Denna studie syftar till att undersöka hur omsättningstillväxten skiljer sig före respektive efter en Initial Public Offering (börsnotering). Urvalet består av bolag som börsnoterats på Nasdaq OMX Nordic under 2009 till 2019. Antalet börsnoterade bolag under denna tidsperiod bestod av 185 och efter bortfall, till följd av studiens kriterier, hamnar urvalet på 96 bolag som studeras. Studien använder sig av en kvantitativ forskningsmetod med en deduktiv ansats där data för omsättning samlas in för respektive bolag. Vidare används ett statistiskt test, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, för att testa studiens hypotes.  IPO är ett omdiskuterat ämne då bolag väljer att gå från privat till publikt för att finansiera verksamhetens tillväxt. Dock är det flera av bolagen som inte undersöker hur en IPO kan eller kommer att kunna påverka den finansiella prestandan, så som omsättningstillväxten. Slutsatsen som tas i denna studie är att det finns skillnader på omsättningstillväxten innan respektive efter en börsintroduktion, där en IPO konsekvenser anses vara negativa för bolagen.

本論文探討公司負債到期結構的實證決定因素。本研究首先選取台灣一般製造業104家樣本，使用複迴歸進行分析，結果顯示此104家樣本公司市價對帳面價值比與實質稅率的係數估計值為負，證明高成長和高預期代理成本的公司，擁有長於三年到期結構負債的比率顯著的較低，驗證資訊不對稱程度較高的企業較不偏好長期負債的假說，並與理論的預測相同。對於負債到期結構之其他三項決定因素，即資產年限、變異性、與超額盈餘而言，結果和假說理論及國外實證研究結果不合，無法驗證資產與負債年限相配之假說，同時以負債到期結構與超額盈餘傳遞訊息假說之理論亦無法成立。由於此六項決定因素皆不具統計顯著性，故而再選取電子業31家樣本進行實證研究。此上市公司電子業31家的實證結果支持代理成本與負債到期結構之間具有負相關的假說，以及企業會配合公司資產年限和負債到期結構的相配假說；然而，實證結果無法驗證此31家電子產業的負債到期結構與企業規模呈現正相關，也無法驗證負債到期結構和公司價值的變異性、超額報酬具有負相關的假說。此外，研究結果並不支持稅負會影響負債到期結構的說法，以及企業會利用負債到期結構發佈訊息的假設。 / This paper investigates the empirical determinants of corporate debt maturity structure by exploring the possible relations between the firm’s debt maturity structure and six firm-specific characteristics of agency-related costs, size, signaling, asset maturity, taxes and variability. This is done by testing the theoretical model of debt maturity structure first using a cross-sectional data set of 104 non-financial Taiwan firms, and then using a data set of 31 Taiwan electronic firms. The results of the test on the 104 non-financial Taiwan firms shows that agency-costs, asset-maturity and taxes exert negative impacts on debt maturity, while size, variability and abcdrmal profit have positive impacts on debt maturity. However, none of these determinants are significant on the debt maturity structure decisions. As for the 31 Taiwan electronic firms, the evidence lends considerable support to the prediction that the impact of agency-costs on debt maturity is negative. The findings also provide support for the notion that these firms match the maturity of their debt to that of their assets. Though firm size is positively associated with debt maturity, it is not a significant determinant. The empirical analysis provides no evidence that taxes and volatility of firm value affect debt maturity structure. Finally, the empirical results are not supportive of the signaling hypothesis that Taiwan electronic firms use their debt maturity structure to signal information to the market.

近年來，我國上市上櫃公司發行公司債籌措資金的情形蔚為風潮。依據我國目前規定，公司擬發行的公司債須由證期會認可之信用評等機構進行評等，並出具報告。既無信用評等向來重視會計資訊的品質，因此引起了本研究探討資訊揭露是否會降低公司債資金成本的動機。關於資訊揭露與負債資金成本的關係，僅見於Sengupta(1998)的研究，而本研究則試圖以資訊揭露能降低代理成本的角度，探討在國內資本市場中，資訊揭露是否與負債資金成本存在一反向關係。 本研究評估揭露指數方法與之前文獻所採用的的內容分析法不同。本研究是以公司發行公司債前一年度盈餘概估情形評估揭露指數口本研究採用最小平方法迴歸分析(OLS)對測試假說，其結果如下： 1.公司發行公司債之增額負債資金成本與資訊揭露程度存在反向關係。 本研究之實證結果顯示，我國資本市場中，公司資訊揭露程度與公司債之殖利率存有顯著的反向關係。顯示在債券的初級市場中，除了債券的條件與公司體質的好壞以外，資訊揭露也可能成為公司債殖利率的決定因素。 2.若公司債的代理成本較高，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本之反向變動關係會較強。 本研究以公司債轉換條款與擔保條款的有無，區分公司債代理成本的高低。實證結果發現，發行具轉換條款公司債之公司與發行不具轉換條款公司債之公司，其資訊揭露對負債資金成本影響顯著較低。驗證了設有轉換條款或擔保條款之公司債將因為債券本身的代理成本下降，而削弱資訊揭露對公司債殖利率的影響。也就是說若公司債屬於普通公司債或無擔保公司債時，資訊揭露對公司債之殖利率影響更大。因此對於有意發行無擔保公司債或普通公司債的公司而言，資訊揭露將更能降低其負債資金成本。 關鍵字：代理成本，負債資金成本，揭露程度，資訊不對稱 / In recent years, it has become a common phenomenon for listed corporations to issue bonds in Taiwan. Currently in Taiwan, the Securities and Futures Committee (SFC) forbids a corporation to issue bonds unless it has been properly rated by a credit rating agency certified by the SFC. Since the credit rating agency all along have generally placed a great deal of emphasis on the quality of accounting information, this research purports to investigate whether fuller disclosure of accounting information can indeed reduce the cost of debt capital. Only one study by Sengupta (1998) focused on the cost of debt capital, and addressed the issue about the relation between the disclosure level the cost of debt capital, and this study attempts to investigate whether a reverse relationship exists between disclosure and cost of debt capital in Taiwan form the angle of the agency cost. The method to determine the score of the disclosure level applied by this research is different from the content analysis method applied by prior studies. This research uses the earning estimation disclosure made in the year prior to the bond issuance, for measuring the disclosure level. This research applies the QLS model to test the hypotheses. After controlling for other variables, this research concludes that: 1.There may exist a reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level. The result shows that there exists a significant reverse relation between the yield to maturity of bond and the corporate disclosure level. This finding leads us to conclude that because of the ability to lower the agency costs and control the information asymmetry, corporate disclosure level, couple with the terms of the bond and the issuing corporation's financial conditions, could be one determinant of the yield to maturity of the bond. 2.If the agency cost of the bond is higher, the reverse relation between the incremental cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be stronger. In this research, agency costs are considered low when the bond is convertible or secured, or vice versa. The result shows that for the corporation issuing convertible or secured bonds, the impact of the disclosure is less significant. This finding verifies that when the bond is convertible or secured, the reverse relation between the cost of debt capital and the disclosure level could be weakened since the agency costs are lower. Therefore, this research draws a conclusion that for corporations that attempt to issue straight bonds or unsecured bonds, the disclosure level plays a more important rule to reduce the cost of debt capital. Key word: Agency Cost, Cost of Debt Capital, Disclosure Level, Information Asymmetry.

Tidigare finanskriser har resulterat i ett större fokus på bankers risktagande. Kriserna har påvisat hur bankers kris kan få förödande effekt på den globala marknaden vilket har föranlett olika konsekvenser (bland annat i form av nya regelverk) för att hantera bankers tendens mot ett för högt risktagande. Bankers inställning till risktagande kan förklaras utifrån dess ägarstruktur där ägarna kan ha olika riskpreferenser.   Forskningsstudier har påvisat att ett samband existerar mellan ägarkoncentration och bankers risk, dock utan någon konsensus om sambandets utseende. Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur ägarstruktur påverkar bankers konkursrisk, där banker inom EU-länder har undersökts. Vidare har karaktären på bankernas största aktieägare tagits i beaktning för att se om sambandet mellan ägarkoncentration och risk skiljer sig beroende på vilka ägare bankerna utgörs av. Därtill har sex hypoteser formulerats som syftar till att undersöka relationen mellan ägarstruktur, agentkostnader och konkursrisk utifrån agentteorin och teorier om bolagsstyrning. För studiens undersökning har  en kvantitativ metod använts tillsammans med en deduktiv ansats.   Undersökningen visar, likt andra studier, att det existerar ett samband mellan ägarstruktur och bankers risk. Mer specifikt visar vår studie att sambandet ser olika ut för olika ägartyper. För vissa ägartyper har vi identifierat ett positivt samband mellan ägarkoncentrationen och bankers konkursrisk medan för andra ägartyper har vi istället identifierat ett negativt samband. Avslutningsvis visar studien att agentkostnader föreligger i större grad när aktieägarna har mindre kontroll över ledningen. / Previous financial crises have resulted in a greater focus on bank’s risk taking. The crises have shown how the bank’s instability may create a devastating effect on the global market, which has given rise to several studies focus on bank’s risk. Bank’s attitude towards risk taking can be explained by its ownership structure where the owners may have different risk preferences.   Research studies have found a relationship between the concentration of ownership and bank risk, but without any consensus on the sign of the relationship. The purpose of this study is to investigate how ownership concentration affects bank’s default risk. The study has been performed on banks within the EU countries. Furthermore, the nature of the bank’s largest shareholders has been taken into consideration to distinguish whether they have an impact on the relationship between ownership concentration and risk. In addition, six hypotheses were formulated which aim to investigate the relationship between ownership concentration, agency costs and the default risk, based on the agency theory and theories on corporate governance. For this study’s survey a quantitative method has been used in conjunction with a deductive approach.   Our findings show that there exists a relationship between ownership concentration and bank risk. More specifically, our study shows that the relationship is different depending on the nature of the owner. For some types of owners, we have identified a positive relationship between ownership concentration and bank’s default risk, while for other types of owners we have instead identified a negative relationship. Finally, this study shows that agency costs are greater when shareholders perform a lower degree of monitoring of the management.

<p>Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att undersöka i vilken utsträckning företag på Stockholmsbörsen följer IAS 36 p. 134, vilket behandlar nedskrivningsprövning av goodwill. Även vilka faktorer som påverkar denna informationsutgivning analyseras.</p> / <p>The purpose of the thesis is to investigate to which extent companies on the Stockholm stock exchange comply with IAS 36 p. 134, and which factors that may affect the compliance with IAS 36 p. 134.</p>

Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att undersöka i vilken utsträckning företag på Stockholmsbörsen följer IAS 36 p. 134, vilket behandlar nedskrivningsprövning av goodwill. Även vilka faktorer som påverkar denna informationsutgivning analyseras. / The purpose of the thesis is to investigate to which extent companies on the Stockholm stock exchange comply with IAS 36 p. 134, and which factors that may affect the compliance with IAS 36 p. 134.

In this thesis, I exploit accounting issues in the Chinese context with a particular focus on the role of government. The thesis consists of three empirical essays, examining how the state coordinates among the state-owned enterprises in executive compensation (essay 1), how the government regulates the dividend payouts of listed firms (essay 2) and how the delisting regulation influences the accounting choices of listed firms (essay 3).The first essay examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) in China. Previous studies of RPE for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent theoretical setting assumed by Holmstrom (1982). In this study, I exploit the existence of a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China to examine RPE in a setting closer to the theoretical assumption. I find that SOEs are more likely to use RPE for executive compensation than non-SOEs. This is consistent with better cross-firm coordination in executive contracting among SOEs under a common “state” principal than among non-SOEs with dispersed principals similar to Western firms. Furthermore, I find a more pronounced RPE effect among SOEs that are larger or have poorer past performance. This implies that the state principal has greater incentives to monitor strategically important firms or those in distress. The second essay examines the market reaction to and earnings management choices around changes in the regulations requiring a higher minimum dividend payout in China to shed new light on the determinants of dividend payout policy. I find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that paid less than the new required minimum payout than for those that paid more than the new required minimum, consistent with agency cost explanations of dividend payout. In addition, I find that low dividend payers exhibit a greater tendency to manage their earnings downwards to comply with the earnings-based threshold, and investors can “see through” such earnings management behaviors. My findings support the view of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2009) that agency costs of free cash flow retention are an important part of the dividend payout story. The third essay explores the earnings-based delisting rule in China that provides particularly strong motivation to manage earnings above the loss/profit threshold. I identify two groups of firms that successfully avoid being ST-ed, i.e. firms with a one-year loss before returning to profit, and firms with consecutive small profits. I provide a comprehensive examination of earnings management in terms of accruals management, real earnings management and non-operating income, to investigate whether Chinese firms manage earnings either to avoid reporting a loss or to avoid reporting two consecutive losses. Though there are mixed results sensitive to the research design for earnings management pattern in the two groups of firms, this study provides insights into earnings management induced by a government regulation.

Study project (MAcc)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The most basic principle of agency theory is that an individual will always serve his own interest best. According to Eisenhardt (1989) agency theory describes individuals as rational, risk averse en motivated by egotism. Agency theory also deals with the conflict that exists between different parties in an organization due to people's egoism. This self-interest can lead to goal incongruence if a person is placed in an environment where he has to serve somebody else's interest. Ownership and management vested in the same party until about 130 years ago. These roles were however separated with the development of the modem organization. The principal or owner is now represented by the shareholder and management serves as the agent. The principal thus appoints the agent to serve and manage his interest in the organization optimally. The principal's goal is the maximising of his shareholders' wealth. The agent's goal to carry out his task with the minimum effort and or to obtain maximum benefit for himself. It is thus clear that the goals of the principal and agent might often differ and this will give rise to goal Incongruence. This goal incongruence may give rise to some managerial actions which will be detrimental to optimal value of the company. The agency conflict, which is caused by man's self interest, manifests in the modem organization in a number of ways. These are referred to agency problems in this assignment. Agency problems are found both on a micro- and macroeconomical level. Agency cost is the sum of the difference between the real and optimal value of the company, the monitoring costs of the principal and the bonding costs of the agent. This cost is to the disadvantage of the principal and might even be to the disadvantage of the agent. It is thus essential that agency conflict and agency costs are reduced to a minimum. A number of measures are taken to address the agency problems and to reduce their negative effect on the organization. None of these measures will be efficient enough ifused in isolation. An optimal combination of solutions will depend on the company's specific circumstances. An empirical study was conducted to determine to what extent the agency problems manifest during the demutualisation of a big insurance business. The measures taken to address these problems were also investigated as well as the extent to which these were successful. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die basiese aanname van agentskapsteorie is dat die individu sy selfbelang altyd eerste sal stel. Volgens Eisenhardt (1989) beskryf agentskapsteorie individue as rasioneel, risikoongeneigd en gemotiveer deur selfbelang. Agentskapsteorie handel verder oor die konflik wat tussen die verskillende belanghebbende partye binne 'n organisasie as gevolg van persone se selfbelang ontstaan. Hierdie selfbelang van die mens kan lei tot doelwitinkongruensie, indien die persoon in 'n omgewing geplaas word waar daar van hom verwag word om 'n ander se belange te dien. Eienaarskap en bestuur was tot ongeveer 130 jaar gelede gevestig in dieselfde party. Met die totstandkoming van die moderne onderneming, is hierdie rolle egter geskei. Die prinsipaal of eienaar word nou verteenwoordig deur die aandeelhouer en die bestuur dien as die agent. Die prinsipaal stel dus die agent aan om na sy belang in die onderneming om te sien en dit optimaal te bestuur. Die prinsipaal se doel is die maksimering van sy aandeelhouerswelvaart. Die agent poog om sy taak met minimale inspanning te voltooi en of uitsonderlike voordeel vir homself te behaal. Dit is duidelik dat die prinsipaal en agent se doelwitte meermale sal verskil en doelwitinkongruensie ontstaan dus. Hierdie doelwitinkongruensie word vergestalt in sekere aksies wat bestuur soms neem en wat daartoe lei dat die optimale waarde van die firma nie bereik word nie. Die agentskapskonflik wat as gevolg van die partye se selfbelang ontstaan manifesteer in die moderne onderneming op 'n verskeidenheid van wyses, wat in hierdie werkstuk as agenskapsprobleme gedefinieer word. Agentskapsprobleme kom op 'n mikro- sowel as op 'n makro-ekonomiese vlak voor. Die verskil tussen die werklike en optimale waarde van die organisasie, plus die prinsipaal se moniteringskoste en die agent se gebondenheidskoste, verteenwoordig agentskapskoste. Hierdie koste strek tot die nadeel van die eienaars en meermale ook tot die nadeel van die bestuur. Dit is dus noodsaaklik dat agentskapskonflik en die gepaardgaande agentskapskoste tot 'n minimum beperk word. Daar word van 'n verskeidenheid van maatreëls gebruik gemaak ten einde die agenskapsprobleme aan te spreek en hul negatiewe impak op die onderneming te versag. Nie een van hierdie oplossings kan in isolasie gebruik gemaak word nie en afhangend van die onderneming se spesifieke omstandighede, sal daar hoogstens 'n optimale kombinasie van oplossings ontwikkel kan word. Daar is vervolgens in hierdie werkstuk 'n empiriese ondersoek uitgevoer ten einde te bepaal in hoe 'n mate die agenskapsprobleme tydens die demutualisering van 'n groot versekeringsonderneming manifesteer. Die neem van regstellende stappe om hierdie probleem aan te spreek is ondersoek, sowel as die mate waartoe hierdie maatreëls suksesvol was al dan nie.

自八O年代以後，台灣半導體通路產業即邁入了激烈的競爭時代。眾多高同質性的業者，相互競奪上游產品線的代理權，以及下游買者市場的交易權；業者的生存契機，主要來自於提供上、下游業者間進行商業交換的平台。因此，此一平台所能提昇的交換效率，及其處理跨組織間交換成本的能力，乃成為不容忽視的課題。半導體通路業為台灣資訊工業中，歷史悠久且具重要地位的產業；研究瞭解半導體通路產業之價值鏈活動，將有助於台灣半導體通路產業之促進升級。 半導體通路商所從事之價值鏈活動功能，予以分類概有商流、物流、金流、資訊流及技術流等五大項；其中，諸多研究證實——技術支援能力，乃屬半導體通路商之核心競爭力之一。過去有關半導體通路商的研究，大多是由競爭策略、企業資源規劃及整體通路之價值鏈活動等觀點著手，但專注於技術流部分，予以進行4C交換成本態勢分析之探討者，則尚未得見；因此，本研究乃有其創始性。 本研究以台灣地區的半導體通路商為研究對象，期望所做研究結果可供台灣半導體通路業者，做為規劃技術行銷策略之實務參考。本研究屬於質性之探索性研究，經由個案訪談及問卷之初級資料與次級資料的蒐集彙整，並以4C交換成本理論的四個主要變數：外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、道德危機成本、專屬陷入成本，進行個案企業之比較分析，並歸納出下列之研究發現與結論： 1. 上游供應商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求排序為：道德危機成本、資訊搜尋成本、專屬陷入成本、外顯單位效益成本。 2. 技術性協力廠商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求排序：道德危機成本、外顯單位效益成本、資訊搜尋成本、專屬陷入成本。 3. 下游系統製造廠商與通路商之技術合作，其對通路商處理交換成本能力的需求為：外顯單位效益成本之功效，高於內隱交換成本之效能。 4. 規模經濟型之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，外顯單位效益成本的優勢，高於內隱交換成本。 5. 利基型之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，內隱交換成本優勢，高於外顯單位效益成本。 6. 經營低技術層次產品之半導體通路商，其對下游系統製造商所提供之技術支援服務功能，外顯單位效益成本的優勢，高於內隱交換成本。 / After the eighth decade, the channel industry of Taiwan semiconductor moved toward serious competition. Many of high similarity company compete with each other in the agency of product line source and the buyer market of OEM customer; the survival opportunity of company is to provide the platform for the exchange between the supplier and customer. Hence, the most critical point is to increase the efficiency and to reduce the exchange cost between the cross-organization in the platform. Semiconductor channel industry is long historical with important position in Taiwan information industry; to investigate and study the semiconductor channel industry will contribute to the research for the upgrade of semiconductor channel industry in Taiwan. The value chain activity of semiconductor channel can be break through into business flow, logistics, financial flow, information flow and technology flow; Among them, technical support ability has been approved to be one of the key competitiveness of the semiconductor channel by many researches. Most of the past researches stood on the views, such as competitive strategy, Enterprise Resource Planning and whole value chain activity, etc., but the point on the 4C exchanges cost co-opetition analysis in the technology flow has not been seen yet. Hence, it’s important for this research. This research is expected to provide the result for the practice reference of the technical marketing strategy to the Taiwan semiconductor channel by focusing on them. This research is belong to the qualitative exploratory research from the data collection of the primary and the secondary information in the interview cases and questionnaires, then to analyze the cases comparatively by the four primary parameters of the 4C exchange cost the cost: the external cost on utility, information searches, morals hazard and hold up asset specificity. Finally, the following important results have been pointed out: 1. The sort of the technical cooperation between the channel and the supplier to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: morals hazard, information searches, asset specificity and the external cost on utility. 2. The sort of the technical cooperation between the channel and the independent design house (IDH) to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: moral hazard, the external cost on utility, information searches and asset specificity. 3. The technical cooperation between the channel and the system manufacture customer to the requirement for the channel ability in dealing with exchange cost is: the effectiveness of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost. 4. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the semiconductor channel of the scale economic type is: the advantage of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost. 5. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the niche type semiconductor channel is: the advantage of the inner exchange cost is higher than that of the external cost on utility. 6. The technology support service function to the system manufacture customer from the semiconductor channel with operating in the low technical level product is: the advantage of the external cost on utility is higher than that of the inner exchange cost.

公司籌措資金時會選擇發行股票或是發行債劵來籌資，本文去比較發行股票與發行債劵來籌資的公司在發行後的長期營運表現會有何異同。此外去探討因子如何影響發行後營運表現，也建立邏輯斯迴歸去探討因子如何影響公司發行決策。關於資本結構有兩個理論，一為融資序位理論，另一為代理成本理論，本文透過上述結果去驗證此兩理論。 / Industrial corporations typically raise external capital by selling common stock or issuing bonds. In this paper, we investigate the long run operating performance of issuers of straight debt and issuers of seasoned equity. Besides, we measure the effects of some factors that have been shown to be associated with changes in performance following the issues. We also examine why firms issue securities even though managers know that stock prices will react negatively to the issue announcement. We construct a logistic model for firms issuing equity and debt to investigate the determinants of firms’ issuing decisions. In existing literature, two eminent theories of capital structure are the pecking order theory and agency cost theory. We try to find evidence to these two theories from the above results.