203 12 Dissertation Summary Dissertation title: Democracy in the Lack of Interest: the Effects of Remote Internet Voting Implementation in the Electoral Process of Selected Countries Name and Surname: Karel Sál Field of Study: Political Science Place of Work: Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague Dissertation Supervisor: PhDr. Petr Jüptner, Ph.D. No. of Pages: 203 No. of Appendixes: 30 Year of Defense: 2016 Keywords: internet voting; remote internet voting; electoral turnout; crisis of democracy; theory of participation; rational choice theory; Estonia; Switzerland; France; Norway; Spain. Abstract: The dissertation thesis named Democracy in the Lack of Interest: the Effects of Remote Internet Voting Implementation in the Electoral Process of Selected States reflects the phenomenon of the last decade - incorporation of new media into the political process. Internet voting is one of the discussed and suggested solutions of the so-called crisis of democracy, which could possibly stop the negative trend of diminishing voter turnout in advanced western democracies. The entire academic debate can be summarized into one question: It is possible, that the way of ballot casting can affect the voter turnout in that scale, that we can recognize a significant-positive...

.:1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Fairness norms can explain the emergence of specific cooperation norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1 Solving the cooperation problem in repeated interactions . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2 Solving the “coordinate to cooperate” problem in repeated interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 .1 The coordination problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.2 .2 Feasible norms in the Battle of the Prisoners Dilemma . . . . . . 12 2.3 Hypothesis on the emergence of cooperation norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.4 Fairness norms as a predictor for the emergence of different cooperation norms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2.5 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.5 .1 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 .2 Phase 1: Social dilemma game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.5 .3 Phase 2: Social value orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 .1 Patterns of cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.6 .2 Which cooperation norms emerge in the PD and in the BOPD? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.6 .3 Which cooperation norms emerge under the shadow of the future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.6 .4 Which cooperation norms emerge under asymmetric pay-offs? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.6 .5 Fairness norms can explain the emerging cooperation norms 27 2.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 A sociological perspective on measuring social norms by means of strategy method experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.1 Towards methodological integration of economics and sociology . . 34 3.2 Measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus of social norms 35 3.3 An introduction to the strategy method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .1 Operationalization of conditionality, intensity, and consensus with the ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .2 Design of the strategy game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.4 .3 Design of the response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.4 .4 Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.4 .5 Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.5 Empirical demonstration of measuring conditionality, intensity and consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3.6 The differences between measuring normative principles and their intensity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 .1 Derivation of hypotheses about differences between strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 3.6 .2 Analysis of offers in strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . 48 3.6 .3 Analysis of acceptance decisions in strategy and response game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 How norms can generate conflict: An experiment on the failure of cooperative micro-motives on the macro-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.1 A perspective of normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 4.2 Bargaining norms as an exemplification of normative conflict . . . . . 58 4.2 .1 Conditional and unconditional bargaining norms . . . . . . . . . . 58 4.2 .2 Normative conflict over commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 4.2 .3 Normative conflict over contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.3 Derivation of hypotheses on normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3 .1 A general model of normative behavior and its application to the ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 4.3 .2 Application of the model to study normative conflict . . . . . . . 65 4.3 .3 Hypotheses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4.4 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .1 The ultimatum game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .2 The real effort task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 4.4 .3 The strategy vector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 4.4 .4 Discussion of the strategy vector method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 4.4 .5 Procedure and participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.5 Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 4.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4.6 .1 Macro-level conditions for normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4.6 .2 The micro-level roots of normative conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4.6 .3 Aggregation of norm adherence on the micro-level to normative conflict on the macro-level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 5 The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions . . . . . . 86 5.1 A conflict theory of norm emergence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 5.2 Application on distributive justice and definition of fairness norms 91 5.3 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .1 Procedure and participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 5.3 .3 The real effort task . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.3 .4 The bargaining game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 5.3 .5 Treatments and measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 5.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.4 .1 The bargaining process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5.4 .2 Consequences of normative conflict: Costly delays . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.4 .3 Macro emergence of norms (mixture model) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 5.5 Discussion and open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 A Proofs and instructions for chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.1 Proof of lemma 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 1.2 Proof of lemma 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 1.3 Instructions chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 B Complete strategy profiles and instructions for chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 Instructions chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 .1 Instructions for the strategy method game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 2.1 .2 Instructions for the response method game, proposer . . . . . . . 125 2.1 .3 Instructions for the response method game, responder . . . . . . 126 C Classification algorithm for fairness types in chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.1 Proof of proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 3.2 Proof of proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 3.3 Classification algorithm for fairness types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 D Instructions chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

The purpose of this essay is to explain Chinas growing presence in Africa through a case study regarding the relationship with South Africa and highlight the specific features of this Chinese presence. In order to achieve the essays goal two theoretical perspectives will be applied to examine the data. These two theoretical perspective is the theory of imperialism defined by Johan Galtung and Rational Choice theory defined by Vivien Lowndes, et al. Through a textual analysis of the sources used, the essay has found that Chinese finance projects in Africa that are commercially viable and mutually beneficial for the African countries still somehow have an negative impact on the African countries development. The textual analysis also account for the motives and reasons behind Chinese presence on the continent as lack of resources as the main reason for China and the lack of a developed society for the African countries. The essay examine as well the consequence with the Chineses expansion on the continent for the African sovereignty and their development in the future.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T19:20:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Anoar Jarbas Provenzi.pdf: 1155462 bytes, checksum: 48318e7c0a982942ec4541880001698e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This study is about the secularization according to Peter L. Berger (theory of secularization) and according to Rodney Stark/William Sims Bainbridge (rational choice theory). Berger (chapter 1) affirms in Sacred Canopy the decrease of religion in modernity, whereas Stark/Bainbridge (chapter 2) supports in A theory of religion its increasing or maintenance. However, both theories have problems (chapter 3). Berger is criticized to affirm the equivalence between modernity and secularization, the belief in a previous age of the faith and the necessity of religious monopoly; Stark/Bainbridge are criticized to defend previous power of rational choice theory, a decontextualized universal rationality and an merely economic approach of religious phenomenon / Este estudo é sobre a secularização segundo Peter L. Berger (teoria da secularização) e segundo Rodney Stark/William Sims Bainbridge (teoria da escolha racional). Berger (capítulo 1) afirma, na obra O dossel sagrado, a diminuição da religião na modernidade, enquanto Stark/Bainbridge (capítulo 2) defendem, na obra Uma teoria da religião, seu aumento ou manutenção. Mas ambas as teorias apresentam problemas (capítulo 3); Berger é criticado porque afirma a equivalência entre modernidade e secularização, a crença em uma pregressa idade da fé e a necessidade de monopólio religioso; Stark/Bainbridge são criticados porque defendem o poder preditivo da teoria da escolha racional, uma racionalidade universal descontextualizada e uma abordagem puramente econômica do fenômeno religioso

This study examined the lobbying of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) by South African companies. The aim of this study was to establish the timing and methods of lobbying of the IASB by South African companies. Central to this study was the seminal work of Sutton (1984), predicting when and how companies lobby an accounting standard-setter. The research hypotheses for this study were formulated on the basis of Sutton’s (1984) predictions. The online questionnaire in this study was distributed to the top 100 JSE primary listed companies in order to collect primary data to test the four hypotheses regarding the timing, methods and perceived effectiveness of lobbying by South African companies. The findings of the empirical investigation indicated that most South African companies lobby later in the due process of the IASB and prefer using their auditors to support their views at the IASB. The findings are subject to certain limitations that are addressed in the study. Lastly, the researcher provided recommendations for future research in accounting standard-setting in South Africa. / Financial Accounting / M. Phil. (Accounting Sciences)

In Feldstudien konnte häufig mittels der Low–Cost Hypothese gezeigt werden, dass normatives Verhalten von den dafür aufzuwendenden Kosten abhängt. Doch hängt die Durchsetzung einer Norm ebenfalls von der Höhe der Kosten ab? Die Gültigkeit der Low – Cost Hypothese bei diesen kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung ist bislang im Feld wenig erforscht. In unserer Studie wird die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen anhand nachbarschaftlicher Kontrollen analysiert. Es werden Daten einer postalischen Befragung von 631 Personen in Leipzig aus dem Jahr 2001 ausgewertet: Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Befürwortung sozialer Kontrollen und der Bereitschaft, soziale Kontrollen tatsächlich an sich zu erdulden, wird mit steigenden Kosten der zu erduldenden Kontrollhandlungen schwächer. Zudem lässt sich die Logik der Low – Cost Hypothese auf andere soziologische Konstrukte übertragen: Die Wirkung von Kriminalitätsfurcht und Autoritarismus ist umso weniger handlungsrelevant, je höher die Kosten der zu erduldenden Kontrollhandlungen sind. Diese Befunde demonstrieren die Gültigkeit der Low–Cost Hypothese im Zusammenhang mit kollektiven Gütern zweiter Ordnung.:Einleitung; Die Übertragung der Low – Cost Hypothese auf die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen; Datenbasis und Operationalisierung; Schlussfolgerung und Ausblick / In field studies, there is evidence that the occurrence of normative behaviour is dependent on its costs. This effect is known as the low cost hypothesis. However, is the enforcement of social norms as well dependent on its costs? So far, there has been little research on the validity of the low – cost hypothesis for so called second order collective goods. In our work, the enforcement of social norms is studied by means of analyzing social control in neighbourhoods. We use data of a mail survey conducted in 2001 in Leipzig, Germany, with 631 respondents: Correlations between approval of social control and willingness to tolerate social control personally decrease with increasing costs to tolerate these control activities. Additionally, the logic of low – cost is transferable to other sociological constructs: The effect of fear of crime and authoritarianism is the less relevant for tolerating social control activities, the higher the costs for these control activities. These empirical findings confirm the low cost hypothesis for the production of second order collective goods.:Einleitung; Die Übertragung der Low – Cost Hypothese auf die Durchsetzung sozialer Normen; Datenbasis und Operationalisierung; Schlussfolgerung und Ausblick

The present study examines General Deterrence Theory (GDT) and its "parent," Rational Choice Theory (RCT), in an information security setting, assessing the behavioral intent to violate organizational policy under varying levels of certainty, severity and celerity of negative sanction. Also assessed is the individual computer user's time orientation, as measured by the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) instrument (Strathman et. al, 1994). How does rational consideration of violation rewards influence the impact of sanctions on individuals? How does time orientation impact intent to violate security policy? How do these operate in an IS context? These questions are examined by assessing the responses of university students (N = 443) to experimental manipulations of sanctions and rewards. Answering vignettes with the factorial survey method, intent to violate is assessed in a setting of Internet piracy of electronic textbooks while being monitored by computer security systems. Findings show that, although traditional GDT variables and reward impact intent to violate, CFC does not cause the hypothesized moderating effect on these variables. However, post-hoc analysis reveals a direct effect of time orientation on behavioral intent, as well as a weak moderating effect opposite of the hypotheses, indicating increased time orientation positively moderates, rather than negatively moderates, the impact of reward on intent to violate. Implications for theory and practice, and future research directions, are discussed.

This study reviews Rational Choice theory and Informal Institutions theory and uses new data to explain the persistence and scale of Argentina's informal domestic work sector. The domestic work sector in Argentina represents a typical case in Latin America: almost entirely dominated by women and high informality levels. The sector has had legal recognition for over a decade, but most of the sector's workers work under precarious conditions without access to those stipulated rights. In line with the adoption of new feminist policies during the last decade in Argentina, recent governments have brought more attention to women working in the domestic sector. This study investigates the implementation of a current financial incentive called Registradas which aims to increase registration levels in the domestic work sector. The material was collected during 29 weeks in Buenos Aires through interviews, surveys with employers, and observational studies from a Facebook group with domestic workers. The findings suggest that the two theories complement each other. Employers and employees in the domestic work sector act rationally from self-interest. However, unwritten rules, expectations of others' behavior, and perceptions of domestic work as an occupation also influence both groups' perceptions of choice and cost evaluation. These unwritten rules restrict and disadvantage employees due to power imbalances, gender norms, lack of information about their labor rights, and poverty. Finally, the study found that the program Registradas has had little effect on the sector's informality rates. The RCT suggests that the low impact could be due to formal employment not being a costly beneficial choice for the employers and neither the employees. This conclusion, however, needs to be understood in a context where labor laws and social security are not systematically and effectively enforced. Weak formal institutions thus enable a competing informal institution of informal employment and, ultimately, costs and benefits of the available choices for employers and employees. / Este estudio revisa la teoría de la Elección Racional y la teoría de las InstitucionesInformales, y utiliza nuevos datos para explicar la persistencia y la escala del sector informaldel trabajo doméstico en Argentina. El sector del trabajo doméstico en Argentina representaun caso típico en América Latina: está dominado casi en su totalidad por mujeres y presentaaltos niveles de informalidad. Aunque el sector cuenta con reconocimiento legal desde hacemás de una década, la mayoría de las trabajadoras del sector laboran en condicionesprecarias, sin acceso a los derechos estipulados. En línea con la adopción de nuevaspolíticas feministas durante la última década en Argentina, los últimos gobiernos hanprestado más atención a las mujeres que trabajan en el sector doméstico. Este estudioinvestiga la implementación del incentivo económico actual llamado Programa Registradas,el cual tiene como objetivo aumentar la formalidad del sector doméstico. El material serecopiló durante 29 semanas en Buenos Aires, mediante entrevistas, encuestas aempleadores y estudios observacionales de un grupo de Facebook con trabajadorasdomésticas. Los resultados sugieren que las dos teorías se complementan. Tanto losempleadores como los empleados del sector doméstico actúan racionalmente en función desus propios intereses. Sin embargo, las reglas no escritas, las expectativas sobre elcomportamiento de los demás y la percepción del trabajo doméstico como una ocupacióntambién influyen en la percepción de la elección y la evaluación de costos de ambos grupos.Estas reglas no escritas restringen y perjudican a las empleadas debido a los desequilibriosde poder, las normas de género, la falta de información sobre sus derechos laborales y lapobreza. Finalmente, el estudio encontró que, hasta la fecha, el Programa Registradas noha tenido ningún efecto significativo en la reducción de la tasa de informalidad del sector. Lateoría de la Elección Racional sugiere que el bajo impacto podría deberse a que el empleoformal no es una opción costosa ni beneficiosa ni para los empleadores ni para losempleados. Sin embargo, esta conclusión debe entenderse en un contexto en el que lalegislación laboral y la obra social no se aplican de forma sistemática y eficaz. La debilidadde las instituciones formales permite, por tanto, una institución informal competidora delempleo informal y, en última instancia, influye en los costos y beneficios de las opcionesdisponibles para empresarios y trabajadores.