Le contrôle de proportionnalité a puissamment évolué dans la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel à partir du début des années 1990. En s’y propageant largement, il paraît se confondre, ou presque, avec le contrôle de constitutionnalité interne de la loi. Cette mutation est perceptible à un double niveau. En premier lieu, le contrôle de constitutionnalité s’est médiatisé. Progressivement, le raisonnement syllogistique qui opère en deux temps à partir d’une confrontation entre la norme contrôlée et la norme de contrôle, s’est enrichi d’une troisième donnée, l’objectif législatif. A la fois moins indéterminé que l’exigence constitutionnelle applicable et plus indéterminé que le moyen législatif correspondant, cet acte prospectif facilite la jonction entre les normes en présence. Pour y parvenir sans dévoyer l’intention du législateur, une restructuration du contrôle de constitutionnalité est nécessaire. En second lieu, le contrôle de constitutionnalité s’est dédoublé. Bien que le Conseil constitutionnel incorpore dans sa propre jurisprudence le triple test hérité de la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande, il ne réalise en réalité qu’un contrôle d’appropriation et de disproportion à l’exclusion de tout contrôle de nécessité. La Haute instance se demande, respectivement, ce que le législateur peut logiquement faire, ce qu’il peut juridiquement faire, sans se demander ce qu’il aurait juridiquement dû faire. Bien que les contrôles d’appropriation et de disproportion soient fondamentalement distincts, les variations de la jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel en obscurcissent la compréhension. Une clarification de son raisonnement s’impose. / Since the beginning of the 1990’s the use of the proportionality test by the Constitutional Council has undergone a deep change. Constitutional judicial review and proportionality test have nearly become synonymous and this evolution can be perceived at two levels. Firstly, the traditional judicial review has evolved so as to include a new element to the confrontation between the norm under review and the higher norm setting the constitutional standard. The reasoning of the Constitutional council has evolved from this binary mode and has included a third element in the equation, which is the goal set by the legislator. The notion of legislative goal serve as a facilitator in the judicial review process, bridging the gap between the legislative and constitutional norms. To make this possible a remodeling of the judicial review is still necessary. Secondly, judicial review has evolved towards the type of proportionality test used by the German Federal Court, however it has only partially done so. The French Constitutional Council is indeed using the rational connection test and the proportionality test but it excludes the necessity test. The Constitutional Council is trying to figure out the rational and the legal elements of the legislator’s decision but does not take in consideration what was the best option the legislator have legally chosen. In addition, despite the fact that the rational connection test and the proportionality test have initially been clearly distinguished in the case-law, their latter inconsequent and the changing use by the Constitutional have blurred the line between them. This has created a confusion that ought to be clarified.

The purpose with this paper is to analyze the temporal scope of the doctrine of Unwilling or Unable and focus on when the right to use force in self-defense ends. According to the doctrine a State has a right to use force in self-defense towards a non-state actor on another States territory, if the harboring state is Unwilling or Unable to suppress the non-state actor. This paper will first analyze which factors governs the right to use force in self-defense according to the Unwilling or Unable doctrine and secondly the findings will be applied to the situation in Syria, where the United States are using force in collective self-defense on Iraq’s request, towards ISIL. The conflict will be analyzed in three different time periods, 2014, 2016 and 2018 to identify for how long the United States has a right to use force in self-defense in Syria. The conclusion in this paper is that in 2014 and 2016 the United States has a right to use force in self-defense towards ISIL on Syria’s territory according to the doctrine, but in 2018 the circumstances has changed and the United States’ right to use force in self-defense in Syria has ended.

O reconhecimento da presunção de inocência não se mostra incompatível com a admissão da prisão e de outras medidas de caráter pessoal no curso da persecução penal. Assim como os demais direitos fundamentais, a presunção de inocência não se mostra absoluta ou insuscetível de restrições. O ordenamento jurídico brasileiro admite intervenções legítimas no âmbito de proteção da presunção de inocência, submetendo-as ao controle da proporcionalidade e do conteúdo essencial dos direitos fundamentais. A proporcionalidade serve como limite das intervenções e desdobra-se nos pressupostos, requisitos extrínsecos e requisitos intrínsecos já explorados. O descumprimento de qualquer destes pontos revela a desobediência à regra da proporcionalidade e, com isto, o caráter ilegítimo da intervenção no âmbito de proteção da presunção de inocência. Esta análise pode ocorrer tanto da perspectiva abstrata, examinando-se a previsão normativa, como da perspectiva concreta, analisando a aplicação e a execução da norma / The recognition of the presumption of innocence is inconsistent with the admission of the prison and other measures of personal character in the course of criminal prosecution. Like other fundamental rights, the presumption of innocence does not show absolute and subject to no restrictions. The Brazilian legal system admits intervention legitimate in the context of protection of the presumption of innocence, places them under the control of proportionality and the essential content of fundamental rights. Proportionality serves as a limit of interventions and unfolds in the assumptions, requirements extrinsic and intrinsic requirements already explored. The breach of any of these seven elements reveals the disobedience to the rule of proportionality and, thus, the illegitimate nature of the intervention under protection of the presumption of innocence. This analysis can occur from both the abstract perspective, examining the legislative provision, as the concrete perspective, examining the implementation and enforcement of the standard.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo avaliar o regime brasileiro de controle dos preços de transferência a partir do confronto dos princípios arms length e da praticabilidade. Inicialmente, são relatadas as principais características históricas e metodológicas do desenvolvimento da disciplina nos âmbitos internacional e brasileiro. Em seguida, é apresentada uma teoria dos conflitos normativos, amparada nas doutrinas de Dworkin e Alexy, para sustentar que a colisão de princípios deflagrada pela variedade de mecanismos que mitigam a realização do arms length em favor da praticabilidade na legislação brasileira deve ser avaliada pelo exame da proporcionalidade conduzido por uma correta fundamentação argumentativa. Defende-se, depois, que o arms length e a praticabilidade estão inseridos no ordenamento constitucional-tributário brasileiro com a natureza de princípios jurídicos respectivamente justificados pelas ideias de igualdade particular e igualdade geral. Configurado o cenário da colisão, é analisada a proporcionalidade dos seguintes mecanismos: definição do aspecto subjetivo, exclusão dos royalties e da transferência de tecnologia, restrições da comparabilidade, margens de lucro predeterminadas, liberdade de escolha de métodos, vedação de outros métodos e utilização de safe harbours. A partir dos resultados da análise, conclui-se que o regime brasileiro não é eficaz no controle dos preços de transferência. Sugere-se, então, um conjunto de medidas alternativas que constitua um meio termo entre a desproporcional praticabilidade obtida com os mecanismos do atual regime e a diminuta praticabilidade da disciplina internacional. / This study examines the Brazilian transfer pricing regime by facing arms length and practicability principles. Initially, historical and methodological characteristics of the discipline development are reported both from international and Brazilian perspectives. Then, based on Dworkin and Alexy doctrines, a normative conflicts theory supports that the collision between principles produced by a variety of mechanisms, which mitigate arms length results by promoting practicability, should be evaluated through a proportionality exam conducted under a correct argumentative discourse. Thereafter it advocates that arms length and practicability are inserted in the Brazilian constitutional tax system as legal principles justified by particular and general equality ideas respectively. Once the collision scenario is configured, proportionality of the following mechanisms is analysed: subjective aspect definition, royalties and technology transfers exclusion, comparability restrictions, predetermined gross margins, choice of methods freedom, other methods prohibition and safe harbours usage. The analysis concludes that there is no efficacy in Brazilian transfer pricing regime. Therefore it suggests a number of alternative measures which constitutes a midterm between the disproportional practicability of the current regime mechanisms and the diminished practicability of the international discipline.

O presente trabalho tem por objeto os direitos fundamentais em matéria tributária, mais especificamente as restrições a que tais direitos se sujeitam sob a justificativa da realização de bens coletivos. Toma-se como premissa que o controle de proporcionalidade é o método que melhor cumpre os propósitos de: a) garantir a máxima eficácia possível a esses direitos; b) permitir o mais intenso controle intersubjetivo de decisões judiciais acerca de restrições a eles impostas. Assume-se como parâmetro de trabalho os direitos de igualdade assegurados ao contribuinte, especialmente o direito à graduação de impostos conforme a capacidade contributiva, em busca da definição dos pressupostos e limites à aplicação do controle de proporcionalidade em matéria tributária. Discute-se o forte consenso que existe sobre a classificação das normas tributárias em fiscais e extrafiscais, concluindo-se que tal classificação é possível. Por conta disso, também se conclui não poder tal classificação servir de critério para delimitar os casos em que o controle de proporcionalidade é devido ou possível. Os pressupostos para aplicação do controle de proporcionalidade em matéria tributária, portanto, são em relação a cada direito fundamental: de um lado, sua construção interpretativa sob a forma de princípio, com um amplo âmbito de proteção; de outro, identificarem-se, em medidas estatais, efeitos restritivos sobre tal direito. / This work aims at the constitutional rights concerning tax matters, specially the restrictions to which such rights are subjected, due to justifications related to collective goods. It takes for granted the proportionality principle as the method which: a) ensures the best realization possible to theses rights; b) enables the most intense inter-subjective control over judicial decisions regarding the mentioned restrictions. The equality rights granted to taxpayers, specially the ability to pay principle were chosen as a pattern on searching to define the requirements and limits to the application of the proportionality principle in tax matters. It questions the strong doctrine of the classification of tax norms according to its fiscal or non-fiscal purposes, concluding that such a classification is not possible. Because of this, it also concludes that this distinction can not be the criteria to define the cases to which the proportionality principle is possible and should be done. The requirements to the application of the proportionality principle in tax matters, concerning each constitutional right, are therefore: a) its interpretative construction with the structure of a legal principle, with a wide realm of protection; b) the identification of State measures that restrict such a realm.

The transfer system was created in order to control player movement between football clubs and has existed since the late nineteenth century. During the negotiation of today’s transfer rules FIFA, UEFA and the Commission found that a breach of contract during the season could upset the balance of competition and therefore should be restricted. It was considered necessary to strengthen the contractual stability and to apply a special rule to preserve the regularity and proper functioning of competition. This was done by the means of a provision stipulating that a football player only can be registered to play with a national association during one of the two registration periods per year, generally known as the transfer windows. Sport has never been included in the formal structures of the European Union and the regulation of sport has instead materialized through verdicts from the European Court of Justice. One of the most influential statements emerging from the Court is that sport is subject to Community law in so far it constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, if the activity is economic there is a risk that it infringes EU law. The purpose of this master thesis is to examine the FIFA transfer window system and to determine whether it violates Article 39 and/or Article 81 EC. The transfer windows, a regulation strengthened by the ECJ in the case of Lehtonen, restrict the ability of players to seek alternative employment and could therefore be regarded as a violation of the free movement of workers. In order to trigger the Treaty provisions guarding the right of freedom of movement the person in question must be a national of a Member State of the European Union and the activity must have a territorial dimension beyond the borders of a single Member State of the European Union. The person in question must also be engaged in some kind of economic activity. It is, however, clear that football players who are members of the European Union and are applying for a job in another Member State, and are performing at a certain level, fulfil these requirements. Footballers should therefore be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC and the prohibition of discrimination contained in that article which catches non-discriminatory private collective measures, such as the transfer system, invented by regulatory bodies like FIFA and UEFA. When considering the FIFA “windows system” it is clear that it is liable of restricting the ability of players to seek alternative employment in another Member State and should therefore be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. Nevertheless, restricted transfer periods have been found by the ECJ to be objectively justified as having sporting benefits in the Belgian Basketball league. It is, however, likely that the “window system”, as it operates in European football, goes beyond what is necessary to achieve team and player contract stability since it is too restrictive and somewhat redundant. Consequently, the FIFA transfer windows do not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and should therefore, if challenged, be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. The use of transfer windows in European football can also be considered to be an issue for competition law and in particular Article 81 EC. The article prohibits all agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States and has the objective to protect consumers, enhance their welfare and to facilitate the creation of a single European market. The ECJ has, however, acknowledged a certain type of sporting rule that, even though it restricts competition, will be granted immunity from Article 81 EC. The FIFA “windows system” should not be regarded as such a rule since it does not fulfil the required conditions. The transfer windows do little for the competitive balance within the European football. It may be argued that it preserves the appeal and the unpredictability of the finishing stages of a championship. However, they also prevent clubs from developing their economic activity and restrict the free play of the market forces of supply and demand. Furthermore, the “windows system” hinders certain clubs from raising the quality of their sporting performance since clubs in minor leagues with a closed window are losing their best players to clubs in a better league with an open window, without being able to replace them. All of this affects the small and economically weak clubs and strengthens the position of the financially strong clubs. As a result a few strong clubs will, contrary to the best interest of consumers, continue to dominate European football. The FIFA regulation of transfer windows is therefore likely to fall under Article 81(1) EC. It is unlikely that the pro-competitive benefits of the FIFA transfer windows outweigh its restrictive effects since it is improbable that they would be considered the least restrictive means of creating these benefits. Subsequently, the FIFA “windows system” would not qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and should, if challenged, be void under Article 81(2) EC.

<p>The transfer system was created in order to control player movement between football clubs and has existed since the late nineteenth century. During the negotiation of today’s transfer rules FIFA, UEFA and the Commission found that a breach of contract during the season could upset the balance of competition and therefore should be restricted. It was considered necessary to strengthen the contractual stability and to apply a special rule to preserve the regularity and proper functioning of competition. This was done by the means of a provision stipulating that a football player only can be registered to play with a national association during one of the two registration periods per year, generally known as the transfer windows.</p><p>Sport has never been included in the formal structures of the European Union and the regulation of sport has instead materialized through verdicts from the European Court of Justice. One of the most influential statements emerging from the Court is that sport is subject to Community law in so far it constitutes an economic activity. Consequently, if the activity is economic there is a risk that it infringes EU law. The purpose of this master thesis is to examine the FIFA transfer window system and to determine whether it violates Article 39 and/or Article 81 EC.</p><p>The transfer windows, a regulation strengthened by the ECJ in the case of <em>Lehtonen</em>, restrict the ability of players to seek alternative employment and could therefore be regarded as a violation of the free movement of workers. In order to trigger the Treaty provisions guarding the right of freedom of movement the person in question must be a national of a Member State of the European Union and the activity must have a territorial dimension beyond the borders of a single Member State of the European Union. The person in question must also be engaged in some kind of economic activity. It is, however, clear that football players who are members of the European Union and are applying for a job in another Member State, and are performing at a certain level, fulfil these requirements. Footballers should therefore be considered as workers within the meaning of Article 39 EC and the prohibition of discrimination contained in that article which catches non-discriminatory private collective measures, such as the transfer system, invented by regulatory bodies like FIFA and UEFA.</p><p>When considering the FIFA “windows system” it is clear that it is liable of restricting the ability of players to seek alternative employment in another Member State and should therefore be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC. Nevertheless, restricted transfer periods have been found by the ECJ to be objectively justified as having sporting benefits in the Belgian Basketball league. It is, however, likely that the “window system”, as it operates in European football, goes beyond what is necessary to achieve team and player contract stability since it is too restrictive and somewhat redundant. Consequently, the FIFA transfer windows do not comply with the requirements of the principle of proportionality and should therefore, if challenged, be regarded as a violation of Article 39 EC.</p><p>The use of transfer windows in European football can also be considered to be an issue for competition law and in particular Article 81 EC. The article prohibits all agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and affect trade between Member States and has the objective to protect consumers, enhance their welfare and to facilitate the creation of a single European market. The ECJ has, however, acknowledged a certain type of sporting rule that, even though it restricts competition, will be granted immunity from Article 81 EC. The FIFA “windows system” should not be regarded as such a rule since it does not fulfil the required conditions.</p><p>The transfer windows do little for the competitive balance within the European football. It may be argued that it preserves the appeal and the unpredictability of the finishing stages of a championship. However, they also prevent clubs from developing their economic activity and restrict the free play of the market forces of supply and demand. Furthermore, the “windows system” hinders certain clubs from raising the quality of their sporting performance since clubs in minor leagues with a closed window are losing their best players to clubs in a better league with an open window, without being able to replace them. All of this affects the small and economically weak clubs and strengthens the position of the financially strong clubs. As a result a few strong clubs will, contrary to the best interest of consumers, continue to dominate European football. The FIFA regulation of transfer windows is therefore likely to fall under Article 81(1) EC.</p><p>It is unlikely that the pro-competitive benefits of the FIFA transfer windows outweigh its restrictive effects since it is improbable that they would be considered the least restrictive means of creating these benefits. Subsequently, the FIFA “windows system” would not qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3) EC and should, if challenged, be void under Article 81(2) EC.</p>

Mokslo darbo temos aktualumas ir problematika. Žmogaus teisių varžymas baudžiamajame procese vykdomas Lietuvos Respublikos baudžiamojo proceso kodekse nustatytų prievartos priemonių forma ir nulemtas aplinkybės, kad baudžiamojo proceso dalyviai ne visuomet tinkamai vykdo baudžiamąjį procesą reglamentuojančių teisės aktų nustatytas pareigas. Tarptautiniuose ir nacionaliniuose teisės aktuose deklaruojami teisinės, demokratinės valstybės, žmogaus teisių apsaugos principai bei tarptautinių teisminių institucijų (Europos Žmogaus Teisių Teismo, Europos Teisingumo Teismo) formuojama praktika riboja prievartos taikymą nustatant proporcingumo principą, reikalaujantį įvertinti ir nustatyti tinkamą balansą tarp žmogaus teises varžančių priemonių ir šiomis priemonėmis siekiamų tikslų. Disertacijos temos aktualumą lemia prievartos priemonių taikymo procese egzistuojantys probleminiai klausimai, susiję su žmogaus teisių apsaugos užtikrinimu, į kuriuos atsakymų ieškoma šioje disertacijoje. Disertaciniame darbe tiriama problema susijusi su baudžiamajame procese vykdomu žmogaus teisių ir laisvių varžymu taikant prievartos priemones. Darbe siekiama nustatyti valstybės galių ribas baudžiamajame procese taikyti prievartos priemones, ištirti ir pasiūlyti mažiau žmogaus teises ir laisves varžančius būdus. Disertacinio darbo problematika apima tris aspektus: pirma, – prievartos priemonių sampratos, funkcijos baudžiamajame procese suvokimą, antra, – proporcingumo principo, jo turinio, kriterijų ir... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / Topicality of the theme of the scientific work and the problems. Constriction of human rights in the criminal proceedings is exercised via the coercive measures, which are fixed in the Criminal Process Code (CPC), and is determined by the circumstance, i.e. that the participants of the criminal proceedings do not always appropriately fulfill their duties, which are fixed in the legal acts, regulating the criminal proceedings. The principles of protection of human rights, which are declared in the international and national legal acts of the lawful, democratic state, and the practice, which is being formed by the international justiciary institutions (the European Court of Human Rights, European Court of Justice) constrict application of coercion by setting the principle of proportionality, according to which the fair balance between the measures, which constrict human rights, and the goals, which are being pursued by these measures, must be considered and fixed. Topicality of the theme of the doctorial dissertation is conditioned by the problematic items, existing in the proceedings of application of the coercive measures, which are related with securing protection of human rights; the solutions of the latter are being searched for in the present dissertation. The problem, which is being investigated in the dissertation work, is related with constriction of human rights and freedoms, which is being exercised in the criminal proceedings via application of coercive measures... [to full text]

Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania sets the principal democratic values of society. Human rights assume special role in the system of constitutional values. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the right of a human being to have his own convictions and freely express them. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the right to everyone to have freedom to express his opinion and convictions and to freely impart them. This is an essential clause for the creation and protection of democracy. Constitutional freedom of expression is realised in ordinary laws. Article 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the principle of freedom of expression that is realised in the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Law on Provision of Information to the Public and other ordinary laws. Freedom of expression, just like other constitutional human rights and freedoms, is not absolute. Employment of the freedom of expression faces such requirements that are required in the democratic society to protect the rights and freedoms of other human beings, as well as the constitutional arrangement. Ordinary courts (general jurisdiction and specialised), which examine cases for determining balance of freedom of expression and other constitutional values, must construe the content of constitutional rights of human beings. Decisions by ordinary courts in the cases of determining the balance of freedom of... [to full text] / LR Konstitucijoje įtvirtintos svarbiausios demokratinės visuomenės vertybės. Žmogaus teisėms konstitucinių vertybių sistemoje tenka ypatinga vieta. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. įtvirtinta žmogaus teisė turėti savo įsitikinimus ir juos laisvai reikšti. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. kiekvienam žmogui suteikia galimybę laisvai formuoti savo nuomonę ir pažiūras bei laisvai jas skleisti. Tai būtina sąlyga demokratijai kurti ir saugoti. Konstitucinė saviraiškos laisvė įgyvendinama ordinariniuose įstatymuose. LR Konstitucijos 25 str. įtvirtintas saviraiškos laisvės principas įgyvendintas LR Civiliniame kodekse, LR Visuomenės informavimo įstatyme bei kituose ordinariniuose įstatymuose. Saviraiškos laisvė, kaip ir kitos konstitucinės žmogaus teisės ir laisvės, nėra absoliuti. Naudojantis saviraiškos laisve susiduriama su tokiais reikalavimais, kurie būtini demokratinėje visuomenėje siekiant apsaugoti kitų žmonių teises ir laisves, konstitucinę santvarką. Ordinariniai (bendros kompetencijos ir specializuoti) teismai, spręsdami žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių pusiausvyros nustatymo bylas, turi interpretuoti konstitucinių žmogaus teisių turinį. Priimdami sprendimus žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių pusiausvyros nustatymo bylose ordinariniai teismai turi remtis žodžio laisvės ir kitų konstitucinių vertybių konstitucine dimensija.

This thesis deals with the law applicable to targeting during an armed conflict — in particular, the law concerning military objectives and the rule of proportionality. The law concerning military objectives is further considered in the context of a UN sanctioned military operation.Using the law applicable to Australia as the frame of reference (particularly Additional Protocol I of 1977), the existing treaty law, relevant case law, and the extensive commentary available is analysed. Separate chapters deal with the law concerning human targets, non-human targets, and currently controversial targets (along with effects based operations). Further chapters deal with precautions in attack and proportionality.The law of targeting in the context of United Nations operations is addressed; and in particular, how a United Nations Security Council mandate might affect what objectives are lawful targets.Finally, I put forward a process by which responsibility for individual components of a targeting decision can be analysed. This will allow for the determination of legal responsibility for discrete steps in a targeting decision. This should prove particularly useful in two situations. First, it will enable military commanders to appreciate what needs to be considered in each targeting decision and thereby ensure that somebody is assigned responsibility for each discrete step. Second, in the event of an investigation into an alleged targeting mishap, it will be possible to identify who had, or at least should have had, responsibility for discrete aspects of the overall targeting decision.