保險為具有持續性及高度社會性之經濟制度，且與國家經濟有密切關係，台灣壽險業近年來快速成長，社會大眾的資金也大舉流入保險公司，因而保險公司的經營穩定度不但影響消費大眾的權益，也影響台灣經濟的穩定性。 本研究以HHM實證模型，將這一些不容易讓人看得懂的財務數據，轉換為一種容易瞭解的經營穩定度評等，利用台灣壽險業89年至98年的財務業務資料，主要以89年至98年期間進行logistic迴歸分析，並再細分為89年至93年及94年至98年等2個子期間進行實證，發現影響台灣壽險業經營穩定度的一致性主要因素為公司規模、投資績效、營業淨利、保險槓桿等四個變數，而且都是正向影響。另89年至98年之10年期間logistic迴歸分析結果較2個子期間更為顯著，代表10年較長觀察期間所得到的結果，優於5年觀察期間的結果，且過去會顯著影響壽險公司經營穩定度的變數，在未來未必仍持續有顯著影響。 根據本文實證發現，建議主管機關未來於修正「人身保險業辦理資訊公開管理辦法」時，能於財務業務指標中納入投資績效、營業淨利、保險槓桿等3項財務性指標，並考慮要求壽險業將辦理財務再保險的相關資訊及對財務報表的影響予以公開揭露，以利消費大眾瞭解壽險公司真實的財務狀況。 / Taiwan’s life insurance industry has experienced a rapid growth and numerous premiums flowed into life insurance companies during recent years. Therefore, the operating stability of life insurance companies affects not only the interests of policyholders but also the economic stability of Taiwan. For a better understanding of financial reports to general public, this study adopts HHM model to transfer financial data of life insurance companies to a rating regarding operating stability. The empirical financial data of Taiwan’s life insurance industry are mainly from 2000 to 2009 and we arrange a whole period as well as two sub-periods for logistic regression analysis. We find that, the factors that significantly and positively affect Taiwan life insurers’ operating stability are firm size, investment performance, operating margin and insurance leverage. With respect to logistic regression analysis, we also find that, the results of a whole period are more significant than those of two sub-periods. According to our empirical findings and toward a fully disclose to general public, we suggest that the competent authority bring investment performance, operating margin and insurance leverage into financial ratios, and ask life insurance companies disclose their transaction information and financial impact of any financial reinsurance by amending the “Regulations Governing Public Disclosure of Information by Life Insurance Enterprises”.

This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.<p> The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.<p> The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e., just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.<p> The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.<p> The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.

This dissertation deals with firms’ visual and pre-visual self-representations in accounting narratives. Self-representations are those descriptions about the company that firms include in accounting narratives to convey the current standings and their identity. External stakeholders increasingly expect non-numerical information about firms to be disclosed, and accounting narratives are a key medium for firms to account for their activities and maintain legitimacy as social actors. The question of which reporting conventions exist for legitimating selfrepresentations, especially from a visual perspective, remains unexplored. The purpose of this study is therefore to explore the empirical phenomenon of self-representations in accounting narratives in relation to legitimation rhetoric. The study is based on three research papers dealing with different patterns of self-representations in accounting-related narratives, including corporate reporting and business model diagrams. The examples are viewed through the theoretical lenses of semiotics and institutional theory, particularly legitimation theory. The study combines visual methods (visual content analysis and visual taxonomy) with other methods (interviews, text analysis) to conceptualize and exemplify what is meant by self-representations in accounting narratives. The study finds that there may be multiple parallel pre-visual self-representations at play to influence representations of the self, that visual self-representations are becoming more common in accounting narratives, and that several rhetorical strategies for legitimation are observable in these representations. By showing how diagrams can serve a legitimating purpose in accounting narratives, it is argued that diagrams should be considered on par with graphs and photographs as visual rhetorical devices in accounting narratives, and that they could be used as key communicative elements in the accounting process. Second, based on the longitudinal and comparative examples of self-representations, it is suggested that self-representations increasingly refer to abstract rather than concrete referents. This change is discussed in terms of the increasingly digital and service-based knowledge economy, where material referents give way to “amaterial” values. The contribution of this study is to describe selfrepresentations through several empirical examples, and to thereby increase awareness among practitioners and researchers of how visuals serve as communicative resources with legitimating functions in accounting narratives. Four concepts are proposed as tools for explaining the observed developments, and for improving visual literacy with regard to accounting narratives: inclusive perspective on accounting narratives, amateriality, self-representation, and diagrams. / Denna licentiatavhandling handlar om företags visuella och ”för-visuella” själv-representationer i kontexten redovisning. Till självrepresentationer hör de beskrivningar som företaget inkluderar i sin externt rapporterade information för att förmedla dess ställning och identitet. Externa intressenter förväntar sig i ökande utsträckning att även icke-numerisk information redovisas av företaget, vilket gör denna typ av externt rapporterade information viktig för att redovisa aktiviteter och för företag att därigenom bibehålla legitimitet som sociala aktörer. Frågan om vilka rapporteringskonventioner som finns kring företags självrepresentationer är i dagsläget inte utforskad. Syftet med denna studie är därför att undersöka det empiriska fenomenet självrepresentationer i kontexten redovisning kopplat till perspektivet legitimeringsretorik. Studien baserar sig på tre forskningsartiklar som behandlar olika empiriska exempel och mönster av självrepresentationer, exempelvis affärsmodellsdiagram. Dessa betraktas utifrån de teoretiska linserna semiotik och institutionell teori, speciellt legitimeringsteori. Studien kombinerar visuella metoder (visuell innehållsanalys och visuell taxonomi) med andra metoder (intervjuer och textanalys) för att konceptualisera och exemplifiera vad som menas med självrepresentation i kontexten redovisning. Studien finner att det kan förekomma många parallella för-visuella självrepresentationer som påverkar företags självuppfattning, att visuella självrepresentationer blir alltmer vanliga i företags externt publicerade information, och att flera retoriska legitimeringsstrategier förekommer i det undersökta materialet. Genom att visa hur diagram används som kommunikationsresurs så argumenterar studien för att fortsatt forskning behövs för att undersöka hur diagram, likt mer utforskade visuella format såsom grafer och fotografier, bidrar till företags legitimeringsretorik i externt publicerad redovisningskommunikation, samt att diagram kan fungera som viktiga resurser för självrepresentation i företags redovisningsprocess. Dessutom föreslås, baserat på longitudinella och jämförande exempel, att självrepresentationer i ökande grad relaterar till abstrakta snarare än konkreta referenter. Denna förändring diskuteras i termer av en alltmer digital och tjänstebaserad kunskapsekonomi, där materiella referenter överges till förmån för ”amateriella” värden. Studiens bidrag är att beskriva själv-representationer genom flera empiriska exempel, och att därmed öka medvetenheten hos praktiker och forskare om hur visuella format kan tjäna legitimeringssyften i kontexten redovisning. Baserat på studiens analys och resonemang lyfts fyra begrepp fram för att förklara den observerade utvecklingen, samt för att bidra till att förbättra praktikers såväl som forskares ”visuella läskunnighet”: ett inkluderande perspektiv på externt publicerad information, amaterialitet, självrepresentation, och diagram.

This thesis consists of four independent chapters on bank capital regulation and the issue of unsolicited ratings.<p><p>The first chapter is introductory and reviews the motivation for regulating banks and credit rating agencies while providing a detailed overview of the thesis.<p><p>The second chapter uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze how banks from six G10 countries adjusted their capital to assets ratios and risk-weighted assets to assets ratio between 1988 and 1995, i.e. just after passage of the 1988 Basel Accord. The results suggest that regulatory pressure brought about by the 1988 capital standards had little effect on both ratios for weakly capitalized banks, except in the US. In addition, the relation between the capital to assets ratios and the risk-weighted assets to assets ratio appears to depend not only on the level of capitalization of banks, but also on the countries or groups of countries considered.<p><p>The third chapter provides Monte Carlo estimates of the amount of regulatory capital that EMU banks must hold for their corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures both under Basel I and the standardized approach to credit risk in Basel II. In the latter case, Monte Carlo estimates are presented for different combinations of external credit assessment institutions (ECAIs) that banks may choose to risk weight their exposures. Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, although the use of different ECAIs leads to significant differences in minimum capital requirements, these differences never exceed, on average, 10% of EMU banks’ capital requirements for corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures. Second, the standardized approach to credit risk provides a small regulatory capital incentive for banks to use several ECAIs to risk weight their exposures. Third, the minimum capital requirements for the corporate, bank, and sovereign exposures of EMU banks will be higher in Basel II than in Basel I. I also show that the incentive for banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage in the standardized approach to credit risk is limited.<p><p>The fourth and final chapter analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings, I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.<p> / Doctorat en sciences économiques, Orientation économie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished