No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Erik Olof Burman, som disputerat 1872 på en boströmianskt präglad avhandling, efterträddes 1911 som professor i praktisk filosofi i Uppsala av sin adept Axel Hägerström. Denne kom att utveckla en materialistisk realism som bröt med Burmans och de närmaste föregångarnas subjektivism. Enligt vad han själv omvittnade, hade Hägerström inspirerats till filosofisk forskning genom att läsa Burmans skrift Om Kants kunskapslära (1884; Kk). I föreliggande studie undersöks dels om denna skrift innebär någon förskjutning av Burmans filosofi i realistisk riktning, dels om den påverkat utvecklingen av Hägerströms realism. Resultat: 1) Kk är väsentligen trogen den boströmianska metafysiken men innehåller formuleringar om rummet och tiden som kan tolkas objektivistiskt; 2) ingen specifik tanke i just Kk kan visas ha påverkat Hägerström; 3) Burmans betoning av verkligheten som logiskt bestämd, hans krav på systemisk enhet i kunskaps- och verklighetsteorin, och Kants avståndstagande från metafysisk spekulation påminner om Hägerström. / In 1872, Erik Olof Burman had defended a Boströmian idealistic dissertation in Uppsala. He was succeeded there in 1911 as professor of practical philosophy by his student Axel Hägerström, who was to develop a materialistic realism in contrast to the subjectivism of Burman and his predecessors. According to Hägerström’s own testimony, he had been inspired to take up philosophical research by reading Burman’s essay Om Kants kunskapslära (1884; ”Of Kant’s theory of knowledge”, Kk). In the present paper, an attempt is made at answering whether Burman’s essay on Kant represents any shift of Burman’s philosophy towards realism, and whether it has influenced Hägerström in that direction. Results: 1) Kk remains largely faithful to Boströmian metaphysics but contains expressions about space and time which may be interpreted in a more objectivistic manner; 2) no thought specifically from Kk can be shown to have influenced Hägerström; 3) Burman’s emphasis on reality as logical determination, his demand for systematic unity in the theory of knowledge and reality, and Kant’s rejection of metaphysical speculation are reminiscent of Hägerström.

Thesis advisor: Stephen J. Pope / This dissertation attends to the crisis of addiction in the United States. The increasing number in annual overdoses and the inadequacy of national responses to curtail these preventable deaths demands an immediate moral response. In the last year, deaths caused by overdose increased by nearly 29 percent, and 20.8 million people in the United States are currently living with substance use disorders. The number of families affected by addiction presents a striking testimony to the scope of the problem. Nevertheless, there is still enormous disagreement over the nature of addiction and therefore how to best treat it. This dissertation will therefore offer a theological approach to addiction in order to advocate for a social response to this crisis.This dissertation proceeds in five chapters. In the first chapter, I evaluate the medical and moral models of addiction. This first chapter engages research in neurobiology and psychology and argues that these models are premised upon a false dichotomy between determinism and freedom of the will. The second chapter explores disagreements in bioethics over the meanings of health, disease, and illness. These different definitions contribute to the chasm between the medical and moral models of addiction. This chapter proposes a holistic account of health for understanding addiction and healing. The third chapter grounds this holistic account of health in Karl Rahner’s transcendental anthropology in order to uphold the fundamental relationality of human persons and to move past the false dichotomy presented in chapter one between determinism and freedom of the will. This chapter then offers a theological examination of sin as a power or force that preconditions freedom. It concludes by proposing a theological and relational account of autonomy. The fourth chapter engages philosophy of the mind in order to argue for a nonreductive approach to mentality that appreciates the ways in which human persons are co-constituted by bottom up and top down causality. A nonreductive approach to mentality offers a way to understand addiction as an interacting set of processes and patterns. This fourth chapter concludes by considering the possibility for responsibility by examining narrativity, vulnerability, and imagination. It argues that there is a moral responsibility to imagine a better world for people living with addictions, and to bring that world about. Finally, the fifth chapter draws upon the theological virtue of solidarity and the principle of the preferential option for the poor in order to articulate a preferential option for people living with addictions. I argue here that Church institutions can stand in solidarity with people who suffer from addiction by acting as providers, educators, and lobbyers. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

This qualitative study examined the experiences of men who commit to romantic relationships with women under 50, post breast cancer diagnosis and treatment. Twelve men from throughout the United States, who were dating these women for at least six months, participated in semi-structured interviews. The data were analyzed using Moustaka's Transcendental Phenomenological approach. Findings focused on initial disclosure timing, previous experience/knowledge about the cancer, initial reactions and concerns, acceptance of the cancer history, focusing on love/connection, respecting and admiring the survivor, and the ongoing impact of cancer on the relationship. The men seemed to experience dating a survivor with acceptance, understanding that though the cancer continues to be a part of their lives, it does not seem to be the focus of their lives or of the relationship. Clinical implications are discussed, highlighting the systemic effect that breast cancer may have on a couple even after treatment is complete. Limitations and future research are examined. / Master of Science

Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Kants Projekt der transzendentalen Deduktion der reinen Verstandesbegriffe hinsichtlich ihrer Fragen, Annahmen, und Argumente. Anders als viele Interpreten schlage ich vor, dass Kants Fragestellung in der transzendentalen Deduktion im metaphysischen Sinne meta-semantisch ist. Indem er alle möglichen konkurrierenden Theorien ablehnt, zeigt Kant überzeugend die Notwendigkeit seiner kopernikanischen Lösung und die Plausibilität der Auffassung von „keiner notwendigen Verknüpfung ohne notwendige Instanziierung“. Ich werde argumentiert, dass Kant verschiedene Argumentationsansätze in der transzendentalen Deduktion entwickelt: das Argument aus der Erkenntnis, das Argument aus dem Selbstbewusstsein, das Argument aus dem Urteil und das Argument aus der Wahrnehmung, und dass sie alle in erster Linie nicht im Wesen anti-skeptisch, sondern erklärend sind. Diese von mir vorgeschlagene Interpretation von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion zeigt, wie ernst Kant seinen transzendentalen Weg für notwendig hält und warum Kants Ansatz vor allem als problemorientiert, nicht aber als gründungsmotiviert angesehen werden sollte. / This present work addresses Kant’s project of transcendental deduction of the pure concepts of understanding with regard to its question, assumptions, and arguments. Unlike many interpreters, I propose that Kant’s question in transcendental deduction is meta-semantic in the metaphysical sense. By rejecting all the possible rival theories, Kant convincingly shows the necessity of his Copernican solution and the plausibility of the view of “no necessary connection without necessary instantiation”. I argue that Kant develops different lines of arguments in transcendental deduction: the argument from cognition, the argument from self-consciousness, the argument from judgment and the argument from perception, and that all of them are primarily not anti-skeptical, but explanatory in character. This interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction reveals how seriously Kant takes his transcendental path to be necessary and why Kant’s approach should be viewed as problem-oriented, rather than foundation-motivated.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FIL - Edson Dognaldo Gil.pdf: 1469522 bytes, checksum: 93803423295828ce6d57adf7e6ced90d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-19 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / The aim of this dissertation is to present and toanalyse the first principle of Fichteʹs Doctrine of Science, namely, that of the self‐position of the I, in the same way the German idealist philosopher expounds it in the firstparagraph of his masterpiece Grundlage der gesammten issenschaftslehre [Foundation of the Entire Doctrine of Scientific Knowledge], published in 1794‐1795. The historical presentation situates Fichteʹs issue in the context of the modern philosophy in general, and of German idealism in particular. Remarks are provided on the relation and mutual influence of German thinkers, especially on the continuity between the transcendental philosophy of Kant and that of Fichte, pointing out, however, the originality of the project of the Doctrine of Science. Some attention is also given to the current state of the Fichte‐Forschung. The systematic analysis, wish constitutes the core of the work, concentrates on the thorough reading of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, pointing out its implications to the question of the relation between being and thinking, morespecifically, the respective transcendental transformation of the Cartesian cogito. Thus, the I, in so far as it is (characterized as) pure intelligence, is the genetic, originary and pre-predicative Act (Tathandlung). Therefore, it is previous toboth discursive thought and objective consciousness (ofa substantiated Cartesian subject), and yet it is accessible by means of an intuitive method; it is nonetheless purely intellectual and authentically meditative meditative philosophy, philosophy as art (ars). There is enclosed a reproduction of the original text of the first paragraph of the Grundlage, as well as the respective translation, of my authorship. There is also a small glossary of the most important terms used by Fichte translated from German into Portuguese / O escopo desta dissertação consiste em apresentar e analisaro chamado Primeiro Princípio da autoposição do Eu da Doutrina da Ciência de Johann Gottlieb Fichte, tal qual o idealista alemão o expõe no primeiro parágrafo de sua obra‐prima Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaftslehre als Handschriftfür seine Zuhörer [Fundamento de toda a Doutrina da Ciência como manual para seus ouvintes], publicada em 1794‐1795. A apresentação histórica visa a situar a problemáticafichteana no contexto da filosofia moderna, em geral, e, em particular, do idealismo alemão. Tecem‐se considerações sobre a relação e a influência mútua dos pensadores alemães, especialmente sobre a continuidade entre a filosofia transcendental deKant e a de Fichte, destacando‐se porém a originalidade do projeto da Doutrina da Ciência. Dedicam‐se, além disso, algumas palavras ao estado atual da Fichte‐Forschung. A análise sistemática, que constitui o cerne do trabalho, concentra‐se na leitura minuciosa do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, destacando‐se suas implicações no que respeita à questão da relação entre ser e pensar, mais especificamente, a respectiva transformação transcendental do cogito cartesiano. Conclui‐se que, para Fichte, o eu, enquanto inteligência pura, é Ato genético, originário (Tathandlung), pré‐predicativo e, portanto, anterior ao pensamento discursivo e à consciência objetiva (de um sujeito hipostasiado, cartesiano), ao qual se tem acesso por meio de um método intuitivo, mas puramente intelectual, autenticamente meditativo filosofia meditativa, filosofia como arte (ars). Como anexos, seguem‐se a reprodução do texto original do primeiro parágrafo da Grundlage, bem como a respectiva tradução, de minha autoria. Além disso, um pequeno vocabulário, alemão‐português, dos termos mais importantes utilizados por Fichte

La philosophie critique de Kant entretient un rapport ambigu à la question du langage. Bien que le système critique ne semble pas contenir de théorie du langage à proprement parler, les effets du registre transcendantal sur la façon d’appréhender le langage en philosophie semblent aussi massifs que souterrains. Pour envisager ce paradoxe, une hypothèse nouvelle est formulée : la philosophie kantienne serait l’expression paradoxale mais particulièrement paradigmatique d’une crise du langage de grande ampleur observable en Allemagne autour de 1800. Ce n’est qu’en replaçant le système critique dans ce contexte de crise que l’on pourra saisir sa portée pour traiter des problèmes du langage. Cela engage paradoxalement à saisir les effets positifs de la mise entre parenthèses du langage. Pour cela, la philosophie critique est d’abord située dans la crise épistémologique de grande ampleur qui accompagne autant un changement de paradigme des théories du langage (de la grammaire générale à la grammaire comparée), que la naissance d’une linguistique « scientifique ». Elle est ensuite située dans un faisceau de symptômes convergeant vers une crise du langage étudiée successivement à travers les exemples des crises poétique, métacritique et de la crise de la langue philosophique. Ces deux contextualisations permettent de poser à nouveaux frais les raisons systématiques qui expliquent un tel travail souterrain du langage par la philosophie critique. La lecture du système kantien comme modélisation topique de la subjectivité permet alors de rendre compte du statut nouveau qu’acquiert le langage et en particulier l’idée de langue naturelle dans le sillage de la philosophie transcendantale. / Kant’s critical philosophy maintains an ambiguous relationship with language. Even though no proper theory of language seems to be found in the critical system, the transcendental method of the Critique has both highly and unexpectedly influenced the philosophical approach to language. Such a paradox can be accounted for by the following hypothesis: Kantian philosophy is the expression of a major language crisis occurring in Germany at the turn of the 18th century, in a paradigmatic but paradoxical way. It is necessary to put the critical system in this context to understand the far-reaching consequences of setting aside language as a philosophical issue. This will lead to analyse the positive effects of Kant’s attitude on new way to deal with language issues. Three steps will be taken in this purpose. The first one examines the meaning of Kant’s critical philosophy in the light of an epistemic crisis mainly embodied by the theoretical shift from “general grammar” to “comparative grammar” and the emergence of scientific linguistics. The second step sheds light on the place of critical philosophy within the framework of a broader language crisis, which will be studied in three fields: 1) Poetry, 2) “Metacritique”, 3) Philosophical language. Systematic reasons for the strong influence of critical philosophy on language will emerge from this double contextualisation. Indeed, understanding the Kantian system as a topical modelling of subjectivity enables to account for the new status of language – and more specifically, for the concept of natural languages – in the wake of transcendental philosophy.

康德主張，空間的「先驗的觀念性」，並且此一觀念性是可以與「經驗的實在性」相容。對於「先驗的觀念性」，處於空間的事物被限定於感性的對象上，即是顯象，因此並不適用在那些「當它們得以透過理性其自身，即是毫無顧及我們感性的狀態」的內容。同樣地，「經驗的實在性」所刻劃的是外在顯象，如同康德在上述引文所指，乃是「在考慮一切可能的外在經驗」。據此，所謂空間的「先驗的觀念性」，從「觀念性」而言，空間是先天的直覺形式，故不屬於對象或事物自身的任何屬性。不過此一空間的觀念性，即先天的直覺形式，乃是任何外在顯象得以可能的條件，所以空間的觀念性，雖是感性主體的認知條件，卻不能等同於僅僅是主觀的觀念性，而是具有先驗條件的觀念性，也就是其是一種先天可能的認知模式，因此，空間的觀念性，乃是「先驗的」，這是康德稱空間為「先驗的觀念性」所持的立場。與此同時，對康德來說，空間的「先驗的觀念性」，則蘊含空間的「經驗的實在性」。從康德看來，我們要意識到任何外在經驗，皆必定在空間秩序關係中被呈現或給與出來，如此一來，空間具有「實在性」。不過，空間的「實在性」其效力僅對於我們外感官的經驗對象才能有效，並無法對事物自身產生任何約束，所以空間的「實在性」，就祇能是屬於經驗的，我們不能將空間的「實在性」歸屬在事物自身。 / Kant advocates the view that space is transcendental ideality and empirical realtiy. This article aims at interpretation of Kant’s space thesis. Kant attempts to offer argument transcendental ideality of space mean that space is subjective and limiting condition to which human intuition. This implication that kant asserts transcendental ideality thesis is that space has limited to appearance, and when applied to the things in themselves, space is merely an idea,or equivalently that is transcendental. However transcendental ideality of space does not mean that objects within of space is nothing, only ideas of our mind. In contrast to this, transcendental ideality thesis as equivalent to empirical reality of space ,that is said to regard space is real, but which is objective validity limited by applicable to outer appearances.