La notion d'« armes de destruction massive » (ADM) est insaisissable : au lieu d'avoir pour but de mieux définir un type d'arme, elle agit à l'inverse, en créant une confusion entre l'arme et les conséquences de son emploi. Cette nature inconsistante se poursuit au niveau juridique. En effet, bien que l'expression fasse très tôt son entrée au sein des Nations unies, aucun traité ni organe officiel n'a, jusqu'alors, réussi à en donner une définition probante. À défaut de définition incontestable, et en l'absence d'un critère vérifiable d'identification de ce qu'est une « arme de destruction massive », cette notion s'est avérée préjudiciable. L'écart entre la réalité de la menace existante en matière d'« armes de destruction massive » et la façon dont elle fut perçue, puis gérée par la communauté internationale, c'est-à-dire à la fois par les États de façon individuelle et par les organisations internationales et les traités de façon collective, a conduit à de multiples dérives. Par conséquent, s'agissant là d'une notion plus politique que juridique, il apparaît nécessaire qu'elle soit précisée ou abandonnée / The term « weapons of mass destruction » (WMD) is ambiguous: instead of aiming to clearly define a certain type of weapon, it does the opposite by creating confusion between the weapon itself and the consequences of its use. This confusion is also reflected at in the legal definition. Indeed, even though the term has been used by the United Nations from an early stage, no treaty or official entity has succeeded in providing a clear definition to this day. The lack of a clear definition, and the absence of defined criteria to determine what constitutes a « weapon of mass destruction », has turned out to be damaging. The dichotomy between the existing threat from « weapons of mass destruction » and the way it is perceived and handled by the international community, including individual states, international organisations, as well as collective treaties, has resulted in several instances of inappropriate use. As a consequence, the term has become a political rather than legal notion. A clearer legal definition is needed, or otherwise the term should be abandoned

Orientador: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / Banca: Hector Luis Saint-Pierre / Banca: Suzeley Kalil Mathias / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: A presente dissertação analisa as mudanças nos elementos domésticos e internacionais que influenciaram a decisão do governo brasileiro de aderir ao Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP) em 1998, após três décadas de rejeição a ele. Essa rejeição era justificada pelo caráter discriminatório do Tratado, que concedia privilégios aos países possuidores de armas nucleares e impedia o desenvolvimento tecnológico autônomo daqueles que não as possuíam. A pesquisa revelou que, em consonância com a explicação oficial, a alteração de postura com relação ao TNP foi fruto das mudanças que ocorreram no plano internacional após o fim da Guerra Fria, juntamente com as mudanças internas, com o fim do regime militar. A manutenção da renúncia ao TNP pareceu, então, infundada por ser incapaz de trazer benefícios práticos para o país e, além disso, causar danos políticos à imagem e à credibilidade externa do país, característica considerada essencial para a obtenção de vantagens no novo contexto internacional / Abstract: This Master's thesis analyzes the changes in domestic and international factors that influenced Brazilian government's decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998 after three decades rejecting it. This rejection was justified by the discriminatory character of the Treaty, which granted privileges to countries possessing nuclear weapons and prevented the autonomous technological development of those which didn't possess them. The survey showed that, in line with the official explanation, the change of attitude to the NPT was the result of the changes that have occurred internationally since the end of the Cold War, along with internal changes, with he end of military regime. The maintenance of rejection to the NPT seems to be, then, seless, for being unable to bring practical benefits to the country and also for causing political damage to the country's external image and credibility, a characteristic considered essential to obtain advantages in the new international context / Mestre

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-29T13:48:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leandro Bessa Souza.pdf: 1503882 bytes, checksum: c9274dfd7e06305481a21cb527c09226 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-05-23 / The objective of the present work is to analyzeBrazil´s insertion processinto the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime since the end of the military regime in the country in 1985, with the purpose of identify the presence ofpossiblecontinuity lines in the Brazilian Foreign Policy on this issue until the end of Lula´s second mandate. We search to study the hypothesis that, in spite of the changes of political parties and presidentson the country´s command, Brazil adopted a strategy of progressive critical and active participation in the discussions of the future of the regime in differentinternational forums.Its policy followedtwo basic master lines: the defenseof the global nuclear disarmament and the country´s right to develop nuclear technology for pacific ends. We founded our study in the analysis of the formation and contradictions of said regime, as well on the advances and reverses of Brazil´s nuclear activities. We conclude that during the examined time lapse, the country´s foreignpolicy had as permanency element what we called resisted adhesion , consistent with conducting the regime´s evolution to guarantee autonomy spaces for Brazil´s action in the nuclear area, avoiding assume bigger obligations for the country, in particular the ones related to nonproliferation, even if in times only by symbolic actions. This directive was maintained during Lula´s government and was intensified during his second mandate, which coincides with the country´s apparent interest in strengthening its nuclear projects on its different aspects. Despite of it, we don´t find possible to affirm that there is a consonance between the Brazilian investments on the nuclear area (which oscillate during the studied period) and its position on the regime in exam. / O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o processo de inserção do Brasil no Regime Internacional de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nuclearesa partir do fim do regime militar no país em 1985, com o intuito de identificar a presença de possíveis linhas de continuidade na Política Externa Brasileira no tratamento dessetema até o final do segundo mandato da gestão Lula. Procuramos estudar ahipótese de que, a despeito das mudanças de partidos políticos e presidentes no comando do país, o Brasil adotou uma estratégia de progressiva participaçãocrítica e ativa nas discussões acerca dos rumos do regime em estudoem diferentes fóruns internacionais, tendo sua política seguido duas linhas mestras básicas: defesa do desarmamento nuclear mundial em geral e do direito do país de desenvolver a tecnologia nuclear para fins pacíficos. Fundamos nosso estudo na análise daformação e das contradições do referido regime, bem como nos avanços e recuosdo desenvolvimento das atividades nucleares no Brasil. Concluímos que durante todo lapso temporal examinado a política externa do paísteve como elemento de permanência o que cunhamos de adesão resistida , consistente na tentativa de conduzir a evolução do regime de forma a garantir espaços de autonomia para a atuação do Brasil na área nuclear, evitando assumir maiores encargos para o país, em particular em face dos instrumentos de não-proliferação, ainda que por vezes apenas por meio de ações simbólicas. Essa diretriz foi mantida durante o governo Lula, tendo se intensificado durante seu segundo mandato, que coincide com um aparente interesse do país em fortalecer os projetos nucleares em seus diferentes aspectos. A despeito disso, nãonos é possível afirmar que há uma consonância entre os investimentos brasileiros na área nuclear (que oscilam no período estudado) e seu posicionamento perante o regime em exame

The scientific endeavors that took place at Hanford Engineer Works, beginning in World War II and continuing thereafter, are often overlooked in the literature on the Manhattan Project, the Atomic Energy Commission, and in regional histories. To historians of science, Hanford is described as an industrial facility that illustrates the perceived differences between academic scientists on the one hand and industrial scientists and engineers on the other. To historians of the West such as Gerald Nash, Richard White, and Patricia Limerick, Hanford has functioned as an example of the West's transformation during in World War II, the role of science in this transformation, and the recurring impacts of industrialization on the western landscape. This thesis describes the establishment and gradual expansion of a multi-disciplinary research program at Hanford whose purpose was to assess and manage the biological and environmental effects of plutonium production. By drawing attention to biological research, an area in which Hanford scientists gained distinction by the mid 1950s, this study explains the relative obscurity of Hanford's scientific research in relation to the prominent, physics-dominated national laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission. By the mid 1960s, with growing public concern over radiation exposure and changes in the government's funding patterns for science, Hanford's ecologically relevant research provided a recognizable and valuable identity for the newly independent, regionally-based research laboratory. With funding shifts favoring the biological and environmental sciences in the latter half of the twentieth-century, Hanford scientists were well prepared to take advantage of expanding opportunities to carve out a permanent niche on the border of American science. / Graduation date: 2003

The aim of the dissertation is to explain the military-political reasons behind the long-term attempt of the Soviet Union to deploy its units on Czechoslovak territory, as well as the root cause of the military operation against Czechoslovakia which was carried out by the five member armies of the Warsaw Pact. One of the main reasons for this was the military and strategic situation in Central Europe in the 1960's, and also the issue of nuclear weapons and their carriers. A separate chapter is dedicated to Soviet attempts to deploy its units on Czechoslovak territory prior to Operation Danube. The final chapter deals with the reorganization of the CPA, the establishment of the CGV and the NATO reaction to the change in the strenght of armed forces present on the border of the two Blocs.

This thesis deals with the topic of the conflict between the US and Iran over Iranian nuclear program and the possibility of resolving it by negotiating a mutually acceptable comprehensive agreement. The aim of this thesis is to analyze whether a zone of possible agreement between the US and Iran on the nuclear issue exists; and if it does, what range of possible agreements falls within it. In order to determine whether a ZOPA exists, the thesis utilizes the negotiation analytic approach, which establishes the elements of the analysis - the parties' underlying interests, their alternatives to a negotiated agreement, barriers to agreement and deal design. By putting the setup elements into a graphical framework representing the negotiation, the analysis finds that a zone of possible agreement between the US and Iran over Iran's nuclear program exists and therefore, a comprehensive deal is possible. However, the existence of major potential barriers to agreement, such as powerful domestic opponents to an agreement on both sides, complicates the negotiating process. The findings of the analysis indicate that to overcome these barriers and reach a mutually acceptable deal, both sides have to retreat from their fixation on maximalist bargaining positions and instead focus on their core underlying...

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There is a brief introduction explaining the themes in the literature available to date and how this thesis aims to add to available material. In chapter one I give an account of early British research into nuclear science, including collaboration between British universities and the effect the MAUD Report had on accelerating the United States atomic programme. I introduce the main British scientists here . In chapter two I focus on diplomacy between Britain and the United States in the period up to the Quebec Agreement. The two countries had their own atomic programmes at this stage and I discuss the lead up to the amalgamation of both programmes in August 1943. Chapter three examines the British raids on German heavy water facilities and the efforts to stop Germany acquiring the means to make an atomic bomb before the Allies. Co-operation between the British and U.S teams at Los Alamos is discussed, along with the crucial role played by Britain in assisting the American scientists. The British nuclear spies are featured in chapter four, focusing on Alan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs. Their actions are discussed along with their arrests and trials. Effects of their cases on British atomic diplomacy with the Americans are highlighted. The final section sums up the legacies of Britain¿s nuclear programme and its effect on British Cold War politics with America and the U.S.S.R. The fusion, or hydrogen, bomb is mentioned briefly and an overall assessment of the achievements of the British scientists is included.