Tenn., Univ., Diss.--Memphis, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich.

Submitted by Bruno Barsanetti (barsanetti@gmail.com) on 2014-04-11T21:04:20Z No. of bitstreams: 1 versaofinal.pdf: 311571 bytes, checksum: 99a792cd3569838d12c1e29951f7df78 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Suzinei Teles Garcia Garcia (suzinei.garcia@fgv.br) on 2014-04-14T11:58:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 versaofinal.pdf: 311571 bytes, checksum: 99a792cd3569838d12c1e29951f7df78 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-04-14T12:49:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 versaofinal.pdf: 311571 bytes, checksum: 99a792cd3569838d12c1e29951f7df78 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-03-20 / We consider trade in dynamic decentralized markets with adverse selection. Unlike the literature so far, we assume that informed sellers (and not uninformed buyers) make take-it-or-leave-it offers, so that signaling through prices is possible. We establish a partial characterization of the equilibrium set, provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, and show that all equilibria involve signaling if the adverse selection problem is severe enough. Moreover, we prove the somewhat surprising result that the highest welfare achieved in equilibrium is invariant to market frictions. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of separating equilibria, completely characterize such equilibria, and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs for separating equilibria is invariant to market frictions. We conclude with a complete characterization of the equilibrium set in the two-type case, and compare our results to the those in Moreno and Wooders (2010), who analyze the case in which buyers have all the bargaining power. Our results show that signaling through prices can have a non-trivial impact on market outcomes and welfare. / Nesta dissertação, consideram-se trocas em mercados descentralizados com seleção adversa. Diferentemente da literatura até o momento, supomos que vendedores informados (e não compradores desinformados) fazem ofertas take-it-or-leave-it, de forma que sinalização através de preços é possível. Estabelecemos uma caracterização parcial do conjunto de equilíbrio, encontramos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de um equilíbrio e mostramos que todo equilíbrio apresenta sinalização se o problema de seleção adversa for suficientemente severo. Além disso, provamos o resultado surpreendente que o maior bem-estar atingido em equilíbrio é invariante às fricções do mercado. Também apresentamos condições necessárias e suficientes para a existência de equilíbrios separantes, que caracterizamos completamente. Mostramos que o conjunto de payoffs associados a equilíbrios separantes é invariante às fricções. Concluímos com uma caracterização completa do conjunto de equilíbrio com apenas dois tipos, e comparamos nossos resultados com os de Moreno e Wooders (2010), que analisam o caso em que compradores têm todo o poder de mercado. Nossos resultados mostram que sinalização através dos preços tem um impacto não trivial tanto nos resultados do mercado quanto no bem-estar.

[pt] Este trabalho testa e encontra evidência de que as taxas de juros de empréstimos bancários respondem mais a aumentos do que a quedas na taxa básica de juros (Selic). A assimetria sobrevive a uma análise de evento, na qual a disponibilidade de uma base com dados diários é explorada com o objetivo de isolar o choque de política monetária sobre os juros. Dentre as potencias teorias que racionalizam essa assimetria, duas são consideradas. A primeira refere-se à existência de poder de mercado, o que permite aos bancos coordenarem um menor repasse como forma de aumentar os lucros de curto prazo. A segunda argumenta que a presença de forte seleção adversa no mercado de crédito diminui o incentivo à concorrência na dimensão preço, reduzindo o repasse de quedas no custo de captação. Como as duas hipóteses produzem implicações empíricas similares em forma reduzida, o artigo propõe e estima um modelo estrutural a fim de testar qual dos dois modelos melhor se ajusta aos preços e quantidades observados no mercado de crédito para pessoa física. / [en] This paper tests and find evidence that support the view that credit interest rates respond more to increases than to decreases in the Central Bank basic interest rate (Selic). This asymmetry is robust to an event analysis, in which the availability of a dataset containing daily information is explored in order to isolate monetary policy shocks on interest rates. Among the possible explanations for this asymmetry, two are considered in the article. The first one refers to the existence of market power, which allows banks to coordinate on a smaller pass-through in order to increase profits in the short run. The second refers to the potential existence of severe adverse selection issues in the credit market, which diminishes the incentives to compete on the interest rate dimension and consequently the pass-through from decreases in the cost of funds. Since the two theories present similar empirical implications in reduced forma analysis, the article proposes and estimates a structural model in order to test which of the competing theories better fits the observed data on prices and quantities for household credit in Brazil.

The work focuses on the issues of the market solving the human organ shortage. The market solution faces the same criticism as the commercial surrogacy. The main purpose of the work is to evaluate the commercial surrogacy system efficiency. Within the solution of this question, the work focuses first on the analysis of the arguments against a market in human organs and consequently theise objections applies to the surrogate motherhood with emphasis on the problem of adverse selection, which from an economic point of view appears to be the most serious. In the applied part the paper tests the existence of the signs of the adverse selection in the countries where payment for the surrogacy is legal. The paper leads to the conclusions, despite some specifics of the market, this solution is efficient and the market itself creates sufficient mechanisms to prevent adverse selection

Titel: Relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare - Ett principal-agent-perspektiv Universitet: Malmö Universitet Kurs: TR128C – Företagsekonomi: Examensarbete i Transport Management Författare: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Handledare: Benedikte Borgström Nyckelord: Agentteori, agentproblem, måldivergens, informationsasymmetri, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmerbarhet Syfte: Att utifrån ett principal-agent-perspektiv studera hur relationen mellan chefer och medarbetare i den studerade miljön påverkas av förekomsten av informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder, samt hur motivationen att prestera på arbetsplatsen kan påverkas av incitamentsstrukturer kopplade till kontraktsupplägget och olika nivåer av övervakning. Metod: Studien har genomförts via en kvalitativ ansats där data insamlats genom intervjuer, observationer och textanalys. Teori: Studiens teoretiska ramverk bygger på principal-agent-teorin och dess komponenter med fokus på informationsasymmetri och skilda målbilder. Slutsatser: I den studerade miljön där relationen mellan principal och agent kännetecknas av hög informationsasymmetri, hög programmerbarhet och parterna motiveras av olika målbilder står principalen inför valet att antingen komplettera ett beteendebaserat kontrakt med tillräckliga övervakningsmekanismer för att utröna agentens beteende, eller försöka upprätta ett resultatbaserat kontrakt. Hög informationsasymmetri kopplat till ett beteendebaserat kontrakt riskerar att lägga grunden för problem kopplade till moral hazard då agenterna blir helt fria att agera efter sina egna målbilder. / Title: The relationship between managers and workers - An agency perspective University: Malmö Universitet Course: TR128C – Business Administration: Bachelor thesis in Transport Management Writers: Jens Andersson, Olle Karlsson & Mattias Pettersson Mentor: Benedikte Borgström Keywords: Agency theory, agency problem, goal divergence, information asymmetry, moral hazard, adverse selection, programmability Purpose: From an agency perspective study how the relationship between managers and workers in the studied environment is affected by the existence of information asymmetry and diverging goals, and also how the motivation to perform at the workplace can be affected by different incentive structures related to the contract form and different levels of surveillance. Methods: The study has been conducted via a qualitative approach and the data has been collected through interviews, observations and text analysis. Theories: The studies theoretical framework is based on the agency theory and its components with a focus on information asymmetry and diverging goals. Conclusion: In the studied environment the relationship between principal and agent is characterized by asymmetrical information flows, high programmability, and diverging goals. This leaves the principal to either reinforce a behavioral based contract with sufficient surveillance to uncover the agent’s behavior, or to try and establish a contract based on results. A high degree of information asymmetry in combination with a behavioral based contract runs the risk of laying the foundation for problems related to moral hazard as the agents are free to act according to their own personal goals.

Credit derivative has become an important financial instrument in global financial market, it plays significant role in transferring credit risk. During the latest financial crisis, collapse of credit derivative market was a main reason led to this worldwide turmoil. In this thesis, I try to investigate this adverse performance through a case study of Goldman Sach's ABACUS 2007-AC1. I conclude three major findings. First, severe interest conflicts and asymmetric information existed between counterparties in credit derivative market in U.S.. Second, the securities‘ credit ratings provided a downward-biased view of their actual default risks, the yields failed to account for the extreme exposure of structured products to declines in aggregate economic conditions. Third, credit derivatives do not eliminate systematic risk, they just shift the risk, CDOs exchanged diversifiable risk for systematic risk during the structuring process, which was difficult to understand for most of investors, we see risk accumulation rather than spreading risk,

This paper investigates whether “skin in the game” has an impact on the actively managed funds’ performance. Based on the agency theory where an agent and a principal in different scenarios might have access to different information etc., can result in differences in financial decisions. In this case it could be whether to invest in the fund they manage or not. We examine the time period from 2018 to 2020, where each year has been analyzed as well as the three-year period. To perform the tests, information on the actively managed funds’ managers has been collected from 160 funds, along with the returns of each year and fund. Both funds with skin in the game and without have been found in Large Value Funds at Morningstar, where all of them are actively managed value or equity funds. We have analyzed 80 funds with skin in the game and 80 funds without. After comparisons to the index Russel 1000 Value Total Return USD, we tested whether there are significant differences in performance between the two groups. What the results indicate is that differences are significant which might be due to the fact that managers have skin in the game, but also that these funds tend to perform better.

This study sought to explore the governance mechanisms that result in agent principal alignment in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), with specific reference to Job Creation. This is important to understand in South Africa as infrastructure PPPs are central to the government’s economic growth strategy. The Renewable Energy Programme (REIPPPP), a decade-old PPP, was identified as the ideal context given its consistent job-creation alignment between the state and its agents, Independent Power Producers (IPPs). Agency Theory posits that agents are inherently self-interested and thus unlikely to act in the interests of principals. However, while some theoretical propositions envisage instances of agent-principal alignment, what is less known are the precise mechanisms by which this can be achieved. This study explored the questions of moral hazard and adverse selection, which refer to goal conflict and information asymmetry in agent-principal relationships. The research was undertaken through a qualitative study, comprised of secondary data analysis as well as semi-structured interviews. It was found that by aligning contracts across multiple stakeholders, agents can increase their enforcement capacity. Furthermore, a rigorous data collection system accompanied by credible penalties, results in greater compliance. This contribution enhances the theory in respect of governance mechanisms whilst simultaneously providing practical guidance for PPP structuring. / Mini Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2021. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / MBA / Unrestricted

När företag väljer att ta in kapital genom en nyemission måste beslut fattas om det ska göras genom en företrädesemission eller riktad emission. Tidigare studier har visat att nyemissioner generellt genererar en negativ avvikelseavkastning. Ny forskning finner dock underlag för att både motiv och typ av emission kan påverka hur offentliggörandet av nyemissionen uppfattas av marknaden. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur riktade emissioner uppfattas av marknaden och om det kan hänföras till motivet med emissionen. Vi studerar 40 riktade emissioner på Stockholmsbörsen under åren 2020-2021. 7 av dessa riktade emissioner klassificerades som positiva och 33 som negativa. Vi fann en negativ genomsnittlig kumulativ avvikelseavkastning för urvalet i stort samt för de negativt klassificerade emissionerna. De positivt klassificerade riktade emissionerna genererade en signifikant positiv genomsnittlig kumulativ avvikelseavkastning. Resultatet indikerar att motivet har en effekt på hur marknaden uppfattar offentliggörandet av en riktad emission.

This study examines asymmetric information content of REIT IPOs as compared to that of industrial IPOs matched by similar asset size, underwriter reputation ranking, and partial adjustment of the offer-price from the midpoint of the original file range. The asymmetric information level is proxied by the relative bid-ask spread (RELSPREAD), adverse selection component of Glosten and Harris (GH, 1988), and the adverse selection component of Lin, Sanger, and Booth (LSB, 1995). All three measures are estimated over 45- and 60-day windows. Using a sample of 78 equity REIT IPOs and 123 Industrial IPOs for the period of January 1, 1993 to December 31, 2007, the results indicate that REIT IPOs have less asymmetric information content as compared to mature industrial firms. All results control for leverage, beginning assets size, issue proceeds, underpricing, partial adjustment, number of IPOs within the same year, venture capital backing, underwriter reputation, average daily volume, average daily price, specialist’s inventory risk, and the turnover ratio. The results also control for the Nasdaq and NYSE rule change of minimum tick increments from 1/8th to 1/16th on June 2, 1997, and June 24, 1997, respectively. The findings provide strong support for the hypothesis that REIT IPOs have less asymmetric information content than non-REIT IPOs.