This study is essentially a critique of how the three dominant paradigms of explanatory international relations theory - (neo-)realism, liberalism, and systemic constructivism - conceive of, analytically deal with, and explain ethnic conflict and sovereignty. By deconstructing their approaches to ethnic identity formation in general and ethnic conflict in particular it argues that all three paradigms, in their epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies through reification and by analytically equating ethnic groups with states, tend to essentialise and substantialise the ethnic lines of division and strategic essentialisms of ethnic and ethno-nationalist elites they set out to describe, and, all too often, even write them into existence. Particular attention, both at the theoretical and empirical level, will be given to the three explanatory frameworks explanatory IR has contributed to the study of ethnic conflict: the 'ethnic security dilemma', the 'ethnic alliance model', and, drawing on other disciplines, instrumentalist approaches. The deconstruction of these three frameworks will form the bulk of the theoretical section, and will subsequently be shown in the case study to be ontologically untenable or at least to fail to adequately explain the complex dynamics of ethnic identity formation in ethnic conflict. By making these essentialist presumptions, motives, and practices explicit this study makes a unique contribution not only to the immediate issues it addresses but also to the wider debate on the nature of IR as a discipline. As a final point, drawing on constitutive theory and by conceiving of the behaviour and motives of protagonists of ethnic conflict as expressions of a fluid, open-ended, and situational matrix of identities and interests without sequential hierarchies of dependent and independent variables, the study attempts to offer an alternative, constitutive reading of ethnic and nationalist identity to the discourses of explanatory IR. These themes that are further developed in the empirical section where, explanatory IRA's narratives of ethnic group solidarity, ethno-nationalism, and national self-determination are examined and deconstructed by way of the case study of the relations between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Iraqi Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties in the wider context of the political status of the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq. With this ambition this study makes an original empirical contribution by scrutinising these relations in a depth unique to the literature.

Cette thèse étudie la couverture de l’actualité en Macédoine faite par la presse internationale et albanophone pendant le conflit ethnique armé de 2001. Elle explore un corpus multilingue [français, anglais et albanais] composé de dépêches d’agences de presse [AFP et Reuters] et d’articles journaux français [Le Monde et Libération], américains [The New York Times et The Washington Post] et albanophones de Macédoine [Flaka, Fakti et Lobi]. Issue d’un cadre théorique et méthodologique complexe, l’analyse de ce corpus repose sur les traditions françaises et nord-américaines de la recherche en sciences de la communication. L’analyse du discours, combinée avec un matériel recueilli lors des interviews des journalistes et avec l’analyse statistique et lexicométrique de contenu, a produit des données qui sont interprétées dans le cadre de la théorie de l’agenda-setting. Les résultats de cette analyse ont permis de répondre à nos questions de recherche : Quelle était l’attention accordée à l’actualité macédonienne par la presse internationale ? Quelles sont la nature et l’importance des informations fournies par les journalistes qui ont couvert cet événement sur le terrain ? Comment cette actualité a-t-elle été traitée par la presse locale de langue albanaise en Macédoine ?Une approche géopolitique et historique fournit le cadre de cette thèse. / Cette thèse étudie la couverture de l’actualité en Macédoine faite par la presse internationale et albanophone pendant le conflit ethnique armé de 2001. Elle explore un corpus multilingue [français, anglais et albanais] composé de dépêches d’agences de presse [AFP et Reuters] et d’articles journaux français [Le Monde et Libération], américains [The New York Times et The Washington Post] et albanophones de Macédoine [Flaka, Fakti et Lobi]. Issue d’un cadre théorique et méthodologique complexe, l’analyse de ce corpus repose sur les traditions françaises et nord-américaines de la recherche en sciences de la communication. L’analyse du discours, combinée avec un matériel recueilli lors des interviews des journalistes et avec l’analyse statistique et lexicométrique de contenu, a produit des données qui sont interprétées dans le cadre de la théorie de l’agenda-setting.Les résultats de cette analyse ont permis de répondre à nos questions de recherche : Quelle était l’attention accordée à l’actualité macédonienne par la presse internationale ? Quelles sont la nature et l’importance des informations fournies par les journalistes qui ont couvert cet événement sur le terrain ? Comment cette actualité a-t-elle été traitée par la presse locale de langue albanaise en Macédoine ?Une approche géopolitique et historique fournit le cadre de cette thèse.

This paper contributes to the literature on post-conflict identity in exploring the question: which conditions favor the success of superordinate identity formation among former conflict parties in post-civil war societies? Building on the social psychological literature on terror management theory (TMT) and optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT), it argues that the presence of a common enemy among former conflict parties increases the likelihood of successful superordinate identity formation. An in-depth qualitative comparative study on national identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) after the 1992-1995 civil war and Lebanon after the 1975-1990 civil war is conducted in order to test the theoretical arguments of this paper. The empirical findings lend preliminary support to this hypothesis, yet also point to limits in the study’s theoretical framework, including the instability of an identity predicated upon a common enemy which may not exist in the future. This paper also identifies two alternative explanations to account for the outcomes observed in the two cases, including differences in the nature of the conflicts and the different ways consociationalism has been implemented in the two countries.

Magister Legum - LLM / This paper aimed to analyse the impact of power sharing on democracy. The paper also compared the approach of Burundi and Rwanda in their constitutions to the concept of power sharing. / South Africa

Les Baloutches sont un groupe ethnique résidant en Asie du Sud-central. Baloutchistan ou, à défaut, le Baloutchistan (qui signifie terre des Baloutches), est un territoire historique qui s'étend du sud-est de l‘Iran et sud de l'Afghanistan au sud-ouest du Pakistan. Le Baloutchistan historique est connu comme le Grand Baloutchistan. Le Grand Baloutchistan est aujourd'hui réparti entre trois pays: l'ouest du Pakistan, sud de l'Iran et le sud-ouest d‘Afghanistan. Les Baloutches sont donc principalement concentrés dans ces territoires. Cependant, il existe une population baloutche importante dispersée dans les Eats arabes du golfe Persique (comme l‘Oman, l‘Émirats arabes unis, etc), en Afrique comme ailleurs en Asie, ainsi qu’une petite diaspora en Europe, en Australie et aux Etats unis. Le nombre total des Baloutches dans les régions mentionnés est estimée entre 10 et 15 millions. Les frontières du Grand Baloutchistan d‘aujourd'hui sont le résultat d'une répartition territoriale officielle entre l'Afghanistan, l'Iran et l'Inde (Pakistan d‘aujourd‘hui) qui a eu lieu vers l‘année 1870. "Bien qu‘apparemment insignifiante dans le contexte de toutes les crises régionales et internationales qui affectent notre monde, le Baloutchistan est, en fait, un espace de liaison: le point à partir duquel les intérêts stratégiques diamétralement opposés convergent" (Draitser, 2012). En ce qui concerne la terminologie, l'utilisation du nom du Baloutchistan, il est utile de prendre en compte le fait que le Baloutche en persan signifie la crête de coq, et puisque les troupes baloutches qui ont combattu pour Astyages de Kai Khosrow en 585-550 BC portaient des casques avec une crête de coq, c'est pourquoi on a leur donnée le nom de « Baloutche ». Dans la liste des guerriers de Kai Khosrow de l'empire d‘achéménide, Ferdowsi a mentionné le baloutche dans le Shâh Nâmeh (Le Livre des Rois) sous l'autorité du général Ashkash (Dashti, 2012). Toutefois, la période pendant laquelle le nom du Baloutchistan ou Baloutchistan est entré dans l‘usage général n'est pas claire, mais elle peut être attribuée à la 12ème/18ème siècle qui a vu Nasir Khan I de Kalat devenir "le premier dirigeant indigène d'établir une autorité autonome sur une grande partie de la région" (Encyclopédie Iranica, 2014). Malgré qu'il n'y ait pas de consensus parmi les scientistes, l'histoire Baloutches et l'origine des Baloutches peuvent probablement être attribués à de pastorales nomades, des tribus indo -Iraniennes qui se sont installés dans le nord-ouest de la région iranienne Balashakan, étant eux- mêmes, les descendants des Aryens descendus au sud de l'Asie centrale il y a environ trois mille ans. Ces tribus indo-Iraniennes sont aujourd’hui connues sous le nom de Balashchik. Le Balashchik deviendrait connu sous le nom des baloutches, des siècles plus tard, quand ils ont migré du nord-ouest de l‘Iran au sud et de la périphérie orientale du plateau iranien, une région qui allait devenir Baloutchistan. Dans cette région du Baloutchistan, les Baloutches ont établi un nation-état indépendant ou semi-indépendant qui durerait environ trois cent ans (Dashti, 2012). Le Balûchistân attirerait les Britanniques dans la première moitié du 19ème siècle comme une voie stratégique pour sécuriser les routes commerciales vers l'Orient, et comme un tremplin vers l'Afghanistan contre les Russes pendant la Première Guerre afghane (1839-1842). Le Raj britannique continuait à statuer et d'administrer la région du Baloutchistan par les traités de 1841 et 1854 avec le Khan (souverain) de Kalat (la capitale du khanat de Kalat, qui était un état princier dominant une grande partie du Grand Baloutchistan). Le traité de 1876 assurerait l'indépendance et la souveraineté de Kalat, dès le départ des Britanniques de la région. Vers la fin du 19ème siècle, un certain nombre de processus de démarcation du Baloutchistan a eu lieu, la plupart du temps pour apaiser l'Iran. (...) / The Baluch are an ethnic group residing in south-central Asia. Baluchistan or, alternatively, Balochistan (meaning land of the Baluch), is a historic territory that stretched from southeastern Iran and southern Afghanistan to southwestern Pakistan. Historic Baluchistan is known as Greater Baluchistan. Greater Baluchistan is today divided into the boundaries of three countries: western Pakistan, southern Iran, and southwestern Afghanistan. The Baluch are therefore concentrated within these territories. However, there is a large Baluch population dispersed in the Persian Gulf States, and a small diaspora in Europe. Although there is no consensus among scholars, Baluch history and the origin of the Baluch can most likely be traced to pastoralist-nomadic, Indo-Iranic tribes that settled in northwestern Iranian region of Balashakan, having, themselves, descended from the Aryans who had moved south from Central Asia around three thousand years ago. These Indo-Iranic tribes became known as the Balashchik. The Balashchik would become known as the Baloch centuries later when they migrated from northwestern Iran to the south and eastern fringes of the Iranian plateau, a region that would become known as Balochistan or Baluchistan. Within this region of Baluchistan the Baluch established an independent or semi-independent nation-state that would last for approximately three hundred years (Naseer Dashti, 2012). Baluchistan would attract the British in the first half of the 19th century as a strategic pathway to secure trade routes to the East, and as a launching pad into Afghanistan against the Russians during the First Afghan War (1839-1842), The British Raj would go on to rule and administer the region of Baluchistan through the treaties of 1841 and 1854 with the Khan (ruler) of Kalat (the capital of the Khanate of Kalat, which was then a princely state controlling much of Greater Baluchistan). The Treaty of 1876 would assure independence and sovereignty for Kalat. Upon the departure of the British from the region. Late in the 19th century a number of demarcation processes of Baluchistan took place, mostly to appease Iran, then Persia. A dispute over claims to Sistan by both Iran and Afghanistan finally saw the division of the territory of Baluchistan in two, between Iran and Afghanistan, in 1904 by the British Commissioner, Sir McMahon. The Khan of Kalat would declare independence on 15 August 1947. The Khan also established an interim constitution that provided for a bicameral parliament. This period of independence lasted from 15 August 1947 to 27 March 1948. After a brief rebellion by the Baluch in Western Baluchistan against Persian rule, Western Baluchistan, or Iranian Baluchistan would finally be incorporated into Iran in 1928. The assimilation of Baluchistan into Pakistan following the 1947 partition of India, and subsequently the creation of Pakistan, was forceful, since the then Khan of Kalate, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan, refused to join Pakistan, and military force had to be used to placate the resistant Baluch, under the leadership of Mir Ahmed Yar Khan. The Baluch of Pakistan, therefore, consider Baluchistan occupied territory. The Khanate of Kalat ceased to exist on 14 October 1955 when the province of West Pakistan was formed. Since their forced accession into Pakistan up to the present, the Baluch have been subjugated to discriminatory policies that have assured their impoverished status. (...)

“Ghost Rations” draws on environmental history and the history of capitalism to explain the development of the communal conflicts that tore apart the multi-ethnic, multi-confessional Ottoman Empire. It focuses on the Ottoman East in 1839-94, a period that began with a Sultanic declaration of religious equality and ended with a dramatic wave of communal violence, the Hamidian Massacres (1894-97). Recent work has described how communal boundaries hardened thanks to the rise of new discourses and symbols of belonging put forth by powerful agencies like the Ottoman state, European colonial powers, and Protestant missionaries. This project builds on these discursive and intellectual explanations for ethnic and religious divides, but it argues that in order to understand how new ideas about difference and belonging came into practice, we must account for provincial partners and the material conditions that assisted in their spread and uptake. To accomplish this, “Ghost Rations” takes up famine, the most intense of material conditions, in the decades before the Hamidian Massacres. The first half focuses on the 1839-76 expansion of imperial institutions that worked to define and police communal boundaries. The second half analyzes three cases of famine between 1879 and 1894, when these reform-oriented institutions wielded outsized influence by distributing life-saving humanitarian aid. These institutions, however, also had the effect of distributing hardship and trauma unevenly along ethno-religious lines. New technologies like the telegraph, environmental forces like El Niño, and financial changes like the spread of banking combined to distribute hunger and hardship along confessional lines. Suffering unequally borne radicalized communal tensions and set the stage for unprecedented violence in subsequent years.

This research question is whether the social and political fear was used in the Syrian case to mobilize the Alawi minority and how. Therefore, this research is deductive research directed toward testing how applicable is the social theory of fear in the Syrian conflict. Whereas the Syrian regime has highly relied on the Alawi minority to sustain its existence in power. This in turn resulted in high casualties within the minority and bad living conditions for both the minority and the country total. However, this did not lead the regime to lose the support of the Alawis. Much of the research made on the topic presented the Alawi minority as the regime loyalists because of being privileged. This research gives a different view on the reasons which led this specific minority to support the Syrian regime. Where it presents a different approach to study the case through qualitative interviewing of a purposive sample, then analyzing the data through the narrative analysis method. The findings of this research fill the research gap presented by simply claiming Alawis are loyalists for being privileged. On the contrary, this research denies this assumption and presents findings that prove the usage of the social fear mechanism and in what method. This research does not only contribute to filling the gap in the existing research, but also to the theory of social fear applying to a further dimension than the author had explained. When it comes to the field of conflict studies, the research presents the mechanism that caused this conflict to become protracted and bloody. Those mechanisms if early detected may help avoid conflicts of the same nature in the future.

This dissertation is a history of efforts to develop the Litani River in Lebanon. Under French rule (1920–43), development projects shaped an unequal distribution of infrastructure that privileged Christian and urban regions. A cohort of nationalist Lebanese engineers advocated developing the Litani River, in Lebanon’s Shi‘a-majority southwest, as a means to foster national unity by resolving inequalities among Lebanon’s religious communities. The resulting Litani project (1955–65) was Lebanon’s first grand-scale hydroelectric project. The United States, France, and the World Bank made the project central to their respective strategies in the decolonizing Middle East. Lebanese engineers competed and collaborated with European and American experts to design infrastructure that connected the Litani, and Lebanon’s hinterland, with the capital, Beirut. Economists, religious leaders, farmers, and communists debated infrastructure designs in Beirut’s bourgeoning public sphere. The completed infrastructure generated electricity for Beirut’s consumers by extracting water from the impoverished rural margins. The World Bank deemed the project a qualified success as an investment. But most in Lebanon considered it a monumental failure because the infrastructure did not meet urgent needs. Rather, the infrastructure materialized preexisting inequalities between Beirut and its peripheries, which provided a visible injustice that a rural Shi‘i political-religious movement mobilized to demand equal rights. Unlike familiar histories of development in which rural communities resist state intrusion, in Lebanon, rural actors and engineers sought to build a larger and more equitable state by constructing socially just infrastructure.

The aim of this thesis is to analyze factors responsible for onset of ethnic conflicts and selected characteristics. By comparing to non-ethnic conflicts it was determined, if there are any differences in onset mechanisms of these two types of conflicts and thus if there is a space for explanatory role of ethnicity as a cause of ethnic conflicts. Selection of examined factors is congruent with the relevant literature and existing analyses and reflects the context of contemporary conflict research. The influence of male unemployment rate, level of Human development index and its inequality-adjusted version, human rights and finally the influence of conflicts in neighbouring countries on the onset of conflict is tested by statistical methods in component analyses. Also the intensity of ethnic and non-ethnic conflicts, war years and HDI are also compared. The comparative style of the research helps to understand the true nature of causes of intrastate conflicts and indicates, that there is no difference between the two types. Empirical character of this thesis is also the reason for assessing it within the context of other quantitative studies of conflict, comparing the results and defining the proper level of analysis for reaching tangible contributions.

This thesis describes the perceptions of the Hutu/Tutsi communities in Bujumbura on the origin of ethnic conflicts in Burundi. With the use of a qualitative research method, this thesis describes the history and origin of ethnicity and ethnic identity between the Hutu and the Tutsi. Focusing on the case study approach, both secondary and primary research methods are used in the process of data sources with emphasis on the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras of the country. The thesis findings show that ethnicity in Burundi has changed over the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras. The ethnic structures in Burundi changed from that of togetherness in the pre-colonial period to that of hatred in both the colonial and post-colonial eras. The way forward for Burundi is to change the governance structures in the country so as to dismantle the colonial structures and shift back to the traditional pre-colonial structures.