refleksief te rekonstrueer sonder eksterne inligting. Ek begin deur die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie uiteen te sit. In elke geval verduidelik ek hoekom dit nodig is vir ‘n teorie van intensie om aan die relevante vereiste te voldoen en werk ek uit wat nodig is vir ‘n verklaring van intensie om aan hierdie vereiste te voldoen. Die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie is: 1) Dit moet die ooreenstemming tussen die drie skynbaar onversoenbare gebruike van intensie verduidelik; 2) dit moet die epistemiese vereistes vir intensie verduidelik; 3) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en motivering, intensie en oorsake, en intensie en redes verhelder; 4) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en praktiese redenering verhelder; en 5) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en morele verantwoordelikheid verhelder. Gesamentlik vorm hierdie vyf vereistes die maatstaf waarvolgens ek die verskillende teorieë van intensie evalueer. Met hierdie maatstaf in gedagte is ek dan in staat daartoe om elkeen van die invloedryke teorieë van intensie, wat ontwikkel is deur Anscombe, Davidson en Bratman, te beoordeel. In elke geval ondersoek ek hoe die relevante teorie van intensie vaar in die voldoening aan elkeen van hierdie vyf vereistes. Hierdie analise wys dat, alhoewel elke teorie ‘n aantal belangrike insigte bied, geen van hul daarin slaag om aan al vyf vereistes te voldoen nie. So ‘n analise stel my verder in staat om die spesifieke probleme te identifiseer waardeur die pogings van al drie denkers om ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie te ontwikkel, gestuit is. Nadat ek die sterk en swakpunte van die drie voorafgaande verklarings van intensie geïdentifiseer het, probeer ek dan om ‘n alternatiewe teorie van intensie uit te werk wat nie aan hierdie selfde komplikasies onderhewig is nie. Deur dieselfde modus operandi as voorheen te volg, evalueer ek my voorgestelde verklaring aan die hand van die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende teorie van intensie. In elke geval wys ek dat my verklaring nie bloot daaraan slaag om aan die gespesifiseerde kriterium te voldoen nie, maar ook, van deurslaggewende belang, dat dit in staat daartoe is om die probleme te oorkom waardeur vorige pogings om die kriterium te vervul, geteister is. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, alhoewel hierdie teorie nie noodwendig afdoende is nie, dit wel die voorwaardes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie vervul en hierdeur lig werp op die konseptuele duisternis waarin intensie gehul is en wat meer as ‘n halfeeu gelede deur Anscombe geïdentifiseer is.

Thesis (PhD) -- University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Philosophy has traditionally been concerned with the question of reason and rationality, as its central focus. From the perspective of the modern metaphysical tradition, this focus has developed around the theme of subjectivity in general, and the assumption of an ahistorical transcendental subject in particular. The idea of reason was thus foundational for the articulation and validation of the notions of truth and freedom. From the perspective of modernity, reason has thus been the condition of the possibility of enlightenment, freedom and moral progress. The debate between Habermas and the representatives of postmodern thinking represents the latest chapter regarding the question of reason, its limits, and its possibilities. What makes this debate particularly challenging is that Habermas, while he defends the idea of reason against its critique by the postmodernists, is actually in agreement with them in their dismissal of the tradition of metaphysical thinking. In view of his defense of the idea of reason, however, Habermas has invariably been accused of defending an outmoded and discredited form of philosophical thinking, while his opponents have generally been hailed as progressive thinkers who have succeeded in effecting a radical break with the conceptual legacy of the metaphysical tradition. In my dissertation I argue that the exact opposite position is the case, namely, that it is Habermas, and not his postmodern opponents, who has effected a radical break with metaphysical thinking. It is his ability to transform the idea of reason, from a transcendental into a postmetaphysical concept, in terms of which the question of reason and rationality, and the related ideas of truth and knowledge, are recast in fallibilistic terms, that, in my view, represents the overcoming of metaphysics. The postmodern turn, on the other hand, in view of its reluctance to consider the question of reason from an alternative model of rationality, finds itself still trapped within a form of transcendental thinking in which it seeks to enquire into the (im)possibility of reason, in the absence of a transcendental subject. In the final analysis, I argue that it is postmetaphysical rather than postmodern thinking, that offers us a practical alternative to the problematic conception of reason, bequeathed by the tradition of metaphysical thinking. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die fenomeen van die rede en die betekenis van rasionaliteit vorm tradisioneel 'n sentrale fokus van die filosofie. Vanuit die perspektief van die moderne metafisiese tradisie het hierdie fokus ontwikkel rondom die tema van subjektiwiteit in die algemeen, en die aanname van 'n a-historiese transendentele subjek in die besonder. Die rede was dus fundamenteel vir die artikulasie en legitimering van die konsepte van waarheid en vryheid. Vanuit die perspektief van moderniteit was die rede dus die voorwaarde vir die moontlikheid van verligting, vryheid, en morele vooruitgang. Die debat tussen Habermas en die verteenwoordigers van postmoderne denke verteenwoordig die mees onlangse hoofstuk van die verhaal van die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit - die beperkings daarvan, asook die moontlikhede daarvan. Hierdie debat bied besondere uitdagings omdat Habermas, terwyl hy die idee van rede verdedig teen die kritiek van die postmoderniste, eintlik met hulle saamstem vir sover hulle die tradisie van metafisiese denke verwerp. In die lig van sy verdediging van die idee van rede, is Habermas egter voortdurend daarvan beskuldig dat hy 'n uitgediende en gediskrediteerde vorm van filosofiese denke bly voorstaan, terwyl sy opponente in die algemeen voorgehou is as progressiewe denkers wat suksesvol 'n radikale breuk gemaak het met die konseptuele erfenis van die metafisiese tradisie. In my dissertasie beweer ek dat die teenoorgestelde inderwaarheid die geval is, naamlik dat dit Habermas, en nie sy postmoderne opponente nie, is wat hierdie radikale breuk met metafisiese denke suksesvol uitgevoer het. Dit is sy verrnoe om die idee van die rede te transformeer vanaf 'n transendentale na 'n post- metafisiese konsep, in terme waarvan die vraag na rede en rasionaliteit, en die verwante idees van waarheid en kennis, omskep is in fallibilistiese beg rippe, wat, soos ek aantoon, 'n (die!) suksesvolle transendering van die metafisika bewerkstellig. Die postmoderne wending, aan die ander kant, in die lig van die traagheid daarvan om 'n alternatiewe en verruimde konsepsie van rasionaliteit te ontwikkel, bly vasgevang in 'n vorm van transendentele denke waarin dit probeer om ondersoek in te stel na die (on)moontlikheid van die rede ten aansien van die afwesigheid van 'n transendentele subjek. Uiteindelik beweer ek dat dit die post-metafisiese eerder as die postmoderne denke is wat aan ons 'n praktiese alternatief bied vir die problematiese konsep van die rede, soos ons dit qeerf het by die tradisie van metafisiese denke.

Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a identificação de divergências inconciliáveis. Joseph Raz é um dos principais expositores contemporâneos do positivismo jurídico, porém sua tese não apenas é controversa, como também mal compreendida. Nesta pesquisa, defendo o argumento de que a má compreensão deve-se ao fato de ser ignorada uma premissa ontológica adotada por Raz. O filósofo supõe que práticas sociais não se referem a nada mais do que fatos socialmente praticados e, portanto, não as reconhece como fonte de normatividade. Com base nesse pressuposto, a natureza do direito não poderia ser investigada do mesmo modo como se investigaria a natureza de um jogo lúdico: aos olhos de Raz, ambos possuem estruturas lógicas e normativas completamente distintas. Com isso em vista, sustento que a divergência a respeito dessa questão de ordem ontológica gera um impasse insolúvel no debate a respeito da normatividade do direito. Para testar o argumento, examino as críticas que Dennis Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin e Stephen Perry fazem à teoria do direito de Joseph Raz. / This is a research on the grounds of irreconcilable disagreements. Joseph Raz is one of the leading authors of legal positivism, whose theory generated a lot of controversy, matched only by the same degree of misapprehension. This research argues that this is due to the fact that an ontological premise held by Raz has been largely ignored. The philosopher considers that social practices are nothing more than socially practiced facts and, therefore, do not acknowledge them as a source of normativity. Furthermore, on that token, laws nature cannot be known and investigated in the same way games are known: according to Raz, both have completely different logical and normative structures. I sustain that there cannot be any fruitful debate regarding the normativity of law, until this ontological matter is not approached. This thesis was tested on the criticism made to the razian theory by Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin and Stephen Perry.

[pt] A tese apresenta uma proposta de estabelecer a discursividade como parâmetro para a formação ética, moral e política na escola, com base na teoria de Habermas. Tomando essa formação como um processo de desenvolvimento da razão prática na amplitude de seus fins – pragmático, ético, moral e também político -, no qual articulam-se a dimensão social e individual, através da intersubjetividade, a tese propõe o termo formação prática para designar a formação ética, moral e política na escola. Trata-se de uma formação voltada para o entendimento intersubjetivo, que tem como fundamento os pressupostos da comunicação e conta com a mediação das instituições sociais para cumprir seu fim de promover a autonomia moral e política na esfera pública, ou seja, uma participação social direcionada ao estabelecimento de princípios de convivência e à construção de um projeto político comum no contexto de um Estado democrático. A formação prática na escola é concebida, nesta tese, como uma formação específica – desenvolvida em paralelo a uma formação cognitiva estrita e uma formação estética – que incide sobre a relação com o outro, partindo dela, conduzindo-se por ela e voltando-se para ela. / [en] This thesis presents a proposal for taking discursivity as the parameter for ethical, moral and political education in schools, based on Habermas s Discourse theory. Practical education is understood as the development of practical reason in its three aspects – pragmatic, ethical and moral -, in which the social and individual dimensions are articulated through intersubjectivity. The term practical education is proposed to designate ethical, moral and political education in schools. This is understood as education oriented towards intersubjective understanding, which has its foundations in the pressupositions of communication, mediated by social institutions, in order to to achieve the goal of promoting moral and political autonomy in the public sphere, that is, social participation directed towards the establishment of principles of peaceful coexistence and the construction of a common political project in the context of the democratic, constitutional State. Practical education in schools is conceived of as a specifica education – developed in parallel with cognitive education, strictly speaking, and aesthetic education – that focuses on our relations with others, as a starting point, a principle of development and an outcome.

In this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-22T22:04:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Davyd Spencer.pdf: 1263158 bytes, checksum: 1cfaed3f7b54b36650dfacd29419f104 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-03-05 / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Amazonas / This work treats of an analysis concerning the phenomenon of the violence and of the modern social conflict in the context of the idea of a powder-conventional society. This definition leaves of the presupposition that the juridical-normative structures of these societies present certain sophistication level and social complexification in what concerns the treatment and regulation of the moral dilemmas, that is, of the conflicts of moral action. In this context, the subject of modern personality tend to guide your actions and behaviors with base in autonomous, abstract and more and more universal ethical-moral beginnings. In face of this, the research looked for to understand the phenomenon of the violence and of the action conflicts as an ethical-moral and normative order problem produced by the effects of the crisis of the modernity, especially in what it concerns to the subjective processes, autonomy and unilateralization of the reason and of the morality. Like this, the research focalized the violence under the horizon of the dilemmas of the practical reason, that is, of your use as middle of coordination of the action of the subjects and resolution of the ethical-moral dilemmas put by the action conflicts. On the other hand, the research suggests that the violence constitutes a social practice linked to the dilemmas of the crisis of the modernity, particularly in what refers to the social relationships of recognition. The presupposition of the reciprocal recognition is based in the relationships responsible intersubjectivity by the formation of the moral identity of the subjects. Consequently, the violence implicates in a norecognition, that is, in a violation practice and social disrespect of the inherent moral expectations to the individual and collective identities, could incur in a fight for social recognition manifests in a social conflict motivated by the violation, denial and disrespect of the grammar morals of the social relationships. The violence and the social conflict in the sphere of the moral dilemmas of the contemporary modern societies, being expressed as a problem of order intersubjectivity, of sense loss and degradation of the socialization processes and social recognition, presents from always in the horizon of the world of the life. / Este trabalho trata de uma análise acerca do fenômeno da violência e do conflito social moderno no contexto da idéia de uma sociedade pós-convencional. Esta definição parte do pressuposto de que as estruturas jurídico-normativas destas sociedades apresentam certo nível de sofisticação e complexificação social no que diz respeito ao tratamento e regulamentação dos dilemas morais, isto é, dos conflitos de ação moral. Neste contexto, os sujeitos de personalidade moderna tendem a orientar suas ações e comportamentos com base em princípios ético-morais autônomos, abstratos e cada vez mais universais. Em face disto, a pesquisa buscou compreender o fenômeno da violência e dos conflitos de ação como um problema de ordem ético-moral e normativo produzidos pelos efeitos da crise da modernidade, especialmente no que concerne aos processos de subjetivação, autonomização e unilateralização da razão e da moralidade. Assim, a pesquisa focalizou a violência sob o horizonte dos dilemas da razão prática, isto é, do seu uso como meio de coordenação da ação dos sujeitos e resolução dos dilemas ético-morais postos pelos conflitos de ação. Por outro lado, a pesquisa sugere que a violência constitui uma prática social vinculada aos dilemas da crise da modernidade, particularmente no que se refere às relações sociais de reconhecimento. O pressuposto do reconhecimento recíproco fundamenta-se nas relações intersubjetivas responsáveis pela formação da identidade moral dos sujeitos. Por conseguinte, a violência implica em um não-reconhecimento, isto é, em uma prática de violação e desrespeito social das expectativas morais inerentes às identidades individuais e coletivas, podendo incorrer em uma luta por reconhecimento social manifesta em um conflito social motivado pela violação, denegação e desrespeito da gramática moral das relações sociais. A violência e o conflito social transitam na esfera dos dilemas morais das sociedades modernas contemporâneas, expressando-se como um problema de ordem intersubjetiva, de perda de sentido e degradação dos processos de socialização e reconhecimento social, presentes desde sempre no horizonte do mundo da vida.

Esta é uma pesquisa sobre a identificação de divergências inconciliáveis. Joseph Raz é um dos principais expositores contemporâneos do positivismo jurídico, porém sua tese não apenas é controversa, como também mal compreendida. Nesta pesquisa, defendo o argumento de que a má compreensão deve-se ao fato de ser ignorada uma premissa ontológica adotada por Raz. O filósofo supõe que práticas sociais não se referem a nada mais do que fatos socialmente praticados e, portanto, não as reconhece como fonte de normatividade. Com base nesse pressuposto, a natureza do direito não poderia ser investigada do mesmo modo como se investigaria a natureza de um jogo lúdico: aos olhos de Raz, ambos possuem estruturas lógicas e normativas completamente distintas. Com isso em vista, sustento que a divergência a respeito dessa questão de ordem ontológica gera um impasse insolúvel no debate a respeito da normatividade do direito. Para testar o argumento, examino as críticas que Dennis Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin e Stephen Perry fazem à teoria do direito de Joseph Raz. / This is a research on the grounds of irreconcilable disagreements. Joseph Raz is one of the leading authors of legal positivism, whose theory generated a lot of controversy, matched only by the same degree of misapprehension. This research argues that this is due to the fact that an ontological premise held by Raz has been largely ignored. The philosopher considers that social practices are nothing more than socially practiced facts and, therefore, do not acknowledge them as a source of normativity. Furthermore, on that token, laws nature cannot be known and investigated in the same way games are known: according to Raz, both have completely different logical and normative structures. I sustain that there cannot be any fruitful debate regarding the normativity of law, until this ontological matter is not approached. This thesis was tested on the criticism made to the razian theory by Patterson, Gerald Postema, Kenneth E. Himma, Nicos Stavropoulos, Ronald Dworkin and Stephen Perry.