La thèse a pour objectif de développer une relation alternative entre les droits de l’Homme et l’économie. A cette fin est entreprise une analyse approfondie de l’idée d’usage public de la raison. Les concepts fondamentaux de l’économie politique, tels que la société civile et l’État, sont ainsi revisités dans un cadre conceptuel qui est, à l’origine, fondé sur la notion de majorité chez Kant, mais qui, dans le même mouvement, va au-delà de cette notion pour rendre compte du pluralisme de la société civile. / The dissertation attempts to account for an alternative connection between human rights and economics. It suggests that this connection involves a comprehensive analysis of the idea of public use of reason. The fundamental concepts of political economy, such as civil society and state, are then re-visited within a conceptual framework which is originally based on Kant’s notion of becoming mature, but at the same time, surpassing it in the extent of the pluralistic society.

Notre thèse offre une lecture des clivages philosophiques à l’arrière-plan de la trajectoire sociale-démocrate. Nous dégageons ainsi deux modèles interprétatifs des institutions sociales-démocrates : le modèle du compromis et celui du libéralisme égalitaire. Sortie de l’orbite marxiste orthodoxe et sur fond d’antinomie entre capitalisme et socialisme, la social-démocratie classique a bien été mise en place dans une logique de compromis par des partis sociaux-démocrates attachés au principe d’appropriation socialiste. Nous avançons qu’il est également possible de réinterpréter le résultat de cette trajectoire historique à partir des exigences rawlsiennes de la justice comme équité, à condition de les étendre à la gouvernance d’entreprise. Ces deux modèles interprétatifs s’opposent sur la question du pluralisme des conceptions de la justice et engagent chacune une conception spécifique de la justice sociale. De plus, ils entraînent des réponses distinctes à la crise contemporaine de la social-démocratie. Le modèle du compromis adapte son projet au nouvel équilibre des forces résultant d’une sociologie politique renouvelée : c’est la piste empruntée par le New Labour. Le modèle libéral égalitaire invite plutôt, sur la base d’une défense de la teneur rawlsienne des principes de justice, à une adaptation des institutions permettant de garantir ou de restaurer leur stabilité. Au final, l’écart entre ces deux identifications possibles constitue l’une des questions majeures auxquelles la tradition sociale-démocrate devra répondre pour clarifier le modèle qu’elle souhaite assumer au XXIème siècle. / In spite of a vast number of political studies on social democracy, little attention has been devoted to its underlying philosophical principles. This doctoral thesis sets out the philosophical distinctions which are crucial to understanding the social-democratic trajectory. It identifies two models through which social democracy can be interpreted, the first centred on the idea of political compromise and the second on liberal egalitarianism. The former echoes the historical development of social democracies. Social democratic parties diverged from Marxist orthodoxy whilst retaining the socialist principle of just appropriation. In this context, social democratic institutions took shape as social democrats compromised with capitalist interests. We suggest, in the second model, that the institutions born through this process are consistent with the Rawlsian perspective of justice as fairness, provided we expand its scope to corporate governance. These rival interpretations of social democracy differ in their conception of social justice and in their stance on the pluralism of conceptions of justice. Moreover, they provide distinct answers to the contemporary crisis of social democracy. The model based on compromise adapts its programme to a new balance of political power resulting from a renewed political sociology – the path followed by the New Labour. The liberal egalitarian model seeks instead to adapt those institutions that can restore support for the Rawlsian principles of justice. Ultimately, the tension between these two interpretations is one of the major questions social democrats need to address to clarify the model they want to put forward in the 21st Century.

Esta tese tem o propósito de desenvolver uma argumentação normativa sobre justiça distributiva e saúde. São duas as questões que pautam a pesquisa: o que devemos uns aos outros, enquanto cidadãos de uma sociedade democrática, na promoção e proteção da saúde de nossos concidadãos? Quais obrigações e deveres de justiça que um Estado democrático possui perante a saúde de seus cidadãos? Para respondermos essas questões, inicialmente, buscamos apresentar um entendimento objetivo e publicamente acessível de necessidades de saúde. Essas necessidades estão relacionadas ao funcionamento normal das espécies e impactam o leque de oportunidades disponíveis ao longo de nossas vidas. Dialogando com a teoria da justiça como equidade, de Rawls, e com a extensão dessa teoria proposta por Daniels, defendemos que o conjunto das instituições, dos serviços, dos bens e dos recursos necessários à manutenção, ao reestabelecimento e à provisão de equivalentes funcionais ao funcionamento normal dos cidadãos devem ser distribuído de modo a respeitar o princípio de igualdade equitativa de oportunidades. Em sequência, desenvolvemos uma argumentação sobre o debate contemporâneo dedicado à definição e à defesa do princípio fundamental que deve balizar a justa distribuição dos mais variados distribuenda. Argumentamos que embora a justiça exija uma noção de igualdade (como a de igualdade democrática que defendemos) e não um patamar de suficiência ou um princípio de prioridade, esses critérios normativos podem auxiliar na formulação e na avaliação de políticas públicas e recomendações institucionais. Questionamos os ataques direcionados às teorias igualitárias, defendendo que essas teorias não podem ser reduzidas, nem obrigatoriamente exigem, a aplicação de princípios distributivos igualitários simples. Por fim, nos dedicamos a desenvolver uma argumentação sobre justiça e saúde centrada nas questões dos determinantes sociais da saúde e do gradiente social em saúde. Defenderemos, em diálogo com a literatura empírica sobre a questão, que políticas públicas de saúde devem ser baseadas em um ideal de igualdade democrática e devem assumir como uma pauta central a eliminação de iniquidades de saúde existentes entre grupos sociais, assim como combater injustiças estruturais presentes nas sociedades contemporâneas. / This thesis aims to develop a normative argument about distributive justice and health. Two questions underpin the study: what do we owe each other, as citizens of a democratic society, in the promotion and protection of the health of our fellow citizens? What justice obligations and duties does a democratic State have vis-à-vis the health of its citizens? Firstly, to answer these questions, we seek to present an objective and publicly accessible understanding of health needs. These needs are related to the normal functioning of species and impact the range of opportunities available throughout our lives. Drawing on Rawls\'s theory of justice as fairness, and on the extension to this theory, proposed by Daniels, we argue that the set of institutions, services, goods and resources necessary for the maintenance, reestablishment, and provision of functional equivalents to normal functioning, should be distributed in a way that respects the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Secondly, we develop an argument about the contemporary debate dedicated to the definition and defense of the fundamental principle that should mark the fair allocation of the most varied distribuenda. We argue that although justice requires a notion of equality (such as that the democratic equality we defend) rather than a threshold of sufficiency or a principle of priority, these normative criteria can aid in the formulation and evaluation of public policies and institutional recommendations. We question the attacks directed at egalitarian theories, arguing that these theories can not be reduced, nor do they necessarily require, the application of simple egalitarian distributive principles. Finally, we are dedicated to developing an argument about justice and health centred on the issues of social determinants of health and the social gradient in health. We shall argue, drawing on the empirical literature on the issue, that public health policies should be based on an ideal of democratic equality and should take the elimination of existing health inequities between social groups as a central guideline, as well as combatting present structural injustices in contemporary societies.

Will Kymlicka’s seminal work on Multicultural Citizenship has done much to advance the case for minority rights worldwide. Agreeing with communitarians that culture is important, yet unwilling to relinquish liberal equality and fairness, Kymlicka builds on John Rawls’s monumental Theory of Justice to show group rights are not only accord with liberalism, but are its true fulfilment. Yet, while Kymlicka’s theory has received accolades for elegantly tying liberalism and culturalism together theoretically, it has been met with equal scepticism over the tenability of its praxis. In this book, I argue that much of the criticism wielded against Kymlicka’s theory results from his crucial reliance on the definition of societal cultures and the contradictions embedded therein. This is further compounded by the tendency of Kymlicka to neglect his commitment to dynamic culture and liberalism in favour of a monolithic treatment of culture, leading us down the path to illiberal conclusions. I suggest that for Kymlicka’s theory of “Multicultural Citizenship” to embrace a truly vibrant multiculturalism, the theory must overcome its internal contradictions and reaffirm its commitment to a multi-layered and recursive approach to group rights. I shall review the strengths and weaknesses of Kymlicka’s theory set against contemporary debates on the topics of nationalism and minority rights and will suggest how the theory can reduce its inner tensions to embolden its critical support for multiculturalism in Canada and worldwide.

[pt] A presente tese de doutorado realiza um estudo comparativo, no âmbito da teoria da justiça, envolvendo a teoria da igualdade complexa, formulada por Michael Walzer, autor inserido no rol dos comunitaristas, e a teoria da justiça como imparcialidade, formulada por John Rawls, autor inserido no rol dos liberais. Trata-se, portanto, de um estudo comparativo de autores baseado na categoria da justiça distributiva, conceito cuja formulação original remonta ao pensamento aristotélico. A tese - que contém elementos de filosofia moral, filosofia política e filosofia do direito - tem por objetivo verificar se a teoria da igualdade complexa, com sua metodologia particularista e seus princípios internos de distribuição, possibilita, como apregoa Michael Walzer, a crítica social ou se, de outra forma, esta crítica deve estar associada a uma moral universalista, como, por exemplo, a que nos é fornecida pelo modelo rawlsiano. / [en] The present doctorate thesis aims to make a comparative study, inthe context of the theory of justice, involving the theory of complexequality, formulated by Michael Walzer, author inserted in the communitarians list, and the theory of justice as fairness, formulated byJohn Rawls, author inserted in the liberals list. It s about, therefore, acomparative study of authors based on the category of distributive justice,whose concept was originally formulated by the aristotelic thought. Thethesis - that contains elements of moral philosophy, political philosophyand philosophy of law - aims to verify if the theory of complex equality,with its particularistic methodology and its internal principles ofdistribution, makes possible, as well as Michael Walzer proclaims, thesocial criticism or if, on the other hand, this criticism has to be associated toan universalistic moral, as, for example, that one provided by the rawlsianmodel.

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls names two conditions as necessary and sufficient for an agent to have self-respect. I argue that Rawls’s two conditions constitute an inadequate understanding of self-respect. Contrary to Rawls, I argue that self-respect requires moral desert, and that self-respect is a distinct concept from self-esteem.

Thesis (DTh)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a critical study of the work of John Rawls, political philosopher, and Reinhold Niebuhr, theologian. The work of these two scholars is brought into dialogue with theological thought to work towards a Christian notion of justice which seeks more than justice as fairness but realises the impossibility of perfect love in this world. Rawls’s two principles of justice form the basis of the discussion, with liberty placed prior to equality, and permissible inequalities only allowed when the weakest benefit. He excludes religion and moral reasoning from justice, essentially any thick theory of the good, in favour of the right; any conception of the good must be in agreement with the right and a thin theory of the good is necessary to guide people in the right direction. In his later works he accepts that people will mostly be guided by some moral or religious thought. Niebuhr believed that a prophetic religion combines an utmost seriousness about history with a transcendent norm. Hope, faith and love form the foundation of a call to a continual struggle for justice and equality. The boundaries in which justice is sought are being continually extended as global cooperation and dependence increase. Perfect justice would be a state of solidarity with no conflict of interests. Because people are a combination of vitality and reason, the social coherence of life can never be based on pure rationality. Our truth is never the truth; we are always subjective and prejudiced. There can be no universal rational standards of justice or neutrality in social struggle. Love is the primary law of nature and a fundamental requirement of social existence. We are called to involvement in society by the very nature of our justification by faith. Equality as the pinnacle of the ideal of justice points towards love as the final norm of justice; for equal justice is the realization of community under the conditions of sin. Justice as imperfect love aims for an equality which is increasingly inclusive and continuously creates space for people to live in harmony. In the final chapter, Rawls and Niebuhr are brought into critical discussion with other theologians. The Christian preference for the poor, an inherent part of theological justice begins the discussion. The importance of moral reasoning for justice comes into conflict with Rawls’s idea that there should be no thick theory of the good influencing justice. Human dignity is an important facet of justice. The inalienable dignity owed to every human being, created in the image of God, is an essential part of theology and can enrich secular theories of justice. Justice necessitates community. People learn how to behave in a way which is just, moral and ethical from their associations in communities. The church community can provide an important place where dialogue and learning can take place. The boundaries of justice are ever-increasing. Globalisation presents challenges to where and how justice is implemented and we become increasingly aware of how our actions affect other people. The responsibility of the struggle for justice is everincreasing. The eschatological hope and the specific way of life which can be offered by the church complete the Christian notion of justice. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is ’n kritiese studie van die werk van die politieke filosoof John Rawls en die teoloog Reinhold Niebuhr. Hierdie denkers se werk word met teologiese nadenke in gesprek gebring om sodoende ’n Christelike idee van geregtigheid te vorm wat meer as billikheid wil wees, en wat terselfdertyd die onmoontlikheid van perfekte liefde in dié wêreld erken. Rawls se twee beginsels van geregtigheid vorm die basis van die argument, deurdat vryheid voor gelykheid geplaas word en met die enigste toelaatbare ongelykhede dié wat tot die swakstes se voordeel is. Hy maak nie gebruik van godsdienstige of morele arugmente om geregtigheid te begrond of vul nie – enige begrip van die goeie moet in ooreenstemming met die regte wees en slegs ’n dun teorie van die goeie is nodig om mense in die regte rigting te lei. Hy aanvaar in sy latere werk dat die meeste mense tog deur morele denke of godsdiens gelei sal word. Niebuhr glo dat ’n profetiese godsdiens ’n diepe erns met die geskiedenis met ’n transendente norm kombineer. Hoop, geloof en liefde vorm die grondslag van ’n oproep tot ’n voortdurende stryd om geregtigheid en gelykheid. Die beperkinge waarbinne geregtigheid gesoek word, word voortdurend uitgebrei soos globale samewerking en afhanklikheid verhoog. Volmaakte geregtigheid sou ’n toestand van solidariteit met geen konflik van belange wees. Omdat mense 'n kombinasie van vitaliteit en rede is, kan die sosiale kohesie van die lewe nooit op suiwer rasionaliteit gebaseer word nie. Óns waarheid is nooit dié waarheid nie en ons is altyd subjektief en bevooroordeeld. Daar kan geen universele rasionele standaarde van geregtigheid of neutraliteit in die sosiale stryd wees nie. Liefde is die primêre wet van die natuur en ’n fundamentele vereiste vir sosiale bestaan. Ons word geroep tot betrokkenheid in die samelewing op grond van die regverdigmaking deur geloof. Gelykheid as die toppunt van geregtigheid verwys na liefde as die finale norm van geregtigheid, want gelyke geregtigheid is die verwesenliking van die gemeenskap onder die voorwaardes van die sonde. Geregtigheid as onvolmaakte liefde het gelykheid wat toenemend inklusief is en voortdurend ruimte skep waar mense in harmonie kan lewe ten doel. In die laaste hoofstuk van hierdie studie word Rawls en Niebuhr in kritiese gesprek met ander teoloë gebring. Die bespreking begin met die Christelike voorrang vir die armes, ’n basiese element van teologiese geregtigheid. Die belang van morele redenering vir geregtigheid kom in konflik met Rawls se idee dat enige dik teorie van die goeie geregtigheid nie behoort te beïnvloed nie. Menswaardigheid is 'n belangrike faset van geregtigheid. Elke mens – as beeld van God – se onvervreembare waardigheid, vorm ’n noodsaaklike deel van die teologie en kan sekulêre teorieë van geregtigheid verryk. Geregtigheid vereis gemeenskap. Mense kan in gemeenskappe leer hoe om op te tree op 'n manier wat regverdig, moreel en eties is. Die kerk as gemeenskap kan 'n belangrike plek wees waar dialoog en opvoeding kan plaasvind. Die omvang van geregtigheid neem steeds toe. Globalisering bied uitdagings oor waar en hoe geregtigheid geïmplementeer behoort te word en ons raak meer bewus van hoe ons aksies ander mense beïnvloed. Die verantwoordelikheid vir die stryd om geregtigheid neem ook steeds toe. Die eskatologiese hoop en die manier van lewe wat die kerk kan aanbied voltooi die Christelike idee van geregtigheid.

In recent years, political legitimacy as a concept distinct from full justice has received much attention. Yet in addition to querying the specific conditions legitimacy requires, there is a more general question: What is legitimacy even about? How ought we identify and conceptualize these conditions? According to the regnant justificatory liberal (JL) approach, legitimate legal coercion is based on reasons all reasonable persons can accept and JL is explicated in terms of a hypothetical procedure. Alas, Part I explains why JL is inadequate. First, I argue that it de-legitimizes all coercion. Second, it undercuts the proposition that there are certain basic rights which must be protected for legitimacy. Third, I suggest that JL structurally involves paternalism. Where should theorists turn? My perhaps surprising proposal is that they turn to the Christian Reformed (CR) tradition of social thought. As I take it, this tradition is composed of such figures as Augustine and Calvin, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Dooyeweerd, and, more recently, Francis Schaeffer. It has long theorized such issues as church-state separation and permissible coercion, and is replete with conceptual resources. Thus, Part II reconstructs an alternative legitimacy framework out of these resources. The central CR insight is this: legitimacy is a function of preventing basic wrongs. Legal coercion is only necessary "by reason of sin". I develop this insight in terms of three ideas. First, those wrongs which must prevented as conditions of legitimacy are objective wrongs, obtaining universally regardless of consent. Second, they presuppose some view of basic teleology. A teleological view is needed to elaborate contentful basic rights non-arbitrarily, but only a basic teleological view insofar as legitimacy is distinct from full justice. Third, I suggest these wrongs are fruitfully understood as constituting an exogenous standard, one that is neither the product of actual nor hypothetical self-legislation. Part III brings JL and CR legitimacy into dialogue. Understanding legitimacy in terms of objective, teleological, and exogenous wrongs, respectively, helps us avoid each of the unacceptable consequences of JL covered in Part I. Legitimacy is better conceptualized in CR terms; preventing such wrongs is what legitimacy is about. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-13 04:18:01.642

<p>A diverse variety of liberal thinkers agree that the peace, order, stability, and well-being of government and society rest upon a fundamental bedrock of shared opinion, sentiment, sympathies, meanings, understandings, beliefs, etc. They appear largely correct in making this supposition, for the requirement is built into the very logic of liberal democratic thinking. And yet, the very plausibility of such a shared political background has come into question particularly acutely for the present generation, and, in large part, as a result of the twin forces of pluralism and polarization.</p><p>The two central questions engaged by this study are: (a) is it still conceptually plausible to presuppose such a background, and if so, (b) under what terms does it make sense; in what way should this background be understood?</p><p>This study tackles this set of questions by means of a critical analysis of select and especially prominent, representative intellectual schools of the twentieth century, for which the theme of pluralism is meaningfully central: (a) John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas (as exemplars of the political liberal project), (b) Michel Foucault and contemporary North American neo-Foucauldians (of the discourse of difference), and (c) Carl Schmitt (of the reactionary politics of meaning). The three Parts of the study are dedicated to these three schools.</p><p>The guiding hypothesis of the study is the contention that political order is always already premised upon a shared political Leitkultur (guiding cultural horizon), that is, some sort of implicitly understood cultural formation, whose structure is mis-described as being either freestandingly postmetaphysical; strictly the work of completely self-transparent, pure human reason; or a subtle vehicle for pernicious normalization. As such, pluralism and polarization is always already bounded within this guiding cultural horizon. Presupposing that the three selected schools are meaningfully representative of the intellectual, pluralist alternatives available in the early twenty-first century, the critical analysis of these three schools bears out the study's central hypothesis.</p> / Dissertation

This thesis assesses the relation between equality and justice by exploring and identifying the relation between equality and justice in Rawls's theory of justice, Sandel's communitarian account of Justice and Sen's capability approach. And these accounts of justice are evaluated from an egalitarian point of view. The main argument defended in the thesis is that justice requires equality. Accordingly, these three accounts of justice are evaluated by taking their understanding of equality into consideration. Egalitarian evaluation of these accounts of justice reveals that all three of them fall short in accordance with the relation between equality and justice in their understanding of justice. Keywords: Capabilities, distributive justice, egalitarianism, equality, fairness, inequality, justice, social justice, virtues