Est-il encore légitime de distinguer, d’une part, la « simple raison », apte à convaincre n’importe quel penseur honnête et lucide, et d’autre part, le domaine de la foi religieuse, où les différences de conviction seraient a priori irréductibles, parce que soumises à des conditions de validité sui generis? Dans quelle mesure ce « partage des voix » entre la raison et la foi, que commandait au siècle des Lumières l’« exigence de l’émancipation » ou de l’affranchissement des tutelles autoritaires (le Selberdenken, le « penser par soi-même »), est-il encore d’actualité pour nous? Les temps ne sont-ils pas mûrs pour une autre attitude de la raison philosophique par rapport à la foi religieuse, qui se proposerait de mettre en question la théorie qui opposait la raison et la révélation comme deux « sources » irréductibles de vérité? Le présent travail poursuivra trois objectifs principaux, dont la visée commune consistera à clarifier les tenants et aboutissants de la critique de la « simple raison » (reason alone) chez Charles Taylor, au regard de la totalité de son œuvre. Dans un premier temps, nous soulignerons que notre auteur récuse le paradigme épistémologique de la philosophie moderne au nom d’un paradigme herméneutique, plus sensible à la finitude langagière et historique de la raison humaine. Notre auteur reconnaît en effet au « débat herméneutique » (hermeneutical debate) une importance cruciale dans le contexte de la sécularité (ou de notre « âge séculier »), qui se caractérise par la coexistence d’une pluralité croissante de perspectives éthiques et spirituelles. Dans un deuxième temps, nous soutiendrons que ce paradigme herméneutique admet une distinction fondamentale entre deux modes de réflexion, l’argumentation transcendantale et la quête d’authenticité, et montrerons que l’argumentation transcendantale peut à son tour être comprise comme une modalité particulière de la « simple raison » dans le contexte du paradigme herméneutique. Ces deux premiers moments de nos analyses, de nature essentiellement exégétique, constitueront la majeure partie de notre thèse. Dans un troisième temps, nous examinerons la distinction entre l’argumentation transcendantale et la quête d’authenticité de façon à mettre en question les limites assignées par notre auteur à la première. Plus précisément, notre intention est de démontrer que la critique herméneutique de la simple raison proposée par Taylor présuppose elle-même la viabilité d’une « éthique transcendantale » et, par conséquent, la viabilité d’une conception transcendantale de la simple raison dans la sphère de la rationalité pratique. Cette éthique transcendantale affleure en plusieurs lieux dans son œuvre sous la forme d’un « humanisme » de type néo-aristotélicien, solidement ancré dans ses analyses des conditions d’arrière-plan inéluctables (ou transcendantales) de l’agir humain, sans toutefois être explicitement conçue et assumée en tant que telle. / Is it still legitimate to distinguish, on the one hand, ‘‘reason alone’’ or nonreligiously informed reason, whose conclusions are in principle able to satisfy any honest and lucid thinker, and on the second hand, the domain of religious faith, where differences of conviction would be a priori irreducible? Is this divide between reason and faith, which was prompted at the time of the Auflkärung by a great call to ‘‘emancipation’’ (to ‘‘think for yourself’’, Selberdenken), still relevant for us today? Are the times not ripe for another philosophical attitude in relation to religious faith, which would call into question the theory that opposed reason and revelation as two irreducible ‘‘sources’’ of truth? This dissertation will pursue three main objectives, whose common aim is to clarify the motives and implications of the critique of ‘‘reason alone’’ in Charles Taylor’s work. First, we will show that Taylor rejects the ‘‘epistemological’’ paradigm of modern philosophy in the name of a hermeneutic paradigm, more sensitive to the linguistic and historical finitude of human reason. Our author maintains, indeed, that ‘‘hermeneutical debates’’ are now obligatory in our secular age, characterized by the coexistence of a growing plurality of ethical and spiritual perspectives. Secondly, we will argue that this hermeneutic paradigm admits of a fundamental distinction between two modes of reflection, that of ‘‘transcendental arguments’’ and the ‘‘quest for authenticity’’, and will show that transcendental arguments can in turn be understood as a specific modality of ‘‘reason alone’’ in the context of the hermeneutic paradigm. These two first stages of our analysis, mainly of an exegetical nature, will constitute the major part of our dissertation. Thirdly, we will examine the distinction between transcendental arguments and the quest for authenticity, to challenge the limits assigned by Taylor to the first domain. Specifically, we intend to demonstrate that the hermeneutical critique of reason propounded by Taylor presupposes the viability of a ‘‘transcendental ethics’’ and, therefore, the viability of a transcendental conception of reason in the domain of practical rationality. This transcendental ethics emerges at several occasions in his work as a kind of neo-Aristotelian ‘‘humanism’’, firmly anchored in his analysis of the inescapable background conditions of human agency, without being explicitly recognized as such.

Submitted by Biblioteca Central (biblioteca@unicap.br) on 2018-04-10T17:39:38Z No. of bitstreams: 2 ricardo_jorge_silveira_gomes.pdf: 1120339 bytes, checksum: d28e2b53467e93c70819066ea7d75b9e (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-10T17:39:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 ricardo_jorge_silveira_gomes.pdf: 1120339 bytes, checksum: d28e2b53467e93c70819066ea7d75b9e (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-01 / The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the political practices of Pentecostal parliamentarians in the 2004 electoral process in the city of Cabo de Santo Agostinho City, Pernambuco, Brazil. We will study the social and political factors that led the Pentecostal evangelical churches to engage in the electoral process. The research started from the assumptions that the main factors that motivate such churches to engage in electoral litigation were the capacity for political influence in the exercise of the functions set forth in the Federal Constitution, as well as a tendency of plurality of positions, evidencing a greater freedom in what concerns the performance in the party political space. The questions that the research sought to answer not only relate to the identification and qualification of subjects, objects of analysis, but also aspects related to their intentions and ways of acting in the attainment of their objectives. In other words, it was tried to answer: who were the members and religious agents that competed for the positions of councilmen, in the city of Cabo de Santo Agostinho, in the Elections of 2004? What were they looking for? And how did each religious institution or candidate organized theirselfs to attract the votes of the faithful? The methodological paths followed were the readings of the specialized bibliography, the documentary research related to the political and religious trajectory of the characters that were successful in the elections, in public offices of the Legislative Power. / O propósito dessa dissertação é investigar as práticas políticas dos parlamentares pentecostais no pleito eleitoral de 2004 no município do Cabo de Santo Agostinho. São estudados os fatores sociais e políticos que levaram as igrejas evangélicas pentecostais a se engajarem no pleito eleitoral. A pesquisa partiu dos pressupostos de que os principais fatores que motivam tais igrejas a se engajarem nos pleitos eleitorais foram a capacidade de influência política no exercício das funções previstas na Constituição Federal, assim como uma tendência de pluralidade de posicionamentos, evidenciando uma maior liberdade no que diz respeito à atuação no espaço político partidário. As questões que a pesquisa buscou responder atrelam não só à identificação e qualificação dos sujeitos, objetos de análise, mas também aos aspectos relacionados às suas intenções e aos modos de atuação no alcance de seus objetivos. Em outras palavras buscou-se responder: quem eram os membros e agentes religiosos que concorreram aos cargos de vereadores, no município do Cabo de Santo Agostinho, nas Eleições de 2004? O que eles buscavam? E como cada instituição religiosa ou candidato se organizou para atrair os votos dos fiéis? Os caminhos metodológicas percorridos foram as leituras da bibliografia especializada, a pesquisa documental referente à trajetória política e religiosa dos personagens que lograram êxito nos pleitos eleitorais, em cargos públicos do poder legislativo.

Ce mémoire a pour objectif de cibler l’un des rapports possibles entre psychologie et philosophie, à travers la lecture que fait Carl Gustav Jung des textes d’Emmanuel Kant. La théorie de la connaissance de Kant, telle que présentée dans sa Critique de la raison pure, apparaît comme étant l’un des piliers philosophiques à la base des développements conceptuels jungiens. Le psychiatre l’a affirmé à plusieurs reprises, notamment dans son ouvrage autobiographique (Carl Gustav Jung, Ma vie, 1963). Il sera question, d’une part, d’évaluer la position scientifique de Jung en tant que construite à partir de celle proposée par Kant. Entre idéalisme et empirisme, Jung semble vouloir se frayer une place dans la science à la manière de l’idéalisme allemand. D’autre part, ce sera l’occasion d’étudier les structures élaborées par Jung, notamment l’inconscient collectif et les archétypes, qui selon lui, sont analogues à certains concepts de Kant tel que la chose en soi et les catégories a priori. Enfin, c’est à travers l’individuation, processus central de la recherche jungienne, que nous tenterons de comprendre de quelle façon les structures se dynamisent et peuvent faire écho à la dialectique de la Raison pure tel que présentée par Kant. Il sera dès lors possible de situer la psychologie analytique de Jung entre esthétique et éthique, telle une théorie éthique s’élaborant à même le développement du Soi. / This dissertation aims to target one of the possible relationships between psychology and philosophy, through Carl Gustav Jung's reading of Immanuel Kant's texts. Kant's theory of knowledge as presented in his Critique of Pure Reason appears to be one of the philosophical pillars at the basis of Jungian conceptual developments. The psychiatrist affirmed this on several occasions, notably in his autobiographical work (Carl Gustav Jung, Ma vie, 1963). To do so, on the one hand, we will evaluate Jung's scientific position as constructed from the one proposed by Kant. Between idealism and empiricism, Jung seems to want to make his own way in science like the manner of German idealism. On the other hand, it will be the occasion to study the structures elaborated by Jung, in particular the collective unconscious and the archetypes, which, according to him, are analogous to certain Kant’s concepts such as the thing in itself and the a priori categories. Finally, it is through individuation, the central process of Jungian research, that we will try to understand how structures are dynamized and can echo the dialectic of Pure Reason as presented by Kant. It will then be possible to situate Jung's analytical psychology between aesthetics and ethics, as an ethical theory formulated within the development of the Self.

I interpret and defend Kant's criticism of traditional metaphysics and his indirect proof of transcendental idealism in the first Critique's Antinomy of Pure Reason. Throughout my thesis, I focus on the role of the principle "P2" in the Antinomy ("If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is given"). I first defend Kant's use of the principle to motivate the proofs of the Thesis and Antithesis arguments in the second antinomy, which concerns composition, and the third antinomy, which concerns causality. I then explain how the role of P2 in the proofs exposes Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism to a significant challenge, to which I develop a response. Finally, I pose the question of whether Kant ultimately argues that the unconditioned exists, or whether he argues that it is merely possible that the unconditioned exists. I explore both options and outline avenues for further consideration of this question, which I argue is crucial to understanding Kant's critical project.

The purpose of this study is to assess the cogency of Francis Schaeffer‘s apologetic in light of John Frame‘s triperspectival epistemology, giving special attention to the existential perspective evident throughout Schaeffer‘s trilogy. The study achieves this aim by employing the instrumental case study method to meet five specific objectives. First, the study determines the extent to which Schaeffer‘s existential perspective is recognized within the apologetic literature that critically engages with his ideas. Based on these sources, the study determines that this perspective is recognized in Schaeffer‘s work but not as an integral component within a broader perspectival approach to apologetics. Second, the study discovers the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism may be used in analyzing apologetic systems to reveal their strengths, weaknesses and cogency. By giving attention to Frame‘s system as a meta-apologetic, it is evident that this tool is applicable to Schaeffer and to other apologists. This establishes Frame‘s perspectivalism as an appropriate theoretical model to use in an instrumental case study on apologetics. Third, the study analyzes the ways in which Frame‘s triperspectivalism is reflected in Schaeffer‘s trilogy, highlighting the existential perspective. Meeting this objective establishes the central theoretical argument of the study, showing that Frame‘s epistemology reveals the underlying cogency of Schaeffer‘s apologetic credibly (?) and does so most profoundly with respect to the existential perspective. Fourth, the study compares Schaeffer‘s existential perspective with that of E.J. Carnell and secular existentialism, which both apologists confronted. On the basis of Carnell‘s critique of existentialism and his existential apologetic of personal rectitude, credible support is offered for Schaeffer‘s engagement with this philosophical movement and his own existential perspective. Fifth, support is offered for the current relevance of Schaeffer‘s apologetic of personal rectitude by showing how the postmodern situation he anticipated is best addressed using the apologetic tools he offers. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Dogmatics))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2012

The purpose of this paper is to define and develop a set of functions of an area in such a manner as to be analogous to the trigonometric and the hyperbolic functions.

It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate the nature of Thoreau's use of organic imagery by tracing recurrent symbols that represent key concepts and provide unity and coherence throughout Walden. By charting the patterns of imagery in Walden, one can observe Thoreau's movement from an initially pessimistic view of man's present state to one of transcendental optimism and hope for freedom in the future.

L'idée de transcendantal, selon son inventeur E. Kant, doit être conçue comme la condition pure et préalable de toute expérience possible. Mais, pour G. Deleuze, une telle idée de transcendantal implique deux défauts fondamentaux : d'une part, elle n'est pas susceptible de rendre compte de la singularité de l'expérience réelle et sensible ; d'autre part, elle présuppose illégitimement qu'il existe un rapport de ressemblance entre le transcendantal qui est la condition et l'empirique qui est le conditionné. Ayant l'ambition de renouveler l'idée de transcendantal en dépassant ces deux limites foncières du transcendantalisme kantien, Deleuze élabore son propre empirisme transcendantal qui détermine le principe générateur du sensible singulier comme la différence d'intensité et définit la condition transcendantale non-semblable comme la différence de virtualité. La différence d'intensité et la différence de virtualité sont respectivement les objets des deux parties de l'empirisme transcendantal qui sont l'esthétique impliquante et la dialectique problématique. De plus, la différence d'intensité et la différence de virtualité, toutes les deux sont les multiplicités qui s'opposent à la simplicité de l'essence de la métaphysique traditionnelle. Et la théorie deleuzienne de la multiplicité complètement différenciée et absolument infinie trouve son origine de la philosophie de Spinoza qui se déploie à travers trois moments qui sont la substance en tant que Multiplicité suprême, l'attribut en tant que multiplicité intensive, et le mode existant en tant que multiplicité extensive. / The idea of transcendental, according to its inventor I. Kant, should be conceived as the pure and priori condition of any possible experience. However, for G. Deleuze, such an idea of transcendental involves two fundamental flaws: on the one hand, it cannot explain the singularity of the real and sensible experience; on the other hand, it presupposes illegitimately that there exists a relation of resemblance between the transcendental qua condition and the empirical qua conditioned. Having the ambition of renewing the idea of transcendental by surpassing these two limits of the Kantian transcendentalism, Deleuze elaborates his own transcendental empiricism which determines the generic principal of singular sensible as the difference of intensity and defines the non-ressemblable transcendental condition as the difference of virtuality. The difference of intensity and the difference of virtuality are respectively the objects of the two parts of the transcendental empiricism that are the implicating aesthetics and the problematic dialectics. Furthermore, both the difference of intensity and the difference of virtuality are the multiplicities which oppose to the simplicity of the essence of the traditional metaphysics. And the Deleuzian theory of the completely differentiated and absolutely infinite multiplicity finds its origin in Spinoza's philosophy which extends itself through three moments that are the substance qua supreme Multiplicity, the attribute qua intensive multiplicity, and the existing mode qua extensive multiplicity.

Ce travail prend en examen le rapport, du point de vue phénoménologique, entre les notions de temps et de vie, et leur implications transcendantales. À ce but les recherches exposées ici se présentent comme l’étude, plus thématique que historiographique, et le développement de questions qui s’appuient sur le noyau profond de l’oeuvre husserlienne, bien que pas toujours directement abordées par Husserl lui-même. Notre thèse consiste à reconsidérer le statut du transcendantal depuis l’articulation entre la vie et le temps, c’est-à-dire entre la vie et la mort, en interprétant par cela toute l’évolution de la philosophie occidentale, qui s’est significativement déroulée sous le signe de la mort socratique. Husserl donne l’impression d’osciller entre la nécessité de distinguer la vie, en tant que détermination transcendantale, de la temporalité, relative à la dimension du constitué, et leur assimilation, dans la mesure où il reconnaît à une certain type de temporalité une originarité constituante et absolue. En d’autres mots, la tentative de définir la vie tombe sur la même ambiguïté qui émerge déjà à l’époque des Zeitvorlesungen à propos de la conscience absolue: tout comme le seuil entre temporalité constituante et temporalité constituée devient mince et perméable, de même façon celui entre vie et temporalité s’estompe en ce que Husserl appelle Vor-Zeitigung et pour laquelle «nous n’avons pas de noms». Il en va de la possibilité de penser la vie sans la réduire à une détermination physique ou biologique, en évitant tout naturalisme (ce qui ne signifie pas son complet discrédit), et de faire ressortir la priorité du sens toujours impliquée par la temporalité, sans pour autant la connecter à une détermination psychologiste. / This work takes into consideration the relationship, as in a phenomenological perspective, between the notions of time and life, and their transcendental implications. To this aim, here is presented a research coping with the study, thematic more than historiographic, and with the development of those issues that, even if not always tackled as such by Husserl himself, deal with the deeper core of Husserlian oeuvre. This dissertation reconsiders the status of the transcendental after the articulation between life and time, that is to say, between life and death, interpreting in this light the whole evolution of Western philosophy, significantly unwound under the sign of Socrates’ death.Husserl gives the impression to swing back and forth between the necessity of distinguishing life, as transcendental determination, and temporality, inasmuch as related to the dimension of the constituted, and their assimilation, insofar as he acknowledges to a certain type of temporality a constituent and absolute originarity. In other words, the attempt to define life meets the same ambiguity already emerged at the time of the Zeitvorlesungen about the absolute conscience: as the threshold between constituent and constituted temporality grows thinner and more permeable, that between life and temporality softens in what Husserl calls Vor-Zeitigung and that «we have no names [for]». Two issues are here at stake: on one hand, the possibility to think life without reducing it to a physical or biological determination, shying away from any naturalism (which does not entail its complete disrepute); on the other, the chance to consider life without connecting it to a psychologistic understanding, as the link with temporality would imply, though preserving, instead, the priority of sense.

Le projet le plus général de Deleuze consiste en ceci : penser les conditions de l’expérience réelle, expérimenter les conditions de la pensée pure. Ce projet ne sera pleinement accompli qu’au début des années 1990, hors du cadre chronologique de notre étude (1953-1970). Nous soutenons la thèse que ce projet général non seulement repose sur un système philosophique précis, mais aussi qu’il se confond avec lui. Ce système se présente chez Deleuze sous différents noms : empirisme transcendantal, philosophie de l’expression, philosophie de la différence et de la répétition, logique du sens ou encore philosophie critique. Sous ces noms, nous croyons que c’est la philosophie comme système de l’expérience qui est en jeu. Deleuze n’oppose pas le système et l’expérience. Si la philosophie de Spinoza a longtemps été lue comme un système sans empirie, celle de Deleuze a surtout été interprétée comme un empirisme sans système. Certaines de ses déclarations nous invitent pourtant à penser autrement : le système n’est pas plus une construction logique abstraite que l’expérience n’est une réalité irréductible au système. La philosophie ne s’oppose donc pas à l’expérience chez Deleuze, elle en pense les conditions systématiques et elle est elle-même une expérience. C’est la genèse et la structure de cette philosophie que nous avons tenté de dégager dans cette recherche. Nous avons cru pouvoir montrer, non pas que le système et l’expérience sont une seule et même chose chez Deleuze, mais que la philosophie prétend atteindre au point où ils passent l’un dans l’autre. / The most general project of Deleuze consists in thinking the conditions of real experience, experimenting the conditions of pure thought. This project will only be eventually accomplished at the beginning of the nineties, that is to say after the period set for of our study (1953-1970). We defend the thesis that this general project is based upon a precise philosophical system, and above all, that it merges with it. This system, in Deleuze’s work, appears under different names: transcendental empiricism, philosophy of expression, philosophy of difference and repetition, logic of sense, or also critical philosophy. Under those names, we believe that philosophy as a system of experience is what is at stake. Indeed, Deleuze doesn’t oppose system and experience. If Spinoza’s philosophy has long been read as a system without an empiric dimension, that of Deleuze has mostly been interpreted as a non systematic empiricism. Yet some of his assertions lead us to think differently: the system is no more an abstract logical construction than experience is a reality irreducible to a system. Deleuze’s philosophy isn’t opposed to experience, it sets its systematic conditions and it is an experience in itself. It is the genesis and the structure of this philosophy that we have tried to expose in this research. Through this work, we believe we’ve managed to show that system and experience are not one and the same thing for Deleuze, but that philosophy claims it reaches the point where they become indiscernible.