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Essay I: This essay provides an overview of the history of the Swedish pension system. Starting with the implementation of the public pension system in 1913, it outlines the key components of each major pension reform up until today along with a discussion of the main trade-offs and concerns that policy makers have faced. It also describes the historical background of the four largest occupational pension plans in Sweden and the mutual influence between these plans and the public pension system.        Essay II: Despite the fact that the increasing involvement of the private sector in pension provision has brought more flexibility to the pay-out phase of retirement, little is known about the characteristics of those who choose to annuitize their pension wealth and those who do not. I combine unique micro-data from a large Swedish occupational pension plan with rich national administrative data to study the choice between life annuities and fixed-term payouts with a minimum payout length of 5 years for 183,000 retiring white-collar workers. I find that low accumulation of assets is strongly associated with the choice of the 5-year payout. Consistent with individuals selecting payout length based on private information about their mortality prospects, individuals who choose the 5-year payout are in worse health, exhibit higher ex-post mortality rates and have shorter-lived parents than annuitants. Individuals also seem to respond to large, tax-induced changes in annuity prices.            Essay III: This essay estimates the causal effect of postponing retirement on a wide range of health outcomes using Swedish administrative data on cause-specific mortality, hospitalizations and drug prescriptions. Exogenous variation in retirement timing comes from a reform which raised the age at which broad categories of Swedish local government workers were entitled to retire with full pension benefits from 63 to 65. The reform caused a remarkable shift in the retirement distribution of the affected workers, increasing the actual retirement age by more than 4.5 months. Instrumental variable estimation results show no effect of postponing retirement on the overall consumption of health care, nor on the risk of dying early. There is evidence, however, of a reduction in diabetes-related hospitalizations and in the consumption of drugs that treat anxiety. Essay IV (with Per Engström): The consumption based method to estimate underreporting among self-employed, introduced by Pissarides and Weber (1989), is one of the workhorses in the empirical literature on tax evasion/avoidance. We show that failure to account for transitory income fluctuations in current income may overestimate the degree of underreporting by around 40 percent. Previous studies typically use instrumental variable methods to address the issue. In contrast, our access to registry based longitudinal income measures allows a direct approach based on more permanent income measures. This also allows us to evaluate the performance of a list of instruments widely used in the previous literature. Our analysis shows that capital income is the most suitable instrument in our application, while education and housing related measures do not seem to satisfy the exclusion restrictions.

Este estudo faz uma análise teórica e empírica dos processos de licitação e contratação de obras e reformas de prédios públicos em uma Universidade Pública Federal, utilizando a Teoria da Informação Assimétrica e dos Contratos. O período da pesquisa foi entre 2010 a 2013, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo que foram analisados 127 processos licitatórios e contratos. As análises revelaram diversas ocorrências em licitações e nas contratações de obras e reformas. Na etapa licitatória, anterior à contratação (ex ante), a sessão para lances das licitações de obras e reformas, em alguns casos, estiveram desertas. Na contratação e execução de obras e reformas (ex post), foram constatados diversos pedidos de prorrogação de prazos e de reequilíbrio econômico financeiro, e na fiscalização das obras e reformas foram constatadas 31 ocorrências nos serviços finalizados pelas Empreiteiras. Os resultados também indicaram que, do total dos processos analisados no período de 2010 – 2013, cerca de 30% das obras e reformas ainda não foram finalizadas ou estão suspensas, o que demonstra deficiências na fiscalização e na gestão dos contratos. Além disso, o tempo médio entre a abertura do processo e a conclusão dos serviços gira em torno de três anos, sendo que grande parte deste tempo foi despendido com procedimentos internos da UFRGS. Tais fatos indicam problemas de seleção adversa e assimetria de informações, além do Hold up problem, em que o Principal é tomado como refém pelo Agente e do problema do Risco moral (Moral Hazard), em que o Agente passa a agir de modo não apropriado ou não aprovado pelo Principal, com a ocorrência dos custos de transação. / This study makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the processes of bidding and contracting works and reforms of public buildings in a Federal Public University, using Asymmetric Information Theory and Contracts. The period analyzed was between 2010 and 2013, at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, being that 127 bidding processes and contracts were analyzed. The analyses revealed several occurrences in tenders and hiring of work and restoration. In the bidding phase, prior to hiring (ex ante), the bidding session for work and renovations, in some cases, was deserted. There were several requests for deadline extension, and economic-financial adjustment in the work and restoration hiring and execution (ex post), while in the inspection of work and restoration it could be noticed 31 occurrences in services finalized by the contractors. The results also indicated that, of the total number of processes analyzed in the period 2010-2013, about 30% either have not been completed or are suspended, which shows deficiencies in the supervision and management of the contracts. In addition, the average time between the opening of the process and the conclusion of services is about three years, and much of this time was spent with internal procedures of UFRGS. These facts indicate problems of adverse selection and information asymmetry , in addition to the "Hold up problem", in which the Principal is taken hostage by the Agent besides the problem of Moral Hazard, when the Agent begins to act inappropriately or in a way which is disapproved by the Principal, together with the incidence of transaction costs.

資訊不對稱為經濟普遍存在之現象，舉凡勞動市場、保險市場與借貸信用市場皆會發生類似主問題。而本文將就資訊不對稱下之借貸信用市場討論效率問題。 　　眾所皆知，當借貸市場存在資訊不對稱時會發生二大問題：道德危險、逆選擇問題，又因此三大問題會導致貸款者對特定契約之供給減少使借貸市場發生超額需求產生信用分配之現象。故可知，市場均衡因資訊不對稱現象之存在可能無法滿足柏拉圖最適。因此本文將借用四個理論模型說明：借貸信用市場之效率問題。 　　理論模型一：逆選擇下之借貸市場效率一最適放款利率與擔保品之決定 　　理論模型二：逆選擇下之借貸市場效率一最適投資水準之決定 　　理論模型三：逆選擇與道德危險下之信用分配效率 　　理論模型四：償還機率訊息不對稱下之資金配置與金融崩潰 　　透過此四個理論模型之分析可歸納出以下之結論： 　　1.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且均衡滿足市場效率時，政府無須干預借貸市場。 　　2.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且無信用分配現象但均衡未滿足市場效率時，政府就應採行自由放任之態度，透過金融中介機構之借貸行為達成社會效率。 　　3.借貸市場存在穩定均衡且存在信用分配現象但均衡未滿足市場效率時，政府就應採行交叉補貼政策干預市場，但並非所有的干預政策皆能使借貸市場之效率提升，其中尤以“補貼低品質借貸契約”之政策為最佳方案，但因為此政策須政府能夠完全區分借款者之品質型態才可採行，因此，若政府無法加以區分借款者之品質型態時，僅好退而求其次採行次佳方案“信用保証政策”。 　　4.借貸市場若不存在均衡，發生金融性崩潰時，政府應擔任最後貸款者之角色，干預借貸市場以降低私人部間之風險。

Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is perceived so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators. Differences in regulatory regimes as well as in the real economies have produced a large variety in the characteristics of financial sectors and of individual intermediaries. In particular, in different places and times it is possible to observe banking sectors more or less competitive, populated by credit intermediaries of different sizes and with different levels of specialization. This variety of institutions raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning financial intermediation sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies all intending to contribute in this direction. Chapter 2 Recent empirical works have found evidence consistent with larger banks having lower incentives to collect soft information and, in particular, to lend to small firms which are typically regarded as relatively opaque borrowers. Another market segment affected by relatively high levels of opaqueness is that of long-term loans and the reason is that, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature, short-term maturities are useful for the purpose of screening and monitoring investment projects. It is therefore interesting to assess whether large and small banks differ in their propensity to issue long-term loans, a type of investigation which has not been conducted yet. The reason why small and large banks might be expected to have a different propensity to issue long-term loans has to do with two notions. First, the effectiveness of a short-term maturity as a screening and monitoring device is preserved only if parties anticipate that, when payments are due, the lender will not be willing to extend the maturity, otherwise the initial short-term loan is de facto a long-term one. The problem may rise if the liquidation of insolvent firms produces lower payoffs than their refinancing: under these circumstances, as suggested by theories on renegotiation, liquidation is not implemented no matter what is written on the contract (parties can easily avoid the inefficiency that would result from liquidation, for example by simply granting a new loan). Second, at a more specific level theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability to commit to not extend thematurity decreases with bank size.1 Small banks are therefore predicted to issue shorter-term loans and to make a better selection of projects. The results are consistent with this prediction. Controlling for other characteristics of both the demand- and the supply-side as well as for the type of guarantee supplied, small banks have lower proportions of long-term loans to total loans and lower proportions of non performing loans to total loans. It should be pointed out that this does not imply that small banks are necessarily more efficient since short-term maturities also have costs; in particular, short-term maturities can interfere with the incentives of good types by inducing short-termism (the inflation of shortterm results at the expenses of total profitability). Moreover, beyond the ability to commit other supply-side features are shown to be relevant in the determination of the maturity, at least with specific classes borrowers. In particular, the findings are also consistent with the presence of economies of scale in lending at long maturities to firms in more technical and innovative industries. Since providing the right incentives to high quality entrepreneurs and to firms in innovative sectors is more likely to be a priority in more advanced countries, a policy implication is that these economies need more the presence of large credit institutions and the more so if venture capital and stock market are of limited size. Chapter 3 As already emphasized, theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability of banks to commit to a given course of action is an important factor for efficiency and that such ability depends on observable characteristics, like bank size. An important aspect which has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature is the effect that competition among banks exert on their ability to commit. The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 tries to provide an answer to this question. More specifically, the model studies the effects of competition among banks when these are subject to dynamic commitment problems which may result in excess refinancing of insolvent borrowers (soft budget constraint) as well as in excess termination of profitable ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). The building assumption is that, because of priority schemes and relationship lending, competition is harsher for new lending than for lending to ongoing projects. The main conclusion is that there exists a trade-off between the benefits that competition brings by disciplining low quality borrowers and the costs implied by worsening the incentives of good ones. The model also allows to look at the effects of competition on stability. This is done in two ways by looking at the extent to which competition interferes with the procyclicality of the banking sector and by studying if competition may eliminate or add inefficient equilibria. The main policy implication is that the optimal level of competition of a banking system is positively related to the quality of the underlying economy. If taken together, the results of chapters 2 and 3 also provide a theory about local or regional banks which is not based on any aprioristic assumption about the technology of these type of intermediaries. As long as these institutions can be seen as banks with a relatively high market power and a relatively small size (they are often important players at a local level although of limited size), both chapters 2 and 3 suggest that these intermediaries can more easily commit to a tough stance at the refinancing stage, with positive effects on their ability to screen out bad projects but with negative effects on their ability to incentivize good types and to fund more technical and innovative firms. In other words, these institutions might promote growth at earlier stages of development, although they are not sufficient to address the incentive issues of more advanced economies. Interestingly, this interpretation of the role of local banks is totally distinct from the traditional one which is based on the aprioristic assumption that these banks are good in doing relationship lending. Chapter 4 Conflicts of interest of economic institutions carrying out a variety of functions are considered a widespread phenomenon severely limiting the efficiency that can be achieved. These worries are often taken as justification for regulations imposing transparency requirements or tougher measures like separation of functions. At the same time, contract theory suggests that the effects of opportunistic behavior can be limited by adopting appropriate incentive schemes. The third study, chapter 4, tries to understand from a theoretical point of view to what extent the use of incentive schemes can address the distortions posed by the presence of conflicts of interest. The universal bank is regarded as a (common) agent serving different clients with potentially conflicting interests: for example, it may buy assets on behalf of investors and sell assets on behalf of issuing firms. The clients offer incentive schemes to the bank and they behave non-cooperatively. The bank decides a level of effort and, when firewalls are absent, a level of collusion, modelled as a costly and unproductive redistribution of wealth among the clients (for example, the banks can at no cost sell the securities it is underwriting to the funds it manages and can do so at the price it likes). Firewalls are defined as all legal or economic devices imposing a real separation of functions and therefore preventing the bank from colluding as specified above. The main conclusion is that in the absence of firewalls the equilibrium incentive schemes are steeper. This means that the equilibrium level of effort is higher and may compensate the (ex post) inefficiency of collusion. In other words, not only appropriate incentive schemes can eliminate the distortions posed by conflicts of interest but, at least in principle, their presence may even be necessary for efficiency (this happens if effort is a public good for the two principals so that the allocation without firewalls is characterized by under-provision of effort). At the same time, the allocation without firewalls is shown to be the least efficient in the presence of one naive player who does not recognize the existence of the conflict of interest. As long as transparency requirements can be considered tools to improve market participants’ sophistication, these results suggest why and how this type of regulation can work. Moreover, the model allows to draw conclusions about the desirability of tougher regulation prescribing a more or less neat separation of functions. With sophisticated economic agents, who can address the distortions posed by conflicts of interest by choosing appropriate incentive schemes, separation of functions is unnecessary or even detrimental for efficiency. On the other hand, more or less powerful firewalls are desirable if market participants are not considered sufficiently sophisticated to be able to react to the presence of conflicts of interest and if transparency requirements cannot increase their sophistication. In few words, the optimal regulation of conflicts of interest is softer in situations involving professionals who are more likely to realize and to react by choosing an appropriate incentive scheme or, more generally, for institutions operating in advanced economies where the average level of market participants sophistication is higher.

Lo scopo della nostra ricerca è di proporre un modello dell'intervento pubblico che differisce dall'approccio standard e di valutare le sue implicazioni in termini di benessere. Noi sosteniamo che in molte circostanze la regolamentazione risulta essere un processo di "give-and-take" pittosto che di "take-it-or-leave-it". Più precisamente, la nostra idea è che la politica regolamentatoria possa essere più generalmente modellizzata come il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, che normalmente implica la partecipazione attiva di ciascun agente coinvolto nell'interazione regolamentatoria. Nel Capitolo 1, seguendo l'intuizione di Spulberg, la regolamentazione è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione tra i gruppi di interesse dei consumatori e delle imprese, con l'agenzia nel ruolo di mediatore. La nostra analisi mostra che l'impresa regolamentata sfrutta il suo potere contrattuale per ottenere un sussidio, il quale è più elevato che con un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" di un meccanismo che massimizza il benessere sociale. L'eccessiva sussidiazione dell'impresa penalizza i consumatori ed implica una perdita di benessere sociale. Noi troviamo altresì che, con informazione asimmetrica sui costi, l'intervallo di tipi dell'impresa che partecipano in equilibrio all'interazione regolamentatoria può essere più grande con la politica negoziata che con la politica "take-it-or-leave-it". Vorremmo sottolineare che il Capitolo 1 è introduttivo e costituisce un passo preliminare per la nostra ricerca. Aldilà dei risultati analitici, il suo contributo è duplice. Innanzitutto, esso descrive le strutture basilari di una politica regolamentatoria negoziata e le sua implicazioni in termini di benessere. In secondo luogo, esso mostra che l'approccio basato sulla contrattazione rappresenta effettivamente un'estensione piuttosto che una negazione dell'approccio standard. In particolare, la contrattazione su una politica regolamentatoria può essere interpretata come un modello generale che include l'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it" come caso limite, che si verifica quando l'impresa è privata di qualsiasi potere di contrattazione durante le negoziazioni. La discussione nel Capitolo 2 sviluppa la struttura precedente e considera un'agenzia che è delegata dal Congresso a rappresentare gli interessi dei consumatori nel precesso di contrattazione con l'impresa sulla politica regolamentatoria. L'esistenza di un'attività di negoaziazione tra l'agenzia e l'impresa è stata largamente ignorata dalla letteratura economica, con la principale eccezione rappresentata dai contributi di Scarpa. Comunque, Armstrong e Sappington, nella loro rassegna sui recenti sviluppi nella teoria della regolamentazione, hanno riconosciuto che la formulazione standard, la quale alloca tutto il potere di contrattazione al regolamentatore, è adottata per convenienza tecnica piuttosto che per realismo. Mentre l'agenzia è stata precedentemente raffigurata come un arbitro imparziale, nel Capitolo 2 supponiamo che essa rappresenti una parte contrattuale, la cui natura può essere benevolente od egoista. In questo contesto, noi studiamo la possibilità di collusione tra l'agenzia regolamentatoria e l'impresa regolamentata, un fenomeno che spesso si verifica in una relazione regolamentatoria. La contrattazione "a latere" tra i due partner colludenti è modellizzata come un processo di negoziazione (eventualmente illegale)parallelo alla negoziazione sulla politica regolamentatoria. La nostra analisi mostra che i consumatori sono penalizzati dalla corruzione, in quanto essi interamente sussidiano il guadagno totale dalla collusione. Inoltre, il nostro modello suggerisce che un'agenzia più forte nel processo di contrattazione rende più desiderabile per il Congresso (cioè per i consumatori)consentire la collusione in equilibrio. Nei primi due capitoli, noi abbiamo considerato l'esistenza di solamente un mercato monopolistico. Il Capitolo 3, che ha beneficiato del contributo fondamentale di Carlo Scarpa, estende l'impianto precedente ed esamina la regolamentazione di due mercati interdipendenti quando i beni sono sostituti. Questo è il caso, per esempio, nelle industrie del gas naturale e dell'elettricità o delle ferrovie e autostrade. Noi ci focalizziamo sul progetto della struttura regolamentatoria. In particolare, noi intendiamo determinare se è meglio per il benessere dei consumatori avere un'autorità unica per entrambi i mercati o suddividere la giurisdizione regolamentatoria tra due differenti agenzie. Quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un'offerta "take-it-or-leave-it", la nostra analisi mostra che due agenzie - ciascuna massimizzante il surplus totale nel suo proprio mercato - impongono prezzi che sono più bassi di quelli derivanti da centralizzazione regolamentatoria. Al contrario, quando la politica regolamentatoria è il risultato di un processo di contrattazione, noi troviamo che un regolamentatore unico, che sequenzialmente contratta con entrambe le imprese, dà ai consumatori un livello di benesere più elevato, purchè il costo ombra dei fondi pubblici, attraverso i quali la produzione è sussidiata, sia sotto una certa soglia. Dunque, in presenza di negoziazioni, il nostro modello suggerisce che la centralizzazione dovrebbe essere la migliore struttura regolamentatoria per i consumatori nei paesi sviluppati, ove la raccolta fiscale non è troppo distorsiva. Se il costo ombra è sopra questa soglia, come spesso accade nei paesi in via di sviluppo, decentralizzare la struttura regolamentatoria risulta in un miglioramento del benessere sociale. / The aim of our research is to propose a pattern of government intervention which differs from the standard approach and to assess its welfare implications. We argue that in many circumstances regulation turns out to be a process of give-and-take rather than take-it-or-leave-it. More precisely, our idea is that the regulatory policy can be more generally modelled as the outcome of a bargaining process, which normally entails the active participation of each agent involved in the regulatory interaction. In Chapter 1, following Spulber’s intuition, regulation is modelled as a negotiation process between the consumers’ and firm’s interest groups, with the agency in the role of mediator. Our analysis shows that the regulated firm exploits its bargaining power to obtain a subsidy which is higher than under a take-it- or-leave-it offer of a total surplus maximizing mechanism. The oversubsidization of the firm penalizes consumers and entails a total surplus loss. We find also that, under asymmetric cost information, the range of the firm’s types participating in equilibrium in the regulatory interaction may be wider under the negotiated policy than under the take-it-or- leave-it policy. We would like to stress that Chapter 1 is introductory and constitutes a preliminary step for our research. On top of the specific analytical results, its contribution is twofold. First, it describes the basic features of a negotiated regulatory policy and its welfare implications. Second, it shows that the bargaining approach to regulation actually represents an extention rather than a negation of the standard approach. In particular, the bargaining over a regulatory policy may be interpreted as a general set-up which includes the take-it-or-leave- it offer as a limit case, that occurs when the firm is deprived of any bargaining power during negotiations. The discussion in Chapter 2 develops the previous framework and considers an agency which is delegated by Congress to represent consumers’ interests in the bargaining process with the firm over a regulatory policy. The existence of a negotiation activity between the agency and the firm has been by and large ignored by the economic literature, with the main exception represented by Scarpa’s contributions. However, Armstrong and Sappington, in their review on the recent developments in the theory of regulation, have recognized that the standard formulation, which allocates all the bargaining power to the regulator, has been adopted for technical convenience rather than for realism. While it has been previously depicted as an impartial arbitrator, the agency is assumed in Chapter 2 to represent a bargaining party, whose nature may be either benevolent or self-interested. In this setting, we study the potential for collusion between the regulatory agency and the regulated firm, a phenomenon which often occurs in a regulatory relationship. The side contracting between the two colluding partners is modelled as a (possibly illegal) negotiation process parallel to the bargaining over the regulatory policy. Our analysis shows that consumers are penalized by corruption, since they entirely subsidize the total stake in collusion. Furthermore, our model suggests that a stronger agency in the bargaining process makes it more desirable for Congress (i.e. for consumers) to allow collusion in equilibrium. In the first two chapters, we have considered the existence of just one monopolistic market. Chapter 3, which has benefited from the fundamental contribution of Carlo Scarpa, extends the previous setting and examines the regulation of two interdependent markets, whose goods are substitutes. This is the case, for instance, in the industries of natural gas and electricity or railroads and motorways. We focus on the design of the regulatory structure. In particular, we intend to determine whether it is better for consumers’ welfare to have a unique authority for both markets or to split the regulatory jurisdiction between two different agencies. When the regulatory policy is the outcome of a take-it-or-leave-it offer, our analysis shows that two agencies - each maximizing total surplus in its own market - set prices which are lower than those arising under regulatory centralization. On the contrary, when the regulatory policy is the outcome of a bargaining process, we find that a unique regulator, which sequentially bargains with both firms, gives consumers a higher welfare level, as long as the shadow cost of public funds, through which production is subsidized, is below a certain threshold. Hence, under negotiations our model suggests that centralization should be the best regulatory pattern for consumers in developed countries, where tax collection is not too distortionary. If the shadow cost is above that threshold, as it often happens in developing countries, decentralizing bargaining turns out to be consumers’ welfare improving.

雖然近年來的文獻已嘗試以有系統的方式，探討創投的參與投資，是否有助於提昇被投資公司的價值，然而這些實證研究卻鮮少剖析創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的價值。再者，此類研究往往從被投資公司上市、上櫃時的股票折價幅度，來探討創投的介入是否對於被投資公司的價值有所貢獻，不過卻較少針對被投資公司的長期經營績效和上市、上櫃後的股價績效進行分析，特別是有關創投對於被投資公司的經營績效影響之相關研究仍付之闕如。因此，本研究嘗試為相關研究另闢蹊徑，以期瞭解創投的參與投資是否確實為被投資公司帶來實質的貢獻。 首先，經由文獻探討和個案分析得知，將代理理論引用至本研究主題確實具有合理性。因此，本研究以代理理論的觀點，嘗試克服傳統「基本主理人──代理人的模式」之限制，並藉由Von Neumann-Morgenstern 效用函數而針對創投的介入對於被投資公司在經營績效和技術上的影響進行理論模式推導，故本研究的理論模式不僅強調技術的提昇為刺激高科技公司產出增加的原動力之外，同時亦考量監控機制和激勵制度彼此可能具互補性的特質。 本研究的各個研究假說分別演繹自理論模式結論或歸納自文獻探討暨個案分析。在實證研究方面，本研究將實證分為三個層次：第一層次係比較國內有創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司和無創投參與投資的上市、上櫃公司，其在長期經營績效與短期股價表現上是否具有差異性。實證結果發現，有創投參與投資的公司，其在長期經營績效和短期股價表現上皆較無創投參與投資的公司來得差；不過，創投的介入確實承擔了被投資公司本身的部分風險。 實證的第二層次則在於檢視，創投是透過何種途徑來影響被投資公司的績效表現。實證結果顯示，主要創投的持股比例、參與被投資公司的創投家數、創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例，或創投投資被投資公司的時點越早，皆對於被投資公司的長期經營績效表現有顯著的正面影響。 另外，創投佔被投資公司的董監事席位比例、創投所承擔被投資公司的技術股股本佔總資本額的比例、主要創投成立的年數越長，或創投參與被投資公司的時點越早，則對於被投資公司上市、上櫃後的短期股價表現有顯著的正面影響。 實證之第三層次，旨在探討創投的參與投資是否加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間。根據實證結果得知，有創投參與投資的公司，其從公司設立至上市、上櫃的時間確實較無創投參與投資的公司來得短，此意謂創投可加速被投資公司上市、上櫃的時間，使得被投資公司可以較早在資本市場上募得資金。 綜合上述實證結論，囿限於國內創投的籌資壓力和追逐聲譽的壓力，以及在「逆選擇」的前提之下，導致國內有創投參與投資的公司其績效表現較無創投參與投資的公司來得差。然而，本研究的實證結果並不否定創投的能力，換言之，本研究的實證結果肯定創投的專業能力和監控能力，同時亦肯定創投在國內產業升級上所扮演的重要角色。 / Although recent work attempts to explore what venture capitalists do and whether venture capitalists' involvement adds value for venture-capital-backed firms, it does not investigate the ways in which venture capitalists add value to their portfolio companies.　Moreover, recent empirical research usually investigates whether venture capitalists' involvement reduces underpricing when their portfolio firms going public, but it seldom explicitly examines the effect of the presence of venture capitalists on operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms.　As a matter of fact, a number of issues relate to the relationship between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have not been fully addressed.　Therefore, the objective of this study is to fill both theoretical and empirical gaps. This study applies agency theory which captures the essence between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and use Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function to analyze the effect of venture capitalists' involvement on their portfolio firms' operating performance and skills.　Our theoretical model not only considers the importance of new technology in modern economies, but also includes the possibility that these two control mechanisms, monitoring and incentives, might be complementary. Moreover, empirical results of this study reveal several important findings.　First, we contrast venture-capital-backed firms with companies that have no venture-capital backing. Our empirical results indicate　operating performance and after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing are both inferior to that of firms without such backing, and the differences are statistically significant.　However, venture-capital-backed firms seem to have lower levels of firm risk. Secondly, empirical results provide evidence that the fraction of equity holdings of the lead venture capitalist, the number of venture capitalists, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm's board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are all positively associated with operating performance of venture-capital-backed firms. In addition, the number of the venture-capital-backed firm's board seats held by venture capitalists, stock compensation system, the age of the lead venture and the length of time that venture capitalists have invested are positively associated with after-market stock performance of firms with venture-capital backing.　Not surprisingly, empirical results also provide evidence that venture-capital-backed firms go public earlier than non-venture-capital-backed firms. Overall, the results of this study support the idea that venture capitalists do provide much more than financing to their portfolio firms.　However, in a venture capital setting, adverse selection, grandstanding and money-recycling are important concerns; these　concerns might explain why performance of venture-capital-backed firms are significantly inferior to that of non-venture-capital-backed firms.　Indeed, our findings support the notion that venture capitalists' investment behavior does influence performance of their portfolio firms in a number of ways due to their skills, expertise and monitoring abilities.

Este estudo faz uma análise teórica e empírica dos processos de licitação e contratação de obras e reformas de prédios públicos em uma Universidade Pública Federal, utilizando a Teoria da Informação Assimétrica e dos Contratos. O período da pesquisa foi entre 2010 a 2013, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, sendo que foram analisados 127 processos licitatórios e contratos. As análises revelaram diversas ocorrências em licitações e nas contratações de obras e reformas. Na etapa licitatória, anterior à contratação (ex ante), a sessão para lances das licitações de obras e reformas, em alguns casos, estiveram desertas. Na contratação e execução de obras e reformas (ex post), foram constatados diversos pedidos de prorrogação de prazos e de reequilíbrio econômico financeiro, e na fiscalização das obras e reformas foram constatadas 31 ocorrências nos serviços finalizados pelas Empreiteiras. Os resultados também indicaram que, do total dos processos analisados no período de 2010 – 2013, cerca de 30% das obras e reformas ainda não foram finalizadas ou estão suspensas, o que demonstra deficiências na fiscalização e na gestão dos contratos. Além disso, o tempo médio entre a abertura do processo e a conclusão dos serviços gira em torno de três anos, sendo que grande parte deste tempo foi despendido com procedimentos internos da UFRGS. Tais fatos indicam problemas de seleção adversa e assimetria de informações, além do Hold up problem, em que o Principal é tomado como refém pelo Agente e do problema do Risco moral (Moral Hazard), em que o Agente passa a agir de modo não apropriado ou não aprovado pelo Principal, com a ocorrência dos custos de transação. / This study makes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the processes of bidding and contracting works and reforms of public buildings in a Federal Public University, using Asymmetric Information Theory and Contracts. The period analyzed was between 2010 and 2013, at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, being that 127 bidding processes and contracts were analyzed. The analyses revealed several occurrences in tenders and hiring of work and restoration. In the bidding phase, prior to hiring (ex ante), the bidding session for work and renovations, in some cases, was deserted. There were several requests for deadline extension, and economic-financial adjustment in the work and restoration hiring and execution (ex post), while in the inspection of work and restoration it could be noticed 31 occurrences in services finalized by the contractors. The results also indicated that, of the total number of processes analyzed in the period 2010-2013, about 30% either have not been completed or are suspended, which shows deficiencies in the supervision and management of the contracts. In addition, the average time between the opening of the process and the conclusion of services is about three years, and much of this time was spent with internal procedures of UFRGS. These facts indicate problems of adverse selection and information asymmetry , in addition to the "Hold up problem", in which the Principal is taken hostage by the Agent besides the problem of Moral Hazard, when the Agent begins to act inappropriately or in a way which is disapproved by the Principal, together with the incidence of transaction costs.

Submitted by Rafael Mourão dos Santos Rodrigues (rmrodrigues@fgvmail.br) on 2014-05-05T18:47:15Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_RafaelMourao.pdf: 1333900 bytes, checksum: 1d361f3d57be73e6205d021c993d7fd9 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by ÁUREA CORRÊA DA FONSECA CORRÊA DA FONSECA (aurea.fonseca@fgv.br) on 2014-05-08T13:31:42Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_RafaelMourao.pdf: 1333900 bytes, checksum: 1d361f3d57be73e6205d021c993d7fd9 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2014-05-13T14:22:53Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_RafaelMourao.pdf: 1333900 bytes, checksum: 1d361f3d57be73e6205d021c993d7fd9 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-05-13T14:41:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese_RafaelMourao.pdf: 1333900 bytes, checksum: 1d361f3d57be73e6205d021c993d7fd9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-10-30 / This thesis is composed of three articles. The first article, 'Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard', considers a principal-agent problem under the simultaneous presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection, where the adverse selection dimension is given over the outcome conditional probabilities given the agents actions. The second article, 'Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection' analyses the optimality of private-public partnerships under the presence of adverse selection. The third article, 'Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure', by its turn, considers the problem of regulating publicly traded companies, where firms have incentives to send opposing signals to the regulator and the market. / Esta tese é composta de três artigos. No primeiro artigo, 'Simple Contracts under Simultaneous Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard', é considerado um problema de principal-agente sob a presença simultânea dos problemas de risco moral e seleção adversa, em que a dimensão de seleção adversa se dá sobre as distribuições de probabilidade condicionais as ações do agente. No segundo artigo, 'Public-Private Partnerships in the Presence of Adverse Selection' é analisada a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas sob a presença de seleção adversa. No terceiro artigo, 'Regulation Under Stock Market Information Disclosure', por sua vez, é considerado o problema da regulação de firmas de capital aberto, onde as firmas possuem incentivos para mandar sinais opostos para o regulador e o mercado.

Submitted by Rafael Mourão dos Santos Rodrigues (rmrodrigues@fgvmail.br) on 2010-07-18T04:38:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao-RafaelMourao.pdf: 276404 bytes, checksum: f08462737eacc3f2b5d0d162f345b922 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Virginio Machado(andrea.machado@fgv.br) on 2010-07-19T11:49:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao-RafaelMourao.pdf: 276404 bytes, checksum: f08462737eacc3f2b5d0d162f345b922 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-07-19T12:12:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao-RafaelMourao.pdf: 276404 bytes, checksum: f08462737eacc3f2b5d0d162f345b922 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-04 / This dissertation analyzes the optimality of public-private partnerships (PPP) in an adverse selection framework. More speciÖcally, I analyze whether the tasks of building and operating an infrastructure for public services should be performed by a consortium or if it should be performed by individually contracted Örms. For that, in a departure from the existent literature, focused on problems of incomplete contracting and moral hazard, I build a multidimensional adverse selection model where the Örms are privately informed and can exert a non-observable e§ort in each task, with the existence of an externality between them, in an extension of the La§ont and Tirole (1986) model. After isolating some conditions under which PPP dominates usual procurement contracts, I rely on numerical analysis to better comprehend the modelís solution, which turns out to be heavily dependant on the correlation between the Örms private information parameters. / Esta dissertação propõe-se a analisar a otimalidade de parcerias público-privadas (PPP) em um ambiente de seleção adversa. Mais especi calmente, analiso se as tarefas de construir e operar uma infraestrutura para serviços públicos deve ser realizada por um consórcio ou se devem ser realizadas por fi rmas contratadas separadamente. Para tal, diferentemente da literatura existente para o problema, focadas nos problemas de contratos incompletos e moral hazard, construo um modelo de seleção adversa multidimensional, onde as firrmas possuem informação privada e podem exercer um esforço não observável em cada atividade, com a existência de externalidade entre as tarefas, em uma extensão do modelo de La¤ont e Tirole (1986). Após defi nir algumas condições sob as quais PPP domina os meios usuais de contratação, utilizo de uma análise numérica para melhor compreender a solução do modelo, que se mostra altamente dependente da correlação entre os parâmetros de informação privada das firmas.