Todos os ordenamentos jurídicos, sejam de tradição de common law ou de civil law, lidam com precedentes. O Brasil, apesar de indiscutivelmente ser um país de tradição civil law, também confere importância para os precedentes judiciais. No plano normativo, estamos às vésperas da vigência de um novo Código de Processo Civil, que positiva um sistema de precedentes. A ordem jurídica deve ser coerente, pois não é formada apenas pelos textos legais, mas também pelas decisões judiciais. Decisões diferentes em situações fático-jurídicas semelhantes revelam uma ordem jurídica incoerente, injusta e irracional. O estudo demonstrará que a observância obrigatória dos precedentes, e a conferência de efeito vinculante a eles, constituem ferramentas para assegurar isonomia e previsibilidade no e para o ordenamento jurídico. Diante de uma decisão, especialmente quando emanada das Cortes Supremas (Supremo Tribunal Federal e Superior Tribunal de Justiça), a sociedade acredita que outros casos podem/ devem ser decididos no mesmo sentido. O estudo demonstrará, também, que é equivocada a ideia de que somente a lei pode conferir eficácia vinculante às decisões judiciais emanadas de determinado tribunal. O Supremo Tribunal Federal tem a tarefa de dizer o sentido e alcance da Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, inclusive com efeito vinculante, enquanto que o Superior Tribunal de Justiça tem o papel de orientar como deve ser interpretada a legislação infraconstitucional federal e a tarefa de unificar a jurisprudência pátria. Isso revela que o sistema judiciário foi criado para ser uniforme, refutando contradições entre os órgãos que o compõem. O estudo apresentará as técnicas para adequada formação, identificação, distinção e superação dos precedentes. Será sugerido que, para adequada formação de precedentes, o STF e o STJ modifiquem a forma como decidem. É reconhecido que, a partir do mesmo contexto fático-jurídico, é possível extrair mais de uma norma concreta; contudo, será demonstrado que não é racional pretender manter a posição divergente quando os tribunais encarregados em conferir a adequada interpretação às normas constitucionais e infraconstitucionais federais já se posicionaram a respeito, eliminando o cenário que possibilitou as interpretações divergentes. Será evidenciado que, na formação do precedente, para garantir integridade e coerência, deve-se ter como norte a possibilidade de universalização da decisão. A justificação da decisão pela universalidade agrega valor à teoria dos precedentes, justamente porque engloba, além do princípio da igualdade ou da segurança jurídica, a pretensão de racionalidade às decisões judiciais. / All legal systems, are of common law or civil law, dealing with precedent. Brazil, despite the arguably be a country of civil law tradition, also attaches importance to the judicial precedents. In legislative terms, we are on the eve of the new Civil Procedure Code, that positive a precedent system. The law must be consistent, because it is not formed only by the legal texts but also by judicial decisions. Different decisions in similar factual and legal situations reveal an inconsistent, unfair and unreasonable law. The study will demonstrate that mandatory compliance with the precedent, and the binding effect of the conference they constitute tools to ensure equality and predictability in and to the legal system. Faced with a decision, especially when emanating from the Supreme Courts (Supreme Court and High Court of Justice), the society believes that others cases may/must be decided in the same direction. Also the study will show, which is wrong the idea that only the law can give binding effect to judicial decisions emanating from that court. The Supreme Court has the task of telling the meaning and scope of the Constitution of the Brazilian Federal Republic of 1988, including binding effect, while the Supreme Court has the function of guiding how it should be interpreted the federal infra-constitutional legislation and task of unifying the country jurisprudence. This shows that the justice system is designed to be uniform, refuting contradictions between the organs that compose it. The study will present the techniques for proper training, identification, distinction and overcoming of the precedents. It will be suggested that, for proper elaboration of precedents, the Supreme Court and High Court of Justice must modify the way that they decide. It is recognized that, from the same factual and legal context, it is possible to extract more than a specific interpretation; however, it will be shown that it is not rational to keep the divergent position when the responsible courts in conferring the proper interpretation of federal constitutional and infra-constitutional norms have positioned themselves, eliminating the scenario that allowed the divergent interpretations. It will be shown that, in the formation of the precedent, to ensure integrity and consistency, should be guided by the north of the possibility of universal decision. The justification of universality in decision adds value to the theory of the precedents, precisely because that it encompasses, besides the principle of equality or legal certainty, the intention of rationality for judicial decisions.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2017-10-02T12:50:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1416441 bytes, checksum: 4dd50a7604c738822ad07fdc76e4b443 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-02T12:50:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 1416441 bytes, checksum: 4dd50a7604c738822ad07fdc76e4b443 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-25 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The idea of freedom is defined by Kant in the critique of pure reason as a transcendental idea of reason, the philosopher investigates the metaphysical problem of freedom and the determinism that is discussed within the conflict of cosmological antinomic propositions. That problem characterizes the investigation if in the world all causality must be attributed to natural laws or whether there is also causality for freedom. The transcendental idea of freedom is defined as a spontaneity able to initiate a series of events that takes place in nature. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kant lays the foundation for the supreme principle of morality Based on the transcendental idea of freedom, that serves as a model to think about freedom in a practical sense, that is, as regards human actions. The Concept of transcendental freedom is the key to explaining the autonomy of the will of human beings, because the concept of freedom necessary assumption for the idea of unconditional imperative Is understood as the concept of morality. However as the concept of freedom is not constitutive, but only imagined, The practical philosophy requires that there is no way to attribute freedom to a rational being without demonstrating as a fact the objective reality of this concept. As a consequence, in Critique of Practical Reason Kant Reversed the order of concepts and put as necessary investigate the validity of the categorical imperative from the moral conscience understood as the fact of reason, Kant believes that with proof of morality as fact of reason, is equivalent to the objective proof of freedom. In view of these considerations, this work proposes to gather the arguments presented in Critique of Pure Reason, in Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals and the Critique Practical Reason, that argue the relationship between freedom and human reason, in order to investigate the possibility of freedom for man. We first describe the way in which reason thinks the idea of freedom From the discussion of the third antinomy, and the solution presented by Kant for this conflict of reason, making a transition from the discussion in a theoretical sense to the practical meaning on which the possibility of pure practical philosophy depends. Therefore, we investigated the Kantian foundation of morality to understand the autonomy of the human will based on the concept of freedom. It became necessary, because, the proof of the objective reality of freedom, thus, we try to prove whether the proof of the reality of morality from the fact of reason, offers equally a proof of freedom. Faced with the impossibility of an empirical objectification of freedom the definition of the practical scope as the field that practical reason can be realized, Composes the place of freedom in the architectural of the pure reason of the Kantian critical system / A ideia de liberdade é definida por Kant na Crítica da razão pura como uma ideia transcendental da razão, o filósofo investiga o problema metafísico da liberdade e do determinismo, que é discutido no interior do conflito de proposições antinômicas cosmológicas. Esse problema caracteriza a investigação se no mundo toda a causalidade deve ser atribuída a leis naturais ou se há também causalidade por liberdade. A ideia transcendental da liberdade é definida como uma espontaneidade capaz de dar início a uma série de eventos que se desenrola na natureza. Na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes, Kant estabelece o fundamento para o princípio supremo da moralidade com base na ideia transcendental da liberdade, que serve de modelo para se pensar a liberdade em sentido prático, isto é, no que concerne às ações humanas. O conceito de liberdade transcendental é a chave de explicação para a autonomia da vontade dos seres humanos, pois o conceito de liberdade, pressuposto necessário à ideia de imperativo incondicionado da moralidade é entendido como o conceito da moralidade. Entretanto, como o conceito de liberdade é um conceito não constitutivo, mas apenas pensado, a filosofia prática exige que não há como atribuir liberdade a um ser racional sem demonstrar como um fato a realidade objetiva desse conceito. Em consequência disso, Kant na Crítica da Razão Prática inverte a ordem dos conceitos e põe como necessário investigar a validade do imperativo categórico a partir da consciência moral entendida como o fato da razão, Kant acredita que com a prova da moralidade como fato da razão, equivale à prova da realidade objetiva da liberdade. Em vista dessas considerações, o presente trabalho propõe reunir os argumentos apresentados na Crítica da Razão pura, na Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes e na Crítica da Razão Prática, que discutem a relação entre liberdade e razão humanas, a fim de investigar a possibilidade da liberdade para o homem. Inicialmente descrevemos o modo como a razão pensa a ideia de liberdade a partir da discussão da terceira antinomia, e a solução apresentada por Kant para este conflito da razão, fazendo uma transição da discussão em sentido teórico para o sentido prático da qual depende a possibilidade da filosofia prática pura. Por conseguinte, investigamos a fundamentação kantiana da moralidade para compreendermos a autonomia da vontade humana com base no conceito de liberdade. Tornou-se necessário, pois, procurar a prova da realidade objetiva da liberdade, desse modo, tentamos, comprovar se a prova da realidade da moralidade a partir do fato da razão, oferece igualmente uma prova da liberdade. Diante da impossibilidade de uma objetivação empírica da liberdade, a definição do âmbito prático como o campo que a razão prática pode realizar-se, compõe o lugar da liberdade na arquitetônica da razão pura do sistema crítico kantiano.

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相對於意識傳統為了滿足知識全知的條件，將身體的隱而未顯視為有缺陷的模糊，現象學重回日常生活世界裡的原初知覺經驗領域，身體作為缺席的模糊不再是認知的障礙，反倒作為潛在的背景是認知得以成立的必要條件。梅洛龐蒂強調完全還原的不可能，將理論重新寓居於身體，身體與世界交錯糾結無法分別，無法外於身體一語道破，只能夠不斷的描述身體與世界的關聯，使得不斷說明成為模糊效能的延續以堆疊出逸離的身體。 為了追求身體最大程度的逸離，本文還必須繼續借道拉崗精神分析，潛意識作為超出主體言說意圖，指向不可見、自我與他人外的他者，連串的取代系列圍繞在缺席旁作離心的循環。於是拉崗認定部分的身體作為象徵的身體才能發揮效能，始終處於異化的過程，但是並不是迷惑在身體的諸種表象中，或者以斷裂確保真實的身體，而是對身體的想像成為身體的不斷延續，身體的諸種表象就是身體的實質存在，使得回歸身體也是逸離身體。 / On contrary to the western philosophical tradition , to set consciousness as priority, builds transparent knowledge. It regard the ambiguity character of body as fault. Phenomenology summons us to go back to primary field of lifeworld. Body is no more the barrier of cognition, instead body become the potential background as necessary condition of cognition. Merleau-Ponty stresses the impossibility of complete reduction. The consciousness inhabit in body in motion. Body is interwined with world and hard to divide. We can’t explore body as objective observer as if we were outside the world. What we can do is to descript the relationship between body and world. Make the descriptions to become the parts of invisible body. In order to catch the character of body’s exceed, we need to have aid of Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Lacan develop that unconsciousness is like the structure of language. It designates the subjectivity speaks beyond what he intend. People desire the lost Other outside the self and other as the third term, instead people used to series of substitutes around the absence as decentered circulation. Lacan identify people is in process of alienation, even in the initial stage. The real body which is fragmented could have effects as symbol. It’s not what people confused with imaginary images, but what people imagine is to continune body. The different body images is body’s substantial existence.

Deontic reasoning is a domain of reasoning concerning permissions, obligations, and prohibitions founded on conditional logic (Wason,1968). The inclusion of a social valence to deontic rules leads to increased rule violation identification in both adults (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992) and children (Harris & Nunez, 1996), suggesting an evolutionary advantage for a specific class of reasoning known as “cheater-detection” (Fiddick, 2004). The current investigation is the first attempt to understand the cognitive and social variables that account for children’s logical reasoning advantage in social violation situations. / Includes bibliography. / Dissertation (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2015 / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

A presente tese tem como intuito inicial investigar as asserções aparentemente conflituosas que Kant faz sobre as coisas em si mesmas, ora em sentido estritamente negativo, como a representação problemática de algo completamente indeterminado, ora em sentido positivo como fundamento ou causa dos fenômenos. Partindo de interpretações que compreendem esse conflito entre asserções sobre as coisas em si mesmas como tendo sua origem nos dois problemas que a filosofia crítica procura solucionar a possibilidade do conhecimento especulativo e a fundamentação da moral , procura-se reconstruir, num primeiro momento, o vínculo entre a crítica da razão e os diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas. Argumentamos que a diferenciação da faculdade racional em duas atividades ou espontaneidades, entendimento e razão, que são expostas pela crítica como produtoras de conceitos e legislações distintas, exige duas maneiras de formular, criticamente, o conceito de númeno. A primeira formulação é feita pelo entendimento mediante a abstração das condições sensíveis de aplicação das categorias, dada sua originariedade em relação à sensibilidade. Este conceito tem de permanecer, contudo, em um sentido estritamente negativo e problemático, visto as categorias consistirem apenas em funções de síntese de representações sensíveis e estarem limitadas, por isso, a um uso empírico. A segunda formulação é feita, em contrapartida, pelas idéias da razão, que pressupõem um prolongamento da síntese pensada nas categorias até o incondicionado. Ainda que envolva uma aparência transcendental essas idéias se fazem necessárias, principalmente, em vista do uso prático da razão. Num segundo momento, porém, voltando nossa atenção ao esforço de Kant em articular sistematicamente esses diferentes modos de representação das coisas em si mesmas no interior da filosofia crítica, procuramos mostrar como a elaboração do conceito de autonomia na passagem para o uso prático, possibilita uma maneira de operar com a aparência transcendental presente nas ideias, sem violar a limitação das categorias ao uso empírico. Nesse sentido, explicitamos como a crítica da razão em seu uso prático desvela um novo caminho para a faculdade de julgar, em que lhe é permitido aplicar legitimamente a categoria de causalidade com referência aos númenos. / The initial aim of this thesis is to investigate the apparently conflicting claims that Kant makes about the things in themselves, sometimes in a strictly negative sense, as a problematic representation of something completely undetermined, sometimes in a positive sense as the ground or the cause of the appearances. Starting with interpretations that understand this conflict between the claims about things in themselves as having its origin in two problems that the critical philosophy aims to solve the possibility of speculative knowledge and the moral foundation our first task is to reconstruct the link between the critique of reason and the different ways of representing things in themselves. We argue that the differentiation of the rational faculty in two activities or spontaneities understanding and reason which are presented by the critical view as producers of distinct concepts and laws, requires two ways to critically formulate the concept of noumenon. The first formulation is made by the understanding by abstraction of sensible conditions of application of the categories, given its originality in relation to sensibility. This concept must remain, however, in a strictly negative and problematic sense, since the categories consist only in synthetic functions of sensible representations and thus are limited to the empirical use. The second formulation, on the other hand, is made by the ideas of reason, which require an extension of the synthesis thought in the categories up to the unconditioned. Those ideas are needed especially in view of the practical use of reason, despite the fact they involve a \"transcendental appearance\". Turning our attention to Kant\'s effort to systematically articulate these different modes of representation of things in themselves within the critical philosophy, the second task of the thesis is to show how the concept of autonomy elaborated in the transition to practical use, provides a way to work with the transcendental appearance present in the ideas, without violating the limitation of the categories to empirical use. In this sense, we elucidate how the critique of reason in its practical use reveals a new path for the faculty of judgment, in which it is legitimately allowed to apply the category of causality with reference to noumena.

This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant's conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant's underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant's practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant's anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant's claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one's overall, long term happiness, given Kant's conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant's justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant's conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.

The dissertation is an examination of obligation, which I argue is a mode of rational necessity that is proper to human agency. I begin from G. E. M. Anscombe’s celebrated attack against modern moral philosophy, and then sketch a positive theory of obligation as it figures in morality and in law, drawing upon the work of Aquinas and Aristotle. The first chapter explicates this idea of “practical necessity” and the second chapter shows that Aristotelian ethics, because it is not a theological law conception of ethics, has no place for a peculiarly moral conception of obligation. The third chapter examines Aquinas’s conception of moral law and argues that Aquinas vindicates Anscombe’s negative critique of the “moral ought.” The fourth chapter shows that the application of exceptionless moral norms (i.e. moral absolutes), which is one kind of obligation, requires attention to aspects of social practices. Attention to social practices allows the resolution of controverted problems about specifying intentions and applying the principle of double effect in a way that makes exceptionless moral norms workable. The fifth and final chapter defends the conception of intentional action assumed in the fourth chapter, and demonstrates that the scholastic ‘sub specie boni’ thesis is an integral part of action explanation, as well as Anscombe’s notion of “practical knowledge”. The upshot of the dissertation is an integrated investigation into how the ideas of good and necessity figure in ethics, law, and human action. / text

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Full text release at OhioLINK's ETD Center delayed at author's request

Denna studie undersöker begreppet likvärdighet genom att analysera hur elevernas bristande kunskapskontinuitet vid skolbyte upplevs och hanteras av rektorer och lärare, samt deras uppfattningar om den nya stadieindelade timplanens påverkan i måluppfyllelse och likvärdighet. Studien baseras på en semikvantitativ webbenkätundersökning med 145 rektorer och lärare i grundskolor i hela landet.  Mer än hälften av informanterna får inte någon information om elevernas tidigare undervisningstid. Kartläggning av elevernas kunskapsnivå vid skolbyte är utbredd och många bekräftar att påtagliga kunskapsluckor existerar. Majoriteten menar att eleverna får möjlighet att ta igen undervisningen genom kompensatoriska åtgärder som innebär anpassning av undervisningssätt och extra insatser utanför skolans ordinarie schema. Tidsstyrningen i skolan påverkas huvudsakligen av timplanen istället för lärarnas och elevernas önskemål. Ramfaktorteori och händelselogik visar att begreppet likvärdighet har två dimensioner. Likvärdighet mellan skolorna påverkas negativt av den befintliga timplanens brist på avstämningstillfällen, som leder till låg kunskapskontinuitet vid skolbyte. Detta avspeglas i informanternas positiva attityd mot centraliseringsåtgärder som exempelvis en stadiepreciserad timplan. Likvärdighet mellan eleverna är det mål som informanterna enligt sin inre logik strävar efter med hjälp av pedagogisk kartläggning och kompensatoriska åtgärdar. För att öka likvärdigheten måste timplanens implementering vara mer realistisk och stadieprecisering måste kompletteras med uppföljning i förhållande till måluppfyllelse. / This study examines the interpretation of educational equity by analysing how students’ lack of knowledge continuity upon school switching is experienced and handled by principals and teachers, and their opinion on the new level-divided national time schedule’s effects on goal attainment and equity. 145 principals and teachers in primary and lower secondary schools in Sweden participate in a semi-quantitative web survey for this study.  More than half of the informants do not receive any information concerning students’ former teaching hours. It is a common practice to chart students’ level of knowledge and one third of the informants confirm a significant knowledge gap. Catching up on lost teaching is possible according to most informants, with compensatory measures that encompass adaptation of teaching methods and extra-curricular activities not included in the normal timetable. Time allocation is mainly determined by the constraints of the national time schedule instead of the needs of teachers and students. By applyingthe theory of frame factor and practical reasoning, it is shown that equity has two dimensions. Equity between schools is dampened by the current national time schedule’s lack of follow-up occasions, leading to inadequate knowledge continuity upon school switching. This is reflected by the informants’ positive attitude towards educational centralisation by means of a more precise, level-divided time schedule. Equity between students has been the main goal that most schools strive for, by implementing knowledge-charting procedures and compensatory measures in the light of practical reasoning. In order to improve equity, a more precise and realistic time schedule needs to be complemented by more rigorous control in relation to goal-fulfilment.