Cost-benefit analysis plays a significant role in the process of siting hazardous waste facilities throughout the United States. Controversy regarding definitively disparate, albeit unintentional, racist practices in reaching these siting decisions abounds, yet cost-benefit analysis stands incapable of commenting on normative topics. This thesis traces the developments of both cost-benefit analysis and its normative cousin utilitarianism by focusing on the impacts they have had on the contemporary environmental justice discourse and highlighting valid claims, misunderstandings, and sedimented ideas surrounding the popularity of cost-benefit analysis. This analysis ultimately leads to an alternative means of realizing environmental justice that both acknowledges the need for greater democratic interactions and attempts to work with, rather than against, the prevailing paradigm of reaching siting decisions.

Inom den statliga förvaltningen skall ansvarsutkrävande fungera som en garant för tjänstemännens myndighetsutövning. Det har emellertid anförts kritik mot att ansvarsutkrävandet har minskat på grund av ineffektiva processer inom den statliga förvaltningen. Det tillsynes minskade ansvarsutkrävandet avser att tydliggöras utifrån två kategorier av teoretiska förklaringar; om det föreligger en slapphetskultur eller om ansvarsutkrävandet sker på ett mer ändamålsenligt sätt. Denna uppsats syftar till att undersöka om minskningen av ansvarsutkrävande vid tjänsteförseelser inom den statliga förvaltningen är reell eller chimär. Studiet av ansvarsutkrävande har fordrat en kvalitativ metod och sker genom en fallstudie inom Försäkringskassan på lokal nivå. För att undersöka vilka uppfattningar i ansvarsfrågan som styr tillämpandet av ansvarsutkrävande inom myndigheten har tio intervjuer genomförts. Intervjupersonerna representerar olika yrkesroller som innefattas i den ansvarsutkrävande processen. De har utifrån sina erfarenheter beskrivit hur ansvarsutkrävande i praktiken sker inom myndigheten. Det empiriska materialet har analyserats utifrån tre teoretiska perspektiv; det rationella, det kulturella och det symboliska. Vilket har fört oss till slutsatsen att minskningen är chimär då myndigheten funnit mer ändamålsenliga sätt att utkräva ansvar. Det tillsynes minskade ansvarsutkrävandet kan förklaras av att myndigheten väljer att hantera tjänsteförseelser med kompetensutvecklande insatser. / Within the functions of government agencies, accountability is a necessity for civil servants to ensure that appropriate levels of authority are being exercised. However criticism has been raised, that inefficient processes within the government agencies have led to reduced accountability. This is to be explained from two categories of theoretical explanations; whether there exists a cultural looseness, or if accountability occurs in a more utilitarian way. The purpose of this study is to examine when misconduct takes place in a government agency, if reduced accountability is imminent or chimera. In order to better understand the perception of accountability in government agencies, the question has been examined regarding The Social Insurance Agency on a local level. The study requires a qualitative method and a case study limited to The Social Insurance Agency. Ten interviews were conducted. The respondents represent several different professions, with differing levels of accountability. Their perceptions have illustrated how accountability takes form in a government agency. The empirical material has been analyzed through three theoretical perspectives; the Rational, the Cultural, and the Symbolic. The conclusion is that the reduction is chimera. The Social Insurance Agency have found more utilitarian ways to hold civil servants accountable for their actions. The seemingly reduced accountability can be explained by an agency´s choice to deal with misconduct by using competence to improve actions.This study is written in Swedish.

Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacred from its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by the absolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moral standing. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to dispose of their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. In between the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient' embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure, for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moral considerability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible. Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In other words, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity with moral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What is the basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient? The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomy and function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that the advocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory in neurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours that look like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails to distinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers only the alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman's pain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral consideration living and non-living entities that deserve moral respect. The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocates present it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentience is not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Morele teorieë wat handeloor aborsie word dikwels as wedersyds uitsluitend beskou. "Pro-life" kampvegters hou oor die algemeen vol dat aborsie onder alle omstandighede moreel veroordeelbaar is, omdat die lewe van meet af heilig is. Daarteenoor hou die ekstreem-liberale oogpunt, wat deur "Pro-choice" voorstaanders ingeneem word, vol dat die ongeborene nie 'n persson is nie, en as sulks geen morele status het nie. Volgens hierdie standpunt is daar geen konflik van regte hier ter sprake nie; vroue het uitsluitelike beskikkingsreg oor hulle eie liggame. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om onder hierdie omstandighede 'n "nie-persoon" om die lewe te bring. Tussen hierdie twee ekstreme standpunte argumenteer party morele filosowe dat die voorbewuste embrio of fetus nie skade berokken kan word nie, omdat dit nie oor die vermoë beskik om pyn of plesier te voel nie. Dit is juis bewussyn en die vermoë om waar te neem wat morele status aan 'n entiteit (hetsy menslik of nie-menslik) verleen. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om 'n voorbewustw embrio of fetus te aborteer. Neurofilosofie basseer filosofiese gevolgtrekkinge op neurolgiese beginsels. Met andere woorde, so 'n standpunt sal eis dat 'n argument oor bewustheid op betroubare neurologiese feite gebasseer word, om sodoende met sekerheid morele status, al dan nie, aan de fetus of embrio toe te ken. Die vraag is dan: Wat is die basiese neuroanatomiese en neurofiologiese apparatuur waaroor 'n entiteit moet beskik om as bewus beskou te word? Die antwoord op hierdie vraag vereis dan ook 'n redelik grondige kennis van die evolusie, anatomie en funksie van die brein. Wanneer die vraagstuk van naderby beskou word, word dit duidelik dat voorstaanders van die bewustheids-argument oor die algemeen nie hulle standpunte op oortuigende, neurologiese feite berus nie. Hulle beweringe rus dan eerder op emosie en op waargenome optredes wat voorkom asof dit 'n reaksie op pyn is. Nog 'n tekortkoming van die bewustheids-argument is dat dit nie 'n onderskeid tref tussen die konsep van pyn en die van leiding nie, en dat dit as 'n utilitaristiese morele teorie slegs die beweerde pyn van die ge-aborteerde fetus in ag neem en nie die leiding van die swanger vrouw nie. Ten slotte neem die bewustheids-argument ook nie morele status van lewende en nie-lewende entiete, wat geregtig is op morele respek, in ag nie. Die hoof uitgangspunt van hierdie dissertasie is dan dat die bewustheids-argument, soos wat dit tans deur voorstanders daarvan voorgehou word, nie neurofilosfies begrond kan word nie. Dus is die argument vanuit 'n bewustheids-standpunt nie 'n oortuigende argument hetsy vir of teen aborsie nie.

Save the Children Fund (SCF) was at its foundation in 1919 a value-driven organization. The values, or guiding principles, of the founding generation are the lens through which I look at the history of SCF, and the associated histories of war and peace, human rights and NGO-state relations. These guiding principles are identified as universalism, utilitarianism and optimistic pacificism. They can be understood as a paradigm to which the social community which made up the founding generation of SCF gave their assent. The first chapter locates the founding generation within the political culture of the anti-war movement. Succeeding chapters detail the metamorphosis of SCIF from a'contentious social movement into a respectable national organization. As soon as the organization adopted a national rather than a universal orientation, the coordinates of all its guiding principles shifted. In particular the optimistic pacificism of the founding generation was replaced by pessimistic defencism. It was not until after the Cold War that SCIF began to realign itself with its original guiding principles. The three guiding principles are found to be of continuing relevance. Universalism has been reasserted as a positive creed leading SCF to seize political opportunities to reach out to children from all sides. The organization has adopted a utilitarian perspective that affirms the dynamic role of young people in generating their own futures. Lastly, the primacy attached to peace by war-affected people has underlined SCFs urgent mission to uphold an optimistic belief in the possibility of peace.

In this paper the concept of a ?human right? is analysed and clarified. Some justifications for human rights ? such as natural rights theory, contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights as vital interests ? are explored with respect to their emphasis on rights as protected choices or protected interests. Finally, a vital interests view is defended in which the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty of movement and political participation form the set of our basic rights without which we cannot enjoy our other rights.

This thesis comprises four chapters, in two parts. The first part examines the result of a Swedish payroll tax reduction; first from the perspective of the worker, then from that of the employer. The second half of the thesis concerns subjective well-being, both from an individual and from an aggregate viewpoint. Payroll Taxes and Youth Labor Demand. In 2007, the Swedish payroll tax was reduced substantially for young workers. This paper examines whether targeted payroll tax reductions are effective in raising youth employment. We estimate a small impact, both on employment and on wages. However, the effect differs markedly across ages, with 4–5 times higher impact on 22–23 year-olds compared to 25-year-olds. Additionally, the employment effects are strongly procyclical, approaching zero in the deep recession. We calculate that the estimated cost per created job is more than four times that of directly hiring workers at the average wage. Payroll Taxes and Firm Performance. The Swedish payroll tax reform of 2007 had the effect that firms' average social fees came to depend on the age structure of their employees. This makes it possible to estimate how firms respond to shocks in labor costs. We find a significant, but very small effect on gross investments, and a negative, but not statistically significant, impact on labor productivity. There are no effects on exit rates or profitability. Beyond Income: The Importance for Life Satisfaction of Having Access to a Cash Margin. We study how life satisfaction among adult Swedes is influenced by having access to a cash margin, i.e. a moderate amount of money that could be acquired on short notice either through own savings, by loan from family or friends, or by other means. We find that cash margin is a strong and robust predictor of life satisfaction, also when controlling for individual fixed-effects and socio-economic conditions, including income. This suggests that cash margin captures something beyond wealth. On Aggregating Subjective Well-Being. This paper discusses the assumptions underlying the aggregation of individually measured well-being. Any aggregation method is associated with measurability assumptions regarding the underlying well-being measure, as well as moral philosophical assumptions with respect to how individual well-being is weighted into a composite metric. I compare welfare across a set of countries, under alternative aggregation methods, and find that countries often can be ranked under comparatively weak measurement assumptions, and, equally important, that aggregation methods can be chosen so as to refrain from strong ethical preconceptions.

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Este trabalho tem por objetivo provar que há mais espaço para elaboração de regras morais no utilitarismo de Mill quando comparado ao utilitarismo de Bentham. Para que esta tese seja provada é necessário comprovar que a concepção de natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill é mais complexa do que a concepção de natureza humana de Bentham, pois é a ciência da natureza humana que constitui o fundamento das prescrições da moralidade. Esta tese provará que a natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Bentham resume-se a uma natureza humana dotada, principalmente, de uma razão capaz de formular cálculos complexos entre prazer e dor (que inclui a intensidade, proximidade, longinquidade, etc) para decidir sobre a melhor ação (aquela que aponta para o prazer, no cômputo geral do balanço). Em outras palavras, um apelo ao primeiro princípio, ao princípio de utilidade é efetuado a cada ação, questionando as regras do costume e reduzindo o espaço da moral a apenas ao princípio de utilidade. Para Mill, ao contrário, a natureza humana é mais complexa. Ela é composta, de leis da mente ou leis psicológicas, da tese hedonista (que significa que os indivíduos buscam prazer e evitam a dor, assim como para Bentham) e subteses da tese hedonista, como o fato de que os indivíduos, por natureza, agem por hábito, possuem faculdades elevadas das quais derivam prazeres de qualidade superior e possuem a capacidade de se transformar ao longo do tempo. Essas características da natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill permitem converter um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que prescreve que é correto buscar o prazer e fugir da dor como característica central, mas que ressalta que mais elementos precisam ser aventados para que se compreenda a busca do prazer ou a busca da felicidade. É precisamente quando a formulação do princípio de utilidade de Mill abre espaço para que mais elementos precisem ser expostos para que se entenda a busca do prazer ou a maximização da felicidade, que surge a possibilidade de elaboração de regras morais, preceitos ou princípios secundários que permitem que o agente guie-se no mundo prático. Em outras palavras, a natureza mais complexa do indivíduo teórico de Mill admite a elaboração de um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que dá margem à elaboração de uma moralidade também mais complexa, com mais regras morais (ainda que inicialmente embasadas em um cálculo de prazer) relativamente à moral de Bentham. / This work aims to prove that there is more place for the elaboration of moral rules in Mills utilitarianism when compared to Benthams utilitarianism. To prove this thesis it is necessary that Mills conception of human nature be more complex than Benthams conception of human nature, given the fact that it is science of human nature which holds the foundation of morality. This thesis will prove that human nature of Benthams individuals is resumed to a human nature which main feature is an instrumental reason, able to formulate complex calculations between pleasure and pain (which includes intensity, proximity, duration, etc of the pleasures and pains) to decide about the best action (the one which decides for pleasure, once made the balance). In other words, an appeal to the first principle, to the principle of utility is done in each action, questioning customary rules and reducing morality to the principle of utility. For Mill, on the contrary, human nature is more complex. It consists of laws of mind or psychological laws, of hedonistic thesis (which means that individuals look for pleasure and avoid pain in the same sense as Benthams individuals) and sub-thesis of hedonistic thesis, such as the fact that individuals act by habit, they have elevated faculties which derive pleasures of higher qualities and they hold the capacity of transforming themselves through time. Those human nature features of Mills individuals permits to formulate a more complex principle of utility which determines that it is right to look for pleasure and right to avoid pain as the main feature, but many more elements need to be sustained in order to achieve a better understanding of happiness. It is precisely when the formulation of Mills principle of utility opens room for more elements to explain the search of pleasure and the avoidance of pain or the maximization of happiness, that the possibility of formulation of moral rules becomes plausible. Secondary principles are necessary in Mills system to be formulated, so the agent can guide himself in the practical world without an appeal to the first principle in each action. In other words, Mills more complex individuals nature permits the elaboration of a more complex principle of utility which opens place for the elaboration of a more complex morality with more moral rules (even if, initially, those moral rules are grounded on a calculation between pleasure and pain) when compared to Benthams morality.

O Objetivo deste trabalho é estabelecer os limites entre a ética e a legislação, a partir da concepção teórica de Jeremy Bentham. Para atingir este objetivo, será efetuada uma reconstrução racional de seu sistema teórico, utilizando a Metodologia da Teoria da Ciência [MTC] e a Metodologia dos Programas de Pesquisa Científicos. Uma vez feita a reconstrução racional da concepção teórica de Bentham, tencionase demonstrar, por meio de elementos de sua sistemática, que o próprio princípio da utilidade estabelece a linha divisória entre ambos os campos. Ou seja, é o princípio da utilidade que ditará o raio de ação da lei e da ética, bem como seus limites. Será possível compreender que estabelecer as fronteiras entre a ética e a legislação, a partir do princípio de utilidade, significa, em última instância, fazer uma análise do balanço envolvendo prazer e dor. Em linguagem atual, pode-se dizer que este exame será aquele em termos de custo e benefício, pois, em muitos casos, a elaboração de legislação e aplicação de punição a determinadas transgressões tendem a gerar custos sociais mais elevados do que o benefício auferido. Em outras palavras, para alguns tipos de transgressão a legislação não deverá ser aplicada, mas apenas as regras da ética. / The aim of this work is to determine the limits between ethics and legislation through the theoretical conception of Jeremy Bentham. In order to achieve this aim, it will be done a rational reconstruction of his theoretical system, using The Methodology of Science Theory [MTC] and The Methodological of Scientific Research Programmes. Once done the Rational Reconstruction of the Bentham\'s Theoretical Conception, it will be demonstrated (through elements of his system) that the principle of utility indicates the limits between these fields. It means that, this principle will dictate the scope and the limits between the legislation and ethics. It will be possible to comprehend that establishing boundaries between ethics and legislation, through the principle of utility, means setting a balance analysis involving pleasure and pain. In contemporary language, it can be said that this examination will be done in terms of cost and benefit. The elaboration of legislation and the application of punishment to certain transgressions tend to generate social costs more elevated than the created benefit. In other words, the legislation shall not be applied to some kinds of transgressions, but only the rules of ethics.

La propriété intellectuelle peut être justifiée de deux façons opposées : selon la théorie utilitariste, la propriété intellectuelle est justifiée si, et seulement si, elle permet d’augmenter le bien-être de la société. A l’inverse, la justification déontologique de la propriété intellectuelle soutient que les individus ont un droit naturel sur le fruit de leur travail. Cette thèse propose de dépasser ce débat en opérant une réconciliation entre l’approche déontologique et utilitariste à la lumière de la dichotomie introduite par Rawls entre le libéralisme de la liberté et libéralisme du bonheur. La thèse examine dans quelle mesure la propriété intellectuelle peut être considérée un droit fondamental protégé par le libéralisme de la liberté tout en intégrant les objectifs du libéralisme du bonheur. Les résultats de la thèse montrent que cette réconciliation s’articule à travers la distinction entre les droits économiques et les droits moraux de la propriété intellectuelle. A la différence des droits moraux, la thèse montre que les droits économiques doivent être justifiés dans une perspective similaire, mais non identique, à la perspective utilitariste. / Intellectual property rights can be justified in two opposite ways: according to the utilitarian theory, the intellectual property is justified if, and only if, it increases the total well-being of the society. By contrast, the deontological justification of the intellectual property contends that individuals have a natural right over the output of their labor. This thesis aims to move beyond this debate in reconciling the deontological approach with the utilitarian approach in the light of a dichotomy introduced by Rawls between liberalism of freedom and liberalism of happiness. This thesis examine in what extent the intellectual property can be considered as a fundamental right protected by the liberalism of freedom while integrating the objectives of the liberalism of happiness. The results of the thesis show that the reconciliation is built mainly around a French legal-based distinction between the economics rights and the moral rights of the intellectual property. By contrast to moral rights, the thesis shows that these economic rights must be justified by a similar, but not identical, perspective to the one endorsed by utilitarianism.