Cette thèse porte sur des propriétés arithmétiques des fonctions méromorphes et transcendantes d'une variable. Dans le chapitre 3, nous définissons des mesures de transcendance pour les fonctions holomorphes et méromorphes sur un domaine régulier de C puis nous majorons ces mesures en fonction de la distribution des petites valeurs de la fonction étudiée.Grâce aux théories de Nevanlinna et d'Ahlfors, nous étudions dans le chapitre 4 la distribution des petites valeurs de certaines classes de fonctions méromorphes sur D ou C afin d'obtenir pour celles-ci des majorations explicites de leurs mesures de transcendance. L'application principale de ce travail est l'obtention de nouveaux lemmes de zéros polynomiaux pour de grandes familles de fonctions méromorphes et en particulier pour les fonctions de Weierstrass et les fonctions fuchsiennes. Dans le chapitre 5, nous montrons que ces lemmes de zéros polynomiaux conduisent à des bornes logarithmiques du nombre de points algébriques de degré et hauteur bornée contenus dans les graphes des fonctions étudiées. / This PhD thesis is about some arithmetic properties of meromorphic functions of one variable.In chapter 3, we define the transcendental measures for holomorphic and meromorphic functions on a regular domain of C, then we obtain upper bounds of these measures in terms of the distribution of small values of the function.Thanks to the Nevanlinna and Ahlfors theories, we study in chapter 4 the distribution of small values of some classes of meromorphic functions on D or C in order to obtain explicit upper bounds of transcendental measures.The main application of this work is the demonstration of new polynomial zero estimates for large classes of meromorphic functions, in particular for Weierstrass functions and fuchsian functions.In chapter 5, we prove that polynomial zero estimates lead to logarithmic bounds of the number of algebraic points of bounded degree and height contained in the graph of the function.

The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the free will debate. Traditional compatibilists claim that determinism does not preclude our capacity for moral agency. Nuanced determinists, such as Derk Pereboom, deny the existence of moral agency and argue that free will is not required to save the basic modes of our practical lives, such as our capacity to affect each other and to lead practically morallives. I will argue in favor of Kant’s view, which holds that since freedom and moral agency is metaphysically possible we cannot deny the possibility of free will and morality. The object of this thesis is to argue for why Kant’s position holds an advantage over determinism and compatibilism; it is not necessarily to argue for Kant’s argument, although I do explain and argue for aspects of it in support of my broader goal of establishing the superiority of Kant’s account.

En este trabajo se examina si de las consideraciones que Donald Davidson ha hecho del caso de la interpretación radical se sigue algo así como una refutación del escepticismo. Se argumenta que tal conclusión no se sigue de las posiciones acerca de la naturaleza del pensamiento y del lenguaje mantenidas por este filósofo americano, ni siquiera con la ayuda del así llamado argumento del intérprete omnisciente. También se rechaza la idea de que concebir su argumentación como un argumento trascendental modesto proporcione mejores resultados antiescépticos. Finalmente se defiende que el mejor modo de articular su posición es como un diagnóstico teórico del escepticismo al estilo del defendido por Michael Williams en su libro Unnatural Doubts. Desde este punto de vista lo que la filosofía davidsoniana haría sería reprochar al escéptico su adhesión al representacionismo y mostrar una alternativa al mismo que explique la posibilidad del pensamiento y del lenguaje. Concebida así la filosofía davidsoniana no constituiría una victoria definitiva ante el escepticismo, sino que más bien mostraría que su posición no es obligatoria y, al menos, garantizaría una presunción de inocencia para nuestras creencias ante el reto del escéptico global. / This work examines whether it follows a refutation of scepticism from Donald Davidson's work on radical interpretation. It is argued that such a conclusion does not follow from Donald Davidson's views on thought and language, not even with the help of the so called omniscient interpreter argument. This work also rejects that such views on language and thought lead to a better result against scepticism when interpreted as a modest transcendental argument. Finally it is claimed that the best way of articulating Davidson's antisceptical strategy is as a theoretical diagnosis of scepticism in a similar vein as Michael Williams has developed in his book Unnatural Doubts. From this point of view what Davidson's philosophy would do is, on the one hand, to reproach the sceptic his adherence to representationism and, on the other hand, to defend an alternative to this philosophical view that explains how thought and language are possible. Conceived of in this way, Davidson's philosophy would not constitute a definitive victory against scepticism. However it would show that scepticism is not compulsory and, at the very least, it would guarantee a presumption of innocence for our beliefs when they face the sceptical threat.

The purpose of this thesis is to give an account of the significance of time in Kant&rsquo / s Critique of Pure Reason by discussing its role in the unification of sensibility and understanding. I primarily investigate the role that time plays in the constitution of objective knowledge. I discuss that since time is the necessary condition for objects to be given to our sensibility, without it any representation would be without a temporal order and perhaps would not make any sense at all. Kant claims that it is imagination that enables the connection between sensibility and understanding possible. After investigating the relation between imagination and time, I argue for the following thesis: what lies at the very heart of the possibility of the connection between sensibility and understanding must be time itself. Finally, I focus on the kinship between time and the self. I argue that when it comes to knowledge of the phenomenal world, time together with transcendental self stands as the condition of all human knowledge.

The main research work in this thesis is to organize the intersubjectivity of Husserl¡¦s theory and to study the two documents of ¡§Ideas II¡¨ and ¡§Cartesian Meditations¡¨ which translate and reorganize the part of intersubjectiveity. The author talks about the ¡§Cartesian Meditations¡¨ first, the late publication, then ¡§Ideas II¡¨ and try to use a reverse method, form transcendental to empiricial, to explore the possibility of intersubjectivity and the trace of the phenomenology in French toward ethics and aesthetics. In addition, author organizes Schutz¡¦s criticism of intersubjectivity of the transcendental theory to contrast with the Husserl¡¦s viewpoint and poses the refutation of Schutz¡¦s criticism in the final part of this thesis. What is the possibility of intersubjectivity? This thesis itself has not been able to provide the concrete opinion. The author poses the "less then contented" as a basis of intersubjectivity, but it only retains in the appendix for the purposes of reference because of its lack of theoretical basis and the persuasiveness.

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The purpose of this qualitative transcendental phenomenological study is to describe a particular phenomenon: the lived experiences of high school teachers who were responsible for creating and teaching a senior-year English Transition Course. Moustakas’ methods, framework and data analysis guidelines, coupled with interviews using Seidman’s three-interview process, is the best procedure for achieving the research aim. Thus, the study is based upon the results of interviews of 10 high school teachers from schools within a specific geographic region who collaborated with four English faculty members from a comprehensive four-year institution within the same region, over a period of three years. It is important to capture this phenomenon, as it occurred within a time of broad educational reform and uncertainty and will allow others to understand how teachers respond to interventions designed to reduce the need for remediation in reading and writing. This research examines the following questions: (a) What is the essence of high school teachers’ experiences planning a senior-year English Transition course designed to achieve college readiness in reading and writing? Specifically, how do teachers experience planning as a result of collaborative sessions with University English faculty? Additionally, how do teachers experience planning (e.g., course goals, units of study, individual lessons) as result of their individual efforts? (b) What is the essence of the experience of teaching a senior-year English Transition course designed to achieve college readiness in reading and writing? The fundamental textural-structural synthesis revealed four common themes as well as a variety of sub-themes across all participants. Scientific terms were used as metaphors. The juxtaposition of this scientific metaphorical depiction, ostensibly at odds in a study of literacy instruction, intends to reveal the complexity of teacher experiences and the totality of external circumstances as well as internal conditions they encountered. The insights from this study may inform curriculum specialists, policy-makers, school administrators, and English teachers.

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

In this thesis the quiddity of knowledge in Kant&#039 / s critical philosophy has been investigated within the historical context of the problem. In order to illustrate the origins of the subject-matter of the dissertation, the historical background of Kant&#039 / s views on the theory of knowledge has been researched too. As a result of this research, it is concluded that Kant did not invent a new philosophical problem, but he tried to improve a decisive solution for one of the oldest question of history of philosophy i.e., &ldquo / How is synthetic a priori knowledge is possible?&rdquo / The theoretical dimension of Kant&#039 / s theory of knowledge is reserved for this purpose. The above mentioned question is not new neither for us nor for Kant, but his answer and his philosophical stand have clearly revolutionary meaning both for us and for him. This thesis claims that his stand-point not only leads to an original epoch for the theory of knowledge, but creates a serious possibility for a new ontology explicating the quiddity of knowledge.

The main concern of the thesis is the problem of reconciliation of freedom and natural causality and to investigate how Kant makes a room for freedom. Kant, firstly, in &ldquo / Analytic&rdquo / , constitutes the conditions of knowledge upon which the objective validity of the law of causality entirely rests. This process of constitution also determines the limits of experience. On the other hand, Kant, in &ldquo / Dialectic&rdquo / , postulates freedom as a noumenal cause together with the law of causality. Transcendental freedom, in this case, is a problematic concept which transcends the limits of experience, as it seems to destruct the unity of experience. However, Kant gives up neither the law of causality nor the idea of freedom, but rather he insists upon the idea that they can exist together without contradiction by asserting the distinction between phenomena and noumena as different grounds on which these two different types of causalities rest. According to Kant both are indispensable, as the former is necessary for the knowledge and the latter is absolutely needed for morality. In this context this thesis aims to explain the objective validity of natural causality which is proved in Second Analogy and the transcendental ground of the idea of freedom which is established in the solution of Third Antinomy in Kant&rsquo / s Critique of Pure Reason. And it is discussed whether Kant&rsquo / s solution of this issue is satisfactory and legitimate or not.