Thesis (M.A.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Philosophy, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

<p>Do we have a moral duty to offer severely ill asylum- seeking children permanent residence permits?</p><p>This thesis analyses our moral duty to offer 410 severely ill asylum-seeking children permanent residence permits. During 2004 an emotionally charged debate started in Sweden. The debate concerned the deportation of 410 severely ill asylum- seeking children and their families. For this and other reasons Sweden was criticized by the United Nations commission along with human rights organizations for being too restrictive in its migration and asylum politics. My thesis outlines the migration and asylum debate and the refugee situation in the world at present together with facts about how the asylum procedure takes place in Sweden. Further I draw upon medical research connected to the asylum procedure along with how the Swedish Government and Save the Children respond to the migration and asylum debate.</p><p>I also explore which rights, in terms of legal implications and ethical principles, these children have. Additional I outline theories in political philosophy from the utilitarian and communitarian tradition. The two philosophers I refer to are Michael Walzer and Peter Singer to apply their views to my primary question. Finally, I reach a critical analysis where I summarize and discuss my research. In the end I offer my final reflections in order to further debate on migration and asylum issues.</p>

<p>Abortion is clearly one of the most controversal and divisive contemporary moral problems. This thesis is an investigation upon significant number of important, fundemental ethical questions in relation to policy of abortion in Nigeria.</p>

Abortion is clearly one of the most controversal and divisive contemporary moral problems. This thesis is an investigation upon significant number of important, fundemental ethical questions in relation to policy of abortion in Nigeria.

Do we have a moral duty to offer severely ill asylum- seeking children permanent residence permits? This thesis analyses our moral duty to offer 410 severely ill asylum-seeking children permanent residence permits. During 2004 an emotionally charged debate started in Sweden. The debate concerned the deportation of 410 severely ill asylum- seeking children and their families. For this and other reasons Sweden was criticized by the United Nations commission along with human rights organizations for being too restrictive in its migration and asylum politics. My thesis outlines the migration and asylum debate and the refugee situation in the world at present together with facts about how the asylum procedure takes place in Sweden. Further I draw upon medical research connected to the asylum procedure along with how the Swedish Government and Save the Children respond to the migration and asylum debate. I also explore which rights, in terms of legal implications and ethical principles, these children have. Additional I outline theories in political philosophy from the utilitarian and communitarian tradition. The two philosophers I refer to are Michael Walzer and Peter Singer to apply their views to my primary question. Finally, I reach a critical analysis where I summarize and discuss my research. In the end I offer my final reflections in order to further debate on migration and asylum issues.

This dissertation reviews the history and discourse of the debate regarding the use of unnamed sources in journalism. A quantitative and qualitative content analysis explores how the use of anonymous sources has changed over the years. The ethics justifying their use are examined through the lens of utilitarianism. The author offers guidelines for their future use.

Demandingness-based objections to utilitarianism and other consequentialist moral theories constitute the most important problem facing moral philosophers today. In this Thesis, I offer an explanation of what makes the demandingness objection compelling, namely, that utilitarianism alienates us from the projects and goals that define us as individual human beings (normally taken to be a separate objection). This suggests that solving the problems demandingness considerations present involves carving out a space for these projects and goals alongside the demands of a consequentialist morality; thus, we have two nearly independent sources of normative reasons, and the real question is how they interact. Various suggestions for answering this question are considered and rejected. I also discuss how Alastair Norcross’ scalar utilitarianism “solves” the demandingness problem, what the costs of this solution are, and how it might be integrated into a theory concerning the aforementioned interaction. / February 2008

In this paper the concept of a ?human right? is analysed and clarified. Some justifications for human rights ? such as natural rights theory, contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights as vital interests ? are explored with respect to their emphasis on rights as protected choices or protected interests. Finally, a vital interests view is defended in which the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty of movement and political participation form the set of our basic rights without which we cannot enjoy our other rights.

The purpose of this essay is, in a political philosophy perspective, to offer an illumination of John Stuart Mill¡¦s thoughts on modernity. In this essay, firstly, in the first chapter, I will try to elaborate the reason why I write this essay and take a perspective of history and political philosophy as my analytic viewpoint. Moreover, I also briefly introduce Mill¡¦s writings and the frameworks of this essay. In the second chapter, I describe the events, movements, and thoughts that gradually shape the modernity. From the standpoints of Weber, Hume and Romanticism, I also refer to one of the most important characteristics of modernity in political philosophy: value pluralism. In Mill¡¦s thoughts, how to response to the problem derived from value pluralism is my most important discourse. In the following chapter, I offer an exposition to detail Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, focusing on his utilitarianism and liberalism. I mainly discuss how Mill¡¦s principles of utility and liberty response to the problem derived from value pluralism. I also discuss two contemporary thinkers¡¦ thoughts to find Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, namely John Rawls and John Gray. In the fourth chapter, I assess and review the criticisms on Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity. In the conclusion chapter, I briefly go through the major viewpoints of this essay.

Advance directives are instructions given by patients – or potential patients – specifying what actions ought to be taken for their health in the event that they are no longer capable to make decisions due to illness or incapacity. Over the last decades, there has been a rising tide in favour of advance directives: not only is the use of such directives recommended by most medical and advisory bodies, they are also gaining increasing legal recognition in many parts of the world. This book, however, takes as its point of departure one of the most commonly discussed medical-ethical arguments against granting advance directives moral force: the Objection from Personal Identity. The adherers of this objection basically asserts that when there is lacking psychological continuity between the person who formulated the advance directive and the later patient to whom it supposedly applies, this seriously threatens the directive’s moral authority. And, further, that this is so because lacking sufficient psychological continuity implies that the author of the advance directive is numerically distinct from the later patient. Although this argument has some initial appeal, most philosophers in the advance directives debate maintain that the Objection from Personal Identity fails, but suggest different reasons as to why. Whereas some argue that the objection has no force because it rests on faulty beliefs about personal identity, others argue that we ought to grant advance directives moral authority even if the author and the later patient are numerically distinct beings. This book investigates some of the most influential of these arguments and reaches the conclusion that the Objection from Personal Identity has more to it than is usually recognized in the medical-ethical debate. Lacking sufficient psychological continuity between author and later patient, it is concluded, does threaten the moral authority of the advance directive.