Share repurchases reached a decade-high level in 2019, just as US equity indices reached a historical zenith, a move in tandem that supports more than merely a correlative relation. However, this relationship moves beyond that of just a close tandem move in indices alongside share repurchases, but to the behavior of firms which began to leverage themselves in order to promote the evermore profitable strategy of large buyback programs. Those repurchases indicate an idiosyncratic and procyclical leveraging that, while much smaller in scope and less combustible by lack of derivative amplification, led to the gorging on unsustainable debt described by Hyman Minsky and experienced in the Great Financial Crisis in the banking industry. In this case, the 'Minsky moment' that may have inevitably popped the self-promotion bubble came in the form of the 'black swan' event of the coronavirus outbreak. This paper aims to historically frame the issues, with delimitation of the effect of buybacks from 2009 to early 2020 with scant reference to historical factors influencing the increased usage of share repurchase programs. The analysis within this historical scope will reflect empirical measures on the market-wide level of share buybacks and debt levels alongside the concurrent equity index acceleration....

This study examines how the relation of earnings and payout is influenced by country-level moderators of investor protection and creditor rights. By using an international sample with 42,148 firm-year observations in 3,658 firms during the years 2001-2017, I find that earningspayout relation is strong. Further, I present evidence that the earnings-payout relation is alleviated in weak investor protection and creditor right countries due to the negative influence of dividends. Although share repurchases positively impact the strong earnings-payout relation, the positive effect of share repurchases is weaker compared to the negative one of dividends. As a consequence, in weak investor protection and creditor right countries, the strong earnings-payout relation is alleviated when it is tested with the logit regression.

In my first chapter, we document and study the use of Rule 10b5 1 preset repurchase plans. We exploit this new and widespread form of payout to examine an issue at the core of payout decisions—the tradeoff between commitment and financial flexibility. Relative to open market repurchases, preset plans provide an expanded repurchase window and increased legal cover, albeit at the cost of reducing repurchase flexibility and the option to time repurchases. These costs and benefits are significantly associated with Rule 10b5-1 adoption. Consistent with preset plans signaling commitment, Rule 10b5-1 repurchase announcements are associated with greater and faster completion rates, with more positive market reactions, and with more dividend substitution than open market repurchases. Lastly, we find that preset repurchase plans represent a unique payout tool whose introduction encouraged a different set of firms to buy back stock and significantly altered the payout landscape. My second chapter examines the strategic use and timing of share repurchases by insiders for personal gain. Using grant level compensation data and a hand-collected sample of monthly repurchases, I find a positive relation between CEO equity sales and share repurchases. I identify the relationship by instrumenting equity sales with equity grant vesting schedules. This relation is persistent across firm characteristics and does not appear to be destroying shareholder value. The results indicate managerial self-interest motivates a subset of share repurchases.

Depois de mais de 30 anos da edição da Lei 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 e da publicação da Instrução CVM 10, de 14 de fevereiro de 1980, volta novamente o regulador brasileiro a sua atenção para os benefícios e perigos dos negócios da companhia com ações de sua emissão. Tal se torna evidente pela publicação, em outubro de 2013, do Edital de Audiência Pública SDM 11/13, por meio do qual a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários pretende substituir a antiga regra aplicável às companhias abertas por uma nova, de conteúdo mais moderno e aderente à nova realidade. Desenvolveu-se durante o século XX e XXI o estudo dos negócios da companhia com as suas ações, admitindo-se cada vez mais numerosas exceções ao inicialmente duro e absoluto preceito proibitivo positivado originalmente pela Aktienrechtsnovelle alemã de 1870. O estudo das finanças sociais e o aprimoramento dos mecanismos de salvaguarda dos interesses protegidos no decorrer do século XX e XXI forçaram (e ainda forçam) a redefinição dos seus contornos jurídicos. No que diz respeito a estes negócios, ressaltam como interesses escudados aqueles dos credores, dos acionistas e do mercado de capitais (e os investidores que nele atuam) os grupos de referência (Bezugsgruppen) do direito societário. É na proteção de seus interesses que se fundamentam as normas que os regem: a utilização de saldo de lucros tutela os credores, o princípio do tratamento equitativo protege os acionistas e as regras de prevenção a atos manipulativos e de repressão ao insider trading salvaguardam o mercado e seus investidores. É, portanto, no confronto com tais interesses que se deve avaliar a legalidade ou ilegalidade de cada um desses negócios, e não na simples (in)existência de uma exceção legal expressa ao conceito proibitivo geral. O art. 30 da Lei das S.A. estipula condições de validade dos negócios com ações próprias, e não meramente um rol de exceções taxativas. / Thirty years after the enactment of Law 6.404, of December 15, 1976 and CVM Instruction 10, of February 14, 1980, once again have the transactions of the company in its own shares gained the attention of the Brazilian regulatory authority, especially in consideration of the benefits and perils arising from them. This is evidenced by the publication, in October 2013, by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários of Public Hearing SDM 11/13, the purpose of which is to replace the old rule applicable to public companies by a new one, containing a more modern approach on the subject and a more reality-driven concept. The studies about the transactions a company is allowed to perform in its own shares have had a great academic and empiric development during the XX and XXI centuries, the result of which has been the gradual acceptance of an ever-increasing list of possible exceptions to the inititally absolute prohibition originally stated by the german Aktienrechtsnovelle of 1870. The study of financial economics and the improvement of the legal protective measures designed over the last century have forced (and continue to force) a broad redefinition of these transactions legal boundaries. In respect to these transactions, the interests of creditors, shareholders and the capital market itself (including the investors which act in it) arise in the center of the legal protective framework they have been denominated as the reference groups of Corporate Law. Safeguarding their interests is the main purpose of the rules revolving around them: the use of profits and profit reserves safeguards creditors, adherence to the principle of equitable treatment adresses shareholder interests and the rules preventing manipulative acts and insider trading practices sponsor the interests of the capital market and its investors. Therefore, it is mandatory that any interpretation on the legality or ilegality of any given transaction by the company in its own shares be preceded by the examination of these concrete interests; this legal analysis cannot be limited to the verification of an express exception to the general rule. Article 30 of Law 6.404/76 must therefore be read as containing a general validity framework, and not merely an exaustive list of exceptions.

År 2000 blev det möjligt för svenska börsnoterade bolag att göra återköp av egna aktier. Detta har medfört ytterligare en möjlighet för hur bolagen kan distribuera den vinst de gör vid brist på andra gynnsamma investeringar. Under perioden 2000 till 2013 har 139 olika bolag genomfört återköp av egna aktier och bland dessa bolag varierar mängden återköpta aktier och antalet genomförda återköpsprogram kraftigt. Aktiebolagslagen sätter ramarna för återköpet och per återköpsprogram får maximalt tio procent av det totala aktiekapitalet köpas tillbaka. Bolagstämman beslutar om återköp skall bli aktuellt och beslutet sträcker sig som längst till nästa bolagsstämma. Sedan 2010 finns en utredning hos regeringen där det föreslås att ta bort tioprocentsspärren och låta det stå bolagen fritt att återköpa hur mycket aktier de vill. Detta examensarbete syftar till att undersöka den svenska markanden och att bidra i debatten och belysa ett område som ej tidigare har undersökts, nämligen sambandet mellan de bolag som genomför återköp av egna aktier samt hur ägarandelen i grupperna styrelsen, ledningen och verkställande direktör påverkas före och efter återköpen. Vidare analyser i den här studien inkluderar 126 av de 139 bolagen. Tretton bolag har exkluderats på grund av bristande uppgifter eller att årsredovisningar helt saknas. Materialet kategoriseras efter dels hur återköpen genomförs; ett enda program, flera program i följd alternativt spridda program, dels efter storlek på bolag enligt SmallCap, MidCap och LargeCap. Vidare analyseras sambandet mellan den genomsnittliga ökningen av det egna innehavet hos bolagets styrelse, ledning och verkställande direktör samt ägarandelen, bolagets storlek och återköpsstrategi. Den slutliga analysen bygger på de bolag som gjort flera återköpsprogram samt där styrelse och VD tillsammans ökat sitt genomsnittliga egna aktieinnehav per återköpsprogram. Vår studie visar ett signifikant samband utifrån den avsedda beroendevariabeln, den genomsnittliga ägarandelen för styrelse och VD samt ett signifikant negativt samband med storlekskategorin largecap. Vilket innebär att den genomsnittliga ökningen i innhav per återköpsprogram delvis kan förklaras genom hur stor ägarandelen var innan återköpet samt bolagets storlek. Även grupptillhörighet, det vill säga typ av återköpsstrategi, har ett samband men detta placerar sig strax under en signifikansnivå på 90 procent. / In the year of 2000 the Swedish government changed a part of the Swedish Companies Act and made it possible for swedish listed companies to repurchase a maximum of ten percent of their own shares. Up until today 139 companies have chosen to use this possibility to distribute some of their profit. Out of the 139 companies thirteen companies are excluded due to missing data, 126 companies remains in further studies of this paper. The pattern of the repurchase varies in three different systems; one share repurchase program alone, several consecutive share repurchase programs and several scattered share repurchase programs. We aim to study if there is a connection between the way the companies repurchase their own shares and the change in ownership within the board, CEO and company management. Our study show that a higher concentration of ownership within the board and CEO has a significant positive effect on the average increase of own shares per program. Also largecap firms has a significant negative effect on the average increase per program.

We study the long-term performance of companies listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange that announced their intention to repurchase shares between the years of 2005 and 2013. We test the hypothesis that the market underreacts to share repurchase announcements and that repurchasing firms consequently outperform the market in the following years. We find that repurchasing firms yield a cumulative abnormal return of 15.76 percent, significant at the 1 percent level, over the four years following the announcement. To address the concern that microcaps may be driving the results, we also investigate the differences in abnormal returns between companies of different sizes. We form three portfolios based on market capitalization and find that the large, medium-sized and small companies yield 14.34 percent, 20.13 percent and 6.61 percent respectively. / Vi studerar den långsiktiga avvikelseavkastningen för företag noterade på Stockholmsbörsen som annonserat aktieåterköp mellan åren 2005 och 2013. Vi testar hypotesen att marknaden underreagerar på dessa annonseringar och att aktieåterköpande företag överpresterar marknaden de nästkommande åren. Vi finner att företag som återköper aktier ger en kumulativ abnormal avkastning på 15,76 %, signifikant på enprocentsnivån, under fyra år efter att företaget annonserat ett aktieåterköpsprogram. För att bemöta kritik mot tidigare anomaliforskning om att microcaps ofta snedvrider resultaten, undersöker vi skillnader i avvikelseavkastning mellan företag i olika storlek. Vi skapar tre portföljer baserat på företagens marknadsvärde och finner att stora, mellanstora och små företag genererar en kumulativ avvikelseavkastning på 14,34 %, 20,13 % samt 6,61 %.

Syfte: Tidigare forskning visar på en positiv abnormal avkastning på företagets aktiekurs vid återköp av aktier. Få studier har vidare undersökt om denna avkastning skiljer sig beroende på frekvensen av återköp. Området kring återköp av aktier är relativt outforskat i Sverige och sedan återköp blev tillåtet år 2000 har det varit en finanskris. Denna studie syftar därmed till att fylla ut forskningsgapet i Sverige med att studera återköp och dess påverkan på avkastningen på den svenska aktiemarknaden, med hänsyn till återköpsfrekvens. Studien är avgränsad till lågkonjunkturen mellan åren 2010-2014 för att se eventuell skillnad från tiden före finanskrisen. Metod: För att besvara studiens syfte har en eventstudie genomförts. Aktiekursdata för de företag som genomfört återköpsprogram under de studerade åren har samlats in från Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Av dessa aktiekursdata har kumulativ abnormal avkastning beräknats för att jämföras mellan grupper och andra studier samt genomföra t-test och envägs-ANOVA. Studiens data består av 68 återköpsprogram fördelat på 41 företag som har delats in i frekvensbaserade grupper på ”1”, ”2-3” och ”4-5” stycken återköpsprogram. Resultat & slutsats: Studiens resultat stödjer den tidigare forskningen om att återköp ger en positiv abnormal avkastning. Resultatet stödjer även signaleringsteorin om att återköp signalerar undervärdering vilket leder till att investerare pressar upp aktiepriset. Resultatet visar däremot inget stöd till de studier som har visat på att återköpsfrekvensen ska ha betydelse för avkastningen eller att avkastningen skulle ha varit högre under lågkonjunktur. På grund av få och motsägande forskning kring detta behövs det mer forskning som kan förtydliga frekvensen och lågkonjunkturens påverkan på avkastningen. Examensarbetets bidrag: Det är intressant ur företagsekonomisk synpunkt att se vilken effekt återköp får på aktiepriset när företag funderar på att utnyttja bemyndigande om återköpsprogram. Denna studie visar att företag i Sverige kan förvänta sig en positiv abnormal avkastning vid annonsering av ett återköpsprogram, i likhet med andra miljöer. Studien visar även att frekvensens och lågkonjunkturens betydelse fortfarande är oviss. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Eftersom studien endast har undersökt den kortsiktiga avkastningen vid återköp av aktier vore mer forskning kring den långsiktiga avkastningen intressant. Studien har inte heller studerat egenskaper hos företagen som gör återköp. Eventuella skillnader mellan företag som gör enstaka respektive frekventa återköp vore intressant att se. / Aim: Previous research has indicated that share repurchases result in a positive abnormal return on company's share price but only a few studies have examined further if return on share price differs depending on frequency of share repurchases. In Sweden share repurchases are quite unresearched field of study and after share repurchases became legal in 2000 there has been a financial crisis. This study aims to fulfil the research gap in Sweden and examine share repurchases' effect to return on share prices depending on frequency of share repurchase on Swedish stock market. Time period of the study has narrowed down to recession between years 2010-2014 to see eventual difference from time before recession. Method: To fulfil the aim of the study event study methodology has been used. The share data for companies that have repurchased shares in chosen time period has been collected from Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. Based on share data cumulative abnormal returns for every share repurchase group have been calculated to compare groups and different time periods. Cumulative abnormal returns are even used to accomplish t-test and one-way ANOVA. Data of the study consist of 68 share repurchase programs that were announced by 41 companies. Those 68 repurchase programs were distributed to three frequency based groups that were ”1”, ”2-3” and ”4-5” share repurchase programs. Result & Conclusions: Results of the study are consistent with the previous research about share repurchases resulting in a positive abnormal return. The results are also consistent with the previous research about repurchases signaling an undervalued stock which leads to an increase in interests from the investors. On the contrary this study is not consistent with the previous research about repurchase frequency and recession's impact to return. Because there are only a few studies about repurchasing frequency and recession's impact to return and the results of studies are contradictory, more research needs to be done. Contribution of the thesis: It is interesting to see which kind of effect share repurchases result in share price when company is utilizing authorization of share repurchase program. This study indicates that a company in Sweden can predict a positive abnormal return by announcing about repurchase program. The study indicates even that repurchase frequency and recession's impact to return are still uncertain. Suggestions for future research: As this study has only examined share repurchases' short-term effect to return on share price, it would be interesting to research long-term effect to return on share price. Also characteristics of companies that repurchase shares and eventual differences between companies that repurchase shares frequent and infrequent would be interesting to see.

Depois de mais de 30 anos da edição da Lei 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 e da publicação da Instrução CVM 10, de 14 de fevereiro de 1980, volta novamente o regulador brasileiro a sua atenção para os benefícios e perigos dos negócios da companhia com ações de sua emissão. Tal se torna evidente pela publicação, em outubro de 2013, do Edital de Audiência Pública SDM 11/13, por meio do qual a Comissão de Valores Mobiliários pretende substituir a antiga regra aplicável às companhias abertas por uma nova, de conteúdo mais moderno e aderente à nova realidade. Desenvolveu-se durante o século XX e XXI o estudo dos negócios da companhia com as suas ações, admitindo-se cada vez mais numerosas exceções ao inicialmente duro e absoluto preceito proibitivo positivado originalmente pela Aktienrechtsnovelle alemã de 1870. O estudo das finanças sociais e o aprimoramento dos mecanismos de salvaguarda dos interesses protegidos no decorrer do século XX e XXI forçaram (e ainda forçam) a redefinição dos seus contornos jurídicos. No que diz respeito a estes negócios, ressaltam como interesses escudados aqueles dos credores, dos acionistas e do mercado de capitais (e os investidores que nele atuam) os grupos de referência (Bezugsgruppen) do direito societário. É na proteção de seus interesses que se fundamentam as normas que os regem: a utilização de saldo de lucros tutela os credores, o princípio do tratamento equitativo protege os acionistas e as regras de prevenção a atos manipulativos e de repressão ao insider trading salvaguardam o mercado e seus investidores. É, portanto, no confronto com tais interesses que se deve avaliar a legalidade ou ilegalidade de cada um desses negócios, e não na simples (in)existência de uma exceção legal expressa ao conceito proibitivo geral. O art. 30 da Lei das S.A. estipula condições de validade dos negócios com ações próprias, e não meramente um rol de exceções taxativas. / Thirty years after the enactment of Law 6.404, of December 15, 1976 and CVM Instruction 10, of February 14, 1980, once again have the transactions of the company in its own shares gained the attention of the Brazilian regulatory authority, especially in consideration of the benefits and perils arising from them. This is evidenced by the publication, in October 2013, by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários of Public Hearing SDM 11/13, the purpose of which is to replace the old rule applicable to public companies by a new one, containing a more modern approach on the subject and a more reality-driven concept. The studies about the transactions a company is allowed to perform in its own shares have had a great academic and empiric development during the XX and XXI centuries, the result of which has been the gradual acceptance of an ever-increasing list of possible exceptions to the inititally absolute prohibition originally stated by the german Aktienrechtsnovelle of 1870. The study of financial economics and the improvement of the legal protective measures designed over the last century have forced (and continue to force) a broad redefinition of these transactions legal boundaries. In respect to these transactions, the interests of creditors, shareholders and the capital market itself (including the investors which act in it) arise in the center of the legal protective framework they have been denominated as the reference groups of Corporate Law. Safeguarding their interests is the main purpose of the rules revolving around them: the use of profits and profit reserves safeguards creditors, adherence to the principle of equitable treatment adresses shareholder interests and the rules preventing manipulative acts and insider trading practices sponsor the interests of the capital market and its investors. Therefore, it is mandatory that any interpretation on the legality or ilegality of any given transaction by the company in its own shares be preceded by the examination of these concrete interests; this legal analysis cannot be limited to the verification of an express exception to the general rule. Article 30 of Law 6.404/76 must therefore be read as containing a general validity framework, and not merely an exaustive list of exceptions.

The amendment of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 in 1999 by Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999 made it possible for the first time, in South Africa, for a company to acquire its own shares and for a subsidiary to acquire shares in its holding company. The position introduced by the 1999 amendments was repealed in 2011 with the coming into effect of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. I have compared capital maintenance rule under the Companies Act 61 of 1973, as amended in 1999 with capital maintenance rule under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. I have also examined in detailed the requirements to be complied with when a company acquires its shares as well as the requirements to be complied with when a subsidiary acquires shares in its holding company. Copyright / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

The capital maintenance rules stem from the English company law and were primarily aimed at protecting the rights of a company’s creditors. Before the introduction of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1998, a company was prohibited from purchasing its own shares. After this legislation was passed, a company was able to do so, provided that it satisfied the solvency and liquidity test and also complied with the new statutory provisions set out by sections 85 to 89 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Section 48 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 now regulates the acquisition by a company of its own shares, as well as the acquisition of shares in its holding company by a subsidiary company. The above actions also fall under the ambit of a “distribution” as defined in the Act and therefore need to satisfy the requirements of section 46 of the Act as well. Unlike its predecessor, the provisions in the new Act are very broad and devoid of guidelines. The emphasis is placed on companies satisfying the principles of solvency and liquidity. Non-adherence to these provisions gives rise to the personal liability of the company’s directors. The provisions of section 48 do not apply where a dissenting shareholder exercises his appraisal rights in terms of section 164 of the new Act, or where a company redeems redeemable securities. These exceptions do, however, still amount to “distributions” and will accordingly need to satisfy the requirements contained in section 46 of the Act. Redeemable securities were initially not exempted from the provisions of section 48. This would potentially have given rise to a situation where a company could approach a court in terms of section 48(6) to reverse a redemption of its securities. It would have had dire consequences for financing by way of redeemable securities. In terms of the Companies Amendment Act 3 of 2011 redeemable securities are now specifically exempted from the provisions of section 48. In terms of the new Act a subsidiary company is allowed to purchase shares in its holding company to a maximum of 10% in the aggregate of the issued shares of any share class, provided that no voting rights attached to such shares may be exercised. The new Act fails to properly address some of the issues regarding the “round-tripping” of dividends and the declaration of a dividend in specie that were already identified as far back as 2001. Where the consideration for a repurchase constitutes a “dividend” as defined in the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, the company will be liable to pay secondary tax on companies in respect thereof. If a distribution does not constitute a dividend, capital gains tax is payable with regard to it. Share repurchases are allowed in terms of Canadian corporate law after the legislative reform which occurred in that country during the 1970’s. The Canadian Business Corporations Act contains provisions that bear a striking resemblance to the provisions of the new Act adopted in South Africa. Whilst the basis and rationale behind the new corporate legislation cannot be faulted, a host of issues and concerns still remain. The unfortunate consequence is that the new Act lacks transparency and is fraught with clumsy errors. Copyright / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted