This thesis attempts to identify the philosophy, key questions and priorities behind the trust laws of Jersey and Malta. By wide accord, the Jersey law has served as a model in many ways to its later Maltese counterpart. This affinity is placed against the similar background of either jurisdiction, which embraced, to varying degrees, both the Civil Law tradition and Common Law influence. The analysis is advanced through the different moments of the trust, from its creation to termination. Nevertheless, the underpinning focus and thrust is on the civilian identity of either trust. It considers whether, and how far, the fundamental Civil Law concepts and language play a defining role in their civilian configuration. The question is asked whether the creation of the trust and the duties of a trustee can possibly be classified as obligational or contractual, or maybe something else. The nature and character of the beneficiary’s rights are also reviewed. The overarching role of good faith and civil responsibility, along with their extent of interaction with traditional Equity fiduciary duties, are weighed, an assessment naturally following from the civilian flavour attributed to the trusts. The conceptual overlapping between the Roman-Civil law fiducia, and related figures such as the mandat prêt-nom, with the Equity fiduciary duties, is assessed. The role, even if subsidiary, of civilian unjustified enrichment, remains an ever-present relevant factor. Sham trusts and simulatio, the Pauline fraud and legitim are considered in the context of the civilian identity of these trusts. The discussion then engages with the other strand of the thesis, being the role of the governing law, as the ‘mind’ behind the trust legislations assessed. The discussion engages with the question whether the trusts fall on the side of respect for the ‘autonomie de la volonté des parties’ or on other policy determinants behind the law.

The study sought to analyse the South African common law defence of moderate and reasonable child chastisement. Regarded by those with religious and cultural beliefs as a way of instilling child discipline, child chastisement has been a centre of contestation in recent years. Constitutionally, children have rights to care, dignity and protection. Thus, child chastisement infringes upon these rights. However, regardless of its intentions, child chastisement has an effect of inflicting pain onto its victims thereby infringing on their rights to human dignity, equality and protection. It can also lead to unintended consequences such as injury or death to its victims. Subjecting children to this cruel, inhuman and degrading action affects the development of children and sometimes haunts them at a later stage in life. In addition, child chastisement lacks the measure of determining whether it is moderate or severe, thereby making it prone to abuse or misuse. The study used a qualitative research paradigm, where data was collected from existing documents and analysed towards understanding child chastisement and finding sustainable ways of improving child welfare in the home or in society. The study also analysed the legal framework on child welfare and chastisement globally, regionally and locally. Instruments such as the UNCRC, ACRWC and the UDHR have a clear stance abolishing child chastisement. The study established that, despite the existence of global instruments promoting child care and protection, the common law defence of corporal punishment in the home and society remains a loophole that needs closing and enactment of laws that outlaws it completely.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) influences the common law of sale in South Africa. “Common law of sale” refers to the essentialia of sale (the minimum characteristics that parties must have consensus on to conclude a valid sale). The parties must have consensus on the intention to buy and sell, the things sold and the purchase price. The common law of sale also refers to the common law duties of the parties, the duties of the seller in particular (conversely therefore the rights of the buyer). The primary duties of the seller which will be investigated are: a. the duty of safe-keeping (including and investigation into the passing of benefit and risk doctrine); b. the duty of delivery and transfer of ownership; c. the warranty against eviction; and d. the warranty against latent defects. The primary common law duties of the buyer to pay the purchase price and accept the thing sold are included in the investigation as well. The formalities required in certain sale agreements, that wording must be in plain language as well as the buyer’s cooling-off rights are also investigated. An investigation into the influence of the CPA on the common law of sale in South Africa warrants a systematic framework and modus operandi which are: a. an investigation into the historical background of the common law of sale and its principles in the Roman law and Roman-Dutch law; b. a critical analysis of the position where the CPA is not applicable (the common law position); c. an extensive analysis and critical evaluation of the relevant provisions of the CPA and the influence thereof on the common law of sale; d. a comparative analysis of the appropriate provisions in Scotland and Belgium; e. a conclusion of the influence of the CPA on the common law of sale (whether the particular common law of sale principle is confirmed, amended or excluded in terms of the Act); and f. recommendations (taking into account the comparative analysis) regarding the rectification of uncertainties and ambiguities that arose as a result of the investigation. It is also important to remember that the existing principles of the common law of sale will still be applicable for transactions and agreements which fall outside the application of the Act. The golden rule to keep in mind when investigating the influence of the CPA on the common law of sale is to determine which approach and interpretation will be most beneficial to the consumer. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / gm2013 / Mercantile Law / Unrestricted

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

No abstract available / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1987. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. [251]-258.

L’obiter dictum désigne un propos «soit dit en passant», une parole incidente que l’on attribue plutôt au juge anglais. Or le Conseil d’État aussi prononce des obiter dicta à l’occasion de la lecture d’arrêts et d’avis contentieux. Dès lors qu’il déroge à l’économie des moyens ou à l’interdiction de l’ultra petita, le Conseil d’État est en effet amené à formuler un énoncé juridique superflu pour la solution contentieuse. Il utilise la technique de l’obiter dictum de deux façons. D’une part, le Conseil d’État donne forme à sa jurisprudence : il crée et systématise ses précédents, sans immédiatement les appliquer aux espèces qui lui sont soumises. Ainsi manifeste-t-il son pouvoir jurisprudentiel. D’autre part, le Conseil d’État développe son jugement : il justifie et explique sa décision surabondamment par rapport à la solution du litige. Aussi exerce-t-il son pouvoir juridictionnel. La méthode de l’obiter dictum, telle qu’employée par le Conseil d’État, déploie le pouvoir de juger de celui-ci. Il va jusqu’à poser du droit de manière générale et abstraite, même en l’absence de nécessité pour régler un cas spécial et concret. A la différence des précédents du juge anglais, la jurisprudence du Conseil d’État ne dépend donc plus intimement des faits. Son pouvoir jurisprudentiel se distancie, de ce point de vue, de son pouvoir juridictionnel. Ce dernier est mis à l’œuvre dans des incidentes qui, quant à elles, tendent plus directement à la résolution des conflits. Attestant d’un renouvellement de son office de juge, les obiter dicta participent pour le Conseil d’État d’une nouvelle façon de dire le droit et de trancher les litiges, en définitive de rendre la justice. / The notion of obiter dictum indicates a comment made «by the way» or «in passing», usually by a Common Law judge. In this study, obiter dicta refer to incidental statements expressed by the French Council of State when it gives a ruling or delivers a judicial opinion. Obiter dicta can be regarded as departures from the efficient tradition of stating the minimum essential to dispose of the matter or as infringements of the prohibition against passing judgment outside the issues raised by the opposing parties. When the Council of State delivers an obiter dictum, it makes a statement of law that is not essential to the judicial outcome. Obiter dicta fulfil two functions. They enable the Council of State to express generalisations independent of particular judgments and thereby to produce an abstract system of precedent. As a consequence, the decisions of the Council of State produce a general jurisprudence that is no longer limited to the facts of particular cases. Obiter dicta also enable the Council of State to justify and explain its judgments in concrete terms, with the result that they contribute to the elucidation and enforcement of its decisions.We can conclude, therefore, that obiter dicta supply the potential for superior general jurisprudence and for improved particular judgment. In short, that obiter dicta reveal a new way for the French Council of State to dispense justice.

En dépit de leurs histoire et géographie distinctes, les systèmes juridiques romano-germanique et de common law ont longtemps influencé et continuent encore d’influencer, au Cameroun, le développement de la procédure pénale en général et des droits de la défense en particulier.D’une influence distincte et imposée dès la colonisation, avec pour caractéristiques principales, en matière pénale, l’existence de deux codes de procédures pénales et une disparité des droits de la personne poursuivie en fonction de la partie du territoire camerounais (ex-Cameroun oriental/ ex-Cameroun occidental), le législateur est parvenu en 2005, sur la base d’une influence commune et voulue des systèmes juridiques romano-germanique et de common law, à construire une procédure et un système de défense pénale uniques, caractérisés par un accroissement des droits de la défense.Produits des compromis et vecteurs du creuset d’influences réciproques des différents systèmes de droit romano-germanique et de common law, les droits de la défense au Cameroun, de la phase préparatoire à la phase décisoire du procès pénal, ont été construits autour des lignes de partage variables, qui traduisent plus une volonté de métissage du droit que l’hégémonie d’un seul système. / Despite their separate history and geography, civil and common law legal systems have long influenced and continue to influence, in Cameroon, the development of criminal procedure in general and the rights of the defence in particular.From a separate and imposed influence since colonization, with main characteristics, in criminal matters, the existence of two criminal procedure codes and a disparity of defense rights depending on the part of the Cameroon territory (eastern Cameroon / western Cameroon), the legislator in 2005, on the basis of a common and desired influence of civil and common law legal systems, succeeded to build a common procedure and criminal defence system, characterized by an increasing of the rights of defence.Products of compromises and vectors of crucible reciprocal influences of civil and common law legal systems, the rights of the defence in Cameroon, from the pre-trial phase to the trial phase of the criminal trial, were built around variable dividing lines, reflecting more a willingness to miscegenation than the hegemony of a single law system.

My thesis examines the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), which is the site of ongoing debate between environmentalists and the oil industry. I begin by analyzing both sides’ claims about the area’s value and establishing that the coastal zone of the ANWR, whose fate is the most precarious, should be protected for both environmental and cultural reasons. I then examine two methods for protection: the common law, and regulation. I conclude that only through proactive regulation can the ANWR continue to thrive.

[pt] Até os anos 1980, tratar de controle de constitucionalidade no âmbito do direito comparado significava ignorar a prática constitucional desenvolvida em boa parte dos países da família da common law. Isso porque o Reino Unido, juntamente com algumas de suas ex-colônias (como Canadá, Nova Zelândia e Austrália, além de Israel, cujo território fora um protetorado inglês antes de se tornar um Estado independente), apegados ao dogma da soberania do Parlamento, resistiam em reconhecer a juízes não eleitos competência para invalidar atos emanados dos legítimos representantes do povo. O cenário começa a mudar com a aprovação da Carta de Direitos e Liberdades canadense, em 1982. Nesta ocasião, os direitos fundamentais foram recolhidos em um documento jurídico dotado de supremacia e rigidez, tendo sido facultado a juízes e tribunais invalidar normas que não os respeitassem. Mas, para conciliar a nova prática com a tradição constitucional habituada à supremacia do Parlamento, alguns arranjos foram feitos, de forma a permitir que a última palavra em matéria de interpretação de direitos constitucionalmente protegidos permanecesse com o legislador. Surgiu, assim, um novo modelo de controle de constitucionalidade, no qual o judiciário possui um papel importante, mas não determinante, na proteção a direitos fundamentais. Este modelo, aqui chamado de controle fraco de constitucionalidade, serviu de inspiração para que o próprio Reino Unido e outras de suas ex-colônias adotassem alguma forma de judicial review entre os anos que marcaram a virada do século XX para o XXI. Nesta tese, pretende-se apresentar as características desse novo modelo, contrapondo-o ao modelo tradicional (forte) de controle de constitucionalidade e, ao final, fazer reflexões sobre a possível recepção do novo sistema em países integrantes da família romano-germânica. / [en] By the 1980s, to approach judicial review in the context of comparative law meant to ignore the constitutional practice developed in a number of members within the common-law family of nations. This happened because the United Kingdom, along with some of her former colonies (such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia, besides Israel, whose territory had been an English protectorate before becoming an independent state), attached to the principle of Parliament s sovereignty, resisted the endowment of unelected judges with the power to invalidate acts performed by the people s legitimate representatives. The scenario began to change with the adoption of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. On that occasion, fundamental rights were put into a legal document tagged with supremacy and rigidity; judges and courts having been authorized to invalidate norms that clearly did not respect such rights. However, to accommodate the new practice without sacrificing the constitutional tradition more accustomed to the sovereignty of Parliament, some arrangements were made in order to allow that the last word on the interpretation of constitutionallyprotected rights would remain with the legislator. Thus a new pattern of judicial review appeared in which the Judiciary plays a significant, but not decisive role in protecting fundamental rights. This pattern, herein called weak-form judicial review, inspired the UK herself and other former colonies to adopt some form of judicial review, in the years that marked the turn of the 20th century to the 21st. The present paper intends to present the characteristics of this new pattern, comparing it to the traditional (strong) judicial review pattern, and it eventually elaborates on the possible receptivity to the new system by member countries of the civil law family of nations.