Selon une présentation classique, le droit du contentieux international est apprécié à travers les concepts de pouvoir de juger, de compétence et de recevabilité. Force est toutefois de constater qu’il est aujourd’hui souvent fait référence, dans les décisions des juridictions internationales comme dans la doctrine, à la faculté procédurale, notamment des personnes privées. Cet intérêt pour la situation du requérant et sa faculté d’obtenir une décision sur le fond de son différend interroge quant à une possible évolution des concepts juridiques régissant la matière. L’étude de ce « droit » d’action dans le cadre du contentieux des investissements permet de se rendre compte de l’utilité de la notion pour le droit du contentieux international. D’une part, une fois déployé, le concept réalise un ordonnancement efficace des règles déterminant la possibilité d’une décision sur le fond. La pratique arbitrale fait preuve à cet égard d’une certaine confusion entre ces règles et celles encadrant l’existence de l’obligation alléguée que l’étude permet de dissiper. D’autre part, le droit d’agir en justice permet plus généralement d’appréhender les effets juridiques du consentement de l’Etat à la juridiction. L’étude démontre en effet que la faculté procédurale procède de l’invocabilité de ce consentement : celui-ci reconnaît à l’entité visée par l’engagement le droit d’agir en justice. Or cet effet juridique ne peut être valablement saisi par le concept de pouvoir de juger, lequel procède de la réunion des consentements. Puisque le contentieux des investissements s’intéresse à plusieurs égards à cette invocabilité, soit pour la préserver soit pour la remettre en cause, on comprend que le droit d’agir soit devenu un concept incontournable en la matière. Mais la nécessité d’y recourir peut s’exporter au-delà du contentieux des investissements, n’importe quelle branche du contentieux international pouvant être intéressée à régir les effets juridiques du consentement du seul Etat défendeur. / The settlement of international disputes is classically studied thought the concepts of judicial power, jurisdiction and admissibility. However it is now common to find references to the notion of « right of action » or « right of claim » in decisions of international tribunals especially when individuals are involved. One might wonder whether this observation reveals an evolution in the concepts governing disputes settlement in international law. The study of the right of action in international investment law demonstrates the usefulness of the concept in explaining the applicable rules. First, as a key concept, it can be used to identify the rules that determine the possibility to obtain a decision of the tribunal as opposed to the rules governing the State’s responsibility. In practice, it appears that the tribunals do not always respect this distinction. Secondly, the right of action allows taking into account the legal consequences of the State’s consent to arbitration. In this case, the concept of judicial power is partly irrelevant as it is usually based on a consent agreement between the parties. It follows that the concept of right of action is relevant when the applicable rules deal with the possibility to invoke and to rely on the consent to jurisdiction expressed by the respondent State. The fact that it is the case in the settlement of disputes between a State and an investor does not mean that it can not be so in the context of a interstate dispute.

[pt] O acesso à justiça é uma preocupação constante dos juristas, em todo o mundo. No Brasil, a regra geral, com poucas exceções, é a necessidade da assistência de um advogado, na relação entre o litigante e o juiz. Este trabalho tem o objetivo de demonstrar que a atuação compulsória do advogado, no diálogo entre a parte e o Estado julgador, é indevida. Como método, foram utilizadas as técnicas de argumentação jurídica e de exame de proporcionalidade, propostas por Robert Alexy. Inicialmente, foram analisados a semântica das normas que fundamentariam tal imposição, a intenção do legislador, os antecedentes históricos, as exceções à regra, um sistema estrangeiro que não aceita tal imposição, os princípios jurídicos envolvidos no problema, as normas de direito constitucional, de direitos humanos, de direito internacional não-internalizado e de direito internacional internalizado, os conceitos já arraigados na dogmática processual brasileira, a jur isprudência, os dados estatísticos, os argumentos analógicos e razões de índole prática. Em um segundo momento, foram examinadas a legitimidade dos fins escolhidos pelo legislador, a necessidade da imposição do advogado, a adequação de tal medida e a ponderação entre os direitos fundamentais conflitantes. Ao final, concluiu-se pela impossibilidade de manutenção da atuação obrigatória dos advogados, nos processos judiciais. Conseqüentemente, ficou claro existir o direito de litigar sem advogado, de maneira irrestrita. / [en] One of the most important concerns for jurists, worldwide, is access to justice. In Brazil, the general rule, with few exceptions, is the necessity of the assistance of a lawyer, in the relationship between litigant and judge. This work intends to demonstrate that the obligatory presence of a lawyer, in the dialogue between the party and the Judiciary, is uncalled for. The method used was the technique of legal argumentation and examination of proportionality, as proposed by Robert Alexy. Firstly, the semantics of the norms, that would be the grounds for such requirement were analyzed, as well as the legislator´s intention, the historical antecedents, the exceptions to the rule, a foreign system that does not accept such imposition, the legal principles involved in the problem, the principles of constitutional law, of human rights, of non-internalized international law and of internalized international law, the already well-established concepts in brazilian procedural dogmatics, the legal precedents, the statistical data, the analogical arguments and the reasons of a practical nature. Secondly, the legitimacy of the ends chosen by the legislator, the need of the obligatory intervention of a lawyer, the suitability of such measure and the balance between the conflicting basic rights were examined. Finally, a conclusion was reached pointing to the impossibility of the maintenance of the obligatory performance of lawyers, in judicial procedures. Consequently, the right to litigate without a lawyer, in an unrestricted way, became clear.

Le droit d’agir devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’Homme est assurément unique dansl’ordre juridique international. Erigé en « pierre angulaire » du système européen de sauvegarde,bénéficie-t-il pour autant d’une protection à la hauteur de cette qualification? L’engorgementmanifeste de la Cour de Strasbourg place cette interrogation dans une actualité perpétuelle.L’étude de ce droit processuel supranational illustre l’existence simultanée de deux courantsprétoriens aux effets diamétralement opposés sur l’exercice du droit d’agir : l’un souple, provictima, qui ouvre largement le prétoire de la Cour et l’autre restreignant a contrario son accès. Sil’approche souple satisfait naturellement l’intérêt individuel des requérants, elle permet égalementà la Cour de bâtir un ordre public européen de protection des droits de l’Homme. Parallèlement,l’interprétation stricte des conditions d’accès repose sur la responsabilisation des acteurs dumécanisme européen et sous-tend un filtrage rigoureux des affaires individuelles. Le droit d’agirreprésente, par conséquent, une composante d’un système de protection de nature« constitutionnelle » évoluant aux rythmes des liens tissés entre les deux courants prétoriensévoqués. C’est en effet par un mouvement pendulaire entre l’ouverture et la fermeture du prétoirede la Cour de Strasbourg que la garantie durable du droit d’agir peut être assurée. / The right of action in front of the European Court of Human Rights is certainly unparalleled in theinternational legal order. In the light of the constant congestion at the Strasbourg Court, one canonly ask if this right is genuinely guaranteed as the corner stone that is intended to be in theEuropean system of protection. The analysis of this supranational procedural right reflects theexistence of two distinct case law dynamics that influence the right of action: the pro victimaeffect, widening the access to the Court, and the opposite restraining effect. The first effect, moreflexible, not only favors the individual interest of the plaintiff, but also allows the Court todevelop the European public order of human rights protection. In parallel, the restraining effect onthe grounds of access to the Court entails a rigorous filtering of the individual cases, in order toachieve an increased accountability on human rights protection both of States and individuals.Therefore, the right of action represents the component of what can be nowadays qualified of a« constitutional » system of Human rights protection. Moreover, the alternate dynamics, closingand opening access to the Court, describe a pendula movement that is essential for a sustainableright of action.