Resumo não disponível

Resumo não disponível

Resumo não disponível

本論文作為對《存有與時間》的一個探究，其研究焦點主要是針對《存有與時間》第一部的寫作計畫──藉由時間性詮釋此在，解說時間之為存有問題的超越界域──探究為何任何一種存有理解皆必須以時間為其可能界域?我首先闡釋了存有理解的可能性條件──此在的時間性，而其所綻出的超越界域，乃是存有的時間狀態，此在理解投設存有之所在。不過，在海德格的前期思路中，尚未超出界域思維，徹底達致存有自身，對於這部分我將從後期思維加以補充說明。

L’objectif central du présent mémoire consiste à interroger les implications générales de l’interprétation taylorienne de la sécularisation, telle que déployée dans ‘A Secular Age’ (2007), pour la philosophie de la religion. Nous soutenons que l’approche herméneutique de notre auteur, reposant sur son anthropologie philosophique, a pour effet d’arrimer de façon indissociable et originale le problème de la sécularisation avec le questionnement philosophique sur la religion. À cet effet, nous présentons la critique du naturalisme déployée par Taylor ainsi que les grandes lignes de sa ‘dialectique’ afin de clarifier l’orientation générale de sa démarche. Nous passons ensuite à une analyse de son interprétation de la sécularisation ainsi que des implications de cette dernière pour les questions constitutives de la philosophie de la religion, touchant notamment la nature de la religion, le statut épistémologique des croyances religieuses, les rapports entre foi et raison ainsi que la relation entre la religion et la science moderne. Nous terminons sur un ton plus critique en interrogeant le ‘réalisme métaéthique’ de notre auteur et en soutenant que sa position pourrait constituer la base d’un ‘récit soustractif’ plus robuste et pénétrant. / The central aim of this work is to assess the most general implications of the interpretation of secularization by Charles Taylor, as it is deployed in ‘A Secular Age’ (2007), for the domain of philosophy of religion. We argue that the hermeneutical approach of Taylor, resting on his philosophical anthropology, binds together in an original and indivisible fashion the problem of secularization and the philosophical reflection on religion. To this effect, I describe his critique of naturalism and the broad lines of his ‘dialectic’ in order to clarify the general orientation of his work. I then move to an analysis of his interpretation of secularization and its implications for the constitutive questions in philosophy of religion, notably regarding the nature of religion, the epistemological status of religious beliefs, the relations between faith and reason as well as between religion and modern science. I conclude on a more critical note with an examination of the ‘metaethical realism’ of our author and by showing that his position might best be understood as the basis for a deepened and reinforced ‘subtraction story’.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.

Chacune des éditions de la Critique de la raison pure contient une preuve de la réalité du monde externe : la première se trouve dans le « quatrième paralogisme » et la deuxième dans la « Réfutation de l’idéalisme ». Ce travail examine l’évolution du premier argument vers le deuxième, en rendant compte de deux critiques importantes de la première édition qui ont influencé le second travail de Kant. La deuxième partie de ce travail se concentre sur des problèmes propres à la Réfutation, où sont traités des sujets particulièrement problématiques, tel que la structure de la conscience empirique déterminée, le rôle du permanent dans l’établissement de l’objectivité, ainsi qu’un argument secondaire présenté dans les notes de bas de page du texte principal et de la préface. / Each edition of the Critique of Pure Reason contains a proof for the reality of the external world: the first is located in the “Fourth Paralogism”, the second, in the “Refutation of Idealism.” This work examines the evolution from the first argument to the second, taking into account two significant criticisms of the first edition which influenced Kant’s second attempt. The latter half of this work treats topics particular to the Refutation only, focusing again on the issues which were stumbling blocks, namely the structure of determined empirical consciousness, the role of the permanent in establishing objectivity, as well as a secondary argument found in the footnotes of the main text and preface.

Jana Vrchovecká: From the sensual experience to the transcendental one The tradition of sensualism or vitalism is rarely represented in the French literature. During the twentieth century several authors tried to revive this tendency. The first apologist was André Gide, whose work Les Nourritures terrestres (1893) was considered as a doctrine of the sensual attitude, and for its spiritual overlap it was even called The New evangel. The deification of the material aspect of the reality becomes the link with the last holder of the Nobel Literature Prize: Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clézio. In his early essay: L'Extase matérielle (1968) he also exalts the sensual experience as the base of the transcendental one. The first part of the work compares the authors' sensual attitude in the mentioned works by the analyse of the particular senses. The synchronic participation of all them should provoke the second state of consciousness whose first grade is the ecstasy and the most desired one is the prophetic mind. The second part analyses the factors that contribute to this double objective. The necessary condition is the anchoring in the present moment. Both the authors worship the cult of the Sun which substitutes the traditional notion of the God. However, the individual must also cut out the bonds that impede...

No description available.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-04-14T13:55:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 425431.pdf: 377029 bytes, checksum: 80b2d42e99d441364398965ef99a3e95 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-03 / Esta disserta??o tem como objetivo investigar a supera??o do idealismo transcendental kantiano realizada pelo idealismo absoluto hegeliano. Os argumentos hegelianos em prol da supera??o do dualismo entre coisa-em-si e fen?meno ser?o detalhados e postos ? prova. Enquanto Kant salienta que a metaf?sica como ci?ncia ? imposs?vel, ou seja, os objetos que as Id?ias transcendentais denotam est?o al?m do espa?o e do tempo, n?o existindo nenhum objeto no mundo sens?vel correspondentes a ela e, portanto, n?o podem ser conhecidas, pois n?o afetam a sensibilidade, Hegel apresenta a realidade como sujeito e nega qualquer forma de cis?o entre o ser e o pensar.