Les sociétés sont traditionnellement classées en sociétés de personnes et sociétés de capitaux. L’intuitus personae constitue le fondement sur lequel repose cette distinction. Fort présent dans les sociétés de personnes, l’intuitus personae serait, en théorie, absent dans les sociétés de capitaux. Toutefois, cette distinction classique ne correspond plus, aujourd’hui, à la réalité. Nous assistons, en effet, à la résurgence de la considération de la personne dans les sociétés de capitaux à travers le développement de techniques contractuelles dont le but est de contrôler l’accès à ces sociétés. Ce mouvement de personnalisation a été renforcé par le législateur, d’abord, par la création de la société par actions simplifiée, mais aussi par la reconnaissance, dans les sociétés cotées, de la notion de concert ou encore d’un droit de sortie au profit des actionnaires minoritaires. La consécration de la validité de l’exclusion, qu’elle soit conventionnelle ou le résultat d’un mécanisme spécifique du droit des sociétés comme le retrait obligatoire ou le coup d’accordéon, participe également de ce phénomène. Cette présence a des conséquences majeures sur le fonctionnement de ces sociétés, mais aussi sur le droit des sociétés en général. En effet, d’une part, la reconnaissance de la primauté des relations entre actionnaires sur les capitaux offre une nouvelle perspective de la notion d’affectio societatis et du principe majoritaire. Et d’autre part, la mise en oeuvre de l’intuitus personae dans des sociétés dans lesquelles il est censé être absent affecte la cohérence même du droit des sociétés en anéantissant la summa divisio sur laquelle ce droit est bâti et en dénaturant le choix du pluralisme juridique, fait de longue date par le législateur français, qui commande en présence d’une pluralité de structures offertes aux opérateurs, une distinction de chacune d’elles reposant sur des critères précis et invariables. / Companies are traditionally classified into partnerships and joint stock companies. Intuitus personae is the basis for this distinction. Clearly present in partnership companies, intuitus personae is, in theory, absent in joint stock companies. However, this traditional distinction does not correspond today to reality. We are, in fact, witnessing a resurgence of the consideration of the individual in joint stock companies by means of contractual techniques whose aim is to control access to these companies. This resurgence has been further strengthened by the legislator, first by the creation of the status of simplified stock company and also by the recognition in listed companies of the existence of concerted action and a right to voluntary withdrawal benefiting minority stockholders. The admission of the validity of exclusion, either conventional or resulting from mechanisms specific to company law such as a squeeze out or even an “accordion squeeze”, add to the growth of this phenomenon. This presence of intuitus personae has major implications on the functioning of joint stock companies and on company law, in general. Indeed, on the one hand, the primacy of shareholder relationships over capital offers a new perspective of the notion of affectio societatis and the principle of majority rule. On the other hand, the introduction of intuitus personae into companies where this concept should have been absent affects the coherence of company law by destroying the summa divisio basis on which this law is founded and by distorting the legal pluralism long ago adopted by the French legislator which, in the presence of diverse legal structures, necessitates a distinction amongst them based on precise and invariable criteria.

Primauté absolue du droit de l’UE ou suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles ? Consacrée à l’analyse des conflits nés ou à naître entre normes constitutionnelle et celles du droit de l’UE, cette étude doctorale s’est focalisée sur l’analyse du lien entre les termes primauté et recours pour relever que dans ce genre de litiges contentieux un syllogisme juridique inédit est appliqué. Il s’agit de celui qui préserve cumulativement le critère hiérarchique caractérisant les ordres juridiques internes des États membres, à son sommet le principe de suprématie des dispositions constitutionnelles sur toutes les autres et l’application effective de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union ; les évolutions récentes du droit interne de l’UE convergent toutes dans ce sens : dans le cadre d’un litige contentieux, la primauté n’est plus une problématique de légalité constitutionnelle, le conflit est contourné. En la matière, les débats sur l’autorité et la force du droit international classique sur le droit constitutionnel ne se pose plus. Il a été séparé entre la force et l’effet des traités du droit international de l’Union. Pourtant sur le plan des principes, même au sein d’un État fédéral, le contenu définitionnel et surtout le maniement du texte constitutionnel n’ont pas été revisités ; la Constitution est le fondement sans être le contenu de validité de la primauté du droit de l’Union, le texte suprême opère en tant que technique de renvoi, il cadre deux types de champs en fonction du critère de l’objet du litige contentieux. Suprématie et primauté sont deux principes de nature juridique différente qui ne s’affrontent pas. La prévalence de la primauté matérielle du droit de l’Union n’affecte nullement la suprématie au sommet de la hiérarchie pyramidale des normes de chacun des États adhérents. / Absolute primacy of Community law or supremacy of constitutional provisions ? Devoted to the analysis of the conflicts born or to be born between EU law and constitutional standards, this doctoral study focused on analysis of the link between the terms of primacy or preemption rule and jurisdictional actions to raise that in this kind of litigation disputes a unreported legal syllogism is applied. It's one that cumulatively preserves the hierarchical criterion characterizing the domestic legal systems of the Member States, at its peak the principle of supremacy of the Constitution over all others and the effective application of the material primacy of Union law ; recent developments in internal law of the Union converge in this sense : in a dispute litigation, primacy is no longer a problem of constitutional legality, the conflict is circumvent. Concerning this matter, the debate on the authority and the force of traditional international law on constitutional law no longer arises. It has been separated between the force and the effect of the treaties of international law of the Union. Yet in terms of principles, even within a federal State, the definitional content and especially the handling of the constitutional text have not been revisited ; the Constitution is the legal basis without being the content validity of the primacy of Union law, the supreme text operates as a reference technique, it fits two types of fields based on the criterion of the contentious issue. Supremacy and rule are two different legal nature principles which do not compete. The prevalence of the material primacy of Union law sets no supremacy at the top of the pyramidal hierarchy of standards of each of the acceding States.

The thesis examines the international law pertaining to the use of force by states, in general, and to the use of force in self-defence, in particular. The main question addressed is whether the use of force, which was purported to be in self-defence, by the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies against al Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan, beginning on 7 October 2001, was lawful. The thesis focuses not only on this specific use of force, but also on the changing nature of conflict, the definition of terrorism and on the historical evolution of limitations on the use of force, from antiquity until 2006. In the six chapters which trace the epochs of international law, the progression of five inter-related concepts is followed: limitations on the resort to force generally, the use of force in self-defence, pre-emptive self-defence, the use of forcible measures short of war, and the use of force in response to non-state actors. This historical analysis includes a particular emphasis on understanding the meaning of the 'inherent right of self-defence', which was preserved by Article 51 of the United Nations' Charter. This analysis is then applied to the use of force against Afghanistan which occurred in 2001. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US and the UK notified the United Nations Security Council of their resort to force in self-defence under Article 51. Each element of Article 51 is analysed and the thesis concludes that there are significant doubts as to the lawfulness of that decision to employ force. In addition to the self-defence justification, other possible grounds for intervention are also examined, such as humanitarian intervention, Security Council authorisation and intervention by invitation. This thesis challenges the common assumption that the use of force against Afghanistan was an example of states exercising their inherent right to self-defence. It argues that if this particular use of force is not challenged, it will lead to an expansion of the right of self-defence which will hinder rather than enhance international peace and security. Finally, this thesis draws on recent examples to illustrate the point that the use of force against Afghanistan could become a dangerous precedent for the use of force in self-defence.

The thesis: "The Causes of Iraqi War: Why the US Administration decided to invade Iraq in 2003" focuses on explanation why the administration of the USA made that step. The specification of the roots of war is based on five causes and seventeen subcauses according to the essay of Stephen Van Evera and other scholars, and the paper trough the methodology of text's analyzes investigates behavior, decision-making process and motivations of the US administration (the level of units) and some steps of the US president G. W. Bush (individual level) in the process leading to the war in Iraq. Concerning the causes of war, the paper introduces different concepts of the offense-defense balance and analyzes whether the balance was disrupted. Secondly, it examines the role of cumulative resources in Iraq like oil, territory and state structures and it shows how they influenced the decision. Third, it searches for the linkage among an emergence of a new threat and responses to it which mouthed to the acceptance of the concept of the first move advantage. Fourth, the thesis accounts for the roots of misperception, where they originate and how they operated in perception of the US administration of the Iraqi threat. Finally, the investigation of the last root of conflict explains why and how windows of...