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1	Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation Forst, Arno 21 April 2009 (has links) This study investigates the effects of insider entrenchment on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation in firms conducting an initial public offering (IPO). The sample comprises 220 US firms that went public between 1996 and 2002. Corporate governance choices regarding entrenchment are captured by six provisions in the corporate charter and bylaws, as well as five anti-takeover statutes, which may or may not be in effect in the state of incorporation. Firm-level items are supermajority requirements for charter amendments, bylaws amendments, and merger approvals, along with the presence or absence of a staggered board of directors, poison pills, and golden parachute agreements. The anti-takeover laws examined are Business Combination, Control Share Acquisition, Fair Price, Poison Pill Endorsement, and Constituencies Statutes. A factor analysis reveals three distinct components of entrenchment: firm- and state-level external entrenchment and firm-level internal entrenchment. External entrenchment is related to market control over management by means of corporate takeovers; internal entrenchment relates to shareholder control over management by means of their voting power. Evidence is found for a positive association between entrenchment at IPO and subsequent CEO cash and total compensation. These relationships are driven by firm-level external entrenchment. Firm-level external entrenchment is also significantly and positively associated with CEO stock-based compensation. The positive effects of entrenchment at IPO on CEO compensation appear not to be transitory and remain constant for at least five years post-IPO. Furthermore, entrenchment at IPO is shown to affect CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. On balance, entrenchment reduces the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock returns and returns on assets. The results of this study underscore the crucial importance of insiders' governance decisions made at the time of the IPO. Little support is found for a re-balancing of components of the CEO's compensation contract in response to entrenchment as predicted under the optimal contracting theory of compensation contracts. The findings of this study are almost entirely consistent with the managerial power theory, according to which entrenchment at IPO causes a permanent shift in bargaining power, which enables CEOs to influence compensation contracts in their favor. Corporate Governance Executive Compensation Initial Public Offering Takeover Defenses Pay-for-performance sensitivity Entrenchment CEO compensation Accounting Business
2	敵意併購下採取防禦措施對主併公司股東利益之影響 / The Effects of Shareholders’ Value of Acquiring Companies on Hostile Takeover Defenses 鄭亦珺, Cheng, I Chun Unknown Date (has links) 循著時光的隧道，自二十世紀初以來，全球企業併購的熱潮方興未艾，時至今日「併購」已為一般人所熟知，併購的型態更演變出多種樣貌。本文以敵意併購為基調，蒐集全球2000年至2015年樣本，研究結果顯示，敵意併購之宣告對主併公司股東短期有不利之影響，若目標公司採取防禦策略時，對主併公司股東而言亦不利。故如果一公司欲發動敵意併購時，需考量目標公司是否有防禦措施的設置，惟此結果未達顯著水準。此外本研究亦針對敵意併購下主併公司股東的異常報酬，探討影響股東異常報酬的原因，實證結果得知，併購溢價越高，對於主併公司股東顯著不利，驗證「贏家的詛咒」理論，亦即併購溢價越多，將使得主併公司持股人的財富移轉至目標公司身上，對主併方股東有不利之影響。 / The trend of Merger and Acquisition is booming as of 20th century and the pattern has become variable and complicated. In this study, hostile takeover, one of the focal point on the subject of M&A, is to be discussed. Samples are collected from 2000 to 2015 globally by SDC platinum. Result shows that hostile takeover activity does not benefit shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. If the target firm adopts defensive tactics, situation will be worse. Therefore, as the bidding firm, it has to considered whether there are defensive tactics against hostile takeover in the target. While these aren’t significant result. Furthermore, this paper attempts to find the factors which would affect shareholders’ abnormal return under hostile takeover, and result shows M&A premium significantly does. The higher of M&A premium, the more unfavorable to the shareholders’ interest of the acquiring firm. It supports the theory of “winner’s curse”. That is, as M&A premium increases, shareholders’ wealth of the acquiring company is expected to transfer to the targets more which is adverse to the shareholders of the acquiring one. 敵意併購反併購防禦措施股東財富贏家詛咒 Hostile Takeover Anti-takeover Defenses Shareholders’ Wealth Winner’s Curse
3	Le droit français des OPA - un modèle pour le droit brésilien ? / The French law of takeover bids, a model for the brazilian law ? Mendia Twardowsky, Bianca 29 November 2017 (has links) L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser le système juridique français et brésilien concernant les stratégies de défense contre les offres publiques d'acquisition visant à prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées en bourse. Les offres publiques d'acquisition font l'objet d'un vif débat, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société cible. En France, de nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Grâce à l'analyse juridique des stratégies anti-OPA en France, le système brésilien peut prendre connaissance de cette expérience et trouver la meilleure approche juridique pour les sociétés cotées ayant un capital flottant important. Au Brésil, la récente vague d'IPO a été possible grâce à la réforme dans la bourse BM&FBOVESPA. Dorénavant, la BM&FBOVESPA présente le scénario idéal pour prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées. Ainsi, l'importance de ce thème est le résultat de la dispersion de l'actionnariat après la première vague d'introduction en bourse dans le marché de capitaux brésilien, et en France, elle se traduit par l'évolution dans environnement légal des défenses anti-OPA face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. / The objective of this thesis is to analyse the French experience and the Brazilian legal environment concerning the defense strategies against hostile corporate takeovers aimed at taking control over public companies. Through the analysis of the French legal system of the anti-takeover strategies, the Brazilian system will be able to acquire this experience and find the best legal approach for Brazilian public companies with dispersed ownership. The importance of this theme is the result of the ownership dispersion following the first IPOs in the current Brazilian securities exchange market, which provides the ideal scenario for taking control of these publicly-traded companies, as well as the changes and the evolution in the French legal environment. Prise de contrôle Offre publique d'acquisition Prise de contrôle hostile Offre obligatoire Offre amicale Sociétés cotées Stratégie de défense anti-OPA Sanctions Actions Société cible Raider Franchissement de seuils Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) Cvm Cade Bm&fbovespa Nivel 1 Nivel 2 Novo mercado Ipo Capital flottant Actionnaires Droits de vote Action de concert Salariés Conseil d'administration Comité d'entreprise Augmentation de capital Transparence Chevalier blanc Bons bretons Poison pill Gouvernement d'entreprise Takeover bid Hostile takeover bid Ownership dispersion Securities exchange commission Mandatory bid Listed companies Anti-takeover defenses Sanctions Shares Raider Target company Amf Cvm Cade Bm&fbovespa Nivel 1 Nivel 2 Novo mercado Initial public offering Free float Shareholders Voting rights Board of directors Transparency White knight Poison pills Corporate governance 346.44

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