Submitted by Cristiane Oliveira (cristiane.oliveira@fgv.br) on 2011-06-03T15:27:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100245.pdf: 1185208 bytes, checksum: 1c92dd32cf10e3a490cb68ccd33a95ab (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-03T16:42:42Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100245.pdf: 1185208 bytes, checksum: 1c92dd32cf10e3a490cb68ccd33a95ab (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Vera Lúcia Mourão(vera.mourao@fgv.br) on 2011-06-03T16:57:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100245.pdf: 1185208 bytes, checksum: 1c92dd32cf10e3a490cb68ccd33a95ab (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2011-06-03T17:04:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 66080100245.pdf: 1185208 bytes, checksum: 1c92dd32cf10e3a490cb68ccd33a95ab (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-12-17 / This paper consists of a study on interest rates sensitivity and adverse selection through personal loans offers in credit cards considering two different samples conducted by a major Brazilian financial institution. Each one of the public was randomly divided into subgroups that received identical personal loan offers, changing the interest rate only. We analyzed the response rate for each subgroup as well as some risk characteristics for all customers within one year after the loan offer. For both audiences was found that customers who accepted the loan had a higher credit risk in comparison to those ones who did not hire. For the higher income public, interest rate has significantly contributed to both the acceptance of the loan and risk level of customers. Lower interest rates offers converted a greater number of customers into loans and customers who accept offers with lower interest rate showed to have a lower risk level than those who contracted the loan with higher interest rates. For lower income public, interest rate was found to be insensitive both in the acceptance rate of the loan and customers risk level, i.e. customers did not take into account the interest rate when analyzing response rates (the response rate was the same for different interest rates) and no differentiation of risk level, unlike what happened with higher income public. / O trabalho consiste em um estudo sobre sensibilidade a juros e seleção adversa por meio de ofertas de empréstimo pessoal atrelado ao cartão de crédito para dois públicos de rendas diferentes realizado por uma grande instituição financeira brasileira. Cada um dos públicos foi dividido aleatoriamente em subgrupos que receberam ofertas de empréstimo pessoal idênticas, alterando-se apenas a taxa de juros. Foi analisada a taxa de resposta para cada subgrupo, assim como as características de todos os clientes até um ano após a oferta do empréstimo. Para os dois públicos foi constatado que clientes que aceitam o empréstimo possuem maior risco de crédito em comparação com os clientes que não contratam o mesmo. Para o público de renda mais alta, a taxa de juros mostrou ser fator importante tanto na aceitação do empréstimo quanto no nível de risco dos clientes. Taxas de juros mais baixas converteram uma maior quantidade de clientes em contratos de empréstimo, sendo que estes possuíam menor risco de crédito do que aqueles que contratam o empréstimo com taxas mais altas. Para o público de renda mais baixa, a taxa de juros mostrou ser insensível tanto na taxa de aceitação do empréstimo quanto no nível de risco dos clientes, ou seja, clientes não levaram em consideração a taxa de juros quando analisamos taxas de respostas (o nível de aceitação foi o mesmo para taxas de juros diferentes) e não houve diferenciação de nível de risco para as taxas de juros ofertadas, ao contrário do que aconteceu com o público de renda mais alta.

[pt] Adequação e validação de métodos econométricos para quantificar o impacto da padronização (normalização) de produtos no consumo e no bem estar dos consumidores. Três são os objetivos centrais da presente pesquisa: (i) caracterização do impacto da implementação da padronização na produção de açúcar, (ii) desenvolvimento de metodologia para a quantificação do impacto da implementação da padronização (normalização de pré-medidos) sobre o nível de produção e, portanto, sobre o bem-estar dos consumidores e (iii) análise do acervo de normas e regulamentação técnica aplicável ao setor açucareiro. Como motivação o trabalho mostra que funções da tecnologia industrial básica constituem de fato instrumentos de redução da assimetria da informação. O trabalho se desenvolveu no recente contexto de implementação de políticas públicas sociais que visam à melhoria do bem-estar de consumidores de baixa renda. O trabalho se desenvolveu em conformidade aos seguintes preceitos metodológicos: (i) revisão da literatura relacionada à assimetria da informação com o propósito de comprovar a hipótese de que a padronização de produtos pode de fato reduzir a assimetria informação; (ii) análise econométrica das sérias históricas da produção brasileira de açúcar. Os resultados do trabalho mostraram que a padronização do açúcar (normalização de pré-medidos), se devidamente implementada, pode implicar na melhoria no bem estar dos consumidores. Uma análise contra-factual clássica dos resultados consolidados mostrou que a padronização brasileira do açúcar reduziu a assimetria da informação presenciada nesse mercado, impactando num aumento de cerca de 8 porcento na produção de açúcar em 2006 devido `a padronização do produto implementada em 1992. Como conclusão a análise econométrica permitiu mostrar que a padronização de produtos constitui-se numa ferramenta estratégica a serviço do Estado promover a competitividade e como instrumento de redução de assimetria da informação em benefício do consumidor e de redução de distorções de mercados. / [en] There are two objetives in this Master dissertation in Metrology: (i) characterization of the impact of the implementation of the standardization in the production of sugar and (ii) development of methodology for quantifying the impact of the implementation of the standardization on the production level and, therefore, on the welfare of consumers. The work was motivated by the use of functions of basic industrial technology to reduce the asymmetric information as market failure is able to generate deficiencies. The investigation was developed in the recent context characterized by the implementation of social public policies aimed to improve the low income consumer s welfare. The work was developed in accordance to the following methodological precepts: (i) review of the literature on asymmetric information in order to verify the hypothesis that the products standardization can reduce the asymmetric information, generating an improvement in the consumer s welfare; (ii) econometric analysis of the Brazilian sugar production time series. As a result, the research shows that the sugar standardization, if correctly implemented, induces consumer s welfare. A contra-factual analysis of the consolidated results has shown that the Brazilian sugar standardization reduced the asymmetric information in this market. The impact of this policy was an increase in roughly 8 percent in the sugar production in 2006 due to the product standardization implemented in 1992. As a conclusion, the econometric analysis developed show that the standardization of products can be considered a powerful strategic tool. Not only to promote specific sector competitiveness, but also as an instrument to reduce the asymmetric information to the benefit of consumers.

Este estudo faz uma análise teórica e empírica dos processos de licitação e contratação de obras e reformas de prédios públicos em uma Universidade Pública Federal, utilizando a Teoria da Informação Assimétrica e dos Contratos. O período da pesquisa foi entre 2010 a 2013, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo que foram analisados 127 processos licitatórios e contratos. As análises revelaram diversas ocorrências em licitações e nas contratações de obras e reformas. Na etapa licitatória, anterior à contratação (ex ante), a sessão para lances das licitações de obras e reformas, em alguns casos, estiveram desertas. Na contratação e execução de obras e reformas (ex post), foram constatados diversos pedidos de prorrogação de prazos e de reequilíbrio econômico financeiro, e na fiscalização das obras e reformas foram constatadas 31 ocorrências nos serviços finalizados pelas Empreiteiras. Os resultados também indicaram que, do total dos processos analisados no período de 2010 – 2013, cerca de 30% das obras e reformas ainda não foram finalizadas ou estão suspensas, o que demonstra deficiências na fiscalização e na gestão dos contratos. Além disso, o tempo médio entre a abertura do processo e a conclusão dos serviços gira em torno de três anos, sendo que grande parte deste tempo foi despendido com procedimentos internos da UFRGS. Tais fatos indicam problemas de seleção adversa e assimetria de informações, além do Hold up problem, em que o Principal é tomado como refém pelo Agente e do problema do Risco moral (Moral Hazard), em que o Agente passa a agir de modo não apropriado ou não aprovado pelo Principal, com a ocorrência dos custos de transação. / This study makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the processes of bidding and contracting works and reforms of public buildings in a Federal Public University, using Asymmetric Information Theory and Contracts. The period analyzed was between 2010 and 2013, at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, being that 127 bidding processes and contracts were analyzed. The analyses revealed several occurrences in tenders and hiring of work and restoration. In the bidding phase, prior to hiring (ex ante), the bidding session for work and renovations, in some cases, was deserted. There were several requests for deadline extension, and economic-financial adjustment in the work and restoration hiring and execution (ex post), while in the inspection of work and restoration it could be noticed 31 occurrences in services finalized by the contractors. The results also indicated that, of the total number of processes analyzed in the period 2010-2013, about 30% either have not been completed or are suspended, which shows deficiencies in the supervision and management of the contracts. In addition, the average time between the opening of the process and the conclusion of services is about three years, and much of this time was spent with internal procedures of UFRGS. These facts indicate problems of adverse selection and information asymmetry , in addition to the "Hold up problem", in which the Principal is taken hostage by the Agent besides the problem of Moral Hazard, when the Agent begins to act inappropriately or in a way which is disapproved by the Principal, together with the incidence of transaction costs.

Submitted by Victor Mauro Salomoni dos Reis (victoreis@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-09-30T20:20:30Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ensaios sobre seleção adversa e risco moral no mercado de crédito2.pdf: 1482544 bytes, checksum: 346d452e357d0cdb84e1b27c0be893bf (MD5) / Rejected by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br), reason: Victor, Além do título diferente da Ata tembém a ficha catalográfica não tem o CDU. Att. Suzi 3799-7876 on 2012-10-01T15:38:29Z (GMT) / Submitted by Victor Mauro Salomoni dos Reis (victoreis@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-10-09T13:13:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Ensaios sobre seleção adversa e risco moral no mercado de crédito.pdf: 1326341 bytes, checksum: 71261b6ac833c4238367fd1d58c725ce (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2012-10-09T14:13:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Ensaios sobre seleção adversa e risco moral no mercado de crédito.pdf: 1326341 bytes, checksum: 71261b6ac833c4238367fd1d58c725ce (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-10-09T14:39:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Ensaios sobre seleção adversa e risco moral no mercado de crédito.pdf: 1326341 bytes, checksum: 71261b6ac833c4238367fd1d58c725ce (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-09-06 / Transactions involve a degree of uncertainty. A contract can not be completely efficient when one side has more information than another, giving rise to a problem of asymmetric information. There are two important problems of asymmetric information: adverse selection and moral hazard, which appear in the Lender-Borrower relationship. Governments have some ways to reduce information asymmetry in the credit market and encourage lending operations in the country. Lender legal protection and the existence of credit bureaus are institutions that contribute to the development of the credit market. The motivation of this research is to analyze the impact on credit market, of the availability of credit information from borrowers, coupled with the importance of the lender legal right. Analyses are conducted to clarify the effects of these institutions on banking spreads, credit default and credit to GDP. Going beyond the literature reviewed, this study empirically examines the effect of bank concentration in information sharing. Another distinctive point of this dissertation is the use of panel technique for the research. The results were: identification of the influence of bank concentration on the depth of information shared, suggestions about the role of public bureaus opening the credit market and indication of complementarity between the exchange of credit information and the legal right. Finally, this study explored nonlinear relationships of the variables identifying the levels that they bring significant impact to the credit market. / Transações envolvem certo grau de incerteza. Um contrato pode não ser completamente eficiente quando um dos lados possui mais informação que o outro surgindo assim, um problema de assimetria de informação. Há dois importantes problemas de assimetria de informação: Seleção adversa e Risco moral, que aparecem na relação Credor-Tomador. Os governos possuem algumas ferramentas para diminuir a assimetria de informação, no mercado de crédito e fomentar as operações de crédito do país. Proteção legal dos credores e a existência dos bureaus de crédito são instituições que contribuem para o desenvolvimento do mercado privado de crédito. A motivação deste trabalho é analisar os impactos no ambiente de crédito, da disponibilidade de informação dos tomadores, aliada à importância dos diretos do credor. Neste sentido, são realizados ensaios sobre o efeito destes quesitos no spread bancário, inadimplência e volume de crédito sobre PIB. Indo além da literatura revisada, este trabalho estuda empiricamente o efeito da concentração bancária, no compartilhamento de informações de crédito dos clientes. São realizados três ensaios buscando esclarecer esse tema. Outro ponto diferenciado desta dissertação é o uso de técnica de painel para a realização dos ensaios. Os resultados encontrados foram: identificação da influência da concentração bancária na profundidade das informações compartilhadas, sugestão sobre a função bureaus públicos em abrir o mercado de crédito de um país e indicação da complementariedade entre a troca de informação de crédito e o direto legal. Por fim, este trabalho explorou relações não lineares das variáveis para identificar os níveis que elas trazem impacto significativo ao mercado de crédito.

Essay I: This essay provides an overview of the history of the Swedish pension system. Starting with the implementation of the public pension system in 1913, it outlines the key components of each major pension reform up until today along with a discussion of the main trade-offs and concerns that policy makers have faced. It also describes the historical background of the four largest occupational pension plans in Sweden and the mutual influence between these plans and the public pension system.        Essay II: Despite the fact that the increasing involvement of the private sector in pension provision has brought more flexibility to the pay-out phase of retirement, little is known about the characteristics of those who choose to annuitize their pension wealth and those who do not. I combine unique micro-data from a large Swedish occupational pension plan with rich national administrative data to study the choice between life annuities and fixed-term payouts with a minimum payout length of 5 years for 183,000 retiring white-collar workers. I find that low accumulation of assets is strongly associated with the choice of the 5-year payout. Consistent with individuals selecting payout length based on private information about their mortality prospects, individuals who choose the 5-year payout are in worse health, exhibit higher ex-post mortality rates and have shorter-lived parents than annuitants. Individuals also seem to respond to large, tax-induced changes in annuity prices.            Essay III: This essay estimates the causal effect of postponing retirement on a wide range of health outcomes using Swedish administrative data on cause-specific mortality, hospitalizations and drug prescriptions. Exogenous variation in retirement timing comes from a reform which raised the age at which broad categories of Swedish local government workers were entitled to retire with full pension benefits from 63 to 65. The reform caused a remarkable shift in the retirement distribution of the affected workers, increasing the actual retirement age by more than 4.5 months. Instrumental variable estimation results show no effect of postponing retirement on the overall consumption of health care, nor on the risk of dying early. There is evidence, however, of a reduction in diabetes-related hospitalizations and in the consumption of drugs that treat anxiety. Essay IV (with Per Engström): The consumption based method to estimate underreporting among self-employed, introduced by Pissarides and Weber (1989), is one of the workhorses in the empirical literature on tax evasion/avoidance. We show that failure to account for transitory income fluctuations in current income may overestimate the degree of underreporting by around 40 percent. Previous studies typically use instrumental variable methods to address the issue. In contrast, our access to registry based longitudinal income measures allows a direct approach based on more permanent income measures. This also allows us to evaluate the performance of a list of instruments widely used in the previous literature. Our analysis shows that capital income is the most suitable instrument in our application, while education and housing related measures do not seem to satisfy the exclusion restrictions.

The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.

The financial crisis in the USA is due to its great consequences still considered to be current topic. Its causes were discussed and analyzed by many researchers, but mostly from the financial point of view. This thesis takes different approach and identifies the role of the moral hazard in the pre-crisis period. Moral hazard is very often underestimated and for many people uninteresting factor. Therefor, the thesis is divided into four parts, which present the theoretical background of moral hazard and bring up the importance and constant presence of it in today's world. The main part of this work is last chapter, which analyzes moral hazard in the causes of the financial crisis. Moral hazard played key role in the pre-crisis period when it was present at all possible levels deforming the behavior of market players and causing the market failure. The deformation had mostly form of excessive risk-taking, unfavourable financial products and abuse of the information asymmetry. Very specific and dangerous kind of moral hazard is associated with the government interventions such as Greenspan doctrine or Too big to fail policy. It is because of its systematic character, when opposed to the moral hazard in the private sector is not required the presence of information asymmetry.

博士（商学） / 乙第395号 / 63p / 一橋大学

The current thesis explores a relatively new academic topic – equity-based crowdfunding. The purpose is to examine which quality signals, used by the entrepreneurs in their fundraising process, tend to increase the probability of closing an equity-based crowdfunding campaign successfully. The findings in this thesis serve as an additional contribution to a relatively unexplored topic of signaling in equity crowdfunding. Besides a theoretical contribution, it provides practical insights that may help entrepreneurs and crowdfunding platforms to increase the probability of successful campaign closure. The data for this study was collected from an international crowdfunding platform Fundedbyme.com. The explanatory variables, both continuous and binary, were divided into several thematic groups, while the dependent variable was defined by either successful or unsuccessful outcome of the campaign. The effect of the explanatory variables on the outcome of the campaign was tested with the help of the logistic regression (logit) model. The results showed that crowd investors in the network of Fundedbyme.com use particular quality signals to distinguish between the projects, in fact, both financial signals and more qualitative signals. Increases in the financial signals such as funding goal and price per share affect the probability of success negatively, while the presence of the qualitative signals (received awards and the indication of the non-executive board) contribute to a higher probability of success. Secondly, the results imply some similarities between the selecting mechanism in traditional funding, reward-based and the equity-based crowdfunding. As a third point, this research shows that the presence of a specific selecting mechanism in crowdfunding helps to some extent decrease the information asymmetry and adverse selection in the market of crowdfunding.

Föränderlig, ofullständig eller osäkerhet kring informationen från företagslåntagare kan skapa betydande utmaningar med kreditrisker för bankerna. På grund av detta ser banker de små och medelstora företagen (SMF) som högre risk. Tidigare forskning tyder på att följder av informationsasymmetri är att banker försvårar företagens tillgång till finansiering. Utifrån detta är syftet med denna studie att beskriva och analysera hur de svenska storbankerna hanterar kreditriskerna vid utlåning till SMF, samt vilka likheter och skillnader det finns mellan bankerna. Med användningen av en kvalitativ datainsamlingsmetod genomfördes semistrukturerade intervjuer med relevanta bankanställda på SEB, Handelsbanken och Swedbank från vilket en tydlig empiri kunde sammanställas. Detta analyserades sedan utifrån teorin om negativt urval och minskad kapitalkostnad samt signaleringsteorin.  Studien fann att de svenska storbankernas strategier för kreditriskhanteringen vid utlåning till SMF utgår från liknande delar. Detta för att både kunna identifiera, förebygga och åtgärda eller minska påverkan från kreditrisker. Skillnaderna mellan bankernas strategier i kreditriskhantering ses i hur de genomför vissa processer och vad de främst fokuserar på vid utlåningen till SMF. Dessa skillnader ses inom vilka externa källor storbankerna använder för informationsinsamling, vilka som har ansvaret för beslutet om kreditvärdighet och om banken använder standardiserade lånevillkor eller inte. / Changing, incomplete or uncertain information from corporate borrowers can create significant credit risk challenges for banks. Because of this, banks see the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) as higher risk. Previous research suggests that consequences of information asymmetry are that banks make it more difficult for companies to access financing. Based on this, the purpose of this study is to describe and analyze how the major Swedish banks manage credit risks when lending to SMEs, as well as what similarities and differences exist between the banks. Using a qualitative data collection method, semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant bank employees at SEB, Handelsbanken and Swedbank from which a clear empirical record could be compiled. This was analyzed based on the theory of adverse selection and reduced cost of capital, as well as the signalling theory.  The study found that the major Swedish banks strategies for credit risk management when lending to SMEs are based on similar elements. This is to be able to both identify, prevent and remedy or reduce the impact from credit risks. The differences between the banks strategies in credit risk management are seen in how they carry out certain processes and what they mainly focus on when lending to SMEs. These differences are seen in which external sources the big banks are using for information gathering, who is responsible for the decision on creditworthiness and whether the bank uses standardized loan terms or not.