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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is
provided by the
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
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Showing 1 to 6 of 6 (0.033 seconds)Spelling suggestions: "subject:"[een] COGNITIVE CLOSURE"" "subject:"[enn] COGNITIVE CLOSURE""
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Why We Decide Not to DecideOtto, Ashley S. 13 September 2016 (has links)
No description available.
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The Effects of Depletion, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Attribute Accessibility on Choice DeferralGuo, Xiaoning 02 October 2012 (has links)
No description available.
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Moderní teorie vědomí a nezachytitelnost subjektivity / Modern Theories of Consciousness and the Elusiveness of SubjectivityKošová, Michaela January 2014 (has links)
This diploma thesis is concerned with the question of the right conceptual approach towards consciousness. It opens up with the thesis that the crucial characteristic of consciousness - its subjective aspect - is profoundly elusive. To understand the nature of this elusiveness we get a loose inspiration from Karl Jaspers (of the continental tradition) and his idea of "subject-object dichotomy" whose main point is a realisation that the conscious subject is in principle unobjectifiable and can never be properly grasped by objectifying thinking. This main idea is then applied to various modern theories of consciousness (coming from the analytical tradition) in order to explore and demonstrate to what extend each of the theories misses or acknowledges the specific irreducibility of consciousness to objectively describable phenomena. Thus we observe that J. J. C. Smart omits subjectivity from his identity theory altogether since he understands reality as objectively graspable in all its aspects. Colin McGinn comes with an interesting explanation of our problems with grasping consciousness as part of the physical world and asserts that we are "cognitively closed" with respect to the solution of the mind-body problem. However, he concludes that a possible solution delivered in objectifying terms exists...
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DECISION-MAKING UNCERTAINTY, NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE, AND SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCELEE, YEONYEOB 06 April 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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[en] THE REDISCOVERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: SUBJECTIVISM, REDUCTIONISM AND THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE COGNITIVE CLOSURE / [fr] LA REPRISE DE CONSCIENCE DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE CONTEMPORAINE DE L`ESPRIT: SUBJECTIVISME, RÉDUCTIONISME ET L`HYPOTHÈSE DE LA FERMETURE COGNITIVE / [pt] A REDESCOBERTA DA CONSCIÊNCIA NA FILOSOFIA DA MENTE CONTEMPORÂNEA: SUBJETIVISMO, REDUCIONISMO E A HIPÓTESE DO FECHAMENTO COGNITIVOCARLOS DIOGENES CORTES TOURINHO 07 January 2004 (has links)
[pt] A pesquisa concentra-se em torno da noção de consciência,
mais precisamente, em torno da redescoberta dessa noção
na
Filosofia da Mente contemporânea. Antes, porém, mostra-
nos,
através de uma revisão histórica dos estudos sobre a
mente,
que a referida noção passa por transformações importantes
do século XVII ao final do século XIX, sendo
caracterizada,
em momentos distintos, como reflexividade,como
intencionalidade e como memória. Em seguida, após
analisar
o processo de enfraquecimento dos estudos sobre a
consciência no começo do século XX, a pesquisa aborda a
retomada desses estudos na Filosofia da Mente
contemporânea, registrando seus principais programas de
pesquisa, bem como os impasses criados a partir das
controvérsias entre as teorias reducionistas da
consciência
e as teorias subjetivistas, partidárias de um anti-
reducionismo. Ao final, analisando a hipótese do
fechamento
cognitivo, nas versões do naturalismo não-construtivo e
da
teoria da diafaneidade,a pesquisa aponta-nos uma solução
para os impasses acerca do problema da consciência no
cenário contemporâneo, procurando ressaltar algumas
implicações importantes para uma compreensão da
consciência
para além de um domínio intencional. / [en] This thesis brings the notion of consciousness into focus.
A critical study is undertaken about the historical fact of
the rediscovery of such a notion along the last decades of
the twentieth century, within the area of philosophy known
as Philosophy of Mind. In order to prepare the study of
such an event, a propedeutic historical survey of
consecutive philosophical conceptions of consciousness,
first as reflexivity, then as intentionality and then as
memory is presented, along with the analysis of the eclipse
of such notion in the behaviouristic psychology and
psychoanalysis of the beginning of the twentieth
century. To this survey it follows a critical exposition of
the research programmes agenda of the (then) new area of
the Philosophy of Mind from the fifties, its
controversies and impasses. Finally a possible solution for
such impasses is suggested to lie in the proposal of two
dimensions of consciousness, one intentional, the other non-
intentional, as an implication of both the naturalistic and
the transparency hypothesis of the cognitive closure
research programme. / [fr] La recherche est concentrée au tour de la notion de
conscience, particulièrement, de la reprise de cette notion
dans la Philosophie Contemporaine de lEsprit. Avant,
cependant, le recherche nous montre, dans le contexte d`une
révision historique des études sur lesprit, que la notion
référée passe par des transformations importantes dès le
XVII siècle jusquà la fin du XIX siècle, transformations
caracterisées par des moments différents, dans lesqueles la
conscience apparait comme réflexion, intention et mémoire.
Puis, après lanalyse du processus daffaiblissement des
études sur la conscience au début du XX siècle, la
recherche montre la reprise des études sur la conscience
dans la Philosophie Contemporaine de lEsprit, en
registrant ses principaux programmes de recherche, aussi
bien que les difficultées crées à partir des controverses
entre les théories réductionistes et les théories
subjectivistes partisanes dun anti réductionisme.
Finallement, en analysant lhypothèse de la fermeture
cognitive dans les conceptions du naturalisme non-
constructif et de la théorie de la transparence, la
recherche nous indique une solution pour les impasses sur
ce sujet dans la scène contemporaine, en recherchant à
mettre laccent sur quelques implications importantes de
lhypothèse de la fermeture cognitive pour la
compréhension de la conscience qui depasse le domaine
intentionnel.
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F. A. Hayek's Critique of LegislationHolm, Cyril January 2014 (has links)
The dissertation concerns F. A. Hayek’s (1899–1992) critique of legislation. The purpose of the investigation is to clarify and assess that critique. I argue that there is in Hayek’s work a critique of legislation that is distinct from his well-known critique of social planning. Further that the main claim of this critique is what I refer to as Hayek’s legislation tenet, namely that legislation that aims to achieve specific aggregate results in complex orders of society will decrease the welfare level. The legislation tenet gains support; (i) from the welfare claim – according to which there is a positive correlation between the utilization of knowledge and the welfare level in society; (ii) from the dispersal of knowledge thesis – according to which the total knowledge of society is dispersed and not available to any one agency; and (iii) from the cultural evolution thesis – according to which evolutionary rules are more favorable to the utilization of knowledge in social cooperation than are legislative rules. More specifically, I argue that these form two lines of argument in support of the legislation tenet. One line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the dispersal of knowledge thesis. I argue that this line of argument is true. The other line of argument is based on the conjunction of the welfare claim and the cultural evolution thesis. I argue that this line of argument is false, mainly because the empirical work of political scientist Elinor Ostrom refutes it. Because the two lines of argument support the legislation tenet independently of each other, I argue that Hayek’s critique of legislation is true. In this dissertation, I further develop a legislative policy tool as based on the welfare claim and Hayek’s conception of coercion. I also consider Hayek’s idea that rules and law are instrumental in forging rational individual action and rational social orders, and turn to review this idea in light of the work of experimental economist Vernon Smith and economic historian Avner Greif. I find that Smith and Greif support this idea of Hayek’s, and I conjecture that it contributes to our understanding of Adam Smith’s notion of the invisible hand: It is rules – not an invisible hand – that prompt subjects to align individual and aggregate rationality in social interaction. Finally, I argue that Hayek’s critique is essentially utilitarian, as it is concerned with the negative welfare consequences of certain forms of legislation. And although it may appear that the dispersal of knowledge thesis will undermine the possibility of carrying out the utilitarian calculus, due to the lack of knowledge of the consequences of one’s actions – and therefore undermine the legislation tenet itself – I argue that the distinction between utilitarianism conceived as a method of deliberation and utilitarianism conceived as a criterion of correctness may be used to save Hayek’s critique from this objection.
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