De toutes les manifestations du réchauffement climatique planétaire, une des plus évidentes est sans aucun doute la fonte de la calotte polaire arctique. À mesure que les glaces pluriannuelles de l’Arctique disparaissent, la dernière frontière géostratégique de la Terre émerge. L’ouverture du mythique passage du Nord-Ouest laisse alors présager l’accès aux ressources naturelles dont regorge l’Arctique et ramène à la vie le fantasme des explorateurs des derniers siècles de raccourcir par plusieurs milliers de kilomètres le passage maritime entre l’Asie et l’Europe. Depuis quelques années, ce scénario a ravivé le débat sur l’Arctique et les questions de souveraineté qui l’entourent, un sujet sensible pour le Canada, notamment en raison de ses significations identitaires. Le théâtre arctique est donc la scène de plusieurs revendications territoriales, mais également de nombreuses spéculations sur la manière dont celles-ci se régleront. Conséquemment, les discours politiques des représentants du gouvernement canadien ont été nombreux dans les dernières années à affirmer haut et fort la vision souveraine du Canada sur sa portion de l’Arctique. Le projet de recherche qui suit vise à étudier le rôle que ces discours jouent dans la construction sociale de la souveraineté du Canada en Arctique. / Of all the manifestations of global warming, one of the most obvious is undoubtedly the melting of the Arctic polar icecap. As the multi-year ices of the Arctic disappear, the last geostrategic frontier of the Earth emerges. The opening of the mythical Northwest Passage foreshadows access to the natural resources which abound in the Arctic, and resuscitates the unrealised desires of past centuries’ explorers to shorten by several thousand miles the sea passage between Asia and Europe. In recent years, this scenario has reignited the debate over the Arctic, as well as issues of sovereignty surrounding it, a sensitive topic for Canada, particularly because of the Arctic’s role in its meanings of identity. The Arctic theatre is therefore the scene of various territorial claims, but also of several speculations as to how they will be settled. As a result, political discourses of Canadian government officials have been numerous in recent years to affirm loud and clear the sovereign vision of Canada on its portion of the Arctic. The following research aims to study the role played by these discourses in the social construction of Canada’s sovereignty in the Arctic. / De todas las manifestaciones del calentamiento global, una de las más obvias es el derretimiento del Ártico. A medida que los hielos plurianuales del Ártico desaparecen, surge la última frontera geoestratégica de le Tierra. El mítico paso del Noroeste hace posible el acceso a los recursos naturales que abundan en el Ártico, y vuelve realidad el sueño de los exploradores de siglos pasados de reducir miles de kilómetros de pasaje marítimo entre Asia y Europa. En los últimos años, este escenario ha intensificado el debate acerca del Ártico y las cuestiones de soberanía que lo rodean, un tema sensible para Canadá, especialmente por el significado identitario. El teatro ártico es entonces el escenario de varias reivindicaciones territoriales, pero también de muchas especulaciones sobre la manera en que éstas serán resueltas. Como consecuencia, en los últimos años han habido diversos discursos políticos por parte de los representantes del gobierno canadiense para reafirmar de manera clara su soberanía en el Ártico. Este proyecto de investigación tiene como objetivo estudiar el papel que éste discurso de soberanía desempeña en la construcción social de la soberanía de Canadá en el Ártico.

"Thèse en cotutelle : Université Laval, Québec, Canada, Philosophiæ doctor (Ph. D.) et Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille, France" / Ravagée par la guerre et occupée pendant plusieurs années, la France a été le théâtre de changements majeurs dans la manière dont ses dirigeants ont appréhendé son avenir au sein du Concert des Nations. Ces derniers étaient conscients de l’importance qu’a eue l’empire entre 1940 et 1945 et le rôle central qu’il avait pour le rétablissement de la légitimité du pays en tant que Puissance mondiale. Dans le domaine économique, les colonies étaient conçues comme un apport essentiel au relèvement de la France et pour sa prospérité. Les décideurs français ont ainsi consolidé les liens entre la métropole française et ses colonies pour fonder une politique impériale sur les principes du républicanisme selon lesquels la République était « une et indivisible ». Les hommes politiques français ont raffermi l’emprise de la France sur leurs territoires d’outre-mer par la création de l’Union française et ont donné un second souffle à la constitution d’un État-Empire, un projet entamé dans les années 1930. La dernière phase d’expansion de l’empire du dix-neuvième siècle faisait place alors depuis les années 1920 et 1930 à une logique de développement et de mise en branle des projets coloniaux de manière à créer un empire qui pouvait constituer un ensemble cohérent. La poursuite de cette logique du mythe colonial français après 1945 a eu pour effet de modifier l’identité de la France en tant qu’acteur du système international. La France n’était plus perçue par ses agents sub-étatiques comme un simple État possédant des colonies, mais bien comme une nouvelle entité dans laquelle ses excroissances dans l’outre-mer faisaient dorénavant partie intégrante de l’État et contribuaient à forger un avenir, qui était dès lors inextricablement partagé. Le bien-fondé de la mission civilisatrice de la France se traduisait dans cette période par un sentiment de devoir envers les territoires d’outre-mer ; le devoir de les amener au développement économique moderne et à un stade civilisationnel supérieur. Ces mêmes convictions ont conduit les gouvernements français à envisager une autre issue à cette relation que celle de l’indépendance totale, encouragée par les mouvements de décolonisation. Cette nouvelle identité a des effets tangibles sur la conception et l’engagement des décideurs et les haut-fonctionnaires français dans les projets destinés à rapprocher les économies européennes et dans la poursuite de l’intégration européenne. Dans le cas de la CECA, puisque cette institution sectorielle avait peu d’impacts sur la production d’outre-mer, on envisageait les bénéfices à une association entre les continents européen et africain comme marginaux. Cependant, le facteur colonial devenait de plus en plus influent dans les prises de décisions effectuées par les haut-fonctionnaires et analystes français du ministère des Affaires étrangères. Il a d’ailleurs constitué l’un des points d’achoppement dans les négociations de la mise en place d’une armée européenne, car l’article 38 du Traité instituant la CED ne prévoyait pas de mesures permettant à la France de conserver les moyens de poursuivre ses opérations de pacification dans l’empire ainsi que la guerre d’Indochine. C’est en ce sens qu’après l’échec de la CED le gouvernement français sous le leadership d’Edgar Faure a entrepris de mener des réformes de manière à trouver une solution durable au dilemme de la vocation européenne ou mondiale de la France. Des réformes politiques et économiques majeures étaient envisagées afin de transformer l’Union française en une association fédérale franco-africaine librement consentie. L’ensemble français ne pouvait donc plus être intégré partiellement à des initiatives européennes, car cela contreviendrait aux principes républicains renforcés par les réformes. Dans le contexte de la « relance européenne », le gouvernement sous Guy Mollet proposait de lier le marché commun européen aux territoires d’outre-mer, ce qui aurait permis l’ouverture des marchés africains aux échanges européens. Intégrées dans cette Eurafrique, les colonies auraient ainsi vu les bénéfices de conserver le lien politique avec la France. Cette thèse analyse la manière dont la souveraineté était comprise et imaginée par les dirigeants français pendant la construction européenne et lors du remodelage de leurs liens avec les anciennes colonies. Sans nier la portée de la souveraineté dans le cadre de l’existence d’un État, elle fut appelée à être modifiée ; ses éléments constitutifs furent repensés au profit d’une forme étatique supranationale. L’étude de ce nouveau modèle des relations internationales sera étendue aux alternatives que les dirigeants français ont proposées aux colonies africaines. Ces derniers les poussaient à dépasser le stade du nationalisme pour adhérer à un modèle étatique jugé supérieur : un stade post-westphalien dans lequel leurs revendications indépendantistes seraient caduques. / Ravaged by years of occupation, France witnessed major changes in policymakers’ vision of the country’s future and of French interests and aims. They were aware of the importance of the empire during the war and the role it would play after the war in the restoration of France’s international legitimacy as a Great Power. Colonies were also conceived as an essential element of France’s revival and of its long-term prosperity. French decision-makers thus sought to strengthen links between the French metropole and its colonies in order to reassess its imperial identity, which was founded on republican principles. These politicians stiffened France’s hold on its overseas territories with the implementation of the Union française and gave a second wind to the achievement of a State-Empire. The nineteenth century expansionary phase of the French empire had given way to another phase of imperialism in which development and progress of the overseas territories were at its core. The continuation of the colonial myth had profoundly modified French identity as a key player of the international system. France was no longer seen by its sub-national agents as a simple State holding colonies, but as a new form of statehood; an entity in which its overseas territories was now a constituent part of it and contributed to forging new perspective for their shared future. This new identity had a significant influence on how interests within the international system and particularly in Europe were pursued, especially within the European integration projects. Decisions makers in the French Fourth Republic evaluated their potential gains and preferences, first of all, through the lens of an Imperial Power. In other words, France’s political and economic elite had first examined the inherent implications of the upholding of their pre-1940 empire on France’s economic and geo-strategic needs, in the shifting context of early Cold War. Pro-European projects were therefore analyzed and weighed in regard to their costs and benefits, in the light of a new grid. Decision makers were influenced by the bien-fondé of French colonialism, based on the sentiment that France had a duty towards overseas territories; a duty of guiding them towards progress and civilization. It is with those considerations in mind that the French governments envisaged another solution to the question of its relationship with its colonies than total independence. The French stance on the European federal project was thus influenced by the introduction of a new variable in the equation of early European integration: the facteur colonial. In the early European integration process, it was considered marginal because of the sectoral approach of the ECSC. Although, the imperial identity was more and more apparent in the interests and policies pursued by the French government during the EDC debate. The introduction of a European army did not ensure France either the possibility of pursuing its peacekeeping operations in the overseas territories or the Indochina War. After the defeat of the EDC project in the French parliament, the government under the leadership of Edgar Faure envisioned a new set of reforms (political, administrative, and economic), which would transform the Union française into a consensual Franco-African federal political association. From this perspective, the ensemble français could not anymore be introduced partially within the European projects promoted in the wake of the « European revival ». Under Guy Mollet’s government, a plan to establish supranational structures in their former colonies and in Europe was formulated so that free trade between the two continents could be established. With the economic benefits anticipated for the overseas territories, this Eurafrican project would have proved to African representatives that their interests lay in maintaining the political link between their territories and France. Accordingly, this thesis argues that French leaders questioned the international relations framework based on the nation-state as the central entity of the international system in order to conciliate their ambitions in Europe and as a State-Empire. These two projects – Franco- African association and European integration ̶ shared common characteristics and conceptual origins: supranationalism. French officials and policy-makers promoted a federal Eurafrican project to avoid the process of decolonization and create a political structure that would defuse difficult and pressing colonial issues. The former French colonies were asked to pass from the status of colonized territories to constituents of a supranational structure. The French decision makers pushed the overseas territories to transcend the stage of nationalism to reach an advanced statehood model: a post-Westphalian stage in which their demands for total independence would be obsolete. / Résumé en espagnol

Bien que les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aient pris place aux États-Unis, la réaction du gouvernement canadien a été de proposer la Loi C-36 (la Loi anti-terroriste), une loi qui apporte plusieurs changements au Code criminel canadien et modifie d'autres lois. L´adoption de cette loi s'est faite dans un temps record. Afin de mieux comprendre cette rapidité (du 11 septembre à sa sanction royale en 99 jours) et de mieux cerner la relation avec un événement survenu à l´étranger, ce mémoire cherche à expliquer les facteurs internes et externes qui ont influencé le moment choisi et le contenu de la loi. / Though the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, took place on foreign soil, the Canadian government reacted to this event by proposing Bill C-36 (the Anti-terrorism Act), an omnibus bill outlining multiple changes to the existing Canadian Criminal Code and other acts. With an aim to better understand this anomaly of Canadian public policy in both its record speed (from 9/11 to its Royal Assent in 99 days) and its relation to a foreign catastrophe, this thesis seeks to explore both the internal and external factors that influenced the timing and the content of Bill C-36.

Malgré le déclin subit par les idéologies impérialistes dans le Canada de l'après seconde guerre mondiale, l'Impérial Order Daughters of the Empire, association féminine bénévole canadienne à buts impérialistes et patriotiques, a réussi à survivre et à garder une importance relative dans la société canadienne de 1939 à 1972. En restant éveillé aux signes de l'évolution de la société canadienne, le groupe a réussi à adapter son discours, ses structures et son oeuvre aux changements que connaît un pays en constante redéfinition de son sentiment nationaliste. A travers quatre périodes distinctes, nous voulons démontrer le cheminement de ce groupe, qui l'amène à survire dans un milieu qui renie ses buts d'existence, mais aussi à connaître de profondes transformations. / Québec Université Laval, Bibliothèque 2013

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The EU’s notable transformation over the past five decades is obviously an event of modern state concepts. However, the EU’s matter of concern has placed too much emphasis on economic and trade issues, while its capability and power have achieved remarkable growth with far-reaching ramifications in both economic and political affairs. This also means that studies of the EU foreign policy have hardly reached North East Asia because of geographical limit between them, the EU’s weak institutional capacity and vestige of the Cold War. Therefore the EU and the Korean Peninsula did not have chance to build a critical relationship. This time could be defined as ‘standstill’ between Europe and the Korean Peninsula or ‘quiet diplomacy’. 1993 marked a turning-point in relations between the EU and the Korean Peninsula. Firstly, European countries have launched the Maastricht Treaty since they had signed in 1992. The Treaty implies the EU’s more strengthened international role in the political and economic area in accordance with its increased capability and reinforced power. Secondly, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT on 12 March 1993 and then the Korean Peninsula was compelled to face a political crisis. Since the EU took unofficial Humanitarian Aids for North Korea in 1994-1995, KEDO and the EU in 1997 agreed to the terms and conditions of the accession to KEDO of its nuclear regulatory body. This was the first challenge of the EU political engagement of the Korean Peninsula question. In the context, this research seeks to answer the question of “What are the EU priorities in its strategy for Korean Peninsula?” that includes broadly the EU’s regional strategy for North East Asia in line with its foreign policy agenda. To tell the conclusion, the EU’s intervention to North Korea was firstly encouraged in dimension of economic interests through vitalization of international trade after the Korean Peninsula would be reunified. The EU considered that Asian nuclear market is an important factor in order to build nuclear technical standard as well as to obtain commercial interests although the European nuclear firms did not obtain chance enough to construct for North Korea nuclear facilities construction. The EU’s political incentives for political change-seeking in North East Asia must also be considered. Actually, the EU diplomatically opened the door of Pyongyang and led the isolated regime to a channel that communicates with international community although the EU did not take a seat at Six-Party Talks to engage itself in the Korean Peninsula question. As a result, the EU could increase the image of a ‘peaceful mediator’ or an ‘honest blocker’ in the term of ‘reputation’ through engagement continued for the Korean Peninsula Crisis. The EU’s foreign policy has been partly successful in context that Europe succeeds in promoting its existence as a global actor. Therefore, its foreign policy would gradually be reinforced to bolster the EU’s credibility and influence in the Korean Peninsula. The EU’s role is surely reduced in the Korean Peninsula issues with the termination of the KEDO project. However, the EU’s role is expected to be performed in different ways under its confidence and capability. The EU’s next engagement depends on where its new incentives will be, and then its question will be how to realize them in accordance with its institutional conditions and actual capacity. / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

The EU’s Trade Relations with China (1975-2008): <p>A Linkage Power at Work?<p><p>(Summary)<p><p>The central aim of this thesis is to improve our understanding of the EU’s power, in particular in its external trade relations/negotiations. Our hypothesis is that the EU is a distinctive kind of linkage power, defined as an actor relying on linkage as a crucial modus operandi in its external relations. We explored how, to what extent and in which distinctive ways the EU is such a linkage power. <p>Our analysis was based on three logically interrelated concepts – power resources, linkage and linkage power. Linkage refers to a leveraging strategy, with an aim of packaging relevant power resources, so as to increase leverage in bargaining, or more generally attain a policy objective. I identified seven types of linkages that the EU used: political-economic issue linkage, economic-economic issue linkage, conditionality, contextual linkage, linkage with a third party, cognitive linkage and synergistic linkage. Linkage can hardly work without proper power resources. The latter, as Dahl (1970) defined, refers to all the resources-opportunities, acts, objects etc – that an actor can exploit in order to affect the behaviour of another. So, linkage is a bridge between power resources and impacts – meaning affecting or changing the behaviour of another party. By putting linkage and power together, we created a new term – “linkage power”, referring to a power based on linkages. The EU, the US, China or any other power can all be such labelled, though these actors may diverge in power resources, linkage strategies and the variables affecting linkage effectiveness. When applying such an analytical framework to the EU, we gave particular attention to the implications of the EU’s sui generis nature on its linkage power.<p>Our case study is the EU’s trade relations with China (1975-2008), which were punctuated by two critical historical junctures – the Tian’anmen Square Incident in 1989 and the EU-China Textile Crisis in 2005. In 1975, The EEC’s successful strategy by linking political issues (Europe-China balancing the Soviet Union and recognising China’s sovereignty over Taiwan) with economic issues (signing the EEC-China Trade Agreement) played a crucial role in securing the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EEC and China. Different types of linkages were then applied to the EEC’s negotiations with Beijing on the 1978 Trade Agreement and the 1979 textile agreement, which effectively prompted the Chinese side to agree to the EU’s terms.<p>Immediately after the 1989 Tian’anmen Square Incident, the EC imposed economic sanctions with an aim of coercing China to accept Western world’s human rights conditions. This linkage did not last long or pay off due to divergent political and economic interests among the Member States and the EC’s institutional handicaps (foreign policy competence was largely in the hands of Member States, collective foreign policy action was non-binding), and soon de-linked.<p>Having realised that confrontational approach did not work well, the EC/EU and its Member States started to change their China policies in 1993-95. The period of 1993-2004 witnessed the EC/EU’s power through partnership. The strategic partnership was seen as a complex of different pairs of issue linkages, ranging from political-strategic issues to economic and human rights issues. The partnership, once established, had fostered new linkages and consolidated old ones. China’s WTO accession was seen as a once-in-a-century opportunity for the EU to exercise linkage through conditionality, so as to extract market access concessions from the Chinese side. Moreover, by linking with China could the European Commission garnered international support for advancing the Galileo project within the Union and ward off some of the US pressure in 2003. <p>The Year 2005 was singled out since an unprecedented trade row on textiles broke out, confronting the EU against China’s export prowess resulting from globalisation and China’s WTO accession. Linkages were used as a predominant strategy to help the EU to persuade and press the Chinese side firstly accept voluntary export restrictions and then share the burden of allowing the blocked textiles in European ports to be released. In 2006-08, the trade deficit problem emerged, coupled with a series political spats between Europe (France and Germany) and Beijing on the Tibet issue. As the EU-China honeymoon was over, the Commission toughened its approach towards China. Although linkage was again used to redress the trade deficit, its effects were not satisfactory, as the EU power resources were eroded. <p>Our conclusions are (1) linkage is a crucial modus operandi in the EU’s internal bargain and its external relations with China; (2) Linkage was generally effective vis-à-vis China, but with variations, either over time or across different linkage types; (3) The EU is a sui generis linkage power, resulting from its institutional characteristics and heterogeneity of interests among the Commission and Member States. We find that the EU’s increased institutionalisation (both regional and bilateral) and competences generally facilitated its use of linkage strategies. The EU’s sui generis structure and its internal interest divergences have mixed implications on its linkage effectiveness. On one hand, the EU’s linkage power was weakened accordingly. But on the other, the Commission could tactically make use of some Member State government’s row with Beijing and advance its own economic agenda (such as the EU-China High-level Economic and Trade Dialogue, HED). Moreover, our research also confirmed Andrew Moravcsik’s argument that issue linkage is more easily made within an issue-area than across issue-areas. But we differ from him on the reason behind that. We find that this was largely attributable to the EU’s pillar structure and competence divisions. <p>The theoretical contributions include: (1) Linkage power provides a distinctive prism to look into the EU’s concrete strategies in internal bargains, and external commercial negotiations. Linkage serves as a crucial strategy for the EU to handle its relations with a far-abroad country like China, including establishing diplomatic relations, negotiating trade deals, forging strategic partnerships and holding high-level dialogue. (2) Giving some insights to the EU’s actorness. We find that the EU, though institutionally not a unitary actor, was somehow able to present its power to the extent like a sovereign state on some occasions using linkage strategies. (3) Contributing to the understanding of the EU’s means to spread its governance model. We find that the EU’s norm-setting goals have often been achieved through non-normative ways – such as interest exchange and trade-off, and other deliberate ways of persuasion and even coercion, mainly based on linkage. (4) Shedding light on the interactions between the Commission and the Member State governments and on the Commission’s autonomy in external trade relations. <p> Two future directions of research have been identified: (1) comparative studies: the EU’s linkage practices vis-à-vis the US, Russia and middle powers, or other actors’ linkage strategies vis-à-vis China; (2) post-Lisbon linkage strategies used by the EU. <p> / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Il s'agit d'étudier la tentative de la Turquie de se positionner comme une puissance sur les échiquiers eurasiens et caucasiens sous la présidence de Turgut Ozal / Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished