Inaug.-Diss.--Heidelberg. / Lebenslauf. Published in full, Heidelberg, C. Winter, 1907. iv, 107 p.

The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.

A dissertação tem como pretensão investigar especificamente a ideia rawlsiana da primazia do justo sobre o bem, explicitando, a partir desse conceito, a crítica de Rawls dirigida ao utilitarismo enquanto uma teoria moral abrangente. Buscamos mostrar que o pressuposto de Rawls é de que o utilitarismo se apresenta como uma teoria moral abrangente que tem como finalidade apresentar um critério geral (o princípio da maior felicidade, bemestar, prazer...) que se aplica a um amplo espectro de questões (senão a quase todas as questões). Do ponto de vista rawlsiano, em uma sociedade marcada por um pluralismo de concepções abrangentes de bem, as quais, na maioria das vezes, têm divergências profundas e irreconciliáveis, a teoria utilitarista não se presta como critério para a resolução de impasses morais e políticos. É preciso encontrar um conjunto de princípios capaz de fornecer um ponto de vista comum a partir do qual seja possível mediar às controvérsias provenientes das disputas entre estas diversas concepções. Nesse caso, a primazia do justo sobre o bem na teoria de Rawls tem o sentido de que os princípios de justiça não pressupõem nenhuma concepção específica de bem e de que eles colocam os limites às formas de vida pelas quais os cidadãos podem se empenhar em realizar as concepções do bem que julgam ser verdadeiras. / Submitted by Marcelo Teixeira (mvteixeira@ucs.br) on 2014-07-09T13:58:57Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Lucas Mateus Dalsotto.pdf: 1738021 bytes, checksum: a5ef09bda40571355eb2091299df9c16 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-09T13:58:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Lucas Mateus Dalsotto.pdf: 1738021 bytes, checksum: a5ef09bda40571355eb2091299df9c16 (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The dissertation is to investigate claims specifically Rawlsian idea of the primacy of the right over the good, explaining, the basis of this concept, the critique of Rawls addressed to utilitarianism as a moral theory comprehensively. We seek to show that Rawls's assumption that utilitarianism is presented as a comprehensive moral theory which aims to present a general criterion (the principle of the greatest happiness, well- being, pleasure...) that applies to a broad spectrum issues (if not almost all issues). The Rawlsian view, in a society marked by a pluralism of comprehensive conceptions of the good, which, in most cases, have profound and irreconcilable differences, the utilitarian theory does not lend itself as a criterion for resolving moral dilemmas and political. It needs to find a set of principles capable of providing a common point of view from which it is possible to mediate contentious disputes arising from these different conceptions. In this case, the primacy of the right over the good in Rawls' theory has the sense that the principles of justice does not presuppose any particular conception of the good and that they put limits to the ways of life in which citizens can engage in conduct conceptions of the good they believe to be true.

A dissertação tem como pretensão investigar especificamente a ideia rawlsiana da primazia do justo sobre o bem, explicitando, a partir desse conceito, a crítica de Rawls dirigida ao utilitarismo enquanto uma teoria moral abrangente. Buscamos mostrar que o pressuposto de Rawls é de que o utilitarismo se apresenta como uma teoria moral abrangente que tem como finalidade apresentar um critério geral (o princípio da maior felicidade, bemestar, prazer...) que se aplica a um amplo espectro de questões (senão a quase todas as questões). Do ponto de vista rawlsiano, em uma sociedade marcada por um pluralismo de concepções abrangentes de bem, as quais, na maioria das vezes, têm divergências profundas e irreconciliáveis, a teoria utilitarista não se presta como critério para a resolução de impasses morais e políticos. É preciso encontrar um conjunto de princípios capaz de fornecer um ponto de vista comum a partir do qual seja possível mediar às controvérsias provenientes das disputas entre estas diversas concepções. Nesse caso, a primazia do justo sobre o bem na teoria de Rawls tem o sentido de que os princípios de justiça não pressupõem nenhuma concepção específica de bem e de que eles colocam os limites às formas de vida pelas quais os cidadãos podem se empenhar em realizar as concepções do bem que julgam ser verdadeiras. / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The dissertation is to investigate claims specifically Rawlsian idea of the primacy of the right over the good, explaining, the basis of this concept, the critique of Rawls addressed to utilitarianism as a moral theory comprehensively. We seek to show that Rawls's assumption that utilitarianism is presented as a comprehensive moral theory which aims to present a general criterion (the principle of the greatest happiness, well- being, pleasure...) that applies to a broad spectrum issues (if not almost all issues). The Rawlsian view, in a society marked by a pluralism of comprehensive conceptions of the good, which, in most cases, have profound and irreconcilable differences, the utilitarian theory does not lend itself as a criterion for resolving moral dilemmas and political. It needs to find a set of principles capable of providing a common point of view from which it is possible to mediate contentious disputes arising from these different conceptions. In this case, the primacy of the right over the good in Rawls' theory has the sense that the principles of justice does not presuppose any particular conception of the good and that they put limits to the ways of life in which citizens can engage in conduct conceptions of the good they believe to be true.

Throughout his career as moral philosopher Hare has insisted that there is a rational way of arriving at substantive moral judgements. Hare develops this view - first presented in ' The language of morals' (1952) and ' Universalizability' (1955) - into the claim that rational agents are required to adopt utilitarian solutions to moral disputes. In ' Freedom and reason ' (1963) this claim is defended with reference to the view that the formal features of moral language (universalizability and prescriptivity)commit moral agents to a certain method of reasoning, and that this method of reasoning, when conjoined with facts about people's desires and preferences, leads us to accept substantive moral judgements consistent with those required by a form of utilitarianism. This view features throughout Hare's subsequent work, but the argument for it undergoes change. This means change in the defence of the claim that the meta-theory Universal Prescriptivism is consistent with a form of normative utilitarian theory, as this claim is argued for in 'Ethical theory and utilitarianism' (1976) and 'Moral Thinking' (1981). I shall endeavour to trace the chronological development of Hare's thinking, and will concentrate on developments in the argument for a theory of act-utilitarianism. I shall argue that the argument for utilitarianism gives rise to two major problems which arise from a specific feature of the argument, namely, the attempt to run the resolution of bi-lateral and multi-lateral cases of conflict along lines analogous to the resolution of conflict in the single-person case. Hare's argument requires that a decision-maker must identify the person with whom he reverses roles as himself, and that he must be prepared to concede that the things his recipient has good reasons for wanting are also reasons for him to want the same things. I argue that it is not possible to make coherent sense of the identity of the person in the reversed-role situation and that the motivational states a decision -maker is expected to deem 'his own' are not properly states of himself. If I am right, the 'identity'-question sits at the root of a motivational gap in Hare's theory.

One of the core issues in contemporary political philosophy is concerned with `political obligation.' Stated in an overly simplified way, the question being asked when one investigates political obligation is, "What, if anything, do citizens owe to their government and how are these obligations generated if they do exist?" The majority of political philosophers investigating this issue agree that a political obligation is a moral requirement to act in certain ways concerning political matters (e.g. a moral requirement to obey the laws and support one's country). Despite this agreement about the general nature of what is being searched for, a broad division has arisen between political obligation theorists - there are some who take political obligations to actually exist ("defenders of political obligation") and there are some who take there to be no general political obligation ("philosophical anarchists"). While there is debate within the camp defending political obligation about what it is that generates the obligations, the common core of all "defender theories" is the fundamental idea that one has a moral requirement(s) to support and obey the political institutions of one's country. Despite utilitarianism's status as one of the major ethical theories, historically, it has largely been dismissed by theorists concerned with political obligation. Within the contemporary debate it is generally accepted that utilitarianism cannot adequately accommodate a robust theory of political obligation. The overarching objective of this dissertation is to challenge this general dismissal of a utilitarian account and to build upon the two accounts which have been developed (R.M. Hare's and Rolf Sartorius') in offering a robust utilitarian theory of political obligation which can be considered a competitor to the other contemporary theories (i.e., theories of consent, gratitude, fair play or fairness, membership or association, and natural duty). However, as this utilitarian account of political obligation develops, the possibility will also emerge for a non-antagonistic relationship between the utilitarian theory on offer and the contemporary political obligation debate. The moral reasons posited by the traditional theories of political obligation (i.e., consent, fair play, gratitude, associative, and natural duty) can be included in and accommodated by my utilitarian account. The utilitarian account of political obligation can accept that there are many types of reasons explaining why broad expectations concerning individual and group behavior are created, and each type of reason can be understood as supporting the utilitarian claim that there are moral reasons for following the laws and supporting legitimate political authorities. Taken all together, my arguments will take the form of a three tiered response to the prevailing opinion that any utilitarian attempt to account for political obligations is doomed. The first tier contends that the utilitarian can consistently claim that there are moral reasons to follow the law. This is not a particularly strong claim, but it is one which has been denied by the vast majority of political theorists. The second tier of my argument addresses this apparent issue by contending that even the traditional deontological accounts of political obligation are not offering more than this. Lastly, it is contended that, given the contingent features of humans (i.e., intellectual fallibility, selfish biases, and the way moral education is tied to rules), the strength of the utilitarian political obligations is comparable to other accounts' analyses of the obligations.

Thesis advisor: Joshua Snyder / In my work I seek to define and understand the best consequences approach to correcting market failures that result in negative environmental outcomes. I do this by exploring the relationship between markets and environmental outcomes through the introduction of case studies. Additionally, I outline the policy solutions used to try to correct these failures. These case studies are evaluated using Peter Singer’s ethical framework as a criterion for best consequences. Based on this analysis, I argue for the use of economic policy to achieve policy goals set in accordance with the needs of stakeholders both human and non-human on an intertemporal scale. Economic terms often fail to capture the true value of natural resources, however, making the best consequences unattainable through such policies alone. Considering this, I argue that we must develop a fundamentally different understanding of consumption and commodities if we are to achieve the most beneficial outcome. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Yes / Despite the revival of interest in nineteenth century psychology and ethics in Britain during the 1980s, and the current debate around Utilitarian ethics in medicine (Buckle, 2005) and care (Offer, 2004), Utilitarian premises, understood as a psychological theory rather than as a moral philosophy, remain largely dormant in contemporary British Psychology. This is so despite their apparent survival in Behaviourism (Plaud & Vogeltanz, 1994). This article examines aspects of their decline within Victorian psychology, by focussing upon the relatively neglected psychological writings of Herbert Spencer. In doing so, it seeks to make a modest contribution to unravelling the complex changes in the nature of nineteenth-century psychology. In particular it is argued that, whilst some explanations of the decline of Utilitarian premises in the Victorian development of psychology focus upon the later part of the century and cultural or institutional factors, an examination of Spencer's works at the mid-century supports the view that changes were under way earlier. Whilst several explanations might be offered for this, changes in economic organisation and in the experience of individual agency are highlighted. The relation between Utilitarian psychology and Utilitarian ethics will then be considered. Finally, at this stage it should be possible to comment upon the significance of the marginalization of Utilitarian premises within the development of Victorian psychology for the contemporary debate about health resource allocation. / ESRC

No description available.

I denna uppsats tas McCloskeys argument mot handlingsutilitarismen upp. Handlingsutilitarismen innebär att en handling är rätt ifall den leder till mer totalt välbefinnande än någon annan alternativ handling. McCloskeys argument mot handlingsutilitarismen handlar om att utilitarismen leder till oacceptabla konsekvenser. Utilitarismen anser det vara rätt att mörda eller straffa oskyldiga i vissa situationer som McCloskey argumenterar emot och anser det vara oacceptabelt. McCloskeys argument handlar om en sheriff som bor i en stad, sheriffen står inför ett svårt val och det är att antigen sätta dit och avrätta en oskyldig man eller låta staden genomlida farliga upplopp som eventuellt kan ta fler liv. Detta argument använder McCloskeys för att visa att utilitarismen leder till motbjudande handlingar. Argument som kommer att framföras mot McCloskeys är att hans exempel är orealistiskt. Även att handlingar så som att döda eller likande oftast inte leder till maximering av det totala välbefinnandet. / In this essay, McCloskey's arguments against act utilitarianism will be discussed. Act utilitarianism states that an action is right if it produces more total well-being than any other alternative action. McCloskey's argument against act utilitarianism is that utilitarianism leads to unacceptable consequences. Utilitarianism considers it right to murder or punish innocent people in certain situations, which McCloskey argues against and considers unacceptable. McCloskey's argument involves a sheriff who lives in a town. The sheriff faces a difficult choice: either to convict and execute an innocent man or to let the town suffer through dangerous riots that could potentially take more lives. McCloskey uses this argument to show that utilitarianism leads to repugnant actions. Arguments that will be raised against McCloskey are that his example are unrealistic. Also, that actions such as killing often do not lead to the maximization of total well-being.