Fientliga företagsförvärv har under en lång tid varit en del av den globala finansmarknaden och är numera inte främmande för de svenska aktörerna. Ett företagsförvärv blir fientligt när bolagets styrelse råder aktieägarna att avslå det framlagda budet. Är budet intressant för aktieägarna, som ofta strävar efter att maximera sin kapitalvinst, kan det dock lätt uppstå en intressekonflikt inom bolaget då styrelsen, till skillnad från aktieägarna, är snarare intresserad av att behålla sin makt och anställning. Detta kan resultera i att styrelsen blir frestad att vidta åtgärder för att förhindra uppköpet.   I samband med fientliga uppköpserbjudanden har det på den amerikanska aktiemarknaden utarbetats en rad försvarsåtgärder som kan vidtas av bolagsstyrelsen i syfte att försvåra eller förhindra ett företagsförvärv. På den svenska aktiemarknaden är vidtagande av åtgärder som har till syfte att förhindra eller försvåra att ett uppköpserbjudande framläggs eller genomförs icke tillåtna enligt 5 kap. 1 §             lagen om offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på aktiemarknaden (LUA). Motiveringen till detta förbud framkommer i bland annat Aktiemarknadsnämndens uttalande AMN 2005:47:”ett offentligt erbjudande anses vara en angelägenhet mellan målbolagets aktieägare och budgivaren, varför målbolagets styrelse inte ska tillåtas försämra förutsättningarna för att ett erbjudande lämnats”. Av denna anledning har styrelsen i ett målbolag som är ett aktiebolag en relativt svag position, då den beslutsfattande makten är hos de enskilda aktieägarna vid exempelvis antagandet av ett framlagt bud och hos bolagsstämman avseende vidtagande av eventuella försvarsmetoder. Dock har det genom AMN:s uttalanden framkommit i en rad praktiska fall att målbolagets styrelse hittat möjligheter att agera och i viss mån kringgå förbudet.   Uppsatsen är en komparativ studie med den svenska och amerikanska rättregleringen i fokus. Paralleller och samband dras även mellan det svenska, europeiska och engelska systemet. Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka svenska företagsledningarnas möjligheter och handlingsutrymme vid tillämpning av internationella försvarsmetoder för att avvärja ett oönskat uppköpserbjudande. I uppsatsen undersöks även de åtgärder som kan vidtas i ett preventivt syfte.   Möjligheten till genomförandet av ett bolagsuppköp är ett nyckelmoment för skapandet av en effektiv värdepappersmarknad där svaga bolag upphör att existera och starka bolag har utvecklings- och tillväxtmöjligheter. Att avgöra vad som stämmer överens med god sed kan dock bli problematiskt, då regleringen på området är oerhört spridd och i viss mån inkoherent. Trots dessa svårigheter har det i praktiken genomförts ett antal företagsuppköp som har visat på att tillämpningen av försvarmetoder är i viss utsträckning möjlig om den går att motivera genom att bolagets eller/och aktieägarnas intressen tillgodoses. Enligt aktiebolagslagen (ABL) är föremålet för aktiebolagets verksamhet att ge vinst till fördelning för aktieägarna. Samtidigt är aktieägarnas förtroende centralt för väl fungerande värdepappersmarknader. En mer omfattande rätt för bolagsstyrelsen i målbolaget att fatta beslut om försvarsåtgärder skulle kunna skada dessa grundläggande ändamål med ABL och den börsrättsliga regleringen. På så sätt skulle en betydligt större makt hos bolagsstyrelsen kunna ha en skadlig effekt, då det är aktieägarnas vinster och förtroende som bör prioriteras. Genom att analysera samspelet mellan de bolagsrättsliga och börsrättsliga principerna och relevanta praktiska avgöranden går det att se att den nationella regleringen är konstruerad på bästa möjliga sätt för att upprätthålla en god sed på den svenska finansmarknaden, trots sina potentiella brister i sammanhanget. / Hostile takeovers have for a long time been a part of the global financial market and are nowadays not an unknown phenomenon on the Swedish stock market. A takeover attempt becomes hostile when the board of directors of the target advises the shareholders to reject the submitted bid. That particular situation can, however, easily become the reason for conflict of interests within the company. The bid can be valuable for the shareholders, who primarily seek ways to maximize their profit at the same time, as the members of the board of directors desire to keep their employment and position within the company. The board can therefore as a result be willing to take action in order to prevent the takeover.   During the mid-20th century, due to a takeover-wave, the American stock market developed a series of defence measures that could be used by the board in order to impede or prevent an acquisition. However, measures that are intended to prevent or impede a takeover offer are prohibited on the Swedish stock market under Ch. 5 § 1 in the Act on Public Takeover Offers. The justification for this prohibition is found in, inter alia, the Swedish Securities Council's (Aktiemarknadsnämnden) statement AMN 2005: 47 where they indicated that a public offer is considered to be a matter between the target company's shareholders and the bidder, why the offeree company should not be allowed to impair the prerequisites for an offer submitted. For this reason, management has a relatively weak position in Swedish corporations, since the decision-making power is not with the board but with the separate shareholders when it comes to accepting a potential bid or the shareholders’ meeting of the corporation when a decision must be made if measures should be enact in order to prevent a bid. However, the boards of directors in some target companies have found opportunities to act and to some extent circumvent the ban posed in the Act on Public Takeover Offers.   The thesis is a comparative study with Swedish and American legal regulations in focus. Parallels are also drawn between the Swedish, European and English systems. The aim is to investigate the ability of the board of directors in Swedish corporations to use different defence methods to fend off an unwanted takeover bid. The paper also examines the measures that can be taken before the bid and as a result have a preventive function.   The possibility of implementing a company takeover is a key element for the creation of an efficient financial market in which weak companies cease to exist and strong companies have development and growth potential. A determination on what actions can be consistent with good practice can be problematic, since the regulations in this area are extremely widespread and somewhat incoherent. Despite these difficulties, the legal practice in this area has shown that the application of the defence methods is to some extent possible if the board of directors focus on supporting the will to defend the company and / or shareholder interests. To give the board of directors extended powers could have a detrimental effect on profits and trust. By analysing the interaction between the principles in company law and securities law as well as some relevant decisions by the Swedish Securities Council, it is possible to see that the Swedish national regulation is designed in the best possible way to maintain good practices on the Swedish stock market despite some shortcomings.

First chapter of this thesis describes the formation of EU policy on energy and summarizes the current objectives, which should be followed by the European Union in the field of energy. There are also mentioned the main actors in the European energy market (i.e. markets with electricity and natural gas as the main focus of the thesis). In the second chapter, mergers and takeovers in general and then their control through the EU competition policy is described. Third, i.e. the last chapter is devoted to the possible consequences of mergers and takeovers (especially dominant position and its abuse). The whole chapter and thesis is closed by selected cases of control of mergers and takeovers in the electricity and gas markets.

This thesis consists of three essays and studies CEO compensation, asset sales and takeovers and investment under uncertainty in empirical corporate finance. The first essay is a joint work with Qianqian Huang, Feng Jiang and Erik lie, titled `The effect of labor unions on CEO compensation'. The second essay `. Union Concessions following Asset Sales and Takeovers' is a joint work with Erik Lie. The third essay is titled `The Effect of Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk on Investment and R&D' and is sole-authored. In the first essay, we document evidence that labor unions compel firms to curtail CEO compensation. First, we find that firms with strong unions pay their CEOs less. Further, firms curb CEO compensation, especially the part that is discretionary, prior to union contract negotiations. Finally, we report that curbing CEO compensation mitigates the chance of a labor strike, thus providing a rationale for firms to pay CEOs less when facing strong unions. In the second essay, we document that the likelihood of asset sales increases with union wages. Furthermore, the acquiring firms gain significant concessions from the incumbent union following asset sales. Finally, the anticipation of union concessions helps explain the excess stock returns around asset sale announcements. We find no comparable effects for takeovers. We conclude that asset sales, but not takeovers, are partially motivated by the potential to extract concessions from unions. Finally, in the third essay, in an attempt to shed some light on the puzzling positive sensitivity of investment to systematic volatility documented in Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), we decompose systematic volatility into a firm's systematic risk exposure (beta) as well as the market and industry portfolio volatility. Surprisingly, we find a positive response of investment to a firm's systematic risk exposure. R&D expenditure is employed as an alternative form of investment. Our results show that idiosyncratic risk actually encourages firms to engage in R&D spending, in contrast with its depressing effect on capital expenditure; whereas systematic volatility depresses R&D in contrast with the positive sensitivity of capital expenditure to systematic volatility.

Takeovers have become a frequent feature of business. Due to their frequency and size, they have potentially considerable implications for the companies involved and their stakeholders.This thesis focuses on valuation problems in relation to takeovers. It comprises an empirical study of a number of Swedish corporate acquisitions, and a comprehensive survey of previous research on the outcome of takeovers.In the empirical study, the capital budgeting approach serves as the frame of reference for valuation. The cash flow consequences of seven takeovers are studied over a maximum period of five postmerger years. Special attention is given to the characteristics of incremental cash flows, the prospect of separating them from cash flows arising from other decisions taken by the merging companies, and the temporal relation between incremental cash flows and incremental accounting income.The comprehensive survey consists of a thorough description of previous research attempting to answer the questions: ‘Are corporate acquisitions successful?’ and ‘Which takeovers are successful and which are failures?’. While the main focus is on studies using financial accounting data, studies relying on stock market and interview data are also discussed.This thesis carries implications for the way takeovers are evaluated and accounted for, and contributes to the existing body of knowledge regarding the outcome of corporate acquisitions. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Företagsförvärv är ofta baserade på företagsledningars förväntningar om skalekonomiska fördelar, förbättrad lönsamhet och ökad konkurrensförmåga. Att dessa förväntningar inte alltid realiseras kan ha att göra med att viktiga förhållanden förbises redan i den process som föregår själva förvärvet, dvs i det s k "strategiska förspelet". Det som händer före ett förvärv har stor betydelse för dess utfall, vilket indikerats inom tidigare förvärvsforskning. Få forskare har dock uppmärksammat strategiska förspel som ett specifikt studieområde. Denna avhandling behandlar huvudmäns och exekutivs handlingar vid strategiska förspel i samband med fientliga uppköpserbjudanden. Boken innehåller en beskrivning av "Iggesundsaffären" 1980-1983 och ett försök att utveckla teoribildningar om vetandet om strategiska förvärvsprocesser. Det fall som studeras gäller bakgrunder till konsekvenser av Stora Kopparbergs och Billeruds ledningars uppköpserbjudande riktat till Iggesunds aktieägare den 29 april 1981. Detta uppköpserbjudande väckte stor offentlig uppmärksamhet och initierade genomgripande strukturella förändringar inom svensk skogsindustri och påverkade även ytterst sammanslagningen av MoDo, Iggesund och Holmen till det s k "Tredje Blocket". / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögsk.

Background: Throughout the last century mergers and acquisitions have been categorized by changes in the global economy. Globalization and changes in legislations has brought forward so called waves that are rooted in the market for the United States. Where the act of acquisitions can be divided into both friendly and hostile takeovers, history shows that hostile takeovers are frequent in the US but less evident in the Swedish market. As for Sweden the existence of control enhancing mechanisms are utilized to enable control of a firm without owning a proportionate share of equity. While the trend of takeover activity is replicated elsewhere, the hostile aspect finds another route. The market for corporate control governs the hostile aspect where firms should be replaced with new managers if agency problems arise between the management and the shareholders. Thus looking at Sweden, corporate governance issues and the establishment of national laws are of certain importance. Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the ownership structure in Swedish listed companies impacts on the occurrence of hostile takeovers and what implications a potential change in the corporate governance structure would have on it. Moreover we intend to map Sweden internationally to give a broad picture of the research area. Methodology: We have made use of a quantitative method for the empirical section and thereafter derived conclusions through the hypothetico-deductive approach. For testing the outcome of hostile bids in Sweden, chi-square tests for independence have been conducted and in regards of an international comparison we have implemented a correlation analysis. Conclusions: With the result at hand we concluded that the theory was partially aligned with the empirical data. The market for corporate control is not fully efficient in Sweden. The reason for that is the multiple voting rights implemented in the target firms which impede the successfulness in replacing a management. The hostile bid frequency has increased over the years, mainly due to potential agency problems among target firms. But parallel to this, which in some regards contradicts theory, is that firms neglects the prevalent ownership structure in Sweden and acquires a foothold as to make their hostile acquisition. In regards of the empirical data, concentrated ownership solely does not harm the market for corporate control in Sweden. Internationally, the correlation between ownership concentration and hostile bid frequencies proved to be negative where Sweden despite this attracts hostile acquirers.

Bakgrund: För att skydda de aktieägare som berörs av uppköpserbjudanden finns detregler för processerna kring dessa. I vissa av dessa uppköpserbjudanden kräverreglerna att målbolaget inhämtar en så kallad fairness opinion där en oberoende partska uttala sig om budets finansiella skälighet för aktieägarna. Skeptikerna tillutlåtandet är många men forskningen på den svenska marknaden, obefintlig. Mycketav kritiken som lyfts fram gäller utgivarnas oberoende och revideringen av takeoverreglerna,som kom år 2009, skärpte kraven kring just oberoende, vilket aktualiserarfrågan kring hur dessa regler fungerar och hur oberoendet ser ut på den svenskamarknaden. Syfte: Syftet med denna studie är att undersöka rollen och framtiden för fairnessopinion, på målbolagets sida, vid offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenskaaktiemarknaden. Genomförande: Studien är av explorativ karaktär och inkluderar 14 kvalitativaintervjuer med utgivare av fairness opinion och andra intressenter med erfarenhet avutlåtandet samt en sammanställning av offentliga uppköpserbjudanden på den svenskamarknaden under åren 2007-2012. Slutsats: Revideringen av takeover-reglerna, år 2009, har haft stor påverkan påmarknaden och bidragit till en ny syn på utgivarnas oberoende och en prispress påfairness opinion. Reglerna lämnar dock en del att önska och vi anser att man börinföra en begreppsmässig distinktion kring utlåtandets användning i olika situationersamt en ökad transparens i utlåtandet för att öka värdet för aktieägarna.Nyckelord: Fairness opinion, uppköpserbjudanden, takeover-regler,värderingsutlåtande, företagstransaktioner / Background: In order to protect shareholders affected by public takeover offers,there are rules regarding the processes surrounding them. In some of these offers, therules require that the target company obtain a fairness opinion where an independentparty evaluates the financial fairness of the offer. The number of fairness opinionskeptics is high but the research on the Swedish market is non-existent. Much of thecriticism concerns the independence of the writers of fairness opinions and therevision of the takeover rules tightened these requirements, which raises questionsabout how these rules work and how independent the Swedish writers are. Aim: The objective of this study is to investigate the role and future of targetcompany fairness opinions in regards to public takeover offers on the Swedish stockmarket. Completion: This is an exploratory study, which includes 14 qualitative interviewswith writers of fairness opinions and stakeholders with experience from fairnessopinions and a compilation of public takeover offers on the Swedish stock marketduring the years 2007-2012. Conclusion: The revision of the takeover rules, in 2009, has had a major impact onthe market and contributed to a new view of the independence of publishers and apricing pressure of fairness opinions. The rules, however, leaves some things to bedesired and we reckon that there should be a conceptual distinction between thedifferent situations of fairness opinions, as well as greater transparency in thestatement to increase shareholder value.Keywords: Fairness opinion, public takeovers, takeover rules

[Truncated thesis] This thesis investigates the relevance of Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow theory to the market for corporate control in Australia. Jensen posits that firms generating cash in excess of that required to fund positive NPV projects face greater agency problems as the free cash flow exacerbates the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. One implication from Jensen’s free cash flow theory is that firms with high levels of free cash flow are more likely to initiate takeovers that are value-decreasing. There are two practical issues in testing Jensen’s theory; first, constructing an appropriate proxy for free cash flow and secondly, identifying firms with free cash flow. These issues are addressed directly in the first of the two essays that comprise this thesis. The first essay develops and assesses the merits of four operational measures for free cash. One of them is a stock measure while the others are flow measures. The stock measure is included because previous studies have mostly used the stock measure of cash when identifying firms rich in free cash (henceforth, cash rich firms), despite that Jensen (1986) has made explicit reference to free cash flow. We test the validity of this approach by investigating whether stock measures of free cash coincide with flow measures. Our results reveal that the stock and flow measures of free cash give rise to quite different lists of cash rich firms. This is an important empirical contribution of the thesis. Given the lack of definitive criteria for deciding which operational measure of free cash flow is most appropriate, we identify multiple sets of free cash flow firms based on the different operational measures developed. For each operational definition, two methods are used to identify cash rich firms. The first method defines a firm as cash rich if its cash variable ranks in the tenth percentile. The second method defines firms as cash rich if their cash variable value is greater than one and a half standard deviations of the value predicted by a model.

This paper examines the minority discount due to lack of control by looking at tender offer premiums on Swedish publicly traded firms from 2007 to 2018. We analyze how ownership structure, the acquired stake and distribution of shares affect the minority discount. Variables focusing on control of shares are tested individually but also included in models addressing additional impacts. Our findings suggest that a bidder’s ownership of the target firm prior to the announcement lowers the bidder’s valuation of the remaining shares. However, the relation between premium and ownership seem to depend on a threshold of having a toehold which justifies the argument of toeholds attaining control and influence of the target firm. Correspondingly, the premium per share increases with the partial interest acquired, suggesting a non pro-rata valuation. We find no evidence of additional premium for minority shareholders in squeeze out events. However, equally powerful blockholders in target firms tend to increase bid premiums, arguably due to increased competition which aligns bid premium valuation to the valuation of control between dual class shares.

The primary purpose of the study was to investigate whether takeover markets are allocationally efficient using Tobin's q as the variable which summarizes the investment opportunities of firms. Chapter I presented the purposes, hypotheses, methodology, and limitations of the study. The two hypotheses proposed were as follows: Acquiring firms' q should be significantly higher than that of control firms, on average, and target firms' q should be significantly lower than that of control firms, on average. Chapter II presented the review of literature on takeovers and theory of investments. Chapter III presented the research design adopted to test the above hypotheses. The methodology to calculate q-values and methods to reduce the bias which may result from choice-based sampling were also given. A paired comparison t-test was employed to test the hypotheses. Sample firms were selected from the COMPUSTAT RESEARCH and COMPUSTAT INDUSTRIAL tape.