Global ETD Search

1	An examination of agency costs: the case of REITs Lowrance, Daniel Scott 30 September 2004 (has links) This dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of shareholder rights plans and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for a unique class of securities, i.e., the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) between 1988 and 2000. This research seeks to establish what form of management, ownership structure and financial characteristics are exhibited by REITs which adopted antitakeover amendments as well as determine their impact on REIT values and the market for corporate control. While merger and acquisition transactions involving public REITs have much in common with M&A transactions involving other public companies, the role of governance has not been explored in REITs for these transactions. This paper finds that while firm specific variables can differentiate between targets and acquirers, the role of the governance structure appears to be quite limited. In fact, REITs seem to be driven by firm level performance. corporate mergers poison pill REIT
2	An examination of agency costs: the case of REITs Lowrance, Daniel Scott 30 September 2004 (has links) This dissertation provides a comprehensive analysis of shareholder rights plans and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for a unique class of securities, i.e., the Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) between 1988 and 2000. This research seeks to establish what form of management, ownership structure and financial characteristics are exhibited by REITs which adopted antitakeover amendments as well as determine their impact on REIT values and the market for corporate control. While merger and acquisition transactions involving public REITs have much in common with M&A transactions involving other public companies, the role of governance has not been explored in REITs for these transactions. This paper finds that while firm specific variables can differentiate between targets and acquirers, the role of the governance structure appears to be quite limited. In fact, REITs seem to be driven by firm level performance. corporate mergers poison pill REIT
3	Acquisitions: Poison Pill for Innovation? Xu, Puwei, De Wulf, Loïc January 2010 (has links) Nowadays, many firms are or have already been engaged in an acquisition process, either as target or acquirer. While these companies seem confident in the potential returns of such endeavors, the positive aspect of those acquisitions has yet to be proven. There is indeed a vivid discussion among scholars, which are divided into two categories. On the one hand, there are those considering acquisitions as a source of additional knowledge that will in turn increase the innovation within the company; and on the other hand, those denigrating acquisitions, assimilating them to a “poison pill” for innovation. The purpose of this research is therefore to investigate whether the acquisitions will influence positively or negatively the innovative performance of companies involved in such processes. Using a quantitative approach, this research analyzed the R&D investments made by those companies and the issued patents gained in return. The research provides mixed results. While acquisitions seem to have a positive impact on the companies‟ innovative performance during the two years following the acquisition, this positive impact does not last and even becomes negative during the third year. Acquisition merger innovation poison pill knowledge innovative performance innovativeness patent
4	Poison Pills : A management-shareholder benefits comparison Zhou, Xin, Alija, Teuta, Ochoche, Owoicho January 2010 (has links) Abstract Problem: The problem of this thesis involves the controversy that the implementation of poison pills generates. The conflict amongst various stakeholders that are affected directly or indirectly by the implementation of the poison pill also contributes significantly to the problem of this thesis. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and compare the benefits of the poison pill adoption on shareholder and management interests. We also seek to evaluate arguments for and against pill adoption, and determine if these arguments are valid in view of facts established from our study. Conclusions: Our study in this thesis has brought us to five conclusions about the poison pill policy in fulfillment of the purpose. We state in our conclusion that arguments for and against the poison pill can both be validated depending on the case, we also state that a general conclusion cannot be drawn as to the negative or positive effect of the poison pill on stakeholders. We proceed to argue that the pill is a very effective fighting toll in the current business world and state that more should be done to regulate pill implementation. We finish up our conclusion by identifying what appears to be an inverse relationship between management and shareholders benefits from the implementation of the pill. Originality: The uniqueness of our study resides in the theoretical framework that is developed from two prevailing hypotheses in the academic research of the poison pill. The previous studies either take on the management entrenchment hypothesis (MEH) or the shareholder interest hypothesis (SIH). However, we have combined the elements of both hypotheses and jointly revealed the advantages and disadvantages of the pill adoption for both management and shareholders via our original management shareholder benefits comparison matrix. Poison Pill Anti-takeover Strategy Hostile Takeover Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis Shareholder Benefits Hypothesis Strategy
5	Poison Pills : A management-shareholder benefits comparison Zhou, Xin, Alija, Teuta, Ochoche, Owoicho January 2010 (has links) <p><strong>Abstract</strong></p><p><strong>Problem</strong>: The problem of this thesis involves the controversy that the implementation of poison pills generates. The conflict amongst various stakeholders that are affected directly or indirectly by the implementation of the poison pill also contributes significantly to the problem of this thesis.</p><p><strong>Purpose</strong>: The purpose of this thesis is to investigate and compare the benefits of the poison pill adoption on shareholder and management interests. We also seek to evaluate arguments for and against pill adoption, and determine if these arguments are valid in view of facts established from our study.</p><p><strong>Conclusions</strong>: Our study in this thesis has brought us to five conclusions about the poison pill policy in fulfillment of the purpose. We state in our conclusion that arguments for and against the poison pill can both be validated depending on the case, we also state that a general conclusion cannot be drawn as to the negative or positive effect of the poison pill on stakeholders. We proceed to argue that the pill is a very effective fighting toll in the current business world and state that more should be done to regulate pill implementation. We finish up our conclusion by identifying what appears to be an inverse relationship between management and shareholders benefits from the implementation of the pill.</p><p><strong> Originality</strong>: The uniqueness of our study resides in the theoretical framework that is developed from two prevailing hypotheses in the academic research of the poison pill. The previous studies either take on the management entrenchment hypothesis (MEH) or the shareholder interest hypothesis (SIH). However, we have combined the elements of both hypotheses and jointly revealed the advantages and disadvantages of the pill adoption for both management and shareholders via our original management shareholder benefits comparison matrix.</p> Poison Pill Anti-takeover Strategy Hostile Takeover Managerial Entrenchment Hypothesis Shareholder Benefits Hypothesis Strategy
6	A tomada de controle de companhia aberta: a poison pill à brasileira / La scolata della società cotata: la poison pill in Brasile Souza, Paloma dos Reis Coimbra de 09 May 2011 (has links) O presente trabalho cuida das técnicas comumente referidas como cláusula de proteção à dispersão acionária, empregadas pelas companhias brasileiras. Tais técnicas foram apelidadas pela comunidade jurídica nacional de poison pills (pílulas de veneno). A expressão já é utilizada na experiência norte-americana para se referir a um conjunto de medidas defensivas contra a tomada de controle hostil, com as quais a poison pill à brasileira guarda pouca semelhança. O tema insere-se no contexto mais amplo da tomada de controle da companhia aberta (takeover) e as técnicas de defesa usualmente empregadas para impedi-la ou dificultá-la, quando indesejada. Tais técnicas são principalmente empregadas por companhias com capital disperso no mercado mobiliário e cujo poder de controle é exercido com a detenção de parcela reduzida do capital social. A busca pela maior dispersão acionária, bem como a presença apenas de ações votantes, fez com que a pílula brasileira se tornasse especialmente comum nas companhias listadas no Novo Mercado da BM&F-Bovespa S.A. Bolsa de Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros. A análise proposta circunscreve-se a tais companhias e à defesa por elas adotada. Dessa forma, parte-se da análise da disciplina jurídica das ofertas públicas voluntárias (artigo 257 da Lei das Sociedades por Ações), principal instrumento para a tomada de controle da companhia aberta, passa-se pelos dois principais sistemas de regulação da tomada de controle, com destaque para os modelos norte-americanos e inglês/europeu, para enfim chegar à apreciação da medida defensiva denominada poison pill tanto como originalmente concebida, na prática forense norte-americana, quanto em sua versão brasileira. É tema recente na literatura jurídica brasileira, ainda pouco explorado, mas bastante conhecido, estudado e vivenciado pela doutrina e experiência estrangeira, com apoio na qual o presente trabalho foi desenvolvido / Il presente lavoro si occupa delle tecniche comunemente citate come clausola di protezione alla dispersione azionaria, usate dalle società brasiliane. Dette tecniche sono state soprannominate dalla comunità giuridica nazionale di poison pills (pillole di veleno). Lespressione già è utilizzata nellesperienza nordamericana per riferirsi a un insieme di misure difensive contro la scalata ostile, con la quale la poison pill alla brasiliana si somiglia molto poco. Il tema si inserisce nel contesto più ampio della scalata della società cotata (takeover) e le tecniche di difesa usualmente impiegate per impedirla o tornarla più difficile, quando non desiderata. Tali tecniche sono principalmente usate da società con capitale disperso sul mercato mobiliare e il cui potere di controllo è praticato con il controllo di porzione ridotta del capitale sociale. La ricerca per una maggiore dispersione azionaria, così come la presenza solamente di azioni votanti, ha fatto con che la pillola brasiliana si tornassi specialmente comune nelle società elencate nel Nuovo Mercato della BM&F-Bovespa S.A. Borsa Valori, Borsa Merce e Mercato a termine. Lanalisi proposta è circoscritta a dette società e alla difesa da loro adottate. In questo modo, si parte dallanalisi della disciplina giuridica delle offerte pubbliche volontarie (articolo 257 della Legge di Società per Azioni), principale strumento per la scalata del controllo di società cotata, passiamo per i due principali sistemi di regolazione della scalata, con distacco ai modelli nordamericani e inglese/europeo, per infine arrivare alla valutazione della misura difensiva denominata poison pill tanto come originalmente concepita, nella pratica forense nordamericana, quanto nella sua versione brasiliana. È tema recente nella letteratura giuridica brasiliana, ancora poco investigata, ma abbastanza conosciuta, studiata e vissuta dalla dottrina ed esperienza straniera, con base nella quale il presente lavoro è stato sviluppato. Companhia aberta Controle acionário Mercado de capitais Misure difensive Offerta pubblica di acquisto Pillola di veleno Poison pill Potere di controllo Scalata della società cotata Scalata ostile Sociedade comercial Società cotata Takeover
7	Anotações sobre medidas defensivas à tomada de controle / Notes on the anti-takeover provisions Nascimento, João Pedro Barroso do 13 May 2010 (has links) As medidas defensivas contra tomadas de controle constituem o núcleo de estudo desta dissertação. São instrumentos jurídicos adotados principalmente por companhias abertas com dispersão acionária, visando à proteção contra uma eventual tentativa de tomada de controle. O assunto é de especial interesse no atual momento do mercado de capitais brasileiro, que vem apresentando significativo desenvolvimento nos últimos anos e propiciando meios para a proliferação no Brasil de companhias abertas com dispersão acionária. O estudo do tema é feito concomitantemente à crescente utilização no Brasil de proteções contra tomadas de controle, inclusive por companhias não dotadas de dispersão acionária. Algumas medidas defensivas são inspiradas na experiência prática de outros países e vêm sendo transplantadas para o Brasil sem a adequada harmonização às características do nosso regime jurídico. Este trabalho analisa os efeitos da utilização de medidas defensivas e, na medida do possível, a admissibilidade da adoção de determinadas defesas no Brasil. São também abordados os balizamentos para a postura da administração de companhias diante de tentativas de tomada de controle. São estudados os padrões de tratamento do tema nos principais modelos existentes na experiência internacional, a fim de fornecer subsídios para a criação de uma identidade brasileira no tratamento das defesas contra tentativas de tomada de controle. / The defensive anti-takeover measures constitute the core area of study in this dissertation. These are legal devices adopted mainly by publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion, aiming at protection against an eventual takeover attempt. The subject is of special interest at the current moment of the Brazilian capital markets, which have shown significant development in the recent years, providing means for the proliferation in Brazil of publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion. The study of the issue is done concomitantly with the increase of utilization in Brazil of anti-takeover protections, including by companies without widespread ownership dispersion. Some defensive measures are inspired by the practical experience of other countries, being transplanted to Brazil without the proper harmonization with the characteristics of our own legal system. This work analyzes the effects of the utilization of defensive measures and, to the extent possible, the admissibility of adoption of certain defenses in Brazil. The boundaries for the behavior of the management of companies under takeover attempts are also approached. The patterns for the treatment of this issue in the main existing models in foreign experience are studied, so as to provide subsidies to the creation of a Brazilian identity in the treatment of the defenses against takeover attempts. Acionista majoritário Ações Comparative corporate law Controle acionário Controlling power Defensive measures Kinds of defensive measures Management duties Poison pill Protection to diluted ownership clauses Shark repellants Sociedade anônima de capital aberto Sociedade comercial Takeover Tender offer
8	Anotações sobre medidas defensivas à tomada de controle / Notes on the anti-takeover provisions João Pedro Barroso do Nascimento 13 May 2010 (has links) As medidas defensivas contra tomadas de controle constituem o núcleo de estudo desta dissertação. São instrumentos jurídicos adotados principalmente por companhias abertas com dispersão acionária, visando à proteção contra uma eventual tentativa de tomada de controle. O assunto é de especial interesse no atual momento do mercado de capitais brasileiro, que vem apresentando significativo desenvolvimento nos últimos anos e propiciando meios para a proliferação no Brasil de companhias abertas com dispersão acionária. O estudo do tema é feito concomitantemente à crescente utilização no Brasil de proteções contra tomadas de controle, inclusive por companhias não dotadas de dispersão acionária. Algumas medidas defensivas são inspiradas na experiência prática de outros países e vêm sendo transplantadas para o Brasil sem a adequada harmonização às características do nosso regime jurídico. Este trabalho analisa os efeitos da utilização de medidas defensivas e, na medida do possível, a admissibilidade da adoção de determinadas defesas no Brasil. São também abordados os balizamentos para a postura da administração de companhias diante de tentativas de tomada de controle. São estudados os padrões de tratamento do tema nos principais modelos existentes na experiência internacional, a fim de fornecer subsídios para a criação de uma identidade brasileira no tratamento das defesas contra tentativas de tomada de controle. / The defensive anti-takeover measures constitute the core area of study in this dissertation. These are legal devices adopted mainly by publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion, aiming at protection against an eventual takeover attempt. The subject is of special interest at the current moment of the Brazilian capital markets, which have shown significant development in the recent years, providing means for the proliferation in Brazil of publicly-held companies with widespread ownership dispersion. The study of the issue is done concomitantly with the increase of utilization in Brazil of anti-takeover protections, including by companies without widespread ownership dispersion. Some defensive measures are inspired by the practical experience of other countries, being transplanted to Brazil without the proper harmonization with the characteristics of our own legal system. This work analyzes the effects of the utilization of defensive measures and, to the extent possible, the admissibility of adoption of certain defenses in Brazil. The boundaries for the behavior of the management of companies under takeover attempts are also approached. The patterns for the treatment of this issue in the main existing models in foreign experience are studied, so as to provide subsidies to the creation of a Brazilian identity in the treatment of the defenses against takeover attempts. Acionista majoritário Ações Controle acionário Sociedade anônima de capital aberto Sociedade comercial Comparative corporate law Controlling power Defensive measures Kinds of defensive measures Management duties Poison pill Protection to diluted ownership clauses Shark repellants Takeover Tender offer
9	Le droit français des OPA - un modèle pour le droit brésilien ? / The French law of takeover bids, a model for the brazilian law ? Mendia Twardowsky, Bianca 29 November 2017 (has links) L'objectif de cette thèse est d'analyser le système juridique français et brésilien concernant les stratégies de défense contre les offres publiques d'acquisition visant à prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées en bourse. Les offres publiques d'acquisition font l'objet d'un vif débat, plus particulièrement lorsqu'elles présentent un caractère hostile pour la société cible. En France, de nombreux efforts législatifs ont été mis en œuvre en vue d'encadrer les OPA et de lutter contre les prises de contrôle rampantes. L'analyse du droit positif permet de mettre en lumière ces différents efforts ainsi que leur mise en œuvre à travers diverses techniques par les sociétés visées. Grâce à l'analyse juridique des stratégies anti-OPA en France, le système brésilien peut prendre connaissance de cette expérience et trouver la meilleure approche juridique pour les sociétés cotées ayant un capital flottant important. Au Brésil, la récente vague d'IPO a été possible grâce à la réforme dans la bourse BM&FBOVESPA. Dorénavant, la BM&FBOVESPA présente le scénario idéal pour prendre le contrôle des sociétés cotées. Ainsi, l'importance de ce thème est le résultat de la dispersion de l'actionnariat après la première vague d'introduction en bourse dans le marché de capitaux brésilien, et en France, elle se traduit par l'évolution dans environnement légal des défenses anti-OPA face à des pratiques qui ne cessent d'évoluer. / The objective of this thesis is to analyse the French experience and the Brazilian legal environment concerning the defense strategies against hostile corporate takeovers aimed at taking control over public companies. Through the analysis of the French legal system of the anti-takeover strategies, the Brazilian system will be able to acquire this experience and find the best legal approach for Brazilian public companies with dispersed ownership. The importance of this theme is the result of the ownership dispersion following the first IPOs in the current Brazilian securities exchange market, which provides the ideal scenario for taking control of these publicly-traded companies, as well as the changes and the evolution in the French legal environment. Prise de contrôle Offre publique d'acquisition Prise de contrôle hostile Offre obligatoire Offre amicale Sociétés cotées Stratégie de défense anti-OPA Sanctions Actions Société cible Raider Franchissement de seuils Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF) Cvm Cade Bm&fbovespa Nivel 1 Nivel 2 Novo mercado Ipo Capital flottant Actionnaires Droits de vote Action de concert Salariés Conseil d'administration Comité d'entreprise Augmentation de capital Transparence Chevalier blanc Bons bretons Poison pill Gouvernement d'entreprise Takeover bid Hostile takeover bid Ownership dispersion Securities exchange commission Mandatory bid Listed companies Anti-takeover defenses Sanctions Shares Raider Target company Amf Cvm Cade Bm&fbovespa Nivel 1 Nivel 2 Novo mercado Initial public offering Free float Shareholders Voting rights Board of directors Transparency White knight Poison pills Corporate governance 346.44

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