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There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the lawmaking process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that. to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. • Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law. they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt. precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be. and often are, the judges. because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract. property, vested rights, due process of the law. liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental. they give direction to all lawmaking. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. 1 Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that Ihe judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to 1 PresidenlTheodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21 . accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as seoaration of DOwers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Futhermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / Thesis (LLM)--North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006.

There exists a lacuna in our legal system, the role of the judiciary in the law-making process is not well defined. 'Historically, the judiciary has always claimed that its duty was merely to interpret and apply the law and that it was not within its province to legislate.' Custom and practice on the other hand has revealed that to some extent, this is not entirely true. Because through precedents and pronouncements of statutes unconstitutional and therefore, null and void, the former in that sense makes laws and is practically involved in the law-making process. "Judicial discretion is another means at the disposal of the judiciary by which the latter legislates." Therefore, the notion that the province of the judiciary is only confined to the interpretation and application of the law is overwhelmingly misleading. The role of the judiciary in the law making process has to be clearly defined and not just to be inferred so that there is left no middle ground or grey area between its involvement and non-involvement. Once this is done, the problem of uncertainty and inconsistency in so far as the judicial process is concerned will be remedied. Since it is indeed the judiciary that decides the cases before them, from these cases it is respectfully submitted that the interpretative process they adopt in arriving at their decision itself amounts to law-making. It is trite law that when courts interpret the law, they also make the law in that process. This reasoning has long been accepted in our legal order and in foreign jurisdictions. The former President of the United States of America, Roosevelt, precisely pointed out in his message to the Congress of the United States on the 8th December 1908, thus: The Chief lawmakers in our country may be, and often are, the judges, because they are the final seat of authority. Every time they interpret contract, property, vested rights, due process of the law, liberty, they necessarily enact into law parts of a system of social philosophy; and as such interpretation is fundamental, they give direction to all law-making. The decisions of the courts on economic and social questions depend upon their economic and social philosophy; and for the peaceful progress of our people during the twentieth century we shall owe most to those judges who hold to a twentieth century economic and social philosophy and not to a long outgrown philosophy, which was itself the product of primitive economic conditions. Even though the above quote was said in the last century, it is still applicable today because judges still do the job of interpreting and applying the law. In doing so they are involved in the law-making process. It has become manifest, as this study will reveal, that the judiciary is involved in the law-making process even though this has proven somewhat irksome to "President Theodore Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States, 8th December 1908, 43rd Congressional Record ,Part 1, p.21" accept and appreciate, bearing in mind the overriding democratic principles such as separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary .. Therefore this study endeavours to interrogate the manner by which the South African judiciary has been involved in the law-making process both during the previous apartheid regime and in the present democratic dispensation. Furthermore, this study also attempts to answer the question as to how the judiciary will continue to legislate in the present judicial transformation process without upsetting the imperatives of the doctrine of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary. / (LLM) North-West University, Mafikeng Campus, 2006

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 100-103)

L’activité professionnelle des acteurs sportifs suscite de la conflictualité. Les litiges qui en découlent sont extrêmement diversifiés. Matériellement, ils sont de nature associative ou contractuelle, administrative ou judiciaire, sociale, fiscale ou pénale, disciplinaire ou non disciplinaire. Territorialement, ils sont de dimension nationale ou internationale. Tous s’inscrivent dans un système de sources particulièrement étoffées : à des normes imposées aux acteurs (normes sportives, étatiques, supra-étatiques) se superposent des normes négociées par eux. Créant des interactions inévitables entre ces ensembles juridiques, un tel pluralisme juridique est à l’origine d’un véritable pluralisme de justice aux incidences processuelles et matérielles fortes.D’un point de vue processuel, qu’ils soient situés dans un ordre juridique national ou rattachés à un ordre juridique supranational ou transnational, les organes de justice ont des caractéristiques et des pouvoirs forts différents, mais répondent néanmoins à des logiques procédurales communes. Si les principes de répartition entre les divers modes de justice diffèrent selon que le litige sportif demeure dans la sphère nationale ou dépasse celle-ci, il reste que, dans leur ensemble, les juges interviennent dans une relation de combinaison, de complémentarité, plutôt que dans un rapport d’opposition.D’un point de vue du droit substantiel, cette démultiplication des juges n’en est pas pour autant malheureuse dans la mesure où ce pluralisme de justice vient, de son côté, opportunément consacrer et alimenter le pluralisme juridique sportif. Forts de leur action jurisprudentielle normative, ces juges, ces arbitres, participent, par une action isolée ou parfois dans le cadre d’un dialogue constructif, à une régulation adaptée et cohérente des différends liés à l’activité professionnelle des acteurs sportifs, en tenant compte des particularités de l’organisation du mouvement sportif et des rapports juridiques noués par ces derniers.Si bien qu’en définitive, les relations entre les phénomènes de pluralisme juridique et de pluralisme de justice participent d’un règlement des litiges sportifs fédéraux et de travail généralement conforme aux principes élémentaires de bonne justice et paraissant résolument adapté aux spécificités de l’activité professionnelle sportive. Ne serait-ce pas là, au fond, l’illustration saillante d’un « pluralisme ordonné » qui tend à respecter la diversité tout en permettant une harmonie d’ensemble ? / The professional activity of those involved in sport provokes much conflict. Consequent disputes are extremely diverse. Materially, they are associative or contractual, administrative or legal, social, fiscal or criminal, disciplinary or non-disciplinary in nature. Territorially, they are national or international. All fit into a particularly robust system of sources: norms imposed on actors (sporting rules, state rules, and supranational rules) overlap with norms negotiated by them. Creating inevitable interactions between these legal entities, such legal pluralism is the source of a true pluralism of justice with strong litigation and material consequences.From a procedural standpoint, whether they are attached to a national legal system or a supranational or transnational one, legal bodies have strongly different characteristics and powers, yet still meet a common procedural logic. In general, judges intervene with a combination and a complementary approach, rather than in an adversarial relationship, even if the principles of distribution between the various methods of justice differ, whether a sporting dispute remains within the domestic sphere or exceeds it. From a substantive law standpoint, this multiplication of judges is not necessarily unfortunate in so far as this pluralism of justice appropriately consecrates and nourishes legal sporting pluralism. With their normative case law actions, these judges and arbitrators take part by acting alone or sometimes within a constructive dialogue, to an appropriate and consistent regulation of disputes relating to the professional activity of those involved in sport. This takes into account the peculiarities of the organisation of sport and the legal relationships established by these actors.Whereby, ultimately, the relationships between legal pluralism and pluralism of justice are part of a general settlement of federal sporting disputes and working disputes that generally conform to the basic principles of fair justice and appearing resolutely adapted to the specificities of professional sporting activity. Does this not illustrate an “ordered pluralism ?

Comment croire ou mettre en doute les propos des individus qui montent à la tribune lors d’un procès de l’Athènes classique ? Les orateurs qui prennent la parole lors d’une affaire mobilisent tout un éventail de preuves pour construire leur discours comme crédible aux yeux des juges. Ces procédures constituent le dispositif de vérité, au milieu duquel les témoins se situent en bonne place dans les discours judiciaires, c’est-à-dire les textes des dix auteurs sélectionnés comme le canon des orateurs attiques des Ve et IVe siècles avant Jésus-Christ (Antiphon, Andocide, Lysias, Isocrate, Isée, Démosthène, Eschine, Hypéride, Lycurgue et Dinarque). Si aucune théorie de la preuve ne se fait jour dans ces corpus, la figure du témoin judiciaire apparaît comme centrale, comme l’illustrent les très nombreuses convocations testimoniales. Le rapport entre témoignage et documents écrits montre également la valeur probante des dépositions. Qu’est-ce qui, alors, permet aux paroles d’un témoin d’être présentées comme véridiques ? Les déposants peuvent être crus car ils engagent leur responsabilité, du fait d’une possible punition divine, s’ils prêtent serment, ou humaine, si l’adversaire lance un procès pour faux témoignage. En outre, les témoins doivent avoir une connaissance directe des événements en question. Mais cette exigence est paradoxale : ils sont le premier intermédiaire entre l’auditoire et les faits. Les plaignants rappellent donc fréquemment aux juges des points déjà connus, afin d’en faire leur propres témoins. Ils cherchent aussi à effacer leur propre rôle dans l’argumentation, en désignant leurs propos comme simples et en minimisant leur expérience oratoire. / How did the Athenians trust or doubt the words of someone who came up to the tribune during a trial? The speakers used a whole range of evidence to make their speech credible for the judges. All these techniques and the witnesses were a very important part of this process can be qualify as the truth apparatus in the orators’ speeches, i.e. the texts from the ten authors chosen as the canon of the Attic orators of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.: Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Isaeus, Demosthenes, Aeschines, Hyperides, Lycurgus, and Dinarchus. Even if no proof theory has been found out, the witnesses were crucial in the courtroom, as we can see from the many times a litigant called a witness to testify. The relation between testimony and written documents also shows the convincing value of the witness statement. Therefore, to what extent could a testimony be considered as truthful? The witnesses were usually trusted because their responsibility was at stake: they could incur a divine punishment, if they swore an oath, or a humane penalty, if they were put on trial for false witnessing. Besides, the witnesses must have a direct knowledge of the events. Yet, there was a paradox in this requirement: they were the first part of the demarcation between the facts and the public of the trial. Thus, the litigants often reminded the judges about some elements already known in order to make them witnesses. Litigants also tried to erase their own role in the demonstration, by presenting their words as simple and by minimising their oratory skills.

O objetivo primordial deste trabalho é fazer uma apresentação do Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos (SIDH) aos operadores jurídicos do Brasil, em especial aos juízes brasileiros. Para isso, noticia-se a mudança de rumo mundial a partir de 1948, com uma nova concepção dos direitos humanos. A soberania do Estado se relativiza. A ONU é criada, conformando o Sistema Global de Proteção aos Direitos Humanos e na sua esteira, os sistemas regionais são instituídos. De maneira pontual, o Sistema Regional Europeu, o Sistema Regional Africano e a incipiência do Árabe e do Asiático são referidos e contextualizados. Nesse ponto da pesquisa, debruça-se sobre o Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos, sistema regional das Américas, fazendo alusão ao seu surgimento, órgãos e instrumentos normativos. Dentre os órgãos, situa-se a Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos como intérprete final dos vários instrumentos normativos do sistema. O mais importante deles é a Convenção Americana de Direitos Humanos (CADH). Denominada também de Pacto de San José da Costa Rica, esta convenção cria um sistema próprio e eficiente de responsabilização estatal a violadores de seus preceitos. Nos termos da CADH, a porta de entrada das denúncias perante o SIDH é a Comissão Interamericana de Direitos Humanos, cujas atribuições são também estudadas. Com o desejo de dotar o leitor de um conhecimento aprofundado acerca da garantia do juiz independente, imparcial e préconstituído, o segundo capítulo do trabalho adentra na jurisprudência da Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos. São relatados vários casos contenciosos e uma opinião consultiva, buscando dotar o leitor de uma precisa noção do entendimento do tribunal interamericano sobre tais garantias. No terceiro capítulo, a partir dos conceitos no Brasil de juiz independente, imparcial e pré-constituído, faz-se um paralelo com a jurisprudência da Corte, demonstrando-se o imperativo de que o juiz brasileiro tenha ciência da jurisprudência do SIDH para necessariamente aplicá-la sob pena de responsabilização do Estado brasileiro. Temas como a hierarquia dos tratados internacionais no Brasil, controle de convencionalidade e diálogo das Corte são tratados, buscando dar uma ampla visão dos reflexos do Sistema Interamericano de Direitos Humanos no direito brasileiro. / Tem main objective of this work is to present the Inter-American Human Rights System (IAHRS) to the legal professionals in Brazil, in particular to Brazilian judges. To accomplish that, we review the worldwide change of perspective concerning human rights that transpired as of 1948, by means of a new conception thereof. State sovereignty is relativized. The UN is organized, the Global Human Rights Regime is formatted, and, in its wake, the regional human rights regimes are also established. One by one, the European, African, and the incipient Arab and Asian regional human rights regimes are referred to and contextualized. At this point of the research, we focus on the Inter-American Human Rights System, the regional human rights regime of the Americas, and point out its origin, organs and normative instruments. Among its organs, we highlight the Inter-American Court of Human Rights as the court of last resort for the interpretation of the several normative instruments of the system, among which we point out the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) as the most important. Also known as Pact of San José, Costa Rica, this convention establishes a unique and efficient system of state responsibility for the infringement of its precepts. Pursuant to the ACHR, complaints under the IAHRS shall be made before the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, whose competences are also reviewed. In order to grant to the reader an in-depth knowledge on the guarantees of an independent, impartial, and preappointed judge, the second chapter of this work focuses on the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. We set forth several litigation cases and one advisory opinion to convey to the reader a precise notion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rightss construction of such guarantees. In the third chapter, from the concepts of an independent, impartial and pre-appointed judge in Brazil, we make a comparison with the Inter-American Court of Human Rightss case law and demonstrate that it is essential that Brazilian judges be acquainted with the IAHRS case law to necessarily apply it, whereas failing to do so may subject the State of Brazil to international responsibility. Themes such as the hierarchy of international treaties in Brazil, control of conventionality, and communication among courts are also reviewed in order to provide the reader with a broad perspective of the influence of the IAHRS on the Brazilian Laws.

Questo studio ha per oggetto l’attività dei giudici imperiali nella Lombardia comunale tra XII e XIII secolo. La prima parte consiste in una lettura d’insieme dell’operato dei giudici imperiali nel solco più generale delle vicende politiche del regno italico durante l’impero di Federico I barbarossa e del figlio Enrico VI. L’intera ricerca è stata condotta a partire dalla documentazione, edita e non; tali risultati sono stati contestualizzati nell’ampio dibattito storiografico sulla natura statuale dell’impero romano-germanico del pieno medioevo. Alla ricostruzione diacronica seguono le schede biografiche dei giudici imperiali più significativi per la ricostruzione storica proposta nella tesi e un’appendice documentaria. Il lavoro è chiuso dalla bibliografia utilizzata e dall'indice dei nomi di persona. / The object of this study is the activity of the imperial judges in the communal Lombardy between twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The first part consists of an overall reading of the activity of the imperial judges in the political strategy in the Italic Kingdom during the empire of Frederick I Barbarossa and his son Henry VI. The entire research is carried out starting from the documentation, edited and inedited; these results are contextualised in the wide historiographical debate on the institutional nature of the medieval Roman-German Empire. The diachronic reconstruction is followed by the biographies of the most significant imperial judges and a documentary appendix. The work is closed by the bibliography and the index.

Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:17:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao_carlos_pessoa.pdf: 1069290 bytes, checksum: 45b9ece9ccba3a6acfdd7eacfd9bf391 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-08-27 / This study titled "Jurisdiction and the power of fact enunciation: normalization in the interstices of the court act" aims to get close to the performance of magistrates and courts of the judiciary power (the court action), specifically in its activities related to the creation of official versions of facts. From the assumption that such activity is based on a specific state power, called in this study the power of fact enunciation, we will show that the court actions are composed by other powers required for its performance. Given this diversity of powers, this study questions what kind of authorities and what kind of legitimization procedures the society is subjected to, specifically the citizens in courts. Based on a critical-dualistic methodology, which divides facts and decisions, balanced by the theory of speech acts, from Searle, this study will try to understand the various forms of ilocucionary strength, which affect the court actions. In this direction, after questioning the means of justification for the judicial activity and verification of its legitimacy, this study will seek to understand the idea of modalization explained by a linguistics enunciation, which will be used to explain how to carry out normalization, found inside the State, in its court action. However, it should be highlighted that this study, although closer to the theory of speech acts, believes that it is possible to match this ideas with the critical dualism and with the theory of truth as correspondence. Finally, this study results in a theoretical discourse related not only to the needs to legitimize the normative activity in a Republican state (in the way of Arendt), and democracy, but also to the activity related to the creation of official versions for past happenings, through the power of the fact enunciation / A presente dissertação, intitulada ¯Jurisdição e poder de enunciação fática: a normalização nos interstícios do agir jurisdicional. tem por objetivo aproximar-se da atuação dos magistrados e tribunais do Poder Judiciário (o agir jurisdicional), especificamente em sua atuação relacionada com o estabelecimento de versões oficiais sobre os fatos. A partir da consideração de tal atuação como oriunda de um poder estatal próprio, denominado por este estudo de poder de enunciação fática, explicitar-se-á que o agir jurisdicional é formado por outros poderes necessários à atuação estatal. Diante dessa diversidade de poderes, o presente estudo indaga a respeito do tipo de autoridade e do tipo de procedimento de legitimação a que os cidadãos estão sujeitos, especificamente os jurisdicionados. Utilizando a metodologia crítico-dualista, que defende a cisão entre fatos e decisões, redimensionada pela teoria dos atos de fala, especificamente de Searle, o presente estudo procurará compreender as diversas formas de força ilocucionária envolvidas no agir jurisdicional. Nessa direção, após questionar as formas de justificação da atividade jurisdicional e da verificação de sua legitimidade, buscar-se-á compreender a ideia de modalização explicitada por uma linguística da enunciação, que será utilizada para explicar como se procede à normalização, verificada no interior do Estado, em seu agir jurisdicional. É importante ressaltar, contudo, que este estudo, apesar de se aproximar da teoria dos atos de fala, acredita ser possível a compatibilização de suas ideias com o dualismo crítico e com a teoria da verdade como correspondência. Por fim, este estudo dissertativo resulta em um direcionamento teórico não vinculado, apenas, à necessidade de legitimação da atividade normativa em um Estado republicano (nos moldes de Arendt) e democrático, mas também, da atividade relacionada com o estabelecimento de versões oficiais sobre fatos pretéritos, através do poder de enunciação fática

This dissertation is motivated by a straightforward question about a drastic change to American politics: why has the process of staffing the circuit courts of appeals, once so agreeable and bipartisan, seemed to have descended into almost complete partisan bitterness? Across the entire time series, these are, after all, the same courts endowed with the same power of judicial review. And when the process of staffing them was harmonious, the courts were nevertheless deciding the fate of major, controversial policies of national importance---such as the New Deal in the 1930s and civil rights in the 1950s---just as they do today. Yes, many other aspects of American politics have changed through the decades. But what could possibly explain such a complete reversal of course? I argue that this change, toward divisiveness and partisan warfare, is actually about the judiciary itself and the substantive manner by which the nominees are thought of---namely, the entry of judicial ideology into the debate through the innovation of circuit judges being evaluated on ideological terms. While taken for granted as central today, any ideological assessment of circuit court nominees, and in particular viewing them as having a comprehensive judicial philosophy as opposed to just a position on singular pressing issue of the day, was almost nonexistent for generations. Its entry into the process was piecemeal and somewhat complicated, but it eventually came to dominate and irrevocably polarize the business of staffing the courts. I argue that this was the key factor that leaves us where we are today. Broadly speaking, I consider the contributions and particular strengths of my dissertation, relative to previous scholarship, to be threefold. First is my argument and accompanying analyses which put the crucial (and severely understudied) role of judicial ideology front and center. Second, I analyze the entire lifespan of the circuit courts, whereas the previous scholarship looks only at (often relatively brief) subsets of their history. As far as I know, this is the first study to systematically look at all circuit court nominations from the establishment of these courts in 1891 through the modern era. Third, I collect and analyze a great deal of new data. In particular I focus on systematically utilizing extensive archival resources and build two original data sets related to the Senate's public and private evaluation of judicial nominees; and while there is certainly a qualitative aspect to much of this research, I also synthesize and make sense of it with quantitative analysis. In chapter 1, I explain the puzzle motivating this research, elaborate my argument, and lay out the theoretical, methodological, and data collection contributions of this dissertation. I also review the literature and describe the three existing schools of thought. In chapter 2, I give an overview of the history of the circuit courts from their founding to the present. In this data-heavy chapter, I examine multiple metrics individually, and using several of these I build a robust composite score of divisiveness for each nominee ever made to the circuit courts, from 1891 through 2020. As far as I know this has never been done before. I find overwhelming evidence that the process has fundamentally changed and become more divisive. In chapter 3, I dig more deeply into the timing of this change, and begin to explore how and why it happened---and begin my attempt at demonstrating how the evaluation of judicial ideology is central to this change. To do this I examine a massive data source that has never been utilized: the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for all nominees. With both qualitative and quantitative analysis, I show that the evaluation of nominees has varied widely over time. Prior to 1979, nominees were evaluated almost exclusively based on their qualifications, with ideology examined only under special circumstances, which I explore in depth. In this time period, ideological scrutiny predicted a contentious confirmation process, providing evidence for my argument that ideological evaluation drove divisiveness. Also in this chapter, I analyze the post-1979 transition to the routine ideological evaluation that permanently altered the confirmation process. I find that Republicans and comprehensive judicial philosophies both played a key role. In chapter 4, I examine the senators' private evaluation of nominees, in part to serve as a check on the validity of my earlier data analysis and also to see if there is any difference between the senators' public and private goals in relation to the judiciary. To do this, I build an original data set of over 1000 internal letters and memoranda from senators, by searching the archival records of nearly every president since Benjamin Harrison as well as over 150 senators. Studying this material qualitatively and quantitatively, the findings here largely align with the analysis of the public committee hearings: for much of history senators were concerned mainly about qualifications, with ideological concern rare and under special circumstances, but eventually ideology came to be the predominant concern which ended the consensual and placid process. This immense historical record also brings to light additional senatorial goals, such as ensuring residents of their own state as well as personal friends obtain judicial appointments. In chapter 5, I focus in on the post-1979 era and I find that the more ideologically distant a nominee is from the Senate, the more divisive the confirmation process is. This provides evidence that the process is defined by ideology related to the nominees, not garden variety polarization of the system. In chapter 6, I conclude, trying to synthesize all of my findings as well as offer some thoughts on areas of future research.