This study investigates the impact of bounded rationality on information security decisions in public Swedish authorities. The research addresses how cognitive limitations and organizational dynamics shape decisions in this area. Utilizing qualitative research methods, in-depth interviews and document analysis, the study provides nuanced insights into decision-making processes. A thematic analysis identifies six recurring themes influencing decision-making: Awareness & Knowledge, Individual Characteristics, Organizational Culture & Behavioral Patterns, Organization & Execution, Regulatory Frameworks & Management, Responsibility & Obligation.  The findings reveal significant influences and barriers in implementing effective security strategies, making a theoretical contribution to information security management in public sectors. This research highlights the importance of understanding human behavior in information security, offering insights to shape strategic directions for policy and practical implementation to enhance organizational and national cybersecurity resilience.

The topic of this study is one specific area where the tension between instrumental rationality and value rationality becomes prominent: the question whether we have a rational responsibility for nature or not. Such a responsibility cannot be derived from instrumental reason, but it is argued that it can be derived from discourse ethics and communicative rationality. The study begins with an examination of Georg-Henrik von Wright's cultural criticism. It is argued that his subjectivist view of values limits reason to the realm of instrumental rationality. Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of instrumental reason is examined. They claim that instrumental reason, through the negative dialectics of the enlightenment, have created a vacuum with regard to values. Marcuse's anthropological solution to the problem of values, and his theory of an emancipatory science and technology, are examined and rejected as Utopian. The philosophy of Jürgen Habermas is examined, and it is shown how he solves the problem of his predecessors through the dual framework of work and interaction. His hypothesis of three knowledge- constitutive interests is analyzed, and it is concluded that a general theory of communication is needed in order to solve the problem of value rationality. It is shown how Habermas later theory of communicative rationality and discourse ethics overcomes the shortcomings of his earlier theory. It is argued, among other things, that his theory of communicative rationality is compatible with a correspondence theory of truth, ontological realism and epistemological fallibilism. Discourse ethics makes a rational discussion of values and norms possible. It is argued that it solves the problem of value rationality, but without providing a definition of the good or the right. It is shown that revisabilty is an important part of discourse ethics. This is manifested in the hypothetical status of discourse ethics, and in the revisability of the norms proposed. It is argued that we are in fact able to rationally propose a norm, which demands responsibility for nature within the framework of communicative rationality and discourse ethics, although such a norm must be the result of the outcome of a rational discourse and is itself, revisable. / digitalisering@umu

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In this thesis my aims are twofold. First, I provide an auto-history of the concept of reason in Anglophone IR from 1919 to 2009. I uncover the centrality of the language of reason. I show that the concept of reason has constituted, undergirded, and empowered many prominent IR scholars’ discourses. Second, I bring out a taxonomy of four construal of rationality. I argue that IR thinkers have spoken in four languages of reason. Kantian reason stands in a relation opposed to passion, emotion and instinct, and makes the stipulation that to base actions on the intellect is prerequisite for pursuing interest and moral conduct. I argue that the British Liberal Institutionalists, Has Morgenthau, Richard Ashley and Andrew Linklater are bearers of this construal. Utilitarian reason refers to the maximization of interests under constraints, where interest can be defined as strategic preference, emotional attachment, or cultural value and constraints as a two-person game, uncertainty or risk. I demonstrate how Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Glenn Snyder, Robert Keohane, Robert Gilpin, Helen Milner, Andrew Moravcsik and many other theorists use the concept. Axiological reason means following rules, cultures and norms, and always uses game as an analytical foundation and attends to the problem of how to enforce rules. I argue that Kenneth Waltz, Nicholas Onuf, Friedrich Kratochwil and K.M. Fierke have deployed the concept to construct their theories. Historical reason views all values as conditioned within a specific spatial-temporal background, and insists that moral problems, which are constituted in the margin of every political conduct, must be solved by overcoming universal morality and the unilateral pursuit of interest. I show that Raymond Aron, Martin Wight, David Boucher and Christian Reus-Smit have conceived of reason in this way.

This article considers three standard asset pricing models with adaptive agents and stochastic dividends. The models only differ in the parameters to be estimated. We assume that only limited information is used to construct estimators. Therefore, parameters are not estimated consistently. More precisely, we assume that the parameters are estimated by exponential smoothing, where past parameters are down-weighted and the weight of recent observations does not decrease with time. This situation is familiar for applications in finance. Even if time series of volatile stocks or bonds are available for a long time, only recent data is used in the analysis. In this situation the prices do not converge and remain a random variable. This raises the question how to describe equilibrium behavior with stochastic prices. However, prices can reveal properties such as ergodicity, such that the law of the price process converges to a stationary law, which provides a natural and useful extension of the idea of equilibrium behavior of an economic system for a stochastic setup. It is this implied law of the price process that we investigate in this paper. We provide conditions for the ergodicity and analyze the stationary distribution. (author's abstract) / Series: Working Papers SFB "Adaptive Information Systems and Modelling in Economics and Management Science"

In my dissertation, I argue that rationality, for real humans, is best understood as a strategy for communication and interacting in a social environment. In particular, I argue that humans are rational to the extent that they are able to understand and be understood by others, to the extent that they can give and accept reasons and explanations. This raises a pair of questions. The first concerns the source of the norms for giving and accepting reasons. The second is why we should accept and follow these norms if they are not guaranteed to preserve truth or optimize outcomes. I address the first question by arguing that these norms function as constraints on our imaginations, on the ways in which we can think about or understand the world. This goes beyond the traditional view that these norms govern acceptable inferences. Rather, I argue, the more significant function of these norms is to govern the structure of our reasoning in the sense of guiding considerations about the relevance and form of our understandings of situations. This suggests an answer to the second question. We ought to accept these norms because they are self-confirming. Following them allows us to communicate and interact with others who follow these same norms. In those endeavors that require interaction and coordination in a social group, being understood is frequently more important than being right. / text

In many important economic situations, decision makers influence each other. The subject of game theory offers a mathematical framework to describe such strategic interaction. This dissertation focuses largely on helping to answering the question,"What will someone do in a particular strategic situation?" In order to do this, it is useful to interweave theory with experimentation. After all, observation of what people really do is a necessity when attempting to create models of what people really do. At the same time, theory can help significantly when formulating interesting hypotheses to test. The chapters in my dissertation illustrate this interweaving of theory and experiments.

Le résumé en français n'a pas été communiqué par l'auteur. / This paper studies firms’ disclosure decisions of product information in a duopoly setting, as well as the welfare implication of compulsory disclosure policy. I show that there is a problem of externality between the two firms: even if disclosure weakens price competition in the market and increases total industry profits, a firm could have incentive not to disclose product information because it decreases his market share. As a result, regulatory policy could increase total industry profits as it could rectify the problem of externality. Therefore, despite more information allows consumers to make a better choice between different alternatives, it might backfire as it could increase the average price in the market. I also present simple conditions on when providing more information could harm consumers, and when it will improve consumer welfare. This paper studies the information processing behavior of a decision maker (DM) who has limited information processing ability. More specifically, the DM can process only a subset of all available information. Before taking an action, he chooses whether to process or ignore signals about the state of the world which he receives sequentially. I show that at the optimum, the DM processes only signals which are strong enough, but will process a weaker signal if it confirms his existing strong belief or if it supports a much more desirable state of the world. This explains some phenomena which have been well documented in the psychology literature, such as preference for strong signals, confirmation bias for individuals with strong prior and wishful thinking. Moreover, I analyze how the Internet, and in general changes in information structures, affects the processing behavior of the DM. The results shed light on different issues in the information era, including polarization and media strategy. This paper studies experimentally whether confirmation bias arises when individuals are exposed to information overload, or equivalently have limited ability to perfectly update their belief with all available information. In our experiment, subjects have to form beliefs as they navigate a sequence of signals within a limited period of time. We compare belief formation under two settings, where the treatment setting imposes a larger information/cognitive load than the control setting. We find that subjects in the treatment setting exhibit a stronger confirmation bias than those in the control setting. Upon receiving a belief-challenging signal, subjects in the treatment group update their belief less than those in the control group. In contrast, upon receiving a belief-confirming signal, subjects update similarly in both settings. As a result, subjects in the treatment setting are also less likely to switch sides: once they believe that one state is more probable than another, they are less likely to switch even if they receive enough belief-challenging signals. Not only do these results show that the limited ability of information processing plays a role in the formation of confirmation bias, they also improve our understanding on the impact of information overload, for example on polarization.

This essay analyses the extent to which individuals who bought Triss in Värnamo at Hemköp are rational in their decision to buy Triss. The expected value was found to be lower than the price of the Triss ticket. The results from the experiment suggests the individuals act irrationally as they did not accept to exchange their Triss for another Triss and an additional Mini Triss. The data from the observation suggests that individuals with a winning Triss tend to exchange it for a new Triss when the amount won is relatively small. When the amount won was relatively larger, the more likely the individuals were to claim the money. When a jackpot Triss was sold in the store, there was no significant increase of sales of Triss in the store, hence the individuals in the store did act rational in the sense they did not buy more or less Triss because of the jackpot was sold in the store. The results found in this paper suggest that individuals who buy Triss acts with a bounded rationality since their decision of buying Triss are driven by emotions, poor understanding of probabilities and risk under uncertainties.

Os Devedores Anônimos são um grupo de ajuda-mútua reunindo indivíduos que se consideram compradores e/ou endividados compulsivos. A partir de pesquisa de campo realizada nos encontros do grupo e de entrevistas aprofundadas com seus membros, são analisadas tanto as condutas econômicas desses agentes antes da entrada no DA, quanto os efeitos que a permanência no grupo tende a engendrar em seu comportamento. Identificando os mecanismos presentes em certas experiências problemáticas no interior da ordem econômica especialmente no que se refere a compras e tomadas de empréstimos vistas pelos próprios implicados como injustificadas, impensadas ou irracionais , este trabalho mostra também como, funcionando à maneira de um dispositivo de racionalização, o grupo incide sobre as condutas econômicas de seus usuários de modo a torná-las mais ajustadas a certas exigências da ordem econômica atual. Isso por meio de mecanismos particulares, que atuam seja incitando a reflexividade e dirigindo a atenção desses agentes para aspectos antes despercebidos das ações econômicas cotidianas (produzindo, assim, um investimento renovado em tais operações), seja suscitando implicitamente dinâmicas afetivas que tendem a conduzi-los na direção de uma maior racionalidade econômica. Demonstra-se, desse modo, não só como certas experiências emocionais contribuem para a realização de ações econômicas que, depois, podem ser motivo de arrependimento, mas também como esse tipo de racionalidade e seu ideal, o modelo do homo oeconomicus não se opõe às emoções, às paixões, mas depende, para sua própria efetivação, de dinâmicas afetivas peculiares. / Debtors Anonymous is a twelve-step, self-help group formed by individuals who consider themselves compulsive buyers and/or compulsive debtors. Based on field research conducted at the encounters of the group and on interviews with its members, it is analyzed the economic behavior of these agents before their entrance in DA and the effects that the permanence in the group tend to cause in their behavior. Along with the identification of the mechanisms present on certain problematic experiences in the midst of the economic order especially buying and credit practices seen by the individuals themselves as unjustified, unthought-of or irrational , this work also shows that, functioning as a rationalization dispositive, the group acts upon the economic behavior of its users in a way that leads them to become more adjusted to certain exigencies of the current economic order. The group does that through particular mechanisms, some of which can incite reflexivity and drive these agents attention to aspects of the everyday economic actions that they werent used to perceive (thus producing a renewed investment on such operations), or others that implicitly generate affective dynamics which tend to conduce these agents in the direction of a greater economic rationality. It is thus demonstrated not only how certain emotional experiences contribute to the realization of buying and credit practices which can later be regretted, but also how that type of rationality and its ideal, the homo oeconomicus model is not opposed to emotions and passions, but depends for its own sake of peculiar affective dynamics.