Afin de maintenir la stabilité du secteur financier et le dynamisme des autres secteurs del’économie réelle, les sociétés d’assurance sont amenées à renforcer leur soliditéfinancière et leur solvabilité. Cependant, malgré l’importance de la question du niveaudes fonds propres dans la solvabilité des sociétés d’assurance et dans la stabilité globaledu secteur financier, elle n’a fait l’objet que de quelques rares tentatives d’analyse. Dansce contexte, l’objectif principal de notre thèse est d’analyser les déterminants de lastructure financière des sociétés d’assurance françaises et l’effet de l’intégration de larégulation prudentielle dans la formation de leur niveau de fonds propres. A cette fin,nous mobilisons les théories du compromis et du financement hiérarchique dansl’élaboration de notre modèle théorique qui est ensuite testé empiriquement auprès d’unéchantillon de compagnies d’assurance françaises sur la période 2006-2012. Lesprincipaux résultats empiriques démontrent que la réglementation prudentielle influencele niveau des fonds propres dans les compagnies d’assurance françaises. / To maintain the stability of the financial sector and the dynamism in the other sectors ofthe economy, the insurance companies have to improve their solvency and manage theirrisks. Despite the importance of the issue of the level of capital in maintaining the overallstability of the insurance companies sector, it has been the subject of a very fewresearches. In this context, the main objective of our thesis is to analyze the determinantsof the financial structure of French insurance companies and the effect of the integrationof prudential regulation in the formation of their level of capital. To this end, we use TOTand POT to develop our theoretical model that we then tested empirically in a sample ofFrench insurance companies in the period 2006-2012. Our main empirical result is thatprudential regulation affects the determinants of the level of capital in the Frenchinsurance companies.

Magister Legum - LLM (Public Law and Jurisprudence) / Zimbabwe is a Southern African country which has witnessed frequent bank collapses in the last two decades. This has eroded consumer and business confidence in the banking sector due to the irreparable financial prejudice suffered by most sectoral consumers. The side effect of this lack of trust in the sector has been the hoarding and preference of cash in most, if not all transactions, as opposed to the use of plastic money. Between April 2015 and March 2016, it is estimated that between US$3 billion and US$7.4 billion was circulating outside the banking system in the informal sector thus exposing the depth of mistrust crippling the banking sector. Together with other factors beyond the scope of this study, it is submitted that this lack of trust and confidence in the sector has contributed to the current cash shortage which, according to Latham and Cohen, has left .a black hole in the financial system that's crushing the rest of the economy'.

O objeto do presente trabalho é o diagnóstico do arcabouço regulatório pátrio destinado à prevenção de crises bancárias, quais sejam a regulação sistêmica e a regulação prudencial, e como as transformações ocorridas no sistema financeiro na segunda metade do século XX o afetam. A partir desse estudo, o trabalho pretende demonstrar que, embora a regulação sistêmica e a regulação prudencial no País tenham incorporado avanços notáveis nas últimas décadas, ainda há falhas significativas a serem corrigidas e desafios a serem enfrentados. Se por um lado o atual arcabouço regulatório é marcado por exigências e controles mais rigorosos que os encontrados em outros países, por outro lado, constam também inúmeros instrumentos de resgate a bancos sendo aplicados de forma desordenada, sem regras claras, com pouca ou nenhuma prestação de contas, e até mesmo desvirtuando o propósito original de alguns desses instrumentos. A presença de uma multiplicidade de mecanismos de resgate com tais características é uma preocupante fonte de risco moral no mercado. Outrossim, o exame das transformações ocorridas no Sistema Financeiro Nacional nas últimas décadas evidencia que as dificuldades enfrentadas por autoridades bancárias em outros países, como o fenômeno do grande demais para quebrar e o monitoramento do risco sistêmico em um contexto de conglomeração financeira, já são uma realidade no País, representando desafios para a regulação sistêmica e a regulação prudencial, e provocando a reflexão sobre as consequências desses movimentos no setor bancário nacional para o arcabouço regulatório vigente. Em conclusão, o trabalho pretende demonstrar que, apesar de seus inegáveis méritos, a exaltação ao arcabouço regulatório pátrio em face de seu desempenho considerado positivo na crise financeira recente deve ser vista com temperamentos, e que a atuação das autoridades bancárias nos próximos anos deve ser mais centrada na correção das falhas identificadas e reflexão sobre os desafios apresentados. / The study aims at evaluating the national regulatory framework designed to prevent banking crises (e.g. systemic and prudential regulation), and how the transformations that occurred in the financial services industry throughout the second half of the 20th century affect it. Based on this analysis, the study intends to demonstrate that, albeit the systemic and prudential regulation in Brazil have incorporated important developments over the last decades, there still are significant flaws that need to be fixed and challenges to be faced. If, on the one hand, the current regulatory framework is marked by demands and controls that are more rigorous than those adopted by other countries, on the other hand, the mechanisms designed to rescue distressed banks are being applied in an unorganized manner, without clear rules, little or no accountability, and even distorting the original purpose of some of these mechanisms. The presence of this variety of rescue mechanisms with such characteristics is a concerning source of moral hazard. Furthermore, the examination of the transformations in the financial system in recent history shows that the challenges faced by banking authorities in other countries, such as the too big to fail phenomenon and the complexity of monitoring systemic risk in the context of financial conglomerates, are also present in Brazil, creating challenges to the current regulatory framework, and claiming a reflection on the consequences of such transformations in the national financial services industry. In conclusion, the study aims at demonstrating that, despite its unquestionable merits, the exaltation to the Brazilian systemic and prudential regulation in light of the countrys performance in the recent financial crisis should be analyzed with caution, and that the role of the banking authorities over the next years should be focused in fixing the flaws identified in the analysis and reflection over the challenges discussed throughout the study.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

The New Zealand economy in the period up to 2006 provides an opportunity to assess an alternative disclosure based approach to the prudential regulation of deposittakers, in a market free of many of the distortions which arise from traditional regulatory schemes. The overall objective of this research has been to assess the effectiveness of the prudential regulation of New Zealand financial institutions and judge if the country is well served by it. Analysis of New Zealand’s registered bank sector suggests public disclosure adds value to New Zealand’s financial system. However, the significant relationship found between disclosure risk indicators and bank risk premiums was not as a result of market discipline, rather it is argued self-discipline was the mechanism, demonstrating bank management and directors are discharging their duties in a prudent manner. A feature of the New Zealand disclosure regime for banks is the significant responsibilities placed on bank directors; directors are then held accountable for their actions. Findings in the management of banks were in contrast to non-bank deposittakers, where disclosure was judged to be ineffective, and of no practical use due to its poor quality. The management of non-bank deposit-takers appeared to receive very little oversight from depositors, their trustees or official agencies. As a result, many appear to have managed their institution in their own interests, with little consideration given to other stakeholders. Failures which occurred in NBDTs from 2006 resulted from deficiencies in the prudential regulation of these deposit-takers, demonstrating the severity of asymmetric information and moral hazard problems which can arise if prudential regulation is not correctly designed and management interests are not aligned with other stakeholders. The New Zealand disclosure regime will never guarantee a bank will not fail, nor should it try to do so, but it should assist the functioning of a sound and efficient financial system. To this end, it is recommended that the Reserve Bank, in re-designing the regulatory framework for NBDTs, hold the management and directors of NBDTs similarly accountable, while also incorporating regular disclosure and minimum prudential standards. Governments have an important role to play in ensuring the financial system is efficient.

Submitted by Cristiane Oliveira (cristiane.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2011-05-26T13:10:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 71070100742.pdf: 1357936 bytes, checksum: 317ce99e12150f05d086d02057a7e979 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia(suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2011-05-26T15:01:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 71070100742.pdf: 1357936 bytes, checksum: 317ce99e12150f05d086d02057a7e979 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia(suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2011-05-26T15:03:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 71070100742.pdf: 1357936 bytes, checksum: 317ce99e12150f05d086d02057a7e979 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-26T17:18:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 71070100742.pdf: 1357936 bytes, checksum: 317ce99e12150f05d086d02057a7e979 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-04-15 / This dissertation aims to examine the factors that drive the bank decision process of capital/investment structure and to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory intervention in Brazil. This study is divided into three chapters. The first chapter presents, in a systematic fashion, the theoretical and empirical literature to explain the financing and investment decisions of a heavily regulated banking firm. It also describes the evolution of international standards of prudential capital regulation, since the publication of the first Basel Accord until the initial steps of Basel III, and the regulatory scenario in Brazil. The second chapter, through a dynamic model of the trade-off theory, analyzes the determinants of Brazilian banks‟ capital buffer between 2001 and 2009, suggesting that: (i) regulatory capital requirements and adjustment costs may influence banks decisions; (ii) supervisory authority evaluations may impact capital buffers; (iii) market discipline may not being effective in improving bank solvency; and (iv) there is a negative relationship between the buffer and business cycle, which may represent a pro-cyclical bank’s capital management. Finally, the third chapter uses supervisory authority ratings (CAMEL) to provide evidences that the supervisory and regulatory pressures induce banks in Brazil to undertake downwards short term adjustments in leverage and also in portfolio risks. / Esta tese tem por objetivo examinar os fatores que direcionam o processo decisório de estrutura de capital/investimento do banco e avaliar a efetividade da intervenção regulatória no Brasil. O trabalho está divido em três capítulos. No primeiro capítulo, apresenta-se, de forma sistematizada, arcabouço teórico e evidências empíricas na literatura para explicar o comportamento da firma bancária, fortemente regulada, em suas decisões de financiamento e investimento. Além disso, descreve-se a evolução dos padrões internacionais de regulação prudencial de capital, desde a publicação do primeiro Acordo de Basiléia até as medidas iniciais de Basiléia III, apresentando também o contexto normativo no Brasil. No segundo capítulo, por meio de modelo dinâmico da teoria de trade-off, analisam-se os determinantes do buffer de capital dos bancos brasileiros entre 2001 e 2009. Os resultados sugerem que: (i) o requerimento regulatório de capital e os custos de ajustes de capital influenciam nas decisões dos bancos; (ii) as avaliações da autoridade de supervisão bancária impacta os colchões de capital; (iii) a disciplina de mercado pode não ser efetiva em aumentar a solvência dos bancos; e (iv) existe uma relação negativa entre o colchão de capital e o ciclo de negócios que pode representar uma gestão procíclica de capital dos bancos. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, utiliza-se metodologia proprietária dos escores das instituições conferidos pela autoridade supervisora (CAMEL), para apresentar evidências de que as pressões regulatória e de supervisão no Brasil induzem os bancos a realizarem ajustes de curto prazo relativamente menores na alavancagem e, principalmente, no risco do portfólio.

Très souvent comparée à la grande dépression de 1929, la crise économique mondiale des années 2007-2012 a révélé que le système bancaire européen, en particulier, est dominé par des banques trop grosses, trop complexes, mais également trop connectées pour faire faillite. Du fait de leur statut systémique, celles-ci jouissent d’avantages de coûts de financement moins chers qui constituent des distorsions concurrentielles mais également des problèmes d’aléa moral quant aux incitations qui les poussent à accroitre leur taille. Fort de ce constat, l’objectif de cette thèse est d’analyser comment la déformation de la structure de marché, de la structure des banques et les problèmes de tarification des risques qu’elles induisent affectent la stabilité financière. Elle est structurée en quatre chapitres. Dans le chapitre 1, nous montrons qu’une augmentation de la probabilité de défaillance individuelle accroit la contribution des banques au risque systémique. Dans le chapitre 2, nous démontrons que la subvention implicite a le potentiel de diminuer mais également d’inverser l'effet réduction des risques de nature systémiques d'une concurrence accrue. Tandis que dans le chapitre 3, nous établissons qu’elle a la capacité de distordre et au-delà d’un certain seuil, d’inverser l’effet accroissement de risques individuels d’une concurrence accrue. Conjointement, ces résultats soutiennent le consensus selon lequel le risque individuel et le risque systémique généré par les banques ont deux dimensions distinctes. Dans le chapitre 4, nous prouvons que les grandes institutions financières identifiées systémiques et bénéficiant de la subvention implicite contribuent davantage au risque systémique quand elles ont une dépendance accrue au financement sur le marché de gros de la liquidité. / The global financial crisis that peaked in 2008 showed that the European banking sector, in particular, is dominated by banks “too big to fail”, “too complex to fail”, but also “too connected to fail”. Due to their systemic status, they benefit from cheaper funding costs leading to competitive distortions, and also raise issues of moral hazard regarding their incentives to grow in size. Against this backdrop, the aim of this thesis is to examine how distortions in the market structure, the structure of banks, and the issues of risk-pricing they induce affect the financial stability. It is articulated around four chapters. In the first chapter, we show that an increase in the probability of individual default raises banks' contribution to systemic risk. In the second chapter, we demonstrate that implicit subsidies have the potential to mitigate and beyond a certain threshold, reverse the systemic-risk reducing effect of increased competition. Nevertheless, in the third Chapter, we establish that implicit subsidies have the ability to distort and beyond a certain threshold, reverse the individual-risk increasing effect of heightened competition. Together, these results support the consensus that individual risk and systemic risk generated by banks have two distinct dimensions. In the fourth chapter, we show that “large” global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) benefiting from implicit subsidies contribute more to systemic risk when they become more dependent on short-term wholesale funding.

O objeto do presente trabalho é o diagnóstico do arcabouço regulatório pátrio destinado à prevenção de crises bancárias, quais sejam a regulação sistêmica e a regulação prudencial, e como as transformações ocorridas no sistema financeiro na segunda metade do século XX o afetam. A partir desse estudo, o trabalho pretende demonstrar que, embora a regulação sistêmica e a regulação prudencial no País tenham incorporado avanços notáveis nas últimas décadas, ainda há falhas significativas a serem corrigidas e desafios a serem enfrentados. Se por um lado o atual arcabouço regulatório é marcado por exigências e controles mais rigorosos que os encontrados em outros países, por outro lado, constam também inúmeros instrumentos de resgate a bancos sendo aplicados de forma desordenada, sem regras claras, com pouca ou nenhuma prestação de contas, e até mesmo desvirtuando o propósito original de alguns desses instrumentos. A presença de uma multiplicidade de mecanismos de resgate com tais características é uma preocupante fonte de risco moral no mercado. Outrossim, o exame das transformações ocorridas no Sistema Financeiro Nacional nas últimas décadas evidencia que as dificuldades enfrentadas por autoridades bancárias em outros países, como o fenômeno do grande demais para quebrar e o monitoramento do risco sistêmico em um contexto de conglomeração financeira, já são uma realidade no País, representando desafios para a regulação sistêmica e a regulação prudencial, e provocando a reflexão sobre as consequências desses movimentos no setor bancário nacional para o arcabouço regulatório vigente. Em conclusão, o trabalho pretende demonstrar que, apesar de seus inegáveis méritos, a exaltação ao arcabouço regulatório pátrio em face de seu desempenho considerado positivo na crise financeira recente deve ser vista com temperamentos, e que a atuação das autoridades bancárias nos próximos anos deve ser mais centrada na correção das falhas identificadas e reflexão sobre os desafios apresentados. / The study aims at evaluating the national regulatory framework designed to prevent banking crises (e.g. systemic and prudential regulation), and how the transformations that occurred in the financial services industry throughout the second half of the 20th century affect it. Based on this analysis, the study intends to demonstrate that, albeit the systemic and prudential regulation in Brazil have incorporated important developments over the last decades, there still are significant flaws that need to be fixed and challenges to be faced. If, on the one hand, the current regulatory framework is marked by demands and controls that are more rigorous than those adopted by other countries, on the other hand, the mechanisms designed to rescue distressed banks are being applied in an unorganized manner, without clear rules, little or no accountability, and even distorting the original purpose of some of these mechanisms. The presence of this variety of rescue mechanisms with such characteristics is a concerning source of moral hazard. Furthermore, the examination of the transformations in the financial system in recent history shows that the challenges faced by banking authorities in other countries, such as the too big to fail phenomenon and the complexity of monitoring systemic risk in the context of financial conglomerates, are also present in Brazil, creating challenges to the current regulatory framework, and claiming a reflection on the consequences of such transformations in the national financial services industry. In conclusion, the study aims at demonstrating that, despite its unquestionable merits, the exaltation to the Brazilian systemic and prudential regulation in light of the countrys performance in the recent financial crisis should be analyzed with caution, and that the role of the banking authorities over the next years should be focused in fixing the flaws identified in the analysis and reflection over the challenges discussed throughout the study.