本研究採1992年至2002年首度上市的樣本公司為研究樣本，並依據同產業規模相當且上市五年以上的原則挑選配對公司，檢驗公司治理、經營績效與機構投資人投資行為之關聯性。與先前研究不同之處在於，本研究深入探討公司治理對經營績效的影響，解釋在不同經濟條件與公司特性下，將影響公司治理機制效率的發揮，使公司治理與績效呈正相關。 本研究利用樣本公司上市當時的公司治理變數，檢驗公司治理對上市後半年的會計績效影響與上市後30天、90天與180天的市場報酬，再進而驗證經營績效對上市後一年機構投資人投資行為的影響，此外，並比較有價證券上市審查準則規定前後的公司，在公司治理與經營績效上是否有差異。透過相關分析、T檢定、迴歸分析與聯立方程式，檢驗三大研究假說，實證結果獲得以下主要結論： 1.樣本公司與配對公司的特性 樣本公司的公司治理機制較健全，會計績效表現也較佳。 2.公司治理程度不同的公司特性 公司治理程度高的公司其市場績效表現較佳，且年齡較小。 3.景氣與產業，對公司治理與經營績效關聯性的影響 產業特性會加強公司治理程度對會計績效的影響；經濟景氣，會加強公司治理程度對市場績效的影響。 4.當經濟景氣差、代理成本高與轉投資家數多時，更突顯公司治理的重要性，公司治理對績效有正向的影響 5.無參與管理的公司，更突顯公司治理的效果，公司治理對績效有正向的影響 6.機構投資人持股比例與週轉率呈正相關 7.經營績效與機構投資人投資行為呈正相關 市場績效對機構投資人持股比例有正向的影響；會計績效對機構投資人週轉率也有正向的影響，顯示績效與機構投資人投資行為呈正相關。 8.法令規範後，公司治理與經營績效表現較佳 9.金融業的公司治理表現較佳 / This paper examines the relationship between the corporate governance, firm performance, and institutional behavior of Taiwanese TSE-listed companies from 1992 to 2002. This paper approves the positive effects of corporate governance to firm performance, and firm performance to institutional behavior as well. Different from the previous studies, this paper addresses the importance of corporate governance under poorer economic conditions, higher agency costs, and a more complicated company structure. Corporate governance mechanism could work effectively when the executives of companies realize the importance of the corporate governance.

La gouvernance des sociétés par actions canadiennes accorde une place aux créanciers, qui contribuent considérablement à leur financement. Les créanciers fournissent une prestation en échange d’une promesse d’être payé plus tard, de sorte qu’ils sont en conflit d’agence avec d’autres parties prenantes de la société par actions, particulièrement les dirigeants. Principale voie procédurale des litiges en droit des sociétés, le recours en cas d’abus (ou « recours en oppression ») permet d’endiguer certains aspects de ce conflit d’agence en octroyant aux tribunaux de larges pouvoirs pour pallier les abus. Cette intervention judiciaire s’exprime par la théorie des attentes raisonnables, selon laquelle le tribunal doit protéger non seulement les droits des parties, mais également leurs attentes raisonnables. La jurisprudence permet de conclure à des attentes raisonnables relativement à l’information fournie par la société, au patrimoine social et au processus décisionnel des dirigeants. Elle laisse également entrevoir une attente raisonnable à l’égard des modifications du partage des risques découlant d’un événement imprévisible. / Creditors feature prominently in the corporate governance of Canadian business corporations and significantly contribute to their funding. Creditors perform in exchange for a promise to be paid later, so that they are in an agency conflict with other stakeholders of the corporation, especially managers. The main procedural route for litigation in corporate law, the oppression remedy helps curb some aspects of the agency conflict by granting courts broad powers to remedy oppressive conduct. This judicial intervention is expressed through the theory of reasonable expectations, which states that the court must not only protect the legal rights of the parties but also their reasonable expectations. The case law shows that creditors have reasonable expectations toward the information provided by the corporation, its assets and the decision-making process of managers and directors. It also suggests a reasonable expectation with respect to changes in the sharing of risks arising from an unforeseeable event.

[pt] Considerando a importância da estrutura de capital para as finanças empresariais, e apesar de não ainda existir consenso sobre a existência de uma estrutura ótima de capital, buscamos neste trabalho investigar à luz da Teoria da Hierarquização das Fontes de Financiamento, desenvolvida por Myers (1984), como a estrutura de capital das empresas brasileiras de capital aberto, no período de 1998 a 2002, estaria associada a uma dada hierarquia de preferência por fontes de financiamento, dentro da lógica proposta pelo autor, onde as empresas utilizariam primeiramente o autofinanciamento, em seguida recorreriam ao uso de dívidas, e como última opção optariam por emitir ações. Desta forma, este trabalho não visa discutir a problemática da existência ou não de uma estrutura ótima de capitais, mas sim analisar empiricamente a importância e validade dos diversos fatores apontados na literatura como determinantes da Estrutura de Capital das Empresas: Dimensão ou Tamanho, Oportunidades de Crescimento, Composição do Ativo, Lucratividade, Risco, propondo e verificando, inclusive, a significância de novas variáveis independentes como o Controle Acionário, Impacto Cambial, da Inflação e da Taxa de Juros. / [en] In view of the importance of the capital structure to corporate finance, and inspite of not existing consensus about the existence of the optimal capital structure yet, we seek in this work to research how the Capital Structure of Open Capital Brazilian Companies, from 1998 untill 2002, would be associated to a specific Pecking Order, inside the logical proposed by Myers (1984). In this way, this work does not try to discuss the existence or not of one optimal capital structure, but analyses empirically the importance and the validity of the many factors pointed in the literature as determinants of the Companies Capital Structure: Dimension, Growth Oportunity, Asset Composition, Profitability, Risk, also proposing and verifying the significance of new independent variables like the type of capital control, the impact of currency devaluation, inflation and the interest levels.

本文立基於Merton(1974)或有求償權評價法及Leland(1994)內生破產資本結構模型上，加入次順位債券的考量，建立一個連續時間資本結構分析模型，量化的資本結構可作為企業融資之決策依據。內生破產行為與風險移轉行為都是股東與債權人之間可能產生的代理問題，本文的模型不但分析這兩種代理問題，更計算其所產生的代理成本。由模擬的結果發現內生破產成本雖然不大，但是其對無風險利率及公司非槓桿價值的波動度卻是非常的敏感。在本文的模型下，只要債務契約不能重新訂立，次順位債券的發行永遠都會降低優先債務的價值。在本模型中次順位債券的風險貼水比優先債券的風險貼水高；但是本文發現不管是優先債券或是次順位債券的風險貼水，當公司接近宣告破產時，公司非槓桿價值的波動度對兩種債券風險貼水的影響出現高風險低報酬的現象，可能的解釋理由如下：當公司接近宣告破產時，公司非槓桿價值波動度的增加使破產可能性提高，進而使風險貼水減少的間接力量大於波動度增加直接使風險貼水上升的力量。 / Based on Merton(1974) and Leland(1994), we construct a continuous-time capital structure model with subordinated debt. Quantitative results may serve the guidance of financial policy of the firm. Both endogenous bankruptcy and risk shifting behaviors are the agency problems between the equityholders and debtholders. Based on our model, the agency problems is considered and the agency costs are calculated. From the result of simulation, endogenous bankruptcy agency cost is small but sensitive to the volatility of unlevered asset value of the firm. Under renegotiation-proof, the senior debt is harmed by the issuance of the subordinated debt in our model. The risk premium of the subordinate debt is higher than that of the senior debt is confirmed by the model, however, when the firm is near bankruptcy, the behavior of "high risk high return" of both debts is reversed. The reason for the junk bond behavior may be explained as the negative effect of risk premiums due to the increase of the probability of bankruptcy is higher than the positive effect of the greater risk caused by higher volatility.

此論文包含三大部分。第一部分探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(D&O保險)的需求因素與公司治理等企業特徵間的關係，配合2003-2007年台灣上市上櫃公司的資料，研究影響公司是否購買D&O保險、保險限額與保險費的決策因素。實證結果證明，大型公司較需要D&O保險保障，且公司的董監事與利害關係人間存在代理成本問題。本文亦發現董監事獨立性等公司治理因素，對D&O保險購買行為有顯著影響，再則，公司的成長性及經理人風險趨避態度，都會影響保險限額的決定。本文結論進一步顯示訴訟風險對保險限額的決定有正向顯著的影響，而財務風險對D&O保險需求亦有若干影響力。第二及第三部分則進一步探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險對公司的行為或策略是否有影響。實證結果顯示D&O保險確實會影響公司風險承擔策略及公司財報方法的穩健性。 / This thesis is comprised of three essays on directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance, one interesting but little explored research area. Based on an unbalanced panel data set of public Taiwanese corporations in years 2003-2007, the first essay investigates the relationship between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance demand and firm characteristics, especially corporate governance. The results suggest that large firms are more likely to purchase D&O insurance, and that there exists agency cost between directors/officers and stakeholders. The findings indicate that corporate governance, such as board independence, has an important impact on D&O insurance demand. Besides, the results show that growth opportunity or managerial risk aversion can affect the D&O insurance coverage amount. The litigation risk also has a positive and significant impact on the D&O insurance amount, and bankruptcy risk weakly influences the D&O insurance demand. In the second essay, I provide evidence regarding corporate business strategy by investigating the relation between directors’ and officers’ (D&O) insurance and risk taking behavior. This essay tries to test (a) whether firms are more active to adopt risk-taking strategies when their directors and top managers are covered by D&O insurance coverage; (b) whether the quality of corporate governance has influence on firm’s risk-taking behavior; and (c) whether insurers can distinguish D&O insurance purchases decision driven by managerial risk-taking behavior and charge adequate premium rate for such behavior. The empirical evidence suggests that D&O insurance coverage has a positive impact on firm risk-taking behavior. In addition, the results indicate that board composition may remarkably influence corporate risk-taking behavior. The preliminary findings also show that insurers can assess the induced risk-taking behavior ex ante and charge adequate premiums rate accordingly. In the third essay, I investigate whether the legal liability coverage result in the propensity of less conservatism and aggressive managerial behavior/strategy. More specifically, this study tests managerial opportunism behavior by examining whether the purchase of D&O insurance coverage is associated with more aggressive financial reporting strategy (i.e., less accounting conservatism). The empirical evidence suggests that D&O liability insurance purchase decision is positively associated with accounting conservatism. That is, firms with insurance coverage tend to recognize bad news in a timely manner, i.e. more earning conservatism. However, there is no significant relation between accounting conservatism and D&O insurance amount. In addition, the evidence shows that firms with strong board structure recognize good news faster than those with weak governance structure.

The relevance or irrelevance of dividend payments has been the topic of much discussion for the past eight decades. The primary objective of this study was to determine the relationship between dividend policy and agency problems of financial services companies listed on the (JSE). Dividend Policy and the Agency Theory underpinned the study. Secondary data of sampled listed financial companies for the period 2005-2016 was sourced from IRESS database. Data was analysed using EViews version 9. The results revealed that the presence of institutional ownership resolves the asymmetry information problems, and, reduces the need to pay dividends. The results also revealed that 54.69% of JSE listed companies under the financials’ services sector practise dividend decisions. The results further revealed that the dividend payout ratio is positively correlated with ROE and LEV, and negatively correlated INST, DIRS and FOREIGN variables. The results confirmed the existence of agency problems on listed financial services companies. / Ukubaluleka okanye ukungabaluleki kokuhlawula izahlulo bekusoloko kusisihloko sengxoxo kumashumi asibhozo eminyaka edluleyo. Injongo ephambili yesi sifundo yayikukufumanisa ulwalamano phakathi komgaqo nkqubo wezahlulelo neengxaki zobumeli (ubuarhente) beenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho nezidweliswe kwiJohannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Izisekelo zesi sifundo nguMgaqo Nkqubo Wezahlulo (Dividend Policy) neNgcingane Yobumeli (Agency Theory). Iqela lesibini ledatha yeenkampani ezidwelisiweyo kwiminyaka ye-2005– 2016 yafunyanwa kwiqula leedatha elaziwa ngokuba yi-IRESS database. Idatha yahlalutywa ngokusebenzisa isixhobo sohlalutyo iEViews version 9. Iziphumo zadiza ukuba ubukho babanini kwiziko loshishino buyazisombulula iingxaki zonxibelelwano olungalingani kakuhle kwaye kuyasicutha isidingo sokuhlawula izahlulo. Kwakhona, iziphumo zadiza ukuba ama-54.69% eenkampani ezidweliswe kwiJSE, phantsi kodidi lweenkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho, enza izigqibo zezahlulo. Iziphumo zaphinda zadiza ukuba intlawulo yezahlulo ihambelana kakuhle neenqobo zeROE neLEV, kanti azihambelani neenqobo zeINST, ezeDIRS kunye nekuthiwa ziFOREIGN. Ezi ziphumo zangqina ukuba kukho iingxaki zobumeli/ubuarhente kwiinkampani ezinikezela ngeenkonzo zemicimbi yoqoqosho / Bonnete le go se be bonnete ga ditefelo tša letseno e bile hlogo ya ditherišano tše dintši mo mo dingwagasome tše seswai tša go feta. Nepo ya motheo ya thuto ye ke go ela kamano gare ga pholisi le mathata a dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša Matlotlo tšeo di lego lenaneong la Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Pholisi ya Ditseno le Teori ya Etšensi ke motheo wa thuto ye. Datha ya magareng ya dikhamphani tša mašeleng tšeo di lego lenaneong la paka ya 2005–2016 e be e hwetšagala go tšwa go lenaneo la datha la IRESS. Datha e sekasekilwe go šomišwa EViews version 9. Dipoelo di utullotše gore go ba gona ga bong ka gare ga sehlongwa go rarolla mathata a tshedimošo ya go se lekalekane, le go fokotša nyakego ya go lefa mašokotšo. Dipoelo le tšona di tšweleditše go re diperesente tše 54.69 tša dikhamphani tšeo di lego lenaneong la JSE ka fase ga ditirelo tša sekgao sa go phethagatša diphetho tša mašokotšo. Dipoelo di tšwetša pele go utulla go re ditekanyetšo tša ditefelo tša mašokotšo du sepelelana gabotse le ROE le LEV, le go sepelelana gannyane le INST, DIRS le FOREIGN. Dipoelo di netefatša go ba gona ga mathata a Etšensi ao a ngwadilwego lenaneong la dikhamphani tša ditirelo tša mašeleng / Abstracts in English, Zulu, Sepedi / Business Management / M. Com. (Business Management)