Decentralization is the process by which the decision making, and planning activities of a community or movement are distributed away from a central authority and spread out more evenly among its members. Decentralized movements have started to regain prominence as digital networking became widely available around the world through the internet and mobile phones over the last two decades. However, there is still a gap in understanding whether digitally networked movements can be sustained over longer periods of time and under what conditions. This dissertation is a mixed-methods study consisting of content analysis and semi-structured in-depth interviews with users of online far-right communities. Specifically, it is a comparative analysis of a decentralized online far-right community (4chan/pol) and centralized online far-right and mainstream communities (Stormfront and Twitter, respectively). The central aim of this dissertation is to show how decentralization impacts essential elements of digitally networked mobilization. The research questions are threefold. First, what is the impact of decentralization on which logic of mobilization (connective or collective action) a movement adapts? Second, does connective action truly do away with the need for collective identity formation, as its proponents have claimed? Third, what is the role of decentralized movement communities during major on-the-ground mobilization events? In chapter two I identify how decentralization impacts the logic of mobilization used by proponents of the far-right political project to sustain decentralized protest for a generalized far-right position. In chapter three I use interview data to show how collective identity remains an integral component of decentralized communities by introducing the concept of Oppositional Identity. Finally, chapter four follows the use of online memes and discourse during the events of the January 6th Insurrection on the Capitol to reveal how decentralized communities capitalize on failed offline mobilization attempts of specific issue-based movements to further radicalize individuals who engage in right-wing activism. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis uncovers important differences between online based social movements on the far-right. This thesis compares two far-right communities: the decentralized 4chan/pol to the centralized Stormfront. The findings make three important contributions to the field of social movements and far-right studies. First, the findings reveal that members of 4chan/pol are able to successfully sustain mobilization that does not depend on organizational involvement and cultivation of solidarity among constituents. This allows members to bypass significant upfront costs of activism without eventually dissipating, similar to movements on the left. Second, the findings reveal that solidarity amongst ingroup members is achieved as a result of mobilization, and not the other way around. For 4chan/pol members, solidarity is sustained through the opposition to the mainstream media rather than through building bonds with members of the ingroup. Finally, the findings reveal how decentralized spaces like 4chan/pol capitalize on offline mobilization of other far-right movements to radicalize supporters during and immediately after the unsuccessful insurrection on the United States Capitol on January 6th, 2021.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Marcio Lamonica Bovino.pdf: 1134865 bytes, checksum: 8598d6fb6e560c08655717e7b28cb283 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-06-08 / The objective of this work comprehends the study of abuse of the right of demanding focusing on the author s procedural behavior even before the demand is initiated. Based on the concepts of the material right about the theory of abuse of the right, associated to the assumption that the lawsuit should start under the ethics, good faith, loyalty and truth principles, we will show specifically the abuse of action of legal process and its consequences to solve the dispute, that including possible effects of antitrust act which is mentioned on the theory of sham litigation. We will also try highlight the abuse of the right on demanding as a consequence of extinguishment due to lack of procedural interest, without prejudice of penalties provided for in the CPC and of the right of compensation that injured party may demand / O objetivo deste trabalho envolve o estudo do abuso de direito de demandar com enfoque para o comportamento processual do autor antes mesmo de iniciada a demanda. Importando os conceitos do direito material acerca da teoria do abuso de direito, aliado à premissa de que o processo deve se iniciar sob os ditames da ética, boa-fé, lealdade e verdade, trabalharemos especificamente o abuso do direito processual de ação e suas consequências práticas para solução da demanda, inclusive dos possíveis efeitos anticoncorrenciais de que trata a teoria da "sham litigation". Buscaremos enquadrar o abuso do direito de demandar como causa de extinção por ausência de interesse processual, sem prejuízo das sanções previstas no CPC e do direito de indenização que o prejudicado (lesado) possa demandar em sede própria

A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América exige, para a configuração da sham litigation, exceção à imunidade antitruste do direito de petição prevista na doutrina Noerr-Pennington, que: (i) a ação ou petição objetivamente não tenha fundamentos, de maneira que nenhum litigante razoável possa esperar sucesso em seu mérito; e que (ii) o litigante possua motivação subjetiva que permita verificar se a ação ou petição camufla uma tentativa de interferir diretamente nas relações negociais de um concorrente. No Brasil, ao investigar e punir infrações anticoncorrenciais, o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica CADE vem aplicando tais critérios, o que, além de cientificamente inadequado, carece de fundamentação legal no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em possível restrição injustificada dos princípios da livre iniciativa e livre concorrência. Propõe-se, neste trabalho, que o abuso do direito de ação e/ou de petição instituto consagrado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro , poderá ser considerado uma infração à ordem econômica passível de punição pelo CADE, se produzir ou puder produzir os efeitos previstos no caput do artigo 36 da Lei nº 12.529/2011. / For the configuration of sham litigation an exception to the right of petition immunity created by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States of America established the following requirements: (i) objective baseless claim, so that no reasonable litigant might expect success on the merits; and (ii) subjective motivation of the litigant, which enables to verify whether the baseless suit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. In Brazil, in order to investigate and punish antitrust infringements, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense CADE has been applying the aforementioned criteria, which is scientifically inappropriate and baseless under the Brazilian legal system, and may result in an unjustified restriction of the principles of freedom of enterprise and freedom of competition. This thesis proposes that the abuse of the rights of action and petition institutions already enshrined in the Brazilian legal system may be considered infringements of the economic order punishable by CADE, if they produce or are able to produce the effects listed in Article 36, caput, of Law No. 12.529/2011.

A Suprema Corte dos Estados Unidos da América exige, para a configuração da sham litigation, exceção à imunidade antitruste do direito de petição prevista na doutrina Noerr-Pennington, que: (i) a ação ou petição objetivamente não tenha fundamentos, de maneira que nenhum litigante razoável possa esperar sucesso em seu mérito; e que (ii) o litigante possua motivação subjetiva que permita verificar se a ação ou petição camufla uma tentativa de interferir diretamente nas relações negociais de um concorrente. No Brasil, ao investigar e punir infrações anticoncorrenciais, o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica CADE vem aplicando tais critérios, o que, além de cientificamente inadequado, carece de fundamentação legal no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, em possível restrição injustificada dos princípios da livre iniciativa e livre concorrência. Propõe-se, neste trabalho, que o abuso do direito de ação e/ou de petição instituto consagrado no ordenamento jurídico brasileiro , poderá ser considerado uma infração à ordem econômica passível de punição pelo CADE, se produzir ou puder produzir os efeitos previstos no caput do artigo 36 da Lei nº 12.529/2011. / For the configuration of sham litigation an exception to the right of petition immunity created by the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine the Supreme Court of the United States of America established the following requirements: (i) objective baseless claim, so that no reasonable litigant might expect success on the merits; and (ii) subjective motivation of the litigant, which enables to verify whether the baseless suit conceals an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor. In Brazil, in order to investigate and punish antitrust infringements, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense CADE has been applying the aforementioned criteria, which is scientifically inappropriate and baseless under the Brazilian legal system, and may result in an unjustified restriction of the principles of freedom of enterprise and freedom of competition. This thesis proposes that the abuse of the rights of action and petition institutions already enshrined in the Brazilian legal system may be considered infringements of the economic order punishable by CADE, if they produce or are able to produce the effects listed in Article 36, caput, of Law No. 12.529/2011.

Throughout the history of Procedural Law, a theme which undoubtedly calls for greater importance is the right of action, however, today does not have greater presence. Accordingly, the focus has moved towards the effective jurisdictional protection due to the phenomenon of constitutionalisation which the right of action has crossed. the author, in addition to analyzing the most important landmarks in the development of right of action, also focuses on the study of what is currently happening with effective judicial protection in order to reach a truly effective process thatensures our rights. / A lo largo de la historia del Derecho Procesal, un tema que sin duda reclama mayor importancia es el del Derecho de Acción, sin embargo, hoy en día no tiene mayor presencia. en tal sentido, el enfoque se ha trasladado hacia la tutela Jurisdiccional efectiva a causa del fenómeno de constitucionalización que atravesó el Derecho de Acción. el autor, además de analizar los hitos más importantes en los que se desarrolla el Derecho de Acción, se centra también en el estudio de lo que viene pasando en la actualidad con la Tutela Jurisdiccional Efectiva con la finalidad de llegar aun proceso verdaderamente eficaz que garantice nuestros derechos.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:29:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cesar Eduardo Lavoura Romao.pdf: 896008 bytes, checksum: 54e55907f1bbf721ad0fe4dd90f12edf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-10-13 / The present work aims at to deepen the study of virtual or anticipated lapse, analyzing its use for the Brazilian Judiciary Power, mainly for the magistrates of lower court. This controversial institute comes being understood as cause of elimination of the interest of action in the criminal proceeding whenever evidenced the possibility of decrements of the punitive lapsing pretension in the retroactive modality, early in the process, even before of the act of receiving the denunciation or of pronounced the sentence, leading in consideration a hypothetical penalty surveyed by the refined circumstances until that moment. For times, after a long procedural proceeding with an intricate probatory instruction, the magistrate is obliged to pronounce the sentence, convicted the defendant and, immediately afterwards, to recognize the extinguishing of the punshability for the retroactive lapsing of the punitive pretension, playing for the thin one, all the developed intellective work in the course of the process and, mainly, at the moment of the elaboration of the condemnatory decree. It is accurately in this scene, and on behalf of the procedural economy and of the effective and coherent search of the application of the penalties, that the virtual lapsing demonstrates to its force and utility. This because it searches to move away from the Judiciary Power useless processes, that will not have resulted beneficial, contributing, only, to generate, unnecessary, more service and, consequently, greater slowness in the procedural proceeding. For the understanding of subject so controversial, surrounded of favorable and contrary arguments, one searched to analyze, in this research, in order to select its validity before the legal system, each one of the arguments advantages and against the institute. First, the consistent ones in the absence of action right; in the criminal proceeding as a pledge of the defendant and not as sanction; in the beginning of the judgment quickly; in the uselessness of the judgment of the prescribed process; e in the similarity of the decision that receives the lapsing with the acquittal. The seconds, contrary to its application, in the pretense breaking the beginning of the legality; the beginning of the innocence presumption; to the obligatoriness of the criminal action; to the possibility of amendment of complain (mutatio libelli); and to the condition of the victim in the process. However, before the ingression in the object of the controversy, there was the analysis of related institutions, such as the right to punish, the purposes of punishment, the criminal action and the proper lapsing, as extinctive cause of ius puniendi / O presente trabalho visa aprofundar o estudo da prescrição virtual ou antecipada, analisando sua utilização pelo Poder Judiciário brasileiro, principalmente pelos magistrados de primeira instância. Esse polêmico instituto vem sendo entendido como causa de eliminação do interesse de agir no processo penal sempre que constatada a possibilidade de decretação da prescrição da pretensão punitiva na modalidade retroativa, logo no início do processo, antes mesmo do recebimento da denúncia ou de proferida a sentença, levando em consideração uma pena hipotética aferida pelas circunstâncias apuradas até aquele momento. Por vezes, após um longo trâmite processual com uma intrincada instrução probatória, o magistrado é obrigado proferir a sentença, condenado o acusado e, logo em seguida, a reconhecer a extinção da punibilidade pela prescrição retroativa da pretensão punitiva, jogando pelo ralo todo o trabalho intelectivo desenvolvido no curso do processo e, principalmente, no momento da elaboração do decreto condenatório. É exatamente nesse cenário, e em nome da economia processual e da busca efetiva e coerente da aplicação da sanção penal, que a prescrição virtual demonstra sua força e utilidade. Isto porque busca afastar do Poder Judiciário processos inúteis, que não terão resultado proveitoso, contribuindo, apenas, para gerar, desnecessariamente, mais serviço e, consequentemente, maior lentidão no trâmite processual. Para a compreensão de tema tão controvertido, cercado de argumentos favoráveis e contrários, buscou-se analisar, nesta pesquisa, de modo a apurar-se sua validade perante o ordenamento jurídico, cada um dos argumentos prós e contra o instituto. Os primeiros, consistentes na ausência de interesse de agir; no processo penal como garantia do acusado e não como sanção; no princípio da celeridade do julgamento; na inutilidade do julgamento do processo prescrito; e na semelhança da decisão que acolhe a prescrição com a sentença absolutória. Os segundos, contrários à sua aplicação, na pretensa violação ao princípio da legalidade; ao princípio da presunção de inocência; à obrigatoriedade da ação penal; à possibilidade de aditamento da denúncia (mutatio libelli); e à condição da vítima no processo. Porém, antes do ingresso no objeto da controvérsia, realizou-se a análise de institutos correlatos, tais como, o direito de punir, as finalidades da punição, a ação penal e a própria prescrição, como causa extintiva do ius puniendi

La victime en col blanc est mésestimée, tant par l’opinion publique que par le droit. Si les infractions en matière économique, financière et boursière heurtent, les personnes lésées par ces agissements bénéficient peu de l’empathie traditionnellement accordée aux victimes pénales. Parmi elles, il en est cependant une qui mérite une attention particulière : l’associé. Alors qu’une personne sur trois dispose en France de cette qualité, l’associé est susceptible d’être une victime du fait de son engagement. Acteur social majeur, il peut subir les effets d’une infraction au droit pénal des sociétés. Lorsqu’il est la victime d’une telle infraction, l’associé a vocation à exercer une action civile. Action en réparation appartenant à tous ceux ayant subi un dommage directement causé par l’infraction, celle-ci est toutefois réservée aux seuls associés titulaires du bien juridique protégé par l’incrimination chef des poursuites. Alors que le droit d’agir en action civile de l’associé est ainsi limité, le bien-fondé de la demande en réparation de son préjudice est également soumis à des conditions interprétées à l’aune de théories singulières. Le brouillard dans lequel se situe aujourd’hui l’associé victime d’une infraction au droit pénal des sociétés est dense. Il nous revient de l’en sortir en proposant des évolutions conformes au droit et répondant à la situation réelle de cette victime pénale jusque-là oubliée. / White-collar victims are usually left on the sidelines, both by the public opinion and the law. While economic and financial offences, without mentioning those related to stock market, are conscience-shocking, the victims of those offences are not of much concern. Yet, one of them is worth paying attention to, i.e. the partner. Being a partner, which is the case for one-in-three French people, may involve a side-effect, that is being victim of his or her own commitment. As a major actor of both business and social life, the partner may be harmed by a business crime. When victim, the partner may bring the civil proceedings, which are actions for compensation belonging to those directly harmed by the criminal offence. Nonetheless, this action is restricted to the partner bearer of the protected legal interest. As for the right of action, the validity of damage claims is limited by conditions interpreted in the light of peculiar theories. The partner, victim of business crimes, is thus lost in a heavy mist, from which he or she must be shown the way out by proposing legal changes addressing the real situation of the up-to-now forgotten victim.

A vedação à modificação da demanda é um mecanismo adotado, na absoluta maioria dos ordenamentos processuais rígidos, com o objetivo de impedir a introdução de questões novas ao longo do feito e, com isso, propiciar maior celeridade processual. De outro lado, todavia, permite que muitas questões nele não discutidas possam ser objeto de demandas posteriores, que tendem a envolver as mesmas partes em discussões conexas ao primeiro litígio, gerando desnecessária multiplicação de demandas afins e, em conseqüência, um crescimento do número de processos no Poder Judiciário que poderia ser evitado ou minimizado. Neste estudo, examina-se a jurisprudência construída pelo Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), ao longo de seus 20 anos de existência, em particular quanto ao tema da modificação do elemento objetivo da demanda, com a intenção de identificar as linhas mestras da interpretação ditada pela Corte Superior quanto a essa específica matéria. Procurou-se examinar, igualmente, as obras doutrinárias relacionadas ao mesmo tema, buscando traçar a evolução da interpretação dos juristas e verificar se ela acompanha, e em que medida, o caminho ditado pela jurisprudência do STJ. / The prohibition against modification of the original complaint is a mechanism adopted, in the vast majority of strict legal procedural orders, in order to prevent the introduction of new issues over the course of a lawsuit and thus enhance the speed of proceedings. On the other hand, however, it creates a situation where many issues that are not raised during the course of such proceedings are covered in subsequent claims or complaints, even though they tend to involve the same parties in court battles connected to the original suit. This generates needless multiplication of related cases and, as a result, an increase in the number of cases before the Judiciary that could be avoided or minimized. This study examines the jurisprudence built up at the level of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) over the course of its 20 years existence, especially regarding the topic of modifying the objective element of the complaint, in order to identify the main lines of interpretation laid down by that higher court as regards this specific issue. Likewise, this study has also sought to examine the doctrinal works related to this same subject, with a view to tracing the evolution of the interpretation of jurists and verifying if it is in keeping, and to what extent, with the path dictated by STJs jurisprudence.

A vedação à modificação da demanda é um mecanismo adotado, na absoluta maioria dos ordenamentos processuais rígidos, com o objetivo de impedir a introdução de questões novas ao longo do feito e, com isso, propiciar maior celeridade processual. De outro lado, todavia, permite que muitas questões nele não discutidas possam ser objeto de demandas posteriores, que tendem a envolver as mesmas partes em discussões conexas ao primeiro litígio, gerando desnecessária multiplicação de demandas afins e, em conseqüência, um crescimento do número de processos no Poder Judiciário que poderia ser evitado ou minimizado. Neste estudo, examina-se a jurisprudência construída pelo Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), ao longo de seus 20 anos de existência, em particular quanto ao tema da modificação do elemento objetivo da demanda, com a intenção de identificar as linhas mestras da interpretação ditada pela Corte Superior quanto a essa específica matéria. Procurou-se examinar, igualmente, as obras doutrinárias relacionadas ao mesmo tema, buscando traçar a evolução da interpretação dos juristas e verificar se ela acompanha, e em que medida, o caminho ditado pela jurisprudência do STJ. / The prohibition against modification of the original complaint is a mechanism adopted, in the vast majority of strict legal procedural orders, in order to prevent the introduction of new issues over the course of a lawsuit and thus enhance the speed of proceedings. On the other hand, however, it creates a situation where many issues that are not raised during the course of such proceedings are covered in subsequent claims or complaints, even though they tend to involve the same parties in court battles connected to the original suit. This generates needless multiplication of related cases and, as a result, an increase in the number of cases before the Judiciary that could be avoided or minimized. This study examines the jurisprudence built up at the level of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ) over the course of its 20 years existence, especially regarding the topic of modifying the objective element of the complaint, in order to identify the main lines of interpretation laid down by that higher court as regards this specific issue. Likewise, this study has also sought to examine the doctrinal works related to this same subject, with a view to tracing the evolution of the interpretation of jurists and verifying if it is in keeping, and to what extent, with the path dictated by STJs jurisprudence.

La « compétence ratione temporis » est une expression d’origine jurisprudentielle dont la signification varie selon le contexte dans lequel elle se trouve employée. Telle qu’elle apparaît dans les décisions des juridictions internationales, celle-ci désigne d’abord la durée de l’habilitation à exercer le pouvoir juridictionnel que l’on associe à la durée de validité de l’engagement juridictionnel de l’Etat. La compétence temporelle désigne également le domaine temporel d’exercice du pouvoir de juger, les Etats précisant bien souvent les catégories de litiges ratione temporis pour lesquels ils peuvent être attraits en justice. Sur la base de ce constat, la doctrine ne voit dans la compétence temporelle qu’une notion à contenu variable sans véritable utilité pour l’analyse du droit positif, et préfère parler soit de compétence personnelle dès lors qu’est en cause l’existence du consentement de l’Etat à se soumettre à la juridiction, soit de compétence matérielle pour envisager les catégories de différends dont le tribunal pourra connaître. L’étude de la jurisprudence internationale conduit toutefois à remettre en cause le bien-fondé d’une telle analyse. Si l’on peut voir dans la compétence temporelle un élément d’identification de la sphère de compétence du tribunal, et donc un aspect de sa compétence matérielle, la résolution pratique du problème de la durée de l’habilitation à juger ne peut être comprise en ayant recours au concept de compétence personnelle. Par la manière dont les juridictions appliquent l’engagement juridictionnel ratione temporis, celui-ci n’apparaît pas simplement comme l’acte par lequel les Etats consentent à se soumettre à la juridiction, mais d’abord comme le titre qui fonde l’action des justiciables. En cela, l’explication des solutions retenues par les juridictions internationales ne peut faire l’économie d’un concept propre à la durée de l’habilitation : celui de compétence ratione temporis. / "Jurisdiction ratione temporis" is an expression that derives from case law, the meaning of which varies depending on the context it is used in. As it appears in International court decisions, it is used to mean the time during which the court has the authority to exercise jurisdictional power which also relates to the time during which the State’s consent to jurisdiction is valid. Jurisdiction ratione temporis also means the time period during which the court has the power to judge as the States often specify categories of disputes for which they can be brought to justice as ratione temporis. On this basis, legal doctrine only sees temporal jurisdiction as a variable notion that is not particularly useful in analysing positive law, and prefers to refer to either jurisdiction ratione personae when there is an issue of whether the State has agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court, or to jurisdiction ratione materiae for categories of disputes for which a court could have jurisdiction. Studies on International case law however call into question the justification of such an analysis. If we can consider that in temporal jurisdiction there is an element of identifying the jurisdictional sphere of the court and therefore an aspect of its jurisdiction ratione materiae, the problem of the time during which a court has jurisdiction cannot be practically solved by referring to the concept of jurisdiction ratione personae. Given the way in which courts apply the title of jurisdiction ratione temporis, this does not appear to be just an act by which the States agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the court but first of all as the very basis of the action. In this, the explanations of the solutions of the International courts cannot ignore a concept that is specific to the duration of authorisation, that of jurisdiction ratione temporis.