Notre recherche s'intéresse aux déterminants de la rémunération des plus hauts dirigeants exécutifs des entreprises françaises cotées au SBF 120. Ce sujet trouve tout son intérêt du fait de la survenue de scandales liés aux montants de rémunération des dirigeants et dans un contexte national marqué par un fort tabou quant à cette question. Pour traiter de notre problématique, nous mobilisons le cadre de la théorie de l'agence complété par des approches permettant de prendre en compte le rôle actif des dirigeants dans la fixation de leurs montants de rémunération (théorie du pouvoir managérial et théorie de l'enracinement). Notre démarche empirique s'inscrit dans une perspective exploratoire en contexte français. Une première étape a consisté, par une étude qualitative, à préciser notre angle de recherche afin de dégager des hypothèses par l'administration d'entretiens semi-directifs et de questionnaires auprès des dirigeants. Ceci a permis de faire émerger des relations entre la performance boursière et économique passées des entreprises (en « t »), le pouvoir du dirigeant, le contrôle du conseil et de l'actionnariat et le montant de rémunération en espèces des dirigeants (salaire et bonus) (en « t +1 »). Nos résultats montrent l'absence de relation entre la performance boursière et économique passées de l'entreprise et le montant de rémunération en espèces des plus hauts dirigeants exécutifs. Par ailleurs des mécanismes de contrôle du conseil et de l'actionnariat externes (administrateurs indépendants et investisseurs institutionnels) affecteraient positivement la rémunération en espèces des dirigeants / Our research focuses on the determinants of CEO remuneration for French companies listed on the SBF 120. This topic is of crucial importance because of the occurrence of scandals about the amounts of CEO compensation and in a national context characterized by a strong taboo on this issue. To address this problem, we mobilize the framework of the agency theory complemented by approaches that take into account the active role of CEOs in setting their remuneration amounts (managerial power theory and entrenchment theory). Our empirical approach is exploratory in the French context. A first step consists, thanks to a qualitative study, in clarifying our terms of research to generate hypotheses by administering semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with CEOs. This has led to the emergence of relationships between past corporate stock market and economic performance (in "t"), CEO power, the control of the Board of Directors and shareholders and the amount of CEO cash remuneration (salary and bonus) (in "t+1"). Our results show no relationship between corporate stock market and economic performance and the amount of CEO cash remuneration. We found a positive and significant relationship between the control of the Board of Directors and shareholders independent directors and institutional investors) and the amount of CEO cash remuneration. Finally, the CEO power positively and significantly affects their amount of cash remuneration

The purpose of my Thesis is an analysis of primary and secondary liability of Members of the Board of directors agains third persons especially against creditors. The main aim of the Thesis is to provide a comprehensive explanation of how the law enshrined in the creditors'pursuit of their rights directly to the members of the Board compared with the international rules. The thesis is composed of tree chapters. Chapter one is a general introduction to an organization, functions, duties and responsibilities of a joint-stock company.The chapter is subdivided into three parts. Part one describes generaly the Board of directors and focuses on its nature, actions, as well as on the casting of its members, on the membership itself and the relationship between the company and its members.The part two targets the rights and obligations related to executing the function given. Part tree pays attention to the responsibility and lability of Members of Board to joint-stock company. Chapter two examines relevant Czech legislation of legal personal lability of Members of the Board, who took part in establishment and managment of the legal entity. This chapter, too, consists of tree parts. Part one deals with individual regulations of the personal liability of Members of the Board. Part two elaborates on the...

The diploma thesis deals with a regulation of the monistic structure of a joint- stock company. This type of governance of a Czech joint-stock companies is introduced by the new Trade Corporations Act ("Act"), which is a part of an extensive recodification of the Czech private law. Introduction of this corporate governance system is not only consequence of this recodification, it is also largely a logical consequence of the statute shopping trend in Europe. The regulation of a monistic joint- stock company as introduced by the Act is not the first monistic company governance regulation in the Czech Republic. This option was already brought by the European Company Act in 2004. The first introductory part of the paper compares the two basic corporate governance systems and introduces the statutory bodies of the companies that distinguish these systems. Consequently, the study compares and evaluates the pros and cons of the two. Next part basically outlines the regulation of the European Company - Societas Europaea (SE). Main focus area of the study is the description of the monistic structure of a joint-stock company as introduced by the Act. The most important part is the description of the Board of Directors. Attention is paid to the membership in the Board, its convening and its conduct and also...

In this dissertation, we first examine the relationship between performance of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use five proxies for bank performance including Tobin’s Q, ROA, loan loss reserve ratio, non-performing asset ratio, and net charge-offs ratio. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, proportion of outsiders, CEO power, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board enhances bank performance, as proxied by Tobin’s Q and loan quality variables. We find no evidence that board structure or CEO power influences firm performance. We see that CEO and board tenure have a positive effect on firm performance. We further employ a crisis dummy during the period 2007 through 2009 to determine if the relationships between firm performance and board characteristics changed during the crisis. Our crisis results show us that board size has a negative effect on Tobin’s Q and the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. Further, we find that board structure decreases the non-performing asset ratio during the crisis. We next examine the relationship between risk-taking of the bank holding company and several board characteristics. We use four accounting based proxies for bank risk-taking including credit risk, liquidity risk, capital ratio and operational risk. We also use three market based proxies for bank risk including market beta, idiosyncratic risk and the standard deviation of its stock return. Board characteristic variables we include are board size, board independence, CEO duality, CEO tenure and board tenure. We find that a large board reduces both balance sheet and market risk. We further investigate the relationships between risk-taking and board characteristics changed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. We find that our results are robust during the crisis.

This dissertation addresses the question of effective delegation, exploring it through the concept of managerial discretion (i.e., a latitude of managerial actions, which lie in the zone of shareholders’ acceptance). While the corporate governance perspective on managerial discretion focuses mainly on the costs associated with delegation, the strategic management perspective emphasizes its benefits in creating value for the firm. Building on research in corporate governance and strategic management, this dissertation develops and empirically tests a theoretical framework that explains how the two distinct dimensions of managerial discretion jointly influence organizational outcomes. The proposed framework illuminates the importance of balance between the restraining and enabling decisions undertaken by professional managers. This dissertation makes a two-fold contribution to the field of corporate governance. First, it identifies and explains organizational and environmental forces that jointly shape strategic and governance dimensions of managerial discretion, redefining the concept. Second, it conceptually and empirically explores an integrative model of managerial discretion within the broader corporate governance framework, providing evidence of the joint effects of governance and strategic dimensions of discretion on organizational outcomes. The results suggest that the effect of governance dimension of managerial discretion on a firm’s performance is contingent on the strategic dimension of discretion. This draws attention to potential strategic implications of board monitoring over managerial decision making. While the majority of studies emphasize the benefits of increased control over managerial decision making, particularly stressing board monitoring, this dissertation also considers the benefits of delegation for firms’ strategic development. By reversing the polarity of the current emphasis on disciplining managers, this dissertation provides a more balanced view of the notion of corporate governance. The value of this approach derives from the integrated model, which highlights the benefits and the costs of delegation.

Cette thèse étudie l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance financière d’une entreprise. Elle est composée de trois chapitres. Dans le premier chapitre, nous effectuons une revue de la littérature sur les conseils d’administration. Nous pointons l’évolution de la gouvernance des entreprises au cours des dernières décennies, et montrons en quoi l’efficacité des conseils d’administration est devenue un sujet majeur de ce champ de recherche et une préoccupation importante des actionnaires et des régulateurs. En particulier, après avoir présenté le cadre théorique de la gouvernance, nous présentons les résultats des articles académiques étudiant l’impact de la composition du conseil d’administration sur la performance de l’entreprise. Dans les deuxième et troisième chapitres, nous étudions l’impact de la présence de différents types d’administrateurs au sein du conseil. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous proposons un modèle théorique pour tenter de comprendre et de déterminer l’impact de la représentation salariale au conseil d’administration sur la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise et sur l’horizon de ses investissements. Nos résultats suggèrent que la représentation salariale peut s’envisager comme un choix, pour les actionnaires, entre liquidité et information. Nous montrons que lorsque des représentants des salariés siègent au conseil d’administration d’une entreprise, celle-ci a une plus grande probabilité d’investir dans des projets à long-terme qu’une entreprise sans représentation salariale. Nous montrons également que les salariés ayant accès à une information interne précieuse, leur présence au conseil d’administration peut permettre d’augmenter la valeur actionnariale de l’entreprise. Ainsi, nous proposons un modèle de la représentation salariale cohérent avec certaines études empiriques. Dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions empiriquement l’impact des connexions politiques sur le taux d’intérêt d’emprunts bancaires en utilisant un échantillon de prêts concernant des entreprises de plusieurs pays. Si ce sujet a déjà été largement traité, nous proposons une nouvelle définition de la connexion politique que nous subdivisons en deux catégories, selon l’exposition médiatique, forte ou faible, des politiciens. Les politiciens les plus en vue sont aussi ceux pour lesquels le risque d’être soupçonné de conflit d’intérêt ou de manquement à l’éthique est le plus important, et pour qui le coût d’un scandale est le plus élevé. Aussi discriminons-nous les connexions politiques selon qu’elles impliquent des politiciens très en vue ou des politiciens à un niveau inférieur. Cette division se fonde sur l’hypothèse que les politiciens les plus exposés sont, ayant le plus à perdre d’un scandale, disposent de la marge de manœuvre la plus réduite en tant que dirigeants d’entreprise et sont donc les moins à même d’impacter la performance de l’entreprise. Nos résultats confortent la pertinence d’une telle redéfinition de la connexion politique en fonction de la visibilité des politiciens concernés. Nous montrons en particulier que les entreprises politiquement connectées qui empruntent auprès de banques politiquement connectées le font à des taux significativement inférieurs à celles non connectées, et que cet effet est plus important lorsque la connexion de l’emprunteur passe par un politicien moins exposé. Nos résultats suggèrent que l’effet est encore plus fort si la banque est elle aussi connectée par l’intermédiaire d’un politicien moins exposé. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que les entreprises connectées politiquement empruntent significativement moins auprès de banques connectées par l’intermédiaire d’un politicien très exposé médiatiquement. Nos résultats suggèrent enfin que cet effet est plus fort à l’approche d’élections, un moment il est particulièrement coûteux pour un politicien d’être soupçonné de manquement à la déontologie. / This thesis studies the impact of the composition of the board of directors on the firm financial performance. It consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, we review the literature on boards of directors. We show the evolution of corporate governance over the past decades, and how the efficiency of boards of directors has became a key issue for shareholders and regulators. After describing the theoretical and historical framework, we present and discuss the academic papers studying the impact of board composition on the firm performance. In the second and third chapters, we examine the impact of the presence of different directors on the board. In the second chapter, we provide a theoretical model that aims at understanding and determining the impact of employee representation on the board of directors on the shareholder value of the firm and on its investment horizon. Our results suggest that with employee representation, shareholders face a tradeoff between liquidity and information. We show that a firm with employee representation is more likely to invest in long-term rather than in short-term projects and that, because employees have access to valuable inside information, their presence on the board may increase the shareholder value. Consistent with some empirical studies, we offer some theoretical support for employee representation on the board. In the third chapter, we study the impact of political connections on the rate of interest of bank loans. We conduct a cross-country study of the impact of political connections on bank loans interest rates. While this topic has already been widely investigated, we offer a new definition of political connection. We subcategorize political connections into two categories: politicians with a high media exposure, and lower level politicians. Politicians with business ties bear the risk of being suspected of ethics breaching or of having conflicting interests, which can be costly for their reputation. We discriminate the political connections of firms based on the idea that with greater exposure comes greater risk of suspicion, and thus smaller ability to impact the firm performance. We study the impact of political connection of the borrower as well as of the lender on interest rates. Our results give support to our definition, as we find significant differences depending on the level of visibility of the political connections of the borrower and of the lender. Our results show that politically connected firms which borrow from politically connected banks enjoy a significantly lower rate if they are connected with lower level politicians. Our results suggest that the rate is even lower if the bank also is connected with lower level politicians. Furthermore, our results suggest that politically connected firms tend to avoid borrowing money from banks that are connected with top politicians. Our results also suggest that this effect is stronger in pre-election periods, when the potential cost for politicians of being suspected of collusion is higher.

This study examines how board diversity and characteristics of directors affect the financial and non-financial performance of Swedish state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs are characterized by state ownership, goal complexity, governmental funding and control and are therefore typical examples of hybrid organizations that purse both commercial and political logics. The board of directors (BODs) of SOEs as representatives of the shareholder serve as corporate governance mechanism to control and monitor the organization to achieve financial and non-financial targets. Further, the boards should compose of directors with the appropriate competence and experience as well as integrity and ethical values to govern the challenges for hybrid organizations.Therefore, information of the BODs on Swedish SOEs are conducted regarding their educational background, professional experience, multiple appointments, tenure, gender diversity and age diversity, as well as the amount of state representatives. Financial performance was measured by using Return on Assets and Return on Equity, while non-financial performance was measured as the fulfillment of non-financial goals and the amount of reported and disclosed GRI standards. Our eight research hypothesizes are all based on prior research on corporate governance concerning board diversity and firm performance in both private as well as public organizations. Moreover, institutional logics and upper echelons theory are used to explain the effects of the diversity characteristics on corporate performance. All hypothesizes were rejected due to insignificant relationship. Even though a significant relationship was indicated between professional experience of the directors and financial performance, the hypothesis was rejected, since the relationship was the opposite of the expected.One of the reasons for these results can be that institutional logics and competing goals prevent the BODs from focus too strong on either financial or non-financial targets.

The role of Governing Board under Czech legal regulation and the role of Board of Directors under English law This Diploma Thesis deals with the position and role of Governing Bodies of joint-stock companies under Czech and English law. In the first part, the author sets theoretical and economical reasons behind the management of a joint-stock company via Governing Body by way of descriptive and explanatory method, and concludes, that a Governing Body should be an instrument which mitigates the agency costs and provides for a flexibile system of governance. In the second part of the Thesis, the author deals with structure, position and role of a Governing Board and related interpretation problems of Czech regulation by way of description, analysis and synthesis. The author summarises the second part with a definition of czech Governing Board as a sui generis body with supervisory and managerial powers, whose position stands somewhere between Managing Board and Supervisory Board. The third part of the Thesis makes an excursion into English law through descriptive, analytic and synthetic method, where the author deals with history, structure, position and role of a Board of Directors as an english counterpart of czech Governing Board. The author defines Board of Directors through historical and...

Este trabalho tem como proposta analisar a regra prevista no art. 147, § 3º, da Lei das S.A., e compreender a efetiva extensão do interlocking board e seus impactos para a vida das companhias brasileiras. Com base na análise dos motivos que levaram à inclusão desse dispositivo, propõe-se uma nova abordagem interpretativa. Afasta-se uma concepção abrangente da hipótese de conflito de interesses contemplada no inciso II ou a interpretação autônoma da atuação em sociedade considerada concorrente, independentemente da existência de conflito de interesses. A proposta interpretativa, nesse sentido, aponta para a complementaridade dos dispositivos, de forma que ocorra o impedimento quando o conselheiro atuar em sociedade concorrente e, em decorrência disso, tiver interesse conflitante com o da companhia. Propõe, da mesma forma, um novo enfoque para o estudo das situações de conflito de interesses entre os administradores e a companhia, sugerindo uma desvinculação das conclusões obtidas com a análise do conflito de interesses do acionista (art. 115, § 1º) para aceitar a possibilidade de uma análise a priori do conflito de interesses entre o administrador e a companhia, ainda que identificável por critérios substanciais. / This work intends to study the Article 147, Paragraph 3, of the Brazilian Corporate Law (Law 6.404/76), and understand the actual extension of interlocking board and their impacts on the Brazilian companies. Based on the study of the reasons that led to the inclusion of this Article during Brazilian Corporate Law changes during the year of 2001, we propose a new interpretative approach. Disregarding a wide view of the conception of conflict of interest, under Article 147, Paragraph 3, Item II, and the autonomously conception of interlocking board, under Item I, regardless the existence of any related conflict of interests, we propose a complementary view of items I and II, so that the disqualification of the board of directors applicant occurs when he/she holds of a position in a competing company and, as a result, have conflicting interests with the company. We also propose a new approach to the study of conflict of interests between managers and the company, suggesting a disconnection of the conclusions from the analysis of conflict of interests between shareholders and the company (Article 115, Paragraph 1) to accept the possibility of a prior analysis of the conflict of interests between managers and the company, even with the use of a substantial criteria.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T16:44:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Adriane Cristina dos Santos de Almeida.pdf: 872430 bytes, checksum: eff9b0219cc013d004b1749834ce1ce5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-11-22 / The objective of this research is to map director s compensation in Brazil. Given that literature about board compensation is scarce in the country, a qualitative study was realized, consisting of several interviews with directors aiming to understand the Brazilian compensation framework. In order to identify the main compensation structures currently adopted, a quantitative study was realized with 165 companies listed in the special listing segments of corporate governance levels at BM&FBovespa, using compensation data from the year of 2010. Descriptive statistics was used in this analysis. From the 35 companies in this sample that pay incentives to directors, a deeper study was realized, about the types of incentives to directors, compensation policies and main metrics used to set compensation. This study also analyzed if director s compensation was given in the same parameters as those for executives. The study concluded that director s compensation for this sample is based exclusively on fixed remuneration as a consequence of Brazilian model of concentrated ownership control, in which shareholder is close to daily activities. In this model, directors focus mainly in monitoring and consulting roles, without much need to be incentivated. Remuneration based in performance is more disseminated for executives than for directors. No excessive alignment between directors and executives was verified. However, within the companies with more incentivebased remuneration, the short-term compensation incentives is more frequent / Esta dissertação tem como principal objetivo traçar um panorama da remuneração de conselheiros de administração no Brasil. Dada a escassez de literatura a respeito da remuneração de conselheiros de administração no país, foi realizada uma pesquisa qualitativa que consistiu em uma série de entrevistas buscando compreender o modelo brasileiro de remuneração de conselheiros. Para identificação das principais formas de remuneração atualmente praticadas, foi realizada uma pesquisa quantitativa com base em uma amostra de 165 companhias listadas nos níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa da BM&FBovespa e analisados dados de remuneração referentes ao ano de 2010, utilizando-se estatísticas descritivas. A partir das 35 empresas desta amostra que praticam remuneração variável ou baseada em ações para conselheiros, foi realizado estudo mais detalhado sobre os tipos de incentivo oferecidos aos conselheiros, as políticas de remuneração e as métricas utilizadas como parâmetro definição da remuneração. Também se buscou analisar se a remuneração baseada em desempenho dos conselheiros de administração segue os mesmos parâmetros da diretoria. Conclui-se que a remuneração dos conselheiros de administração para esta amostra é, sobretudo fixa, devido ao controle acionário concentrado no Brasil, em que o acionista encontra-se próximo ao dia-a-dia da empresa, com reduzida necessidade de incentivo aos conselheiros, que se atém aos papeis de aconselhamento e monitoramento. A remuneração baseada em incentivos para executivos é muito mais disseminada do que para conselheiros e não se verificou estímulo, através da remuneração, ao alinhamento excessivo entre conselheiros e executivos. Todavia, nas empresas em que a remuneração baseada em desempenho é mais disseminada para os conselheiros, ainda há grande participação de remuneração baseada no curto prazo