Ce mémoire est une étude du corpus kierkegaardien. Elle tente de saisir en quoi il déplace notre conception de la vérité ; et elle y montre comment ce corpus envisage le theologique dans sa dimension de communication littéraire. Cette étude se veut une interprétation de son discours, selon deux modalités énonciatives distinctes : la première étant une reprise de son projet de cours sur la communication, la seconde étant celle de la critique textuelle. Elle posera la question de la communication de la vérité comme une occasion de réfléchir la pratique théologique.

Zugl.: Franfurt am Main, Univ., Diss., 2006/07

Submitted by Maria Aparecida (cidazen@gmail.com) on 2017-04-18T12:38:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo Sousa.pdf: 1065037 bytes, checksum: ead7826a917d1286a816e1dda4f207ca (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-04-18T12:38:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo Sousa.pdf: 1065037 bytes, checksum: ead7826a917d1286a816e1dda4f207ca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-01-20 / CAPES / This research aims to gather Soren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813 – 1855) phylosophy to the portuguese poet Mário de Sá Carneiro (1890 – 1916) through a theme that is developed in the authors’ works: the matter of myself. Kierkegaard develops this theme starting from the conception that man is a synthesis between heterogeneous elements – the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, the possibility and the necessity. In his literature, Sá-Carneiro deals with this issue presenting a subject in phycho disorder, characterized as a fragmented being, unable to balance personal desires and goals with reality. Although they develop this problem in different way in their works, we sustain the following hypothesis: both in Kierkegaard and in Sá-Carneiro we noticed the human being existing problem while looking for fufillments that may eliminate the incompleteness experience which lies inside the subject. To fight the problem of synthesis, facing despair, man must become him himself, with faith helping him trying to eliminate the mortal illness. In Mário de Sá Carneiro, there is a recurrence to the double, when the subject spreads trying to reach the accomplishment of something, harmonizing imagination and reality. The present paper aims to present how the authors develop this theme. To the development of the problem, we take as main works the texts Fear and fright (1843) and Human despair (1849), from the danish phylosopher and the novel Lucio’s confession (1913), from the portuguese writer. Lately, the work moves towards an interpretation of the short story “The man of the dreams”, from Sá-Carneiro, considering the aesthetic stage as the reading key to the text. In this analysis stage, we seek to find similarities between the character named Russo in Sá Carneiro’s short story, and Johannes, pseudonym and author of Diary of a seducer (1843), which lives this existence possibility. At last, we analyse two characters from Lucio’s confession still by the existence aesthetic stage perspective. / A pesquisa consiste em aproximar a filosofia de Søren Aabye Kierkegaard (1813-1855) da literatura do poeta português Mário de Sá-Carneiro (1890-1916) por meio de um tema que se desdobra nas obras dos autores: a questão do eu. Kierkegaard desenvolve este tema partindo da concepção de que o homem é uma síntese entre elementos heterogêneos – o finito e o infinito, o temporal e o eterno, a possibilidade e a necessidade. Em sua literatura, Sá-Carneiro trabalha esta questão apresentando um sujeito em desequilíbrio psíquico, caracterizado como um ser fragmentado, incapaz de equilibrar desejos e aspirações pessoais com a realidade. Embora desenvolvam este problema de forma diferente em suas obras, sustentamos a seguinte hipótese: tanto em Kierkegaard, quanto em Sá-Carneiro percebemos o problema da existência do ser humano enquanto busca por realizações que possam eliminar a experiência de incompletude que reside no interior do sujeito. Para enfrentar o problema da síntese, encarando o desespero, o homem deve tornar-se um si mesmo, com a fé a auxiliá-lo na tentativa de extirpar a enfermidade mortal. Em Mário de Sá-Carneiro, há a recorrência ao duplo, quando o sujeito se dispersa na tentativa de atingir a realização de algo, harmonizando imaginação e realidade. A presente dissertação objetiva apresentar como os autores desenvolvem este tema. Para o desenvolvimento do problema, tomaremos como obras principais os textos Temor e tremor (1843) e O desespero humano (1849) do filósofo dinamarquês e a narrativa A confissão de Lúcio (1913) do escritor português. Posteriormente, o trabalho incide para uma interpretação do conto “O homem dos sonhos”, de Sá-Carneiro, considerando o estádio estético como chave de leitura para o texto. Nesse estágio da análise, buscamos encontrar similaridades entre a personagem o Russo do conto de Sá-Carneiro, e Johannes, pseudônimo e autor de Diário de um sedutor (1843) que vivencia esta possibilidade de existência. Por fim, analisaremos duas personagens de A confissão de Lúcio ainda pela perspectiva do estádio estético da existência.

Univ., Diss./2006--Trier, 2005.

Zugl.: Berlin, Freie Univ., Habil.-Schr., 2002/03.

Originally presented as the author's thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 238-244).

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2017-05-31T20:32:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 elvioneifigur.pdf: 2651084 bytes, checksum: 2772677f0539e39c525d652067a83802 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2017-06-01T11:52:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 elvioneifigur.pdf: 2651084 bytes, checksum: 2772677f0539e39c525d652067a83802 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T11:52:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 elvioneifigur.pdf: 2651084 bytes, checksum: 2772677f0539e39c525d652067a83802 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-15 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Para Søren Kierkegaard, a vida exige o encontro de uma verdade pela qual se possa viver e morrer. Segundo ele, a incerteza objetiva, sustentada na apropriação da mais apaixonada interioridade é a verdade, a mais alta verdade que há para um existente. Essa definição de verdade como subjetividade é, ainda, uma paráfrase da fé. Para o filósofo da religião, a verdade do cristianismo está, não na objetivação de doutrinas, mas na apropriação de seu(s) paradoxo(s) com a paixão da interioridade; no salto da fé. Decorre daí que a verdade religiosa, essencialmente subjetiva, só é efetivamente comunicada de forma indireta; por e para o indivíduo livre em sua existência. Muitas vezes, entretanto, a verdade religiosa é transformada em verdade objetiva, absoluta. É o que acontece em instituições religiosas, caso da Igreja Evangélica Luterana do Brasil (IELB), em que o ideário de proclamação baseia-se na premissa de que o erro precisa ser corrigido e a verdade proclamada. Tal realidade, observada claramente na atuação comunicacional midiática, revela forte tendência à racionalização da fé em detrimento da subjetividade do existente em busca de sentido último. / For Søren Kierkegaard, life demands the encounter of a truth one can live and die for. According to him, the objective uncertainty, sustained by the appropriation of the most passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest existent truth for a person. This definition of truth as subjectivity is also a paraphrase of faith. For the philosopher of religion, the truth of Christianity does not lie in the objectification of doctrines, but in the appropriation of its paradox(es) with the passion of inwardness; In the leap of faith. Religious truth, essentially subjective, is only effectively communicated indirectly; by and for the free individual in their existence. Often, however, religious truth is transformed into absolute, objective truth. This is what happens in religious institutions like the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Brazil, where the idea of proclamation is based on the premise that the error has to be corrected and the truth proclaimed. This reality, clearly observed in the media communication, reveals a strong tendency towards rationalization of faith at the expense of the subjectivity of the existing person in search of ultimate meaning.

Ce mémoire présente une analyse des influences causées par l’œuvre kierkegaardienne à l’intérieur des différentes conceptions de l’existentialisme du 20e siècle. Considérant tout d’abord deux lectures chrétiennes de l’existentialisme moderne, celle proposée dans l’Introduction aux existentialismes d’Emmanuel Mounier et celle du Court traité de l ’existence et de l ’existant de Jacques Maritain, l’auteur souligne ensuite l’héritage de Kierkegaard et met en évidence l’intérêt porté à la philosophie kierkegaardienne par ces deux penseurs de l’existence du 20e siècle. L’analyse fait ressortir les richesses et les limites de la pensée kierkegaardienne telle que l’appréhendaient Mounier et Maritain, tandis que la présentation de leurs deux conceptions de l’existentialisme aura fait voir comment l’œuvre de Kierkegaard a diversement influencé le cours de l’histoire philosophique.

No description available.

This thesis investigates Søren Kierkegaard’s (1813-1855) reception of the writings of Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788). I focus on four specific topics. In chapter one I examine Kierkegaard’s early reception of Hamann which I argue provides the basis for Kierkegaard’s conception of his own authorial task. In particular, I examine concepts of humour and systematicity and the centrality of the figure of Socrates. Central to my argument is a contrast between Kierkegaard’s reception of Hamann and that of Hegel’s review. In chapter two I show that Kierkegaard develops an argument against speculative philosophy and its claims to have achieved the absolute beginning. I argue that Kierkegaard appeals to Hamann’s critique of Kant which centres around the possibility of a priori cognition and the dependency of reason on language. I contend that Kierkegaard takes up Hamann’s critique in order to show that the absolute beginning which speculative philosophy claims to have achieved in the form of pure thinking is unachievable because of the dependency of thought on language. Chapter three examines the conception of selfhood in Hamann and Kierkegaard. I address their views of the self as unified and their critique of alternative conceptions of selfhood which undermine this unity. I show that Kierkegaard’s arguments in relation to despair and forgetfulness share important similarities with Hamann. Chapter four explores Kierkegaard’s critique and repair of post-Kantian reflection theory. I demonstrate that Kierkegaard proceeds to provide a minimal view of the self achieved through reflection which finally encounters its own limits in its own self-knowledge. I propose that Kierkegaard presents this as Socratic ignorance and that his model for outlining the limits of self-knowledge stems from Hamann. I develop my argument by arguing that for Hamann and Kierkegaard self-knowledge is only available through divine revelation.